New Balkan Policy Needed.

Key Points

* Recent fighting in Macedonia could represent a dangerous slide into a new Balkan conflict.

* Uncertainty over Kosovo's future remains a destabilizing factor in the Balkans.

* The potential for instability in Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina is growing.

In the aftermath of the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, instability has continued to plague the Balkan region. All the areas of the former Yugoslavia, except Serbia (having recently experienced a democratic political transition), face increasing instability.

Kosovo

In the first months after the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo in June 1999 and the Kosovar Albanian refugees returned to their homes, the minority Serbs and Gypsies became the victims of Albanian revenge attacks. The few Serbs who have remained in Kosovo live in scattered enclaves under the protection of KFOR troops. Nevertheless, sporadic violence has continued to erupt, including the bus bombing in February 2001 killing Serbs heading to a religious event. KFOR has been unable to stop the violence from spilling over Kosovo's borders to Macedonia and to Serbia's Presevo Valley region, which has a sizable ethnic Albanian minority. Meanwhile, Macedonia has closed its border with Kosovo, raising the likelihood of a serious economic crisis in Kosovo that could induce further instability there.

Macedonia

The hostilities in Macedonia began in February 2001 when ethnic Albanians began fighting Macedonian forces along the Kosovo-Macedonia border. The Albanian fighters belong to the newly formed National Liberation Army (NLA), which has sought to "liberate" the Albanian minority in Macedonia through armed struggle. Members of the NLA include extremist ethnic Albanians from both Macedonia and Kosovo, who can infiltrate Macedonian border villages (such as Tanuvsecti and Brest) by either slipping through KFOR lines in Kosovo or traversing a 3-mile buffer zone in the Presevo Valley between Kosovo and Serbia proper. In early March 2001, fighting quickly spread from the border region to the area around Tetovo, the main ethnic Albanian town in Macedonia. Bulgaria has offered Macedonia military technical assistance, and German KFOR troops in barracks near Tetovo have reinforced their positions with tanks, warning the NLA not to shoot at the German positions. The Greek foreign minister has expressed full Greek support for the Macedonian government, and NATO has recently allowed the Yugoslav Army to return to the buffer zone on Kosovo's border to help stem the flow of armed militants and weapons into northern Macedonia.

Montenegro

Border changes seem increasingly likely in the neighboring province of Montenegro, where the Montenegrin leader has spoken openly of independence or a loose confederation with Serbia. Such a development is yet another potentially destabilizing factor in the Balkans. Like Macedonia, Montenegro has an ethnic Albanian minority, and Albanian extremists could potentially take advantage of the instability in Montenegro to launch attacks against the Montenegrin authorities. In March 2001, NATO allowed Yugoslav Army troops into the Montenegrin section of the buffer zone bordering on Kosovo. This move was widely criticized by Montenegrin government officials, who over the past few years have considered the Yugoslav army to be a threat to Montenegrin autonomy. Despite Slobodan Milosevic's ouster from power in October 2000, the Montenegrins have continued to move closer to secession from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and will be holding a referendum on secession in June 2001.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

In February 2001, Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska (a Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina) signed an agreement establishing special relations. Simultaneously, the Bosnian Croats have sought to revisit the Dayton Accords and establish their own entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These developments will affect Bosnia's future constitutional status and the viability of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a truly multiethnic state. Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat policies may indicate movement toward integration with Croatia and Serbia, respectively. The demand for border changes in Bosnia also raises the potential for a return to ethnic conflict.

Given all these escalating tensions and conflicts, it is imperative for the U.S. administration to articulate a firm and comprehensive Balkan policy. Otherwise, subregional conflicts, such as the violence in Macedonia, could lead to wider war in the Balkans.

Robert D. Greenberg <[e-mail]> is a professor in the Department of Slavic Language at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is currently a Fulbright scholar in Macedonia.