Network centric war: myth or reality?

Yury Emelyanovich GORBACHEV was born in Odessa, on February 22, 1921. Joined the USSR Armed Forces in 1939. Graduated from the Ulyanovsk Military Signals School (1941), Military Signals Academy (1950), and Higher Academic Courses under M.V. Frunze Military Academy (1971). Took part in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 from February 1942 to May 1945. During the war, commanded a headquarters company. He also was deputy signals chief with a detached rifle brigade on the North-Western Front, and deputy signals chief with a rifle division on the Western and the 3rd Byelorussian Front. In the postwar period, served as a senior officer and group chief at the MOD's Signal Troops headquarters, chief of EW department at the operational training directorate of the Main Staff of the Land Forces, chief of EW department at the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, chief of EW department at the General Staff, deputy chief of staff--EW service chief with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, senior lecturer at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy and the General Staff Academy.

After his discharge from the USSR Armed Forces (1985) and to this day he has been employed as a leading research fellow by the Central Institute of Military Technical Information of the RF MOD.

The instability of the geopolitical situation in the late 20th and early 21st century and the new trends in its development connected with the breakthrough in information technologies and the testing in the real combat environment of the advanced types of weapons, reconnaissance and electronic warfare equipment, automated C & C and communications systems made it incumbent on the military leadership in many world countries to rethink the theory and practice of armed forces organizational development. That period saw early progress in views on how to improve command and control of the armed forces in the course of military operations. The armed forces in the U.S. and a number of other countries developed a new concept, Network Centric Warfare (NCW). It must be noted right away that in its essence, as I see it, NCW is not a system of views on the conduct of war as a whole. Rather it is a governance concept reflecting a new method for armed forces command and control in 21st-century operations. To validate my view, let me first consider the main premises of its authors. After that I will analyze them and offer my evaluation.

The concept of "network centric warfare" owes its birth to the rapid development of information technologies, development of precision weapons and weapons based on new physical principles, as well as emergence of new operational-strategic categories such as "information warfare," "information superiority," etc. Its authors--retired Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, former director of the Office of Force Transformation; JCS expert John Garstka; and DOD expert David Alberts--believe it to be a consequence of the ongoing revolution in combat management. In their view, whoever can see changes occurring in the course of that revolution and seeks to actively utilize them will win in politics, business and military affairs. (1) In effect, they repeat the thesis (which became axiomatic in the West) that was conceived by the U.S. futurologists Alvin and Heidi Toffler who claimed that nations waged wars and controlled armed forces in the same way as they pursued business and generated wealth. On this basis, a number of Western military specialists assert that the current revolution in military affairs involves a C & C transformation that is unprecedented since the epoch of the Napoleonic wars, when France was the first to put into practice the concept of mass armies and developed a system to control these. The essence of the new revolution in military affairs, specifically, where command and control is concerned, was formulated by the Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jay Johnson who claimed that a fundamental shift had occurred in the nature of combat operations and that the U.S. armed forces leadership was learning how to control troops (forces) in new conditions of the situation. (2)

Published by the DOD, Alberts' book investigating general programs of [C.sup.4]ISR systems (C & C, communications, computer software, reconnaissance and surveillance) defines the NCW concept as one designed to secure information superiority over the enemy in an operation. The concept is used to achieve general high combat readiness, to increase promptness of command and control, to ensure the high speed of operations and an utmost degree of the enemy being engaged with fires, to step up survivability of friendly forces, and to enhance the degree of their coordination. (3) According to Alberts, these potentialities, once realized, will result in the new units considerably increasing their combat efficiency by comparison with the existing ones.

A similar view on the NCW concept is present in a report compiled by Aldo Borgu, program director for Operations & Capability Program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. He believes that the NCW concept has introduced a new orthodox view in the theory of military art (military thought) and that certain armed forces specialists are prepared to allow and accept a number of restrictions and to make changes in the existing concept of warfare. The NCW concept, to his mind, stands for a new model of warfare and C & C. (4) Addressing a Washington conference on military theory development in January 2004, Gen. Thomas Frank, former Commander of the U.S. Central Command, defined the NCW concept as a means to increase combat capabilities of the U.S. Land Forces and the Marines in joint operations and as a pathway to further improvement of both. (5)

