Nuclear arms: positions of the 'Super-Powers'.

USSR: The United States was speeding up the arms race in many areas of the world in an attempt to attain military superiority and attain first-strike capability. The Soviet Union had never sought military superiority and would in no circumstances permit others to have military superiority over it. The United States was justfying its development and production of new armaments as "bargaining chips" in negotiations. The notion of arming in order to disarm was absurd.

The higher the level of military opposition and confrontation, even where there was a strategic balance, the less stable and more uncertain that balance was. Thus a greater potential existed for sliding into a nuclear war. The United States had selected 40,000 targets in the USSR for nuclear attack. It intended to allocate $2 trillion to the arms race over the next five years, $450 billion of which was for preparations for a nuclear war.

Although the United States had allegedly been "passive" regarding an arms buildup during the past 15 years, it actually had equipped its strategic forces with multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); it had added to its forces new Minuteman-3 missiles, Poseidon C-3s, Trident 1s and 2s, increasing the number of nuclear warheads by 2.5 times. The greater accuracy of Poseidon C-3 and Minuteman-3 systems had further increased United States strike capacity.

Work was also being carried out on nuclear submarines armed with new Ohio-type missiles, B-1 and Stealth bombers, armament-strategic cruise missiles, the neutron bomb, the cosmic laser beam and radiological and chemical weapons and on developing nuclear weapons of a new generation. American strategic potential and forward-based systems in Europe were to be expanded with the addition of medium-range nuclear missiles, cruise missiles and Pershing 2s. The overall number of strategic nuclear warheads was to increase from 15,000 to 20,000 by 1990.

United States: It sought only to restore a stable military balance, assure deterrence and reduce the risk of war. It found unacceptable a perpetuation of the present situation, in which it was compelled to maintain a large strategic arsenal, and favoured "a more stable strategic balance at much lower levels of armaments".

Effective deterrence and arms control had been difficult to achieve because of the Soviet weapons buildup over the last decade. Since 1972, Soviet nuclear weapons had increased threefold. An estimated 12 to 14 per cent of Soviet GNP was devoted to defence, as compared to 8 per cent in the United States.

The West had unilaterally retired more than 1,000 nuclear warheads in Europe since 1979. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided in October 1983 to withdraw 1,400 more nuclear warheads over the next several years, bringing to 2,400 the total to be removed from Europe since 1979, and reducing NATO's stockpile to its lowest level in 20 years. One old warhead would be removed for each Pershing-2 or ground-launched cruise missile deployed.

By contrast, the Soviets had increased its missiles in Europe, deploying SS-20 missiles at the rate of one per week in recent years. Its missile force had expanded on all levels. At least three new SS-20 bases were under construction east of the Urals, in addition to the already deployed 351 operational SS-20 launchers, comprising 1,053 warheads. Large numbers of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles had been retained. New, more accurate shorter-range missile systems--the SS-21, 22 and 23--were being deployed.

Since the mid 1960s, the United States stockpile quantity had declined considerably. The number of nuclear weapons in its total inventory was one third less now than in 1967; some 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons were deployed now than in the late 1960s; its total megatonnage was one fourth of the 1960 total.

USSR: It advocated the immediate and specific elaboration of a nuclear disarmament programme leading to the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapons. It favoured the maintenance of the approximate strategic military equilibrium existing in Europe and on a global scale between the Warsaw Treaty Organizations (WTO) and NATO.

The Soviet Union would seek reduction and limitation of farms on the basis of the existing equilibrium so that approximate parity at any given moment would be maintained at an increasingly lower level. Strict compliance with the principle of equality and equal security had to be made.

It had proposed a declaration on the condemnation of nuclear war and consideration of specific measures to prevent nuclear war and to promote a cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament, with the aim of eliminating nuclear stockpiles and, ultimately, the risk of nuclear war.

The Soviet Union had undertaken unilaterally an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. It favoured treaties on non-use of force in international relations and on mutual non-use of force between countries of WTO and NATO. It also proposed a treaty on non-use of force in outer space.

Nuclear-weapon Powers had to adhere strictly to a defensive doctrine, which was the doctrine underlying the building of the Soviet armed forces, including their nuclear components. Preventive wars and concepts of pre-emptive nuclear strikes were alien to Soviet military doctrine.

Those who did not wish to condemn nuclear war used the word "verification" as a kind of safety valve to block the process of disarmament. The Soviet Union had proposed effective measures of verification which corresponded to the specific needs of each particular agreement on limiting the arms race and on genuine disarmament.

United States: A nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. The United States was committed to reducing nuclear arms and to negotiating in good faith towards that end. It had already reduced the number of its nuclear weapons worldwide. Replacement of older weapons was unavoidable, but it wished to negotiate genuine arms reductions. It favoured equitable, verifiable, militarily significant arms control agreements that would stabilize forces at significantly lower levels than currently existed and would adopt a flexible approach in seeking that end.

