New liberties for Moroccan women.

the American University Law School recently hosted a speech by Lorne W. Craner, the Undersecretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. In response to a question about the hasty adoption of an anti-terrorism law and the negative impact it might have on Morocco's transition to democracy, Craner replied that the United States sells Morocco's version of democracy to Arab countries and that the United States cannot afford to have Morocco take a U-turn. Four years have elapsed since the death of King Hassan II, and his successor, Mohamed VI has recently announced the first major reforms of his reign--major revisions to the family code legislating women's status in Moroccan society.

There is a growth in democratic political movements throughout the Arab world and an increased urgency in the idea of democracy, women's emancipation, and constitutional reform. The consequences of the rise of radical Islam and the escalating targeting of innocent civilians in terrorist attacks have hastened the discussion on profound and meaningful reforms, forced a debate toward "democratization" and transparency, and provided countries such as Morocco with the opportunity to push for reforms to the family code, also known as the mudawana.

In one of his first speeches after coming to power, King Mohamed stressed the need to improve the situation of Moroccan women, who constitute half of society and whose "interests are still denied" The subjugation of women there, though limited by law and constitution, is rampant, ranging from wage discrimination to physical abuse to under-representation in administrative and political bodies. For decades, women were legally defined as dependent on men. Emboldened by the king's support, women and human rights organizations have long pushed for reforms, demanding equal rights in marriage, challenging a host of religiously sanctioned practices--from polygamy to repudiation--and requiring changes in core legislation that are blatantly discriminatory toward women and that lie at the root of women's subordination in Moroccan society.

In March 1999 then-Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi officially introduced a draft of a national plan to integrate women into economic development. The 118-page Plan d'action national pour l'integration de la femme au develeoppement" (PANIFD includes recommendations on four main strategic objectives: education, women's integration in economic development, strengthening of women's legal and political rights, and improvement of women's reproductive health. The initiative indeed mobilized civil society and made it a strong ally to the government on an issue that united them both. The Islamist reaction, however, was swift, powerful, and extremely negative. The official Islamist political party of Justice and Development (PJD) rallied over two million protesters in the streets against the plan, claiming that such laws are a blatant attack on Islam and "a Western imposition on our core values." The rally succeeded in convincing the former prime minister to shelve the initiative.

The new reforms introduced by the king in his recent speech to the parliament highlighted the same problematic issues addressed in the 1998 Plan faction. But the political context is quite different and the hopes for implementation much greater.

The new mudawana raises the minimum age for marriage from fifteen to eighteen; introduces the right for women to freely choose a spouse without prior consent of an adult male. Article 24 abolishes the wilaya, granting women the right to choose whom they marry. In the current mudawana marriage is defined as "a legal contract by which a man and a woman are united in a commune and long conjugal life" under "the direction of the husband." The new reform replaces the word husband with "under the leadership of both spouses." Gone is the Napoleonic statement that emphasized the role of the husband as the "head of the household." This is of extreme potential significance for the status of women both within the marriage and in society in general.

The new code stipulates that marriage is pronounced before a judge and no longer controlled by an Adul, a religious clerk linked with the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This is a significant reform that takes the recognition of marriage out of the hands of religious authorities. The code also declares that divorce is to be decided by a civil judge.

However, the issue of divorce remains complicated. Repudiation is no longer unilateral (by men only) but it still requires women to prove that harm has been done. Women, however, can still call for "the procedure of disunion," which allows them not to have to prove any cause but only to claim that they find it "impossible to continue living with their husbands. The code also institutes a welfare plan for divorced women and stipulates the equitable distribution of marital property in case of dissolution of the marriage.

While attempting reform, the provisions on polygamy are unclear. Rather than outlawing polygamy altogether, the code says that a man seeking to take multiple wives is required to make a request of a family judge to authorize the unions. The judge will approve the request if the judge decides the petitioner can afford to maintain more than one family and would be equitable to all. Article 42 of the draft code stipulates that, when the man makes such a request to the judge, he should include "a statement about his material situation and his financial obligations." But it isn't clear what kind of statement is required. Polygamy is outlawed if the man agreed before his first marriage not to marry another. But overall, the new code allows women to not only voice her opinion on the matter but also to decide whether she wants to stay in the marriage if a second wife is taken.

In order to undercut any unwelcome negative reaction by Islamists, the king, in his role as the "commander of the faithful," stressed that the new reforms to the family code are based on the Maliki interpretation of Islam and are mindful of women's rights in a modern society.

The bombings in Casablanca in May 2003 perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists have weakened the influence of the Islamist parties and the PJD has taken a very low profile in recent political events (including running restricted lists in local elections). The king's decision to send the family code to parliament for approval puts the PJD (the main opposition political party and the party with the third-largest representation in parliament) in the position of having to support the reforms or risk even further alienation from the electorate. The decision to bring the code before parliament is also noteworthy in that it helps to strengthen the process of democracy and helps push for widespread adoption of the new reforms. The king has called for all Moroccans to rally behind the new draft code. And thus far, even the PJD has declared that the new plan "constitutes a substantial accomplishment for the entire Moroccan people."

While the proposed reforms are welcome and have been hailed by women's groups throughout the country, given the current political context, the king could have gone much further. He could have banned polygamy altogether, addressed the rights of children born out of wedlock or born out of rape, and made reforms in the sticky issue of inheritance. But for now, Mohamed VI's reforms have still been hailed by all as a major breakthrough in the long struggle for equal rights by Moroccan women.

The success of the newly adopted code, however, is not assured. Past experience in the Arab world suggests that, while attempts for reform were initiated by heads of state or government, such reform has been frustrated when it didn't garner widespread public--and political--support. Kuwait's attempt to give women the right to vote and Jordan's attempted reform of its family code and efforts to address honor killings never materialized because the parliamentary bodies representing the public struck these reforms down.

The impact of these reforms in Morocco has far-reaching implications and could lead to a domino effect in the Muslim world. A few days after Morocco announced the new draft of the family code, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika called for establishing a new commission to tackle the Algerian family code.

Morocco needs a strong campaign by civil society and the media to support the implementation of the new code, to explain to the public what is at stake, and to gather widespread public support. Past experience shows that civil society's outreach efforts in a country with high illiteracy rates among women were lacking. New outreach and advocacy strategies should be designed. Now is the time for the civil society to stand up and grab the opportunity.

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Abderrahim Sabir is senior program associate for Human Rights Education Associates and a former in-residence director of Freedom House in Morocco.