New US Role In The Middle East - Part C - What Are The Risks?

The war on terror is progressing at multiple speeds. Phase One of the war, namely the destruction of the Taliban and the capture of its key leaders and Al Qaida chief Osama Bin Ladin, is not yet complete. But Phase Two has already begun, with the return of UN arms inspectors to Iraq. Top ranking US officials have repeatedly declared since Sept. 11, 2001, that failure is "not an option" in the war against terror. Yet failure in many aspects of the war is a distinct possibility, especially in the political sphere. Critics say the US may win the war against terror but will make new enemies in the process.

From the president down, US government officials have also stated that the war will be a long one. Speaking on April 17, 2002, at Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, President Bush said the war will not be quick and will not be easy, noting: "We're tough, we're determined, we're relentless. We will stay until the mission is done". Referring to the Middle East, he pointed out: "Every leader, every state must choose between two separate paths: the path of peace or the path of terror... Now, every nation and every leader in the region must work to end terror".

Meanwhile, Al Qaida is expanding its war against America and its allies. The US has confirmed that Bin Ladin was indeed the person whose voice was in a taped address recently delivered to Qatar's Al Jazeera TV channel by an intermediary in Pakistan; although a Swiss institute has later reported that its studies indicated that the voice was not that of the Al Qaida chief. The taped speech, defiant as always and warning of more attacks to come, has lent a new level of mystique to the man who has achieved iconic stature in the Islamic world. Coming after months of reports that he may have perished in the US bombing of the Tora Bora caves over the past year, Bin Ladin's latest address appears to have been the signal for a new spate of attacks against the interests of the US and its allies.

On Nov. 28, three strikes were directed against Israel - two in Kenya, and one involving an attack on a Likud leadership election polling station in northern Israel. Within hours, Israeli and Western commentators were linking the violence to Al Qaida - with suggestions that the attacks were sub-contracted out by the organisation to local Islamists. This followed a series of murders of Americans in the Middle East, including a nun in Lebanon and an USAID worker in Jordan.

What these events made clear is that the Al Qaida network, as well as its reputation in the Arab World, continues to grow despite the change of regime in Afghanistan, and the tough global intelligence and financial crackdown being co-ordinated by Washington. It is also clear that the Al Qaida is able to bypass the surveillance of its people and its finances to the extent that it can carry out sophisticated strikes such as the one in Bali on Oct. 12, 2002, and the ones in Kenya on Nov. 28. In that respect, the American led war on terror has been less successful than expected.

Within this geo-political context, the US is now priming the international community for the possibility of a war against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Although Iraq has agreed to the return of UN inspectors to look for weapons of mass destruction, few observers believe that Washington will allow Saddam to continue as leader of Iraq. In the Middle East, the public opinion is that pressure will be applied until the regime in Baghdad has no choice but to confront the inspectors, and the US would then resort to military action. But Washington will not get much public support in this exercise, either from its Arab allies or from members of the European Union.

In the Muslim World, suspicions of American intentions have already made things very difficult for Washington. Similar suspicions, albeit couched in more polite language, are found at the UN where the US in October and November had to engage in weeks of negotiations to get a satisfactory resolution on future dealings with Iraq. The resolution was watered down considerably from the original US proposal, with France taking credit.

For his part, Bush seems to have cornered himself over Iraq. Having raised the stakes against Saddam's regime, Bush finds himself in a position where he must remove the Iraqi leader if he is to retain his domestic political credibility as well as America's global standing. Leaving Saddam in place would amount to accepting defeat, something which Washington cannot contemplate as that would flash a green light inviting "rogue" regional leaders to follow in the Iraqi leader's approach in dealings with the US. Failure to complete Phase One of the war against terror, i.e. through the capture of Bin Ladin and the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, would invite more recruits to join Al Qaida and more aspirants to emulate the two men should they be killed in US military action.

Moreover, from the US perspective, true success in the war against terror can only be claimed when the conditions that breed terrorists in the Middle East are removed. This would be a long-term project taking possibly decades, and would be a task no less monumental than the defeat of communism. A great deal of instability can be expected before a sustainable and stable system emerges, if the US succeeds. If not, the logic of the airplane attackers of Sept. 11, 2001 would have triumphed.