Neo-Salafi_Plans For Caliphate From Iraq & Beyond Are Questioned.

*** Arab League's Amr Moussa Is Set To Hold A Conference In Cairo For Accord Among Iraq's Various Ethnic, Sectarian And Nationalist Factions - With An American Blessing And Special Care From The Saudis *** The Mehlis UN Report On The Assassination Of Hariri Is Just The Start Of A Process To Implicate Syrian And Lebanese Figures While Damascus Perceives A Dangerous Trap: Stripping The Ba'thist Regime Of 'All' Its Regional Cards; Many Wonder What Hafez al-Assad  Would Have Done Had He Been Alive After The Post-9/11 Developments In The Middle East And In Lebanon

NICOSIA - There is a big question mark over recently reported plans to set up a Neo-Salafi emirate in Iraq's Sunni Arab Triangle and then, in an ultimate post-Israel phase, establish a universal caliphate in which all Muslims will have to be converted into this extreme strain in Sunni Islam. One claim is that the recently reported letter to the head of al-Qaeda's Iraq branch from the trans-national Neo-Salafi movement's deputy leader, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, was the work of the American intelligence.

It is important to note that major sects in Islam, particularly the Salafi movement in Sunnism and the Ja'fari (or Twelver) movement in Shi'ism, historically have each developed a universal authority to be established for all Muslims. The Salafis have their universal caliphate in the horizon - a super-state to rule the world under a khalifah, i.e., a successor to the Prophet Muhammad. The Ja'faris have their universal imamate - a super-theocracy to rule the world under a "Supreme Guide" who deputises for the 12th Imam who will one day return to earth (see ood4bbIraqConstnOct10-05).

However, Iran's Ja'fari theocracy is worried by its rapid drift to a confrontation with the US-led Western powers; its Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has begun to back-track from the excessive utterances of newly-elected President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad - whose strong campaign for Iran to pursue a full nuclear fuel cycle has alarmed the top leadership (see rim4bbIraqIranOct24-05).

Whether or not Zawahiri's letter is authentic does not change the fact the Neo-Salafi insurgency in Iraq has begun to affect parts of the Middle East. The letter was reportedly addressed to Abu Mu'ab al-Zarqawi, who leads al-Qaeda Organisation for Jihad in Mesopotamia.

Anthony Cordesman, a military expert at the Washington Centre for Strategic and International Studies, says in Iraq the most extreme of the insurgents, such as al-Qaeda of Zarqawi, see their current activities as part of a broader struggle for an Islam dominated by their narrow view of Sunni puritanism. He says the question is not if there will be a Neo-Salafi struggle against Shi'ites, but when.

Cordesman adds: "Such insurgents do not have to 'win' in Iraq, at least in any conventional sense of the term. An outcome that leaves Iraq in a state of prolonged civil war, and forces a spreading conflict in Islam between Sunnis and other sects..., would be seen as a prelude to a broader eschatological conflict they believe is inevitable and that God will ensure they win".

The Christian Science Monitor on Oct. 7 said: "The word that best describes the mood of the letter's writer [Zawahiri] might be 'beleaguered'. He laments the recent loss of a wife, son, and daughter... He hints at money problems and asks for cash... He complains that not all of his recent works have been published, and that he's lost the manuscript of his last book. He notes...that American Intelligence has apparently acquired his computer. Some experts suspect that the letter is a fake, and that the CIA - not Al Qaeda bigwig Ayman al-Zawahiri - may be its true author".

It was US intelligence which made public the 13-page letter. Others call it a fascinating document, and say much of it rings true. This describes al-Qaeda's ultimate victory, in which the US is expelled from Iraq, Israel is conquered, and all Muslims are converted to Neo-Salafism. That has long been al-Qaeda's bleak vision for the future.

The Monitor on Oct. 17 quoted retired Brig. Gen. Russell Howard, a counter-terrorism expert at the Fletcher School of Tufts University, as saying: "If [Zawahiri] didn't write it, it was certainly someone who understands what al-Qaeda wants". Posted in full on a US government website, the 6,000-word letter to Zarqawi, dated July 9, 2005, is purportedly from Osama bin Laden's deputy in the al-Qaeda network.

Zarqawi and his group of Neo-Salafi insurgents are thought to be behind many of the most deadly suicide bombings in Iraq, including suicide bombs directed at government targets and Shi'ite Arab civilians. In the letter, Zawahiri thanks Zarqawi for his efforts, and says that Iraq "is now the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era". Other Islamic conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan and Chechnya, are just "groundwork".