Sweeping and unverifiable declarations of intent must not be confused with effective arms control. "We must not be lured by agreements which might appear appealing, but on reflection do not really serve the goals for which they are intended." The United States had serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements already negotiated.

Effective arms control would take time and patience. Attempts of the United States and its allies to maintain an effective deterrent and military balance were essential for stability in the world and an incentive for the arms control process. The United States had pursued programmes to strengthen defences and redress imbalances that had come about over the past decade. These programmes would provide strong incentives for the Soviet Union to negotiate for genuine arms control.

United States: A longer-range intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) imbalance in Europe raised the risk of conflict in that region and thus of a general nuclear conflict. Since 1979, NATO had pursued the twin goals of restoring the INF balance in Europe, which had been increasingly disturbed as a result of the Soviet Union's SS-20 deployments, by preparing to deploy its own INF assets, if that was the only way to restore stability, and of conducting negotiations to eliminate the need for such deployments.

The key objective was to restore a European balance, which did not at present exist, and to do so at the lowest feasible force levels. For the past several years, the Soviet Union had periodically claimed that a balance already existed, and then proceeded with further SS-20 deployments. Between 1979 and 1983, it had increased the number of its long-range INF missile warheads from 800 to 1,300, and during that time NATO did not introduce a single United States warhead of that category into Europe.

The United States proposed what it called the "zero option", describing it as the best, fairest, most practical solution to the problem. An entire class of weapons systems--the longer-range INF missiles--should be banned. The zero option would restore the longer-range INF balance by totally eliminating those forces.

An interim solution would be to reduce those missiles to some equal number on both sides between zero and 572, aiming for the lowest possible level. The Soviet Union had proposed a "half zero option"--zero for the United States, many hundreds of warheads for the Soviet Union, zero deployments for their, side, in effect perpetuating a complete Soviet monopoly in those missiles.

The United States propose that:

(1) if the Soviet Union agreed to reductions and limits on a global basis, the United States would not offset the entire Soviet global missile deployment through United States deployments in Europe, but would retain the right to deploy missiles elsewhere;

(2) the United States would consider limitation of aircraft as well as missiles; and

(3) it would be prepared to address teh "mix of missiles" that would result from reductions, and in the context of reductions to equal levels, it would be prepared to reduce the number of Pershing II ballistic missiles, as well as ground-launched cruise missiles.

The Soviet Union wanted renunciation of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and appropriate reductions in existing medium-range nuclear systems on that continent to identical levels, with regard to delivery vehicles, missiles and aircraft and the warheads carried by them. Before United States deployment of new missiles in Europe, there had been approximate equality between the Soviet Union and the United States and between WTO and NATO countries in strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear missiles and conventional armaments, which did not mean equal numbers of identical armaments. Soviet strategic forces included more land-based intercontinental missiles; the United States had an edge in the area of strategic aviation.

The Soviet Union said the United States had proposed reducing to zero the number of Soviet medium-range missiles, not only in the European but also in the eastern part of the country, while NATO would not destroy a single missile or aircraft. That would mean zero missiles for the USSR and zero reductions for NATO.

A genuine zero option would be to eliminate all medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons from Europe or, as an alternative, to renounce deployment in Europe of new medium-range missiles and reduce all existing missiles by roughly two thirds, leaving 300 missiles on the USSR and NATO sides, respectively.

It proposed equal total levels of delivery vehicles--missiles and aircraft--and of nuclear warheads carried by them. The interim solution of the United States would have the USSR reduce its medium-range nuclear arsenal and "give its blessing" to deployment of new United States missiles, existing British and French missiles, and the European forward-based systems of the United States.

Equality with regard to warheads on missiles of the Soviet Union on one hand Great Britain and France on the other had to be guaranteed. The Soviet Union wanted any agreed total armament levels to include those of British and French arsenals. The British and French systems could destroy targets on the territory of the USSR and its allies and constituted a significant component of NATO's nuclear arsenals. For several years there had been a ratio of 1:1 in terms of delivery vehicles and 1:1.4 in favour of NATO in terms of warheads.

In further statements after the suspension of the bilateral negotiations in Geneva in November, the Soviet Union said the Pershing 2 missiles could reach Soviet territory in 5 to 6 minutes, and cruise missiles were supposedly able to slip undetected through Soviet air defences. Those would thus constitute strategic first-strike weapons. The United States had refused to undertake a non-first-use obligation.

The socialist countries were thus obliged to take counter-measures to defned their security, as announced by the Soviet Union on 24 November 1983. First, the Geneva talks were suspended and obligations undertaken by the Soviet Union unilaterally revoked. Work was accelerated on deployment of operatrional-tactical missiles of an increased range in the territory of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

Since United States missiles in Europe would increase the nuclear threat to the USSR, the Soviet Union would deploy corresponding systems in ocean areas and seas, adequate to the threat posed by the American missiles in Europe. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not intend to have one single missile in excess of what the United States and NATO had overall.