While the U.S. armed forces use the term "network centric war," other countries have a terminology of their own to define this operational-strategic category. For example, Joint Allied Command (NATO) employs the term Network Centric Capability (NCC); UK, Network Enabled Capability (NEC); France, Info-Centric Warfare (ICW); Australia, Network Enabled Warfare (NEW); The Netherlands, Network Centric Operations (NCO); and Sweden, Network Based Defense (NBD). Some countries use other notions, such as Knowledge-Based Command and Control (KBCC). So wide a spectrum of alternative names of the NCW concept is indicative of a different degree of progress in armed forces and therefore different opportunities for their use in 21st-century operations. The British NEC concept, for example, has it that the communications networks (network enabled capability) can only complement reconnaissance assets, communications centers and weapons systems, which they will support (serve). The generalized critical judgments on the U.S. NCW concept as coming from NATO military specialists are to the effect that it is characteristic of large-scale combat operations.

In 1996, the U.S. armed forces command made the first step in outlining the main tenets of the NCW concept and expounded them in the JCS memorandum Joint Vision 2010, making a brief reference to it in the section dealing with organization of coalition operations and operations involving the Allied Joint Force in Europe. Nevertheless, armed forces of European NATO countries are not always ready for large-scale funding of steps implementing the NCW concept or its likes directed at the further contraction of the Detect-Engage (reconnaissance-weapons) cycle, such as the one suggested by the U.S. military strategist John R. Boyd. He worked out "OODA Loop" concept (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act--OODA) which pools together the four components of the combat operations process by creating a chain (loop). In accordance with his theory, periods of action alternate with those of relative calm, during which forces prepare for new responses to enemy reaction with account taken of attainment or otherwise of goals set. (6)

So what the NCW concept is all about in concrete terms? Its authors believe that practical implementation of the NCW theory will make it possible to transit from the war of attrition to a more fast-moving and efficient form of combat operations characterized by the rapidity of control and self-synchronization of the structure of forces and their C & C systems. The speed of command and control, as seen by the U.S. specialists, implies three aspects.

* First. Forces rapidly achieve information superiority which is understood as a higher degree of comprehension, more profound and congruent insight into battlefield situation, and more precise vision of one's own advantages and the disadvantages in the enemy C & C system. It is not a greater inflow of information. Technologically, this information superiority is achieved by the introduction of new systems--control, tracking, reconnaissance, supervision, computer modeling and information warfare (warfare against enemy combat control systems).

* Second. Owing to their information superiority, the armed forces will put into practice the principle of the massing of results, not the massing of forces (to my mind, the authors meant a greater efficiency of employment of separate units and elements that simultaneously operate in several sectors instead of the massing of forces in one sector).

* Third. Information impact results in the enemy losing his capability to pursue successful combat operations and succumbing to a shock.

As an example of how the U.S. armed forces can and must operate in an NCW environment, Cebrowski and Garstka consider a hypothetic start-of-war situation. An information attack will disable the entire enemy air defense system--C & C centers, communications centers, radars, SAM systems, and air defense aviation control system. According to the authors, the loss of up to 50% of C & C forces and assets will impact negatively on the enemy's strategy and force him to discontinue resistance, which is the aim of NCW. (7)

The principle of self-synchronization of the structure of forces and their C & C systems has been borrowed from the complex systems theory which postulates that all complex phenomena, structures and systems can best organize themselves on the "bottom-to-top" principle. In this connection, the U.S. authors view self-synchronization of the structure of forces and their control systems as the capacity of the military structure and control systems to self-organize from below rather than change on orders from above. They also believe that the structure of troops (forces), the forms and methods of their performing combat missions, and control systems will change at their own discretion albeit in conformity with the needs of the higher command echelons. Furthermore, they hold that the self-synchronization will enable superiority over the enemy in speed and surprise; tactical and operational pauses, which the enemy might make use of, will disappear; all control processes and military operations themselves will become more dynamic, active, and effective, and will acquire the form of continuous high-speed combat operations with resolute aims as distinct from former consecutive engagements (operations) with operational pauses.

Conceptually and theoretically, the authors represent the NCW model as a system made up of three lattice-structured subsystems: information, sensor (reconnaissance), and combat. The first subsystem is viewed as the basis of the whole system, with the second and third ones superimposed upon it. Reconnaissance forces and assets are the elements of the second subsystem (to my mind, it is the basic one), while weapons, combat equipment and personnel of separate tactical subunits that are joined together by C & C components are the elements of the third one.

Thus, the authors believe that the network centric war is waged by a ramified network of well-informed but geographically dispersed forces. The main characteristics of those forces are the following: a highly efficient "information lattice" securing an authorized access to information; employment of long-range precision weapons; troop maneuverability; highly efficient combat control system; an integrated "sensor lattice" merged with the subsystem of separate tactical subunits and the combat control subsystem.