Zawahiri then outlines what he calls al-Qaeda's incremental goals for the future. First, expel the Americans from Iraq. Second, establish a Neo-Salafi emirate over as much Iraqi territory as possible - "i.e., in Sunni areas" - to fill the vacuum left by the departing US power. The third phase involves extending this wave of jihad to the "secular countries neighbouring Iraq". Then, according to the letter, comes a final confrontation with Israel, "because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity", and establishment of a universal caliphate in which other sects of Islam convert to al-Qaeda's Neo-Salafi principles.

Zarqawi and his jihadist forces need to be ready to implement this strategy because "things may develop faster than we imagine", says Zawahiri in the letter, citing the US experience in Vietnam. Then the admonitions begin. Beheadings of hostages, and suicide attacks against ordinary Shi'ite Arabs, are not helping the movement, Zawahiri warns. The Muslim masses are put off by such slaughter. Even the elite of the mujahadeen may question the correctness of picking a fight with the Shi'ites "at this time". The bottom line is that popular support may be the difference between victory and defeat. "We are in a battle, and...more than half of this battle is taking place in the field of the media", says the letter.

On Oct. 13, al-Qaeda's wing in Iraq denounced the document as a fake. In the US, some experts noted its convenient release date, just before the Oct. 15 referendum on a new Iraqi constitution, and the fact that the English translation of the text did not contain many of the flowery religious asides which characterised al-Qaeda communications in the past. On his popular Middle East website, Juan Cole, a University of Michigan Middle East expert, on Oct. 14 said the blessing on the Prophet Muhammad invoked at the letter's beginning did not sound right. He claimed it appeared to reflect Shi'ite, not Sunni, language. Cole wrote: "My gut tells me the letter is a forgery", adding that Shi'ite Arab groups in Iraq may have produced it.

The US government, for its part, has vehemently defended the missive's authenticity. State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said: "It shows clearly the nature of the enemy we're dealing with".

Other experts say the letter's contents should not seem too surprising. It is true that serious splits in the jihadi movement have emerged in recent months, centring on the war in Iraq and Zarqawi's use of suicide bombings, says Bernard Haykel, an associate professor of Islamic studies at New York University. He says it is easy to find evidence on jihadi websites and online journals that Zarqawi's attacks on ordinary Shi'ites in Iraq are turning many Muslims against the jihadis altogether. It is possible that the attacks "are making them lose credibility with their support base", says Haykel. The issue for the jihadis may well be a practical one - possible loss of support in the region - rather than respect for Shi'ite religious rights.

The office of the director of national intelligence in Washington, which posted the letter on its website, has given no details of how it fell into US hands beyond saying it was "obtained during counterterrorism operations in Iraq". The director's office said: "This lengthy document provides a comprehensive view of al-Qaeda's strategy in Iraq and globally. The document has not been edited in any way and is released in its entirety in both the Arabic and English translated forms. The US government has the highest confidence in the letter's authenticity".

Zawahiri says: "It is imperative that, in addition to force, there be an appeasement of Muslims and a sharing with them in governance". He argues that alongside armed struggle Zarqawi should establish a political movement capable of attracting not only Islamic fighters but tribal elders, scientists, merchants and "all the distinguished ones who are not sullied by appeasing the occupation". The letter says: "We don't want to repeat the mistake of the Taliban, who restricted participation in governance. They did not have any representation for the Afghan people in their ruling regime, so the result was that the Afghan people disengaged themselves from them".

Zawahiri's letter repeats the Neo-Salafi view that Shi'ite Islam is based on "falsehood", but questions the need to pursue this conflict in Iraq. On the Sunni-Shi'ite enmity, the letter says: "This subject is complicated... Any rational person understands...that the Shi'ites co-operated with the Americans in the invasion of Afghanistan, and they co-operated with them in the overthrow of Saddam... People of discernment and knowledge among Muslims know the extent of danger to Islam of the Twelve'er [Ja'fari] school of Shi'ism. It is a religious school based on excess and falsehood..." The letter warns that, while this view of the Shi'ites may be obvious, it is not well understood by the majority of Muslims: "Many of your Muslim admirers among the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shi'ites. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on...mosques... Why kill ordinary Shi'ites, considering that they are forgiven because of their ignorance?"

