Navy Can Secure 'Access' for Joint Force.

Future enemies could attempt to deny U.S. entry to ports and airfields

Despite the geographic and--sometimes perceived--philosophical distance between the operating fleet and those inside the Beltway, the Navy's ongoing efforts inside the Pentagon and in the fleet are indeed moving in the same direction.

The most important issues for both the fleet and Navy Pentagon are the employment of forces and their contribution to joint war fighting.

During the past decade, successive strategy and force assessments have sought to balance ends with means and to identify a "right-sized" U.S. military. This year, the second Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will attempt to refine U.S. defense strategy and determine the force structure needed to execute that strategy. The central question is which capabilities are needed to defend America's global security interests.

Each of the services possesses unique and complementary attributes. Future projection of U.S. combat power overseas--where many of our security interests lie--will therefore be a joint endeavor.

Since the end of the Cold War, many of the forces that were based overseas have returned to the United States. This suggests that the future joint force must be more mobile and expeditionary to overcome the "tyranny of distance," particularly in the Asian theater.

The Army and the Air Force have begun "transforming" their force structures and/or organizations to do just that.

A rapidly deployable joint force must be capable of moving quickly to the fight. To accomplish that, it needs immediate and sustained access to any region of the world where U.S. security interests are threatened. Access is critical to U.S. operations against a potential foe. All else flows from the initial success of maintaining the access required for the follow-on fighting forces.

In the coming decades, we expect that this access may be challenged by nations that seek to expand their regional influence in ways that compete with the interests of the United States. One possible area of emphasis for the forces of these regional competitors would be on anti-access or area-denial capabilities, employing asymmetric means to deny access to regions of U.S. interest. Land-based cruise missiles, advanced surface-to-air missiles, land and sea mines and conventionally powered submarines typify the scope of these military threats. Other potential threats are ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction and information warfare.

The QDR analysis should identify those capabilities that overcome those challenges and create the requisite conditions for the timely projection of joint combat power.

It is helpful to consider the question of why naval forces are deployed overseas in peacetime, and how improved capabilities will expand the capacity of those forward-deployed forces to assure access.

The United States is a maritime nation with global interests. The oceans are the great commons" that connect us to the world. And in an era of globalization, information and communications technologies inextricably link our interests and economic prosperity to the freedom of these "commons."

Maritime transport alone accounts for more than 99 percent of the volume and 80 percent of the value of all intercontinental trade. U.S. exports directly support 11.5 million U.S. jobs and have fueled one-third of total economic growth since 1993. Nearly three quarters of those exports travel by sea.

Global information networks have become the catalysts for "just in time" supply chains, or those "heel-to-toe" economic relationships that allow merchandise to move more efficiently, without the overhead costs of warehouses and storage facilities. It is maritime transportation, however, that makes "just-in-time" work. Ships at sea have replaced the warehouse ashore.

Forward deployed naval forces, additionally, can be employed from within a region, without restrictions, even as we might begin to deploy other assets. From that timely response, the United States gains tactical surprise.

Denying sanctuary to a potential adversary means not permitting the littorals to be either a barrier, or a maritime area that we cede to an enemy. The credibility of that response shapes regions of interest, deterring potential foes and reassuring allies and friends.

Naval forces have responded to 144 contingencies during the last decade, including 11 combat operations. Every Navy carrier battle group to deploy since 1998 has engaged in combat as part of Operation Allied Force in Southeastern Europe and/or operations in Southwest Asia. For example, during Operation Desert Fox in December of 1998, rotationally deployed naval forces struck 85 targets over four nights of combat. These same naval forces required no reconstitution and subsequently continued their routine six-month deployments in other theaters of operation. Because of the desire for tactical surprise, the National Command Authority directed that only naval tactical aviation and weapons from Navy ships be employed on the first night.

Improvements to sensors and networks, combined with better weapons, make today's naval forces significantly more capable than their counterparts of only a decade ago.