According to the Cebrowski and Garstka concept, forces may wage NCW at any level (tactical, operational, strategic) regardless of geographical regions, combat missions, or composition and structure of the armed forces. (8) They believe, information in NCW concept will come from the information sphere linked closely with the other two spheres (physical and cognitive) that jointly form the NCW sphere, not from separate "platforms" (combat equipment, reconnaissance assets, observation posts, reconnaissance teams, helicopters, aviation, satellites, etc.). The physical sphere, as defined by the U.S. expert, is the place where the militarily affected situation develops. It is where military operations unfold (on land, in water, air and outer space) and where "physical platforms" operate, linked by communications networks.

The cognitive (rational mental) sphere, according to Garstka, takes shape in the minds of participants in a conflict and is characterized, on the one hand, by such notions as representation, realization, understanding, conviction, and values, while, on the other, by the decision-making process. What he places in this sphere are leadership, moral state, cohesion, level of training and combat experience, public opinion, commanders' thinking, decision-making methods, intellect and erudition.

The information sphere is where information exchanges take place, commanders' decisions are communicated, C & C is implemented, and knowledge forms and builds up along with views on the physical sphere. This means that it is reflected in virtual reality. Garstka says it is the fundamental bridgehead in the fight for information superiority. The developers of the NCW theory hold that information superiority characterizes the state of the information sphere when one of the sides gets preeminent information positions. (9)

The above essentials of the NCW concept, according to its authors, consist in that it makes it possible to achieve, on the basis of the absolute information superiority over the enemy, complete synchronization of combat operations, control systems and all battlefield actions, guarantee celerity of control, and thus boost combat capabilities and security of the armed forces. (10)

As is to be regretted, neither the authors of the new concept, nor military specialists in other Western countries and Russia (specifically Candidate of Historical Sciences I.M. Popov and Capt. 1st Rank (Ret.) A. Gorshkov, who reviewed the concept for the Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie in 2004 and 2005 (11)) indicate clear and easily understandable true reasons for the rise of this concept in the United States. Moreover, no one explains the difference between the existing views on military operations and the NCW concept, nor shows its influence on shifts in forms and types of combat operations, or principles and methods of armed forces control in an operation.

One can glean the reason for the NCW concept's emergence from pronouncements made by the current U.S. President, who declared that the United States should secure its world leadership by a periodic show of force. (12) It is on this basis that the U.S. intends to build what it sees as fair and solely right international relations. The emphasis in the show of force is on the active utilization of information technologies, information field and information component of the armed forces. For example, the JCS memo on the development of the U.S. armed forces in the 21st century, Joint Vision 2020 (July 2000), says that information superiority over the adversary is the U.S. armed forces' priority for the next 20 years. (13) In 2002, U.S. President George Bush signed a directive ordering to draw up the fundamentals of a national cyberwar strategy, a strategy to defend own computer networks (Computer Network Defense, CND), and a strategy to attack enemy computer networks (Computer Network Attack, CNA).

So, what is the distinction between the existing concepts and the new point of view on organizing and carrying out control over forces and weapons? The first thing to note is that this area of military affairs is most strongly exposed to impacts of the information technological breakthrough, because the modern revolution in military affairs is closely linked with the qualitative transformation in information technologies that are modifying both military equipment and principles of command and control. Accordingly, a fundamental change is affecting not only weapons systems and combat equipment (a case in point being the coming of information weapons) but also control systems along with the military affairs as a whole and the combat might of the armed forces. This, in turn, leads to the emergence of new forms and methods of combat operations. For example, the U.S. armed forces and the Allied Joint Force (NATO) conceived such new forms of combat actions as information operations (offensive, defensive, special) and such a warfare method as command and control warfare (C2W).