Abdel Barei' 'Atwan, editor of al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper, who has met bin Laden and Zawahiri, says the Arabic version of the letter is well-written and has "the same style" as Zawahiri's. "I think it is fairly authentic but I can't tell 100%". He says the ideas it contains are "typical Zawahiri".

Neil Quilliam, an analyst at security consultants Control Risks, says the letter should be treated with caution. The Guardian on Oct. 13 quoted him as saying: "It's a very interesting time for it to be released" - referring to concerns about Sunni participation in Iraq's constitutional referendum on Oct. 15. Quilliam added: "At a time when people are trying to get the Sunnis to buy into the political process, the letter suggests a coincidence of interest between Zawahiri and the ongoing political process".

The following are extracts from the Zawahiri letter to "the gracious brother Abu Mus'ab" [al-Zarqawi]. "We must think for a long time about our next steps and how we want to attain it, and it is my humble opinion that the jihad in Iraq requires several incremental goals: The first stage: expel the Americans from Iraq. The second stage: establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate - over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq... The third stage: extend the jihad (holy war) wave to the secular countries neighbouring Iraq. The fourth stage: it may coincide with what came before - the clash with Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity.

"My raising this idea - I do not claim that it is infallible - is only to stress...that the mujahideen must not have their mission end with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their weapons..." The letter stresses the importance of having allies and popular support: "If we look at the two short-term goals... removing the Americans and establishing an Islamic emirate in Iraq...we will see the strongest weapon which the mujahideen enjoy...is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq and the surrounding Muslim countries. We must maintain this support as best we can, and we should strive to increase it... In the absence of this...the Islamic mujahideen movement would be crushed...

"Planning must strive to involve the Muslim masses in the battle, and to bring the mujahideen movement to the masses and not conduct the struggle far from them... The Americans will exit soon, God willing, and the establishment of a governing authority - as soon as the country is freed from the Americans - does not depend on force alone. Indeed, it is imperative that...there be an appeasement of Muslims and a sharing with them in governance...

"Things may develop faster than we imagine. The aftermath of the collapse of American power in Vietnam...is noteworthy... We must be ready...before events overtake us... We must take the initiative and impose a fait accompli upon our enemies...

"It would be a political endeavour in which the mujahideen would be a nucleus around which would gather the tribes and their elders, and the people in positions, and scientists, and merchants, and people of opinion, and all the distinguished ones who were not sullied by appeasing the occupation and those who defended Islam.

"We do not want to repeat the mistake of the Taliban, who restricted participation in governance to the students and the people of Kandahar alone. They did not have any representation for the Afghan people in their ruling regime, so the result was that the Afghan people disengaged themselves from them..."

In releasing the full text on Oct. 11, in Arabic and English, the office of John Negroponte, the new director of US national intelligence, took the extraordinary step of posting it on his office's Website, www.dni.gov. The letter also alluded to difficulties facing al-Qaeda's leaders, including what Zawahiri calls "the real danger" posed by the Pakistani military in its searches for militants in north-western Pakistan, near the Afghan border, where Zawahiri and bin Laden are believed to be hiding.

Zarqawi had argued in a letter to bin Laden in January 2004 that he believed his strategy to attack Iraq's Shi'ites and thus cause an all-out Sunni-Shi'ite war was beneficial to his cause. But Zawahiri cast his letter as a reply to that, pointedly warning Zarqawi that such strikes amounted to "action which the masses do not understand or approve".

Zarqawi, a Jordanian militant of Palestinian origin whose insurgent network was endorsed in 2004 by al-Qaeda leader bin Laden, has emerged as the most prominent leader of an increasingly deadly Sunni Arab rebellion and the leader among the Neo-Salafi jihadis. His affiliation with al-Qaeda has allowed him to expand his network by incorporating indigenous Iraqi groups.

Zarqawi declared an all-out war on Iraq's majority Shi'ite population in September 2005 to curry favour among the disaffected. But more recently, he qualified his campaign by excluding Shi'ite Iraqi groups opposed to the US-led occupation of the country. These include the followers of young Shi'ite Arab mullah Muqtada al-Sadr and its Jaysh al-Mahdi militia.

In his July 9 letter, Zawahiri asked Zarqawi to send him a $100,000 payment to make up for funding lost since May, when Pakistani forces captured Abu Faraj al-Liby, a Libyan operative whom US officials described as al-Qaeda's third most important figure.

Negroponte's office said the letter's release was approved only after US officials were assured that its disclosure would not affect ongoing American intelligence or military operations.