Nuclear risk reduction strategy for NATO.

There is no conventional military threat to NATO or to Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, thousands of nuclear weapons on hair trigger alert remain poised to destroy the industrialized world in an hour. In this article, excerpted from a longer report entitled "A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO," the British American Security Information Council argues that NATO should adopt a comprehensive nuclear risk reduction strategy.

There are six essential steps that NATO needs to take to begin the process of reducing and eliminating the risks posed by nuclear weapons to Europe:

1. Commit to and take programmatic action toward the rapid global elimination of nuclear weapons;

2. Reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons;

3. Halt NATO's first-use policy;

4. Store or eliminate all non-strategic nuclear weapons and relinquish the option of nuclear weapons use by non-nuclear-weapon states;

5. Initiate a European Co-operative Threat Reduction Program;

6. Issue a declaration reaffirming, as an Alliance, the commitments its members have made in other international treaties and texts.

These steps outline a comprehensive nuclear risk reduction strategy for NATO. The list begins with the most important and broadest steps, and proceeds to less far-reaching initiatives. Most importantly, the last five steps would all follow from a sincere undertaking of the first.

Commit to and take programmatic action toward the rapid elimination of nuclear weapons

The five nuclear-weapon states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) legally committed themselves to nuclear disarmament by joining the Treaty (1968), Article VI of which states

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Treaty parties strengthened that commitment at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. That document called for a "programme of action" that included the "determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons." In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice reconfirmed this commitment. The Court unanimously found that there is an "obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international controls."

The need for a commitment to complete elimination is clear. The high-level Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, convened by the Australian government (1996), emphasized the importance of this step:

This commitment would change instantly the tenor of debate, the thrust of war planning, and the timing or indeed the necessity for modernization programs. It would transform the nuclear weapons paradigm from the indefinite management of a world fraught with the twin risks of the use of nuclear weapons and further proliferation, to one of nuclear weapons elimination.

More recently, in June 1998, eight nations led by Ireland issued a call for rapid progress on nuclear disarmament. The eight nations - Ireland, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden - sought "a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability" from both the nuclear-weapon states and the nuclear-weapon-capable states.

The June declaration led to a UN First Committee and General Assembly resolution. Despite heavy pressure from France, the UK and the US to vote against the resolution, every non-nuclear-weapon state in NATO except Turkey abstained. The first operative paragraph of the resolution called on the nuclear-weapon states to make an "unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination" of their nuclear arsenals. The resolution originally contained a call to consider "undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons." (United Nations 1998a) In a successful effort to gain support from NATO members, it was changed to call for consideration of "measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines." (United Nations 1998b)

Study on elimination

NATO, in line with those commitments, and the commitments already made by the nuclear-weapon states in the Alliance, should undertake studies on elimination. Such a study was recommended by a Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly chaired by British Conservative Sir Peter Emery. NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) should begin a comprehensive examination of the steps and requirements to reach elimination. This should consider a broad range of options for reaching zero, as well as verification measures needed to maintain that status indefinitely.

Together or in parallel with the NPG, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) should conduct a study examining the requirements and steps needed to reach the elimination of nuclear weapons, highlighting contributions that each Alliance member and Russia can make. Important topics that need to be researched include: the transition from low numbers of weapons to zero, permanent maintenance of the verification regime; storage and/or destruction of nuclear materials, and how to handle break-out if it occurs.

The PJC already has a working group on nuclear weapons that has three items on its agenda. Two of these items - tactical nuclear weapons and President Yeltsin's statement on de-alerting nuclear weapons - should be included among the next steps in the disarmament process as a whole. Adding a fourth item on elimination of nuclear weapons provides a comprehensive and necessary overview.

The mere existence of this working group as it is currently set up demonstrates that nuclear-weapon states are willing to discuss disarmament issues in a multilateral forum, even one that includes non-nuclear-weapon states. The same states object to discussions in the UN or other fora that include non-nuclear-weapon states.

Reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons

NATO has already taken steps to reduce the alert status of some nuclear systems, particularly for tactical weapons. Thousands of warheads have been completely withdrawn and are being destroyed or stored in the United States. Aircraft no longer sit on Quick Reaction Alert, with their electronics preheated and loaded with nuclear weapons, ready for immediate take-off.