The current period saw a considerable rise in the amount of information needed for political and military decision-making. Information itself became more dynamic as well, tending to age quickly. To take an adequate decision in a modern operation, a commander-in-chief (commander) needs only fresh and precise info in real time that reflects the operational (combat, electronic) situation as it is at a given moment. Information's complexity and dynamism are factors requiring much more time for its analysis, while the modern character of combat operations dictates that decision-making should take as little time as possible or even happen instantly in certain cases. U.S. armed forces specialists estimate that time shortage is what makes a large strategic formation's commander (in the still existing control system) accept decisions on the basis of 30% of info his staff is able to handle. In consequence, a combat order (operational directive) is not always adequate to the volatile situation. The lack of full data on the enemy and the friendly forces is the current traditional feature of armed forces control organization. It is explained by the existence of separate "platforms" used to collect, handle and distribute information, analyze it, prepare proposals for the commander and his subsequent decision-making, plan operations (engagements), and hand down combat orders (operational directives) and instructions to forces (i.e., to perform reconnaissance and target designation, organize communications and combat control). This can contain considerably and restrict the entire command and control of the armed forces. No systems for integration of the existing separate "platforms," even in conditions of automation, are able to provide in full for the timely, let alone instantaneous, decision-making adequate to the existing situation. Therefore, the probabilistic (putative) nature of information about the enemy and the vital necessity of being able constantly to see the battlefield, as well as some exceptionally high requirements to the validity of accepted decisions is one of the pointed contradictions in modern combat control. As never before, the incompleteness of data on the enemy and friendly forces is inadmissible as leading to growing situational uncertainty and to errors in decision-making.

Other problems in the existing armed forces control concept are the following: the grown scale of operations and increased C & C distances; the growing dynamism of combat operations; the possibility of waging so-called standoff wars; the high probability of separate "platforms" and elements of control systems being disabled; the grown likelihood of information being distorted, suppressed or disrupted in control channels; insufficient reliability and low carrying capacity of separate "platforms;" a great number of coupling devices that make "platforms" arcane and inadequately mobile. On top of that, some other contradictions continue to be aggravated, such as the one between the strict centralization of command and control in an operation (combat) and the need to give lower-echelon commanders an utmost degree of initiative, something involving a certain measure of control decentralization; between the brevity of the combat order (instruction) form and its content which must reflect precisely the entire complexity of the situation and ensure clarity (correct understanding) of combat missions; between the prioritizing of objectives and the choice of ways and means for their attainment.

The authors of the NCW concept believe that all these contradictions can be solved through a transition to its implementation on the basis of full, comprehensive automation of C & C agencies, forces, systems and assets, as well as formation of computerized large strategic formations, combined units and units.

Analyzing the essentials of the U.S. NCW concept cannot but reveal that its authors, on the one hand, confuse different notions related to the meaning of war, its forms, types and methods with notions of command and control of troops (forces), while, on the other, declare in a veiled form new tendencies in the development of the C & C system. Therefore, it is often hard to understand whether they speak about new principles, forms, types and methods of military operations (the examples dealing with the hypothetic start of war, disappearance of the sequence of combat operations and operational pauses, a transition from the war of attrition to a more efficient "form" of warfare, etc.) or about modifications in the methods of C & C organization (the examples dealing with the speed of command and control, self-organization of the structure of military control from below and abolition of the centralized control system, alteration of access to information, unification of the control system with that of separate tactical subunits and the "sensor lattice," etc.). At the same time, the authors, while considering the essentials of the NCW concept, fail to mention information war (the Russian term for it is information confrontation), its forms (offensive, defensive, special, information operations and their methods), and forces and assets of warfare against combat control systems, even though they do speak about securing information superiority. All of that warrants the claim that the main meaning of the NCW concept consists in a changed command and control method rather than new forms and types of military operations.

This conclusion is confirmed by a number of DOD documents published in 2004 and 2005. For example, the DOD believes that the basis of armed forces reform strategy is creating a family of concepts of joint operations (JO), which introduce clarity in the existing interconnections between operational, functional and integrated concepts of joint forces (JF). (14) Drawn up and approved by the Pentagon in November 2003, the JO concepts describe how wars of all types will be waged during the first 15-20 years of the 21st century. They are subdivided into operational, functional and joint integrated JF concepts. The former define forms of possible military operations, while the latter the principles of operational and combat support for combat operations, as well as those of operational and combat training of JF. The approved DOD document classifies the NCW concept as belonging to operational, not functional, JF concepts. Consequently, it may define only the methods of JF control in 21st-century operations, not the forms and types of combat operations.

In keeping with the old but still effective concept of control accepted by the U.S. Armed Forces and NATO's Allied Joint Force, the command and control process is of a complicated, multi-faceted and multi-echelon nature. It is based on the traditional foundations of military organization, and is strictly centralized and hierarchic. Different command echelons operating within its framework often have a very limited access to information. For example, a big number of various combat, reconnaissance and control "platforms" are linked by communications systems possessing numerous coupling and automation devices. Consecutive or parallel information acquisition from all sources precedes subsequent information handling, analysis and distribution as it does decision-making in each command and control echelon. Later information and accepted decisions are exchanged between forces cooperating in an operation. The same happens between senior and subordinated command echelons. Besides, situationally inadequate completeness and reliability of information lead to the lengthening of the command and control process and acceptance of what are not always correct and valid decisions.