While the other services are "transforming" to become lighter and more expeditionary, the Navy is continuing an evolution from platform-centric to network-centric operations, with an emphasis on effects-based warfare. This transformation is about changes in force capability--not necessarily force structure. That means leveraging the mobility of naval platforms, reducing their signature and distributing unit level offensive and defensive capabilities throughout the force.

The Navy's continued evolution to a network-centric force, arming the war-fighter with both better knowledge of the battle space and the weapons to use that knowledge to act quickly and decisively, is central to its ability to provide sustained assured access for joint power projection.

Although much of the joint force's manpower will arrive by air, the majority (usually 90 percent) of the force for joint operations must deploy by sea. Maintaining freedom of the seas is therefore key, not only to the success of the Navy's operations at sea and the introduction of the joint force, but also to sustaining the lines of communication to ground-based forces once the battle is joined.

From a practical standpoint, this entails making improvements to individual sensor systems and increasing the number of "nodes on the network." By introducing more sensors into the environment, networking that sensor data, then displaying the information to the operator in a user-friendly fashion, greater speed of command becomes possible.

A broad range of these initiatives is both in progress and programmed within the Navy's current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). For example, outfitting the F/A-18E/F fighter-attack aircraft with the Airborne Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)--a phased array radar--will allow that aircraft to see farther and more precisely while using less energy. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs, or miniaturized submarines) will be deployed from submarines to precisely map the ocean bottom, finding and neutralizing mines without putting manned platforms at risk. They will covertly provide hydrographic surveys to support amphibious operations, and transmit this information back to the network in real time. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) will provide a vantage point over land that cannot be achieved by shipborne sensors and that may be hazardous for manned aircraft.

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) will allow platforms to share sensor information about the air picture to engage targets beyond the "sight" of onboard sensors. Similarly, the Naval Fires Control System (NFCS) will contribute to our effort in the ground war, providing for a shared ground picture and integrated "calls for fire"--allowing ships to provide artillery from the sea by displaying the land battle to the afloat commander in real time.

The principles of network-centric warfare involve applying that knowledge of the battle space to engagements with smart, precise weapons with extended reach.

Extended-range guided munitions will provide high volume, GPS-guided fire for precision effects. The miniaturization of air-dropped weapons, such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition, will allow the carrier air wing to attack more targets in a single sortie.

Today's carrier air wing can strike more than four times as many daily aim-points as its Desert Storm counterpart, and currently programmed capabilities will result in almost a seven-fold increase by 2008. At the same time, the Navy has distributed strike capability throughout the force, from 14 carriers in 1982 to 144 strike platforms today.

Precision, long-range gunfire from surface platforms will provide high-volume fire support to ground troops maneuvering ashore. Together, this family of offensive capabilities will provide deep-land attack for interdiction of shore-based systems while providing "artillery from the sea" to support lighter ground forces until they are firmly established ashore.

In this decade, the Navy also will deploy advanced defensive capabilities.

The Navy Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) will protect key ports, airfields and amphibious lodgments. Projecting defense from the sea against theater ballistic missiles--which may be armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--provides defenses for ground forces flowing into theater until they become established ashore.

TBMD-capable ships can play a critical role in combined operations with coalition partners, defending friendly units as well as key sites ashore.

Navy TBMD platforms provide a protective "umbrella" for the Aerospace Expeditionaty Force (AEF) and the Brigade Combat Team. They will contribute to the success of Air Force and Army transformation efforts, because they will need less of the critical, initial airlift to deploy defensive systems.

There are times when there is no substitute for ground-based troops. The Navy-Marine Corps team provides mobile, flexible combat power-operating from the seas--making the Marines another "battery of the fleet."

With improved capabilities to provide troops in the field with real-time, fully automated "calls for fire" from high-volume, precision gunfire platforms, the Navy will enable ground units to arrive and maneuver without their own organic heavy artillery.

Vice Adm. Dennis McGinn is the deputy chief of naval operations for naval warfare requirements and programs (N7).