The UK Strategic Defence Review announced that Trident submarines will now be "routinely at a `notice to fire' measured in days rather than the few minutes' quick reaction alert sustained throughout the Cold War." (UK Government 1998) Details are not available on how this `notice to fire' status was implemented. Comments from UK officials indicate this is an operational or procedural change, rather than a technical one. Crews will not constantly be on stand-by alert, and there will be less emphasis on being in constant communication. As a safety measure to reduce the likelihood of accident or miscalculation, this step is praiseworthy.

To expand this step, NATO should declare that there is no requirement for maintaining its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force on high alert. Up until the UK announcement of this policy, both British and US nuclear submarine forces were maintained at the same level of alert as they were during the Cold War. Given the lack of threat of massive attack, the US should join the UK in de-alerting its submarine-based forces. NATO should then endorse and promote this as a step to reduce the risks associated with maintaining a high level of alert. The 1995 incident, when Russian officials mistook the launch of a US weather rocket off Norway for a SLBM launch, demonstrated those risks all too well.

Further steps

More far reaching steps are also possible, including removing warheads from delivery vehicles and ending the permanent patrol of submarines. The US has already committed, with Russia, to early deactivation of weapons that both countries will destroy under the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty. Deactivation steps can also serve as de-alerting steps. All three NATO states should take steps to reduce the alert status of their nuclear weapons, and develop ways to make that status verifiable.

However, de-alerting should not be seen as a substitute for further disarmament. It is merely one step to reduce the immediate danger of accidental, inadvertent or mistaken nuclear launch. The ultimate goal must remain the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Store or eliminate all non-strategic nuclear weapons and relinquish the option of nuclear weapons use by non-nuclear-weapon states

NATO is extremely concerned about Russian tactical weapons. The number, location, and status of the Russian tactical weapons are unknown; Russia's ability to maintain command and control of its arsenal is, by most accounts, deteriorating; and a sharp downturn in Russian stability is still possible. These concerns, combined with Russian awareness that its tactical forces are deteriorating even faster than its strategic arsenal, were the driving factors in the language on tactical nuclear systems in the 1997 Helsinki agreements outlining a framework for a proposed START III treaty. The deterioration of its conventional forces drove Russian doctrinal changes and increased reliance on forward basing of tactical nuclear forces. NATO enlargement exacerbated this concern. NATO should make strenuous efforts in the talks concerning the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty to reduce Russian concerns by cutting the Alliance's conventional forces, and enhancing related confidence-building measures.

NATO should support two separate options for reducing and eliminating tactical nuclear weapons: include tactical nuclear weapons in START III, and take reciprocal unilateral steps by Russia and the US to reduce nuclear weapons. Both options need to be considered and pursued as appropriate.

Ending the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would also end the most provocative aspect of NATO's nuclear sharing: the preparations for and the possible use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states during times of war.

End nuclear training programs and remove infrastructure

Thus, along with withdrawing US nuclear weapons, NATO should stop training pilots from non-nuclear-weapon states for nuclear missions and remove all associated infrastructures for those states' territories. As NATO recently made clear, nuclear weapons' "fundamental purpose is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war." (Defence Planning Committee/Nuclear Planning Group 1998) The military role for US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe is absolutely minimal. There is no need for forward deployment, and the political costs far outweigh the benefits. The withdrawal of such weapons would neither weaken US commitment to Europe, nor encourage Russian military adventurism.

Halt NATO's first-use policies

As the UK stated in its Strategic Defence Review (UK Government 1998):

[T]he collapse of Communism and the emergence of democratic states throughout Eastern Europe and in Russia means that there is today no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe. Nor do we foresee the re-emergence of such a threat.

NATO conventional forces in Europe are vastly superior to any conceivable threat, including the slim possibility of a reconstituted Russian army. For these reasons, the two nuclear-weapon states in Europe and NATO should declare no-first-use policies.

In practice, any state which used nuclear weapons would gravely damage its national interests and position, generating massive international and public opposition. The political and economic cost of being the first to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state would be particularly high. In the present environment, any NATO state that did so would become a pariah, shunned by the international community.

NATO needs to translate its 1990 commitment only to use nuclear weapons as a last resort into a military doctrine that precludes first-use. It is inconceivable, in all but the most extreme circumstances, that a non-nuclear-weapon state could mount a conventional attack that would threaten the existence of a nuclear-weapon state.

Furthermore, any use of nuclear weapons, especially first-use, would damage the international non-proliferation regime permanently. Further use of nuclear weapons would be seen as an option, and dozens of states would reconsider their non-nuclear status.

