Nicaragua surprise: Sandinistas split; Somoza party gains.

In early February, Pope John Paul visited Nicaragua for the second time, bringing renewed international attention to a nation that has slipped from the limelight. In February 1990, world attention had been riveted on the election that brought Violeta Chamorro to power in an upset of the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Six years later, this October, there will be another presidential election. It has received little international attention. For Nicaragua, however, it may be as critical as the 1990 election.

In an attempt to carry forward the work of the current government, Chamorro's son-in-law, Antonio Lacayo, is running as the candidate of the newly formed National Project (PN). But the government is unpopular and his candidacy is registering less than 5 percent support in the polls. The Sandinista Front remains the leading opposition party, but it has been damaged by a split. The chief beneficiary of the troubles of both Chamorro and the FSLN has been Arnoldo Aleman, the mayor of Managua until he resigned last year to begin a campaign for the presidency. Most current polls show Aleman, head of the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC), as the clear front-runner with support of between 40 and 45 percent. His popularity is surprising since the PLC is the legacy of the dictator Anastasio Somoza, who was overthrown by the Sandinista revolution in 1979.

To understand how an heir to Somoza's brutal past stands on the verge of gaining power in Nicaragua, it is necessary to analyze the last six years. When Chamorro took office in April 1990, she promised to reverse the downward trend of the economy within one hundred days. In fact, her government almost ended then. The popular forces, responding to a call from Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega "to govern from below," took to the streets to block her program of rolling back the social and economic gains of the Sandinista period. By summer 1990, Nicaragua had gone back to a near civil-war situation with barricades in the streets of Managua. At that point FSLN leaders struck a deal with the government. It protected the FSLN from the liquidation plans of the far Right and granted legitimacy to key aspects of the Sandinista land-reform program. In return, the FSLN pulled back from its street mobilizations and acquiesced in the return of control of the Nicaraguan economy to the financial elite through privatization. Over the next three years, the FSLN engaged in virtual co-government with Chamorro's governing UNO party through an alliance in the National Assembly.

Chamorro's policies benefited the small Nicaraguan upper-middle class but failed to solve the country's primary social and economic problems. The working-poor and marginalized sectors of Nicaraguan society, the power base of the FSLN, were further impoverished. Because the FSLN was seen by many as cooperating with the government rather than acting as a forthright opposition, its fortunes sank along with those of the Chamorro government. The FSLN was also hurt by the widely held perception that its top political leaders and some officials of the Sandinista army had profited illegally during the transition period, taking possession of cars, homes, and valuable farm land, in what was known as the pinata. Tied in the popular mind to several prominent cases of corruption, the Sandinista Front began to lose the moral authority it had accrued during its years as a rebel force and the holder of state power.

The FSLN's problems were further compounded when the party underwent a formal split in 1995. A new group, the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) was formed under the leadership of former FSLN Directorate member and vice-president, Sergio Ramirez, who declared his intention to run for the presidency in 1996. The new party has only about one-tenth the membership of the FSLN, but its ranks include many prominent Sandinista intellectuals, among them former Minister of Culture Ernesto Cardenal and former National Directorate member Luis Carrion. The FSLN split may have been inevitable, given the ideological diversity of the movement; but the fissure has divided the party and the progressive forces at a dangerous time of resurgence by the right wing.

The rise of Aleman and the PLC is a complex phenomenon. While an heir to the Somoza legacy, Aleman probably does not represent a serious possibility of the return of terror and dictatorship to Nicaragua. The PLC leader's current advantage in the polls is the result of his work as the popular mayor of Managua and the population's overall disappointment with both Chamorro and the FSLN. As mayor, Aleman skillfully used large-scale public-works projects and patronage to cultivate the image of a politician "who gets things done." This image has played well in many of the neighborhoods of the capital. Initially, Mayor Aleman's rhetoric and actions against the FSLN raised the specter of a return to Somoza tyranny. He carried out provocative attacks on the FSLN, including an attempt to close down the monument to Carlos Fonseca, FSLN founder, in central Managua. But Aleman moderated his stance, conceding the reality of a core of Sandinista support in Nicaraguan society and the commitment of the overwhelming majority of Nicaraguans to political democracy. Aleman realizes that he must win the presidency through the ballot, and once in power he is likely to have little option except to rule by constitutional means. The Nicaraguan populace remains committed to democratic rule and any would-be dictator faces a popular uprising.

With a significant portion of the Nicaraguan electorate undecided, the election outcome is not preordained. The progressive forces led by the FSLN may yet find a way to unite and to craft a political message that successfully refutes the neoliberal populism of the PLC leader. Such a strategy is possible because of Aleman's identification with Somoza and the reality that his political and economic program would do little more to improve the lives of ordinary Nicaraguans than have the six years of the Chamorro government.