Meanwhile, in order to win in a modern engagement (operation), it is necessary not only to know everything about the enemy but also to constantly track his actions and forecast his intentions. It is also crucial to know the location and state of friendly troops (forces) and see their actions and weak, vulnerable spots. The decision-making should be timely and adequate to the situation, with decisions promptly handed down to lower-level echelons and mission performance verified. Along with that, the main feature of modern wars is information confrontation which not only changed the nature of military operations, leading to their new forms (information operations) and methods (synergic employment of C2W forces and assets in information operations) but also shifted the emphasis in armed confrontation to the information and intellectual area. It became possible to influence the enemy military-political leadership and personnel participating in the preparation, approval and control of political and military decisions even before the start of combat operations, as well as in their course and after completion. This means that an effective impact can be brought to bear on command and control of the armed forces of the opposing side.

Information war and information superiority content can give one a fairly clear idea of tendencies in the development of the command and control process. The main ones are the following: an opportunity to influence enemy personnel participating in the command and control process, up to the point of "beheading" the leadership; reduction of control echelons and the command and control cycle itself; enhancement of efficiency, information content and promptness of command and control; global expansion of the information field, now capable of reaching any region of the world and even the outer space; access to information at any command and control echelon down to platoon commander or a separate combat system ("platform"); completeness, reliability and actuality of information, its coming to consumers in real or nearly real time in conditions of battlefield visualization; seamless mating of information structure systems and control systems; a capacity for preemptive decision-making, with decisions fully adequate to the existing operational (combat, electronic) situation; shift of emphasis in armed confrontation to the information and intellectual area.

Another thing to note is the guideline documents accepted by the armed forces of the United States, other advanced countries and NATO's Allied Joint Force and not envisaging self-organization and self-synchronization of the military structure from below. Moreover, as the authors of the NCW concept state, the forms, types and methods of combat operations as well as command and control thereof cannot become modified of their own accord. All U.S. armed forces manuals (15) and those of NATO's Allied Joint Force (16) impose the centralized, hierarchic principle of armed forces organization and control, along with political and military decision-making, allowing only a reasonable measure of initiative and a possibility of decentralized operation of military units within the framework of the general operational plan and decision accepted by the upper command echelon. Breaching this main principle incapacitates efficient psychological operations and disinformation activities, efforts to secure the necessary operational security, the timely identification of the "centers of gravity" in the enemy's armed forces, and the timely detection, engagement and suppression of his most important facilities. All of that, as I see it, can disrupt operational plan and invite defeat. Apart from that, from-below self-synchronization of command and control systems will not always secure surprise and information superiority over the enemy. Neither will it exclude operational pauses that are sometimes quite necessary for forces to restore their combat capability, nor will make combat operations more dynamic and effective. In my view, it can only increase the likelihood of the enemy prematurely cracking the concept of a campaign (operation, engagement) and enable him to win information superiority and thus preempt operational decision-making and later performance.

The model of any war, network centric included, cannot be represented as a system made up of the three "lattices" (subsystems): information, sensor (reconnaissance), and combat. Only a combat command and control system of some or other separate military units can be represented in that way. It is all the more so for the fact that a war is not "a ramified network of well-informed but geographically dispersed forces;" rather it is their combat employment and information support for them in a campaign or operation. Apart from that, the forces, though dispersed in different regions, must nevertheless be centrally controlled to attain the end goal of an operation.

And the last remark. Practical implementation of the NCW concept doesn't make it possible to independently secure an absolute information superiority over the enemy and achieve full synchronization of command and control of combat operations and battlefield actions. According to U.S. armed forces manuals and those of NATO's Allied Joint Force, information superiority over the enemy is achieved by a number of information operations (offensive, defensive and special).