Militarily, there is increasing recognition that nuclear weapons are ineffective in achieving strategic objectives. US General Colin Powell (1995) revealed that although the military considered nuclear use, no viable option could be found during the 1991 Gulf War.

It is difficult to envisage circumstances in which it would be in NATO's interest to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. The question would put extreme pressure on the Alliance, as member states would have differing ideas about whether nuclear use was appropriate or not.

Chemical and biological weapons

One scenario frequently suggested for using nuclear weapons is to respond, or even pre-empt, the use of chemical or biological weapons. Former Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Command General Lee Butler describes using nuclear weapons as a solution to chemical or biological attack as an "outmoded idea." According to Butler: "Conventional retaliation would be far more proportionate, less damaging to neighbouring states and less horrific for innocent civilians." (Smith 1997)

Following reports of the recent German initiative on first use, General Butler (1998) sent a letter to NATO Defence Ministers. In it, he wrote:

[W]hatever the utility of a First Use policy during the Cold War, it is entirely inappropriate to the new global security environment; worse, it is counterproductive to the goal of nonproliferation and antithetical to the values of democratic societies.

In addition, planning for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states undermines the security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon states signatories to the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. The discussion on security assurances at the 1998 meeting on the future of the NPT highlighted the continued importance placed on this issue by non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states to provide any additional guarantees.

Finally, as noted before, to rely on nuclear weapons is to rely on a weak instrument. The dangers of scenarios "requiring" nuclear use pale in comparison to scenarios where political issues preclude that option. These latter, true worst case scenarios should encourage risk reduction strategies and non-nuclear responses.

Initiate a NATO Co-operative Threat Reduction Program

NATO should create an integrated Co-operative Threat Reduction Program, designed to parallel and add to the US Nunn-Lugar program. The program could assist in:

* safeguarding nuclear weapons-capable materials and knowledge;

* strengthening Russian export control regimes;

* strengthening safety and security at nuclear facilities;

* handling and converting of excess nuclear weapons materials; and,

* contributing to disarmament.

Its budget should equal or exceed the US Co-operative Threat Reduction Program. Such a program would be a logical development of existing co-operation in the non-proliferation field. It would be supported by the vast majority of the non-nuclear-weapon states throughout the world. The creation of such a program would also give great depth and substance to the NATO-Russia partnership.

Issue a declaration reaffirming, as an alliance, the commitments its members have made in other international treaties and texts

NATO member states are parties to an impressive array of international treaties and conventions. On the nuclear front, the most important of these is the NPT. Non-nuclear-weapon state members of the NPT are committed not to obtain nuclear weapons; nuclear-weapon states are committed to pursue nuclear disarmament, to not provide nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states, and to provide access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

In 1995, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, those commitments were strenghened, particularly the pledge to disarmament. Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament sets out a program of action for nuclear disarmament. The 1996 agreement on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was an important achievement from that program. However, NATO has not outlined its program for "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally," as called for in Principles and Objectives (1995).

To strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, to reassure other states of the sincerity of their commitments, and to reflect the new security order, NATO member states should, as an Alliance, issue a declaration reaffirming their NPT commitments.

NATO should also adopt a policy concerning nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, based on the resolution adopted by the NPT Review and Renewal Conference in 1995.

Excerpted from "A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO," BASIC Research Report 99.1, Julianne Smith and Martin Butcher, eds., January 1999, published by the British American Security Information Council (1900 L Street NW, Suite 401, Washington, DC 20036, http://www.basicint.org).

References

Australian Government 1996, Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August (http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html).

Butler, General Lee, USAF (Retired) 1998, letter to NATO Secretaries of Defence, 10 December.

Defence Planning Committee & Nuclear Planning Group 1998, "Final Communique," Press Release M-DPC/NPG-1(98)72, NATO, 11 June (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-072e.htm).

International Court of Justice 1996, "Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons: Request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations," Communique No. 96/23, 8 July.

Powell, C. 1995, My American Journey, Random House, New York.

Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 1995, NPT/Conf.1995/32 (Part 1).

Smith, R.J. 1997, "The Dissenter," Washington Post, 7 December.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968.

United Kingdom Government 1998, The Strategic Defence Review, July (http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/index.htm).

United Nations 1998a, Resolution A/C. 1/53/L.48*, 27 October.

United Nations 1998b, Resolution 53/77Y, 3 December.