Following the suspension of the talks, the United States said that even after deployments were completed, should that prove ncessary, Western countries would have fewer missiles and warheads than the Soviet Union.

The addition of short-range missiles in East Germany and Zechoslovakia, characterized as countermesures for planned NATO deployments, would have the effect of altering the balance in missiles of that catergory at a time when NATO had decided to carry out a reduction of 35 per cent. The Soviet Union's missile deployment measures seemed calculated to create an imbalance in all catergories in shorter-range and longer-range theater weapons.

The Soviet Union proposed as a first step a freeze on the strategic nuclear arsenals of both sides. Both should forego increases in the present number of missiles and the development and testing of new types and kinds of strategic arms. Both should limit to the maximum extent possible the modernization of the existing systems.

Ultimately, deep reductions of all strategic weapons should take place in the interest of enhancing over-all military strategic stability. Existing arsenals of both sides should be reduced by approximately 25 per cent, to equal levels, with a substantial cut in the number of nuclear warheads to equal agreed levels. Such a reduction would assure a military strategic balance at much lower levels and rule out the acquisition by either party of one-sided advantages or monopolies.

The Soviet Union proposed a ban on the Deployment of long-range cruise missiles and other new kinds of strategic systems. Qualitative upgrading would be strictly limited and subject to verification.

United States proposed reductions would result in the United States having 1.5 times more delivery vehicles and 3 times more nuclear warheads than the Soviet Union. By withdrawing its obsolete weapon systems from service, the United States could deploy unimpeded all its new eapons designed for first-strike nuclear capability. Its proposals were intended to adjust conditions for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) to suit its buildup programmme.

Reduction through modernization or build-down was merely a cover for buildup, as it involved replacing old nuclear weapons by new more dangerous weapons. The reduction would affect primarily land-based ICBM warheads predominant in the Soviet strategic arsenal, and to a much lesser extent would require a reduction of submarine-based warheads and strategic air forces, on which the United States relied.

The Soviet Union asked whether land-based ICBMs could be considred more destabilizing than cruise missiles or sea-based ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles had "unprecedented accuracy" and would be extremely difficult to intercept by early warning systems once alunched and their numerical strength and deployment would be difficult to monitor with national technical means. Sea-based ballisitc missiles were capable of striking from unexpected directions and with shorter flight times than ICBMs.

The Soviet Union proposed a treaty calling for a simultaneous freeze, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of all nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear-weapon delivery systems and weapons, by all States possessing them. Initially, as an exmpale to other States, the United States and USSR could institute such a freeze. The Proposed treaty calls for a renunciation of deployment of nuclear weapons of all kinds and types, a moratorium on all tests of weapons and delivery systems and cessation of the production of fissionable materials for manufacturing nuclear weapons.

The United States said it could not be satisfied with "merely capping the nuclear arms race at the current, very high levels". It wanted significant, verifiable reductions.

The United States said its objectives in START negotiations were a safer, more stable strategic balance at force levels much lower than those currently existing. In particular, it sought to remove any incentive on either side to launch a first strike.

It wanted reduction of present nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and United States by almost 50 per cent to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads; a flexible approach to reducing the disparity and destructive capability and potential of ballisitc missiles; substantial reductions in deployed ballistic missiles; and effective ferification. Present strategic arsenals not only were too high in absolute quantity but also had elements of instability in their force structure.

The goal of strategic arms control negotiations was to reduced the possible incentives to consider a nuclear first strike, a goal most effectively achieved by negotiating concrete measures affecting both the means and the incentives to carry out such a strike. Any measures had to be equitable to both sides, taking into account the asymmetries of the nuclear arsenals.

The United States had recently proposed a mutual guaranteed "build-down" of ballisitc missile warheads and a build-down of bombers, designed to encourage stabilizing systems. The so-called build-down proposal would include a provision linking modernization to reductions, using variable ratios which identify how many existing nuclear warheads must be withdrawn as new warheads of various types are deployed; and a provision calling for guaranteed annual percentage reductions. The United States had suggested as a minimum an annual reduction of 5 per cent.

The United States was also willing to discuss the "build-down" of strategic bombers and additional limitations on air-launch cruise missiles carried by United States bombers. It was willing to negotiate "trade-offs" between United States advantages in bombers and Soviet advantages in missiles in ways that would move towards a more stable balance of forces.

kIt was prepared to establish a working group in START to discuss the build-down initiative. That concept would allow a degree of latitude to both sides in determining how to carry out reductions. If the means and incentives were objectively reduced, the threshhold to nuclear conflict would have been significantly raised. Such a goal should be at the heart of any programme for preventing nuclear war.