Quite naturally, the U.S. armed forces, being at the stage of revision of the existing programs within the framework of the C4ISR control concept and using military actions to test the possibility of transiting to network centric command and control of troops (forces) in operations, which means the use of network distribution and simultaneous communication of info to all armed forces C & C echelons (where it concerns them) in near-real time mode, are coming to realize the need for finding new methods of military (combat) operations and developing new tactics. The new C & C concept enables acceleration of operational (combat) decision-making and operation (engagement) planning. It can also help to increase mobility of the armed forces, their situational combat readiness, and ultimately their combat might (combat capability). In this context, one can speak about the NCW not only as an armed forces C & C concept but also as a concept enabling elaboration of new methods of military operations. But we mustn't put the equality sign between the notions of "NCW" and "network war." Also described occasionally as cyberwar, the latter is a component of information operations pursued to attack or defend computer networks (Computer Network Attack, CNA; Computer Network Defense, CND). It may use different electronic warfare assets (including directed energy equipment, weapons, etc.), information weapons and diverse electronic and computer defense assets.

Thus, the above analysis and evaluation enable us to state with certainty that NCW is a reality not a myth. But it is a reality that reflects, not a new type or form of military (combat) operations but a new form and methods of command and control of the armed forces of states or coalition of states in 21st-century operations with the use of an integrated information space (information field) that is formed in near-real time mode. As it is used, the military agency's "platforms" and "centers" do not disappear anywhere but are only unified in an integrated information control computer system; they function in a synergic mode and possess many degrees of freedom. This is why the speed (promptness) of command and control and the principles of self-synchronization of C & C systems are not the essence of war but that of a changed command and control process. It is quite natural that a new form of armed forces command and control will lead to a change in the content of both command and control itself and the character of military (combat) operations.

An analysis of views on the operational-strategic concept of NCW, as accepted by the U.S. armed forces and NATO's Allied Joint Force, makes one give thought to this question: How most successfully to disorganize command and control of the potential adversary's forces if he uses this concept in operations against Russia's armed forces? As is obvious, separate efforts by engagement forces and EW forces and assets of Russia's armed forces will be unable to disrupt network control of the adversary's "network centric forces." Neither will they secure preemption in operational (combat) decision-making or information superiority over the adversary. Therefore, it is necessary, right now, to adopt measures in order to improve the systems and assets of reconnaissance, electronic warfare, communications, command and control, and weapons, and to develop information weapons and directed energy weapons capable of disrupting the operation of automated databases and computer networks and disabling the main enemy command and control and reconnaissance components. It is necessary to create a unified network to command and control not only the said assets but also tactical and operational CC & D forces and all information confrontation assets in order to "strike with a fist, not the spread fingers." It makes sense, as I see it, to think about further improvement of the EW service of the RF Armed Forces, specifically about its transformation into information and electronic warfare troops, because the U.S. armed forces services already created, between 2001 and 2003, information war agencies (centers to plan information operations and control them) and the Air Force, first information war units. On top of that, forces and assets have been assigned for pursuing information wars in the military area (C2W forces and assets), ones based on electronic warfare forces.

NOTES:

1. J. Garstka, Office of Force Transformation, and D. Alberts, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, "Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework," June 2004, p. 2.

2. Armada International, May 2004, p. 72.

3. D. Alberts, J. Garstka, F. Stein, "Network Centric Warfare:" Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority," CCRP Publication Series, Washington, D.C., 2000, p. 2.

4. Australian Defense Force. Enabling Multidimensional Maneuver. The Australian Defense Force NCW Concept, ADO NCW Conference, Canberra, Australia, May 2003.

5. T. Frank, "Impact of Network Operations on Iraqi Freedom," 22 January 2004, p. 4.

6. Armada International, p. 66.

7. A. Cebrowski, J. Garstka, "Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," Proceedings, January 1998.

8. J. Garstka, Network Centric Operation Short Course, DOD USA, Washington, April 2004, pp. 6, 8, 24, 25.

9. J. Garstka, op. cit.

10. J. Garstka, "Network Centric Warfare Offers Warfighting Advantage," Signal Forum, Signal Magazine, May 2003.

11. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 9, 2004; No. 12, 2005.

12. "The National Security Strategy of the USA," Washington, D.C., September 2002.

13. Joint Vision 2020, Americas Military: Preparing for Tomorrow, USA, GPO, Washington, D.C., June 2000, pp. 10, 36.

14. A. Cebrowski, "Military Transformation: A. Strategic Approach," DOD, Washington, D.C., Fall 2003, P2. GAO-05-70. "Military Transformation," Washington, p. 8.

15. JP 3-0; JP 3-13; JP 3-31; FM 3-0; FM 3-13, and others.

16. MC. 64/7; OSTAG 1022; MC. 422; SDS. 23/93 and others.

Col. Yu.E. GORBACHEV (Ret.)

Candidate of Military Sciences