The Soviet Union said a comprehensive nuclear test ban was long overdue. Preceding its elaboration, a moratorium on all nuclear explosions could be instituted. However, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had state that "nuclear tests are necessary for developing and modernizing warheads, for maintaining the dependability of the stockpiled arsenals and for evaluating the effect of the use of nuclear arms."

The United States said a comprehensive nuclear test ban remained a "long-term goal". It continued to seek ways effectively to verify nuclear testing limitations.

China said the arms race between the super-Powers posed a direct threat to the peace and security of all States and increased the danger of the outbreak of a new world wa. The proposals put forward by each at the bilateral talks were designed to weaken the other and maintain its own supremacy. China believed that disarmament could not be separted from the struggle to safeguard international security and oppose hegemonism; that the two super-Powers should take the lead in disarmament; that nuclear disarmament should go hand-in-hand with conventional disarmament; that small and medium-sized States were entitled to maintain their necessary forces for national defence; that disarmament agreements should include strict and effective measures for international verification; and that all States should participate on an equal footing in discussing, negotiating and supervising disarmament agreements.

China had undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use them against non-nuclear States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. If the super-Powers agreed to reduce their arsenals by half, China proposed that an international conference be held to discuss reduction of nuclear weapons by all nuclear States, to be implemented later according to a reasonable ratio and procedure, leading ultimately to the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

France favoured guarantees of stability, reduction of forces gradually to lower and lower levels, continuous monitoring of information provided and establishment of a "genuine equilibrium" between nations. A ban on use or first use of nuclear weapons would not reduce dangers threatening mankind, as intentions could not be verified, and the degree of confidence required for acceptance of such measures was "all-too clearly lacking in present-day international relations".

With regard to the strategic arsenals of the "central systems", France felt their reduction was the responsibility of the two Powers which possessed them in such excessive quantities. "This overkill capacity means that they could seek greatly reduced levels of armaments that would still be compatible with their security requirements".

The maintenance of a stable deterrent in Europe was a necessary guarantee against a nuclear or other war. The emplacement of SS-20s by the Soviet Union caused "disequilibrium" and was a "destabilizing factor". There "is not a European strategic nuclear balance distinct from the overall balance". Nuclear devices stationed in Europe could not be considered apart from the overall nuclear balance of forces. American intermediate-range missiles on

European soil stressed the solidarity existing between Europe and the United States and restored stability by strengthening deterrence. The idea that parties to the bilateral negotiations could dispose of the interest or resources of a third country without their consent was by definition untenable. The French nuclear force was independent, subject to the sole authority of the President of the Republic.

The United Kingdom said dfence forces should be sufficient to meet all reasonable defence needs, but it was determined to seek international agreements to diminish those needs. The goal was enhanced security through balanced reductions in forces. Britain wanted the elimination of all missiles of intermediate range, or an interim agreement providing for equality between the super-Powers.

The United Kingdom wanted realistic, balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament which would enhance peace and security. There was no reason why the strategic systems of non-participants in the bilateral negotiations should be included in those negotiations. Britain's force was a strategic one, representing less than 3 per cent of the strategic nuclear forces available to the United States or to the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union and United States strategic arsenals were to be substantially reduced, and if no significant changes occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would want to review its position and consider how best to contribute to arms control in view of a reduced threat.

General Assembly President Jorge E. Illueca on 20 December, in his concluding statement in plenary, posed a number of questions regarding the nuclear arms race, in the belief that "an appeal for reason and sanity from this rostrum is more urgent, more justified and more compelling than at any moment in history".

He urged the United States and th USSR to ponder the questions "which prey more and more on the minds of millions of people everywhere":

(1) How can either side now reliably determine within a few minutes whether radar reports of incoming missiles are accurate?

(2) How can the responsible decision-makers be expected under conditions of great stress and within time constraints to make well-informed and prudent judgement?

(3) How can responsible control over short-range nuclear weapons be sustained when they have been handed over to battalion commanders?

(4) Have not some incidents shown, in microcosm, the potential for destruction when a Government considers its security is under imminent threat, even by conventional means and in a lengthy time-frame?

(5) Has it not now become more likely that a single finger on a single uninterceptible missile can plunge the world into a nuclear holocaust?

(6) Considering the foregoing, is the current round of increased missile deployment truly strengthening the security of either side? Or is it not, rather, causing greater insecurity for everyone in the world?

(7) With 40,000 nuclear warheads now in existence having one million times the destructive power of the Hiroshima bomb, and both sides capable of destroying each other many times over, are present arsenals really not adequate?

(8) Has the arms race taken on a totally irrational momentum of its own going beyond the control and will of either side?

(9) Has the time not come for you to make a concentrated effort to stabilize the nuclear-arms race and to reduce the risks of conflict?