Naval force development: evolution of theory and practice.

The changes in the politico-military situation in the world and in Russia's geostrategic and socioeconomic position that occurred at the end of the past century and at the beginning of this century necessitate the development of new approaches to defining the status and the role of the Navy in ensuring the country's military security at sea and the protection of its national interests in the World Ocean, and therefore a scientific substantiation of naval force development in the 21st century.

"The history of the naval idea in Russia has known periods of decline and revival, has had its ups and downs. In a country with continental traditions, the navy was as a general rule seen as a temporary means, and therefore temporary tasks were being set. As they were fulfilled, the need for a naval force would disappear, until a new need would arise. In the meantime, the navy was falling into decay, aging, losing its traditions, and feeling cut off from the state and statehood, but whenever foreign policy all of a sudden confronted the country with an unexpected naval adversary, hectic efforts were deployed to organize a navy, often without a plan, without science, without logistics, and without methodology. As a result, the decrepit organism failed the test, and the navy died needlessly." (1)

These words, written more than 80 years ago, are to a very large extent also applicable to the present-day status of the Navy. In the opinion of the present authors, the reasons for this are as follows.

First, virtually throughout Russia's naval history, we have witnessed frequent, not always called-for, changes and shifts in tasks, and the absence of clear-cut guidelines for the navy's employment. All of that deprived the navy of a well-substantiated plan for its organization and development.

Second, historical analysis of naval force organization and development shows that it proceeded without scientific substantiation, by command and administer methods, had an extensive (rather than intensive) character, and was geared above all toward development of branches and arms of the naval service, not organization of operational/strategic, operational, and operational/tactical forces, ensuring the performance of target specific operational and operational/tactical tasks at sea. That approach resulted in an imbalance of the naval structure, dispersion of forces and assets, and an ineffective spending of financial and material resources.

Despite the drastic changes that have occurred in the external and internal conditions and factors, the naval force development theory has remained virtually unchanged. This brought about a crisis that consists in that, on the one hand, the state does not have the resources to build the needed naval force and on the other, the Navy is affected by a lack of a clear-cut decision-making process in the area of force organization and development. There are two ways of dealing with this situation--either by increasing government spending on the maintenance and development of the Navy, which is not possible in the foreseeable future due to well-known economic reasons, or by ensuring a strict scientific substantiation of decisions that are made in the naval force development sphere, as well as ensuring their effective implementation. The second option is by far the most expedient in so far as it helps to clarify the purposes of naval force development and to achieve maximum effectiveness in using the resources that are provided for ensuring the country's security in the naval sphere.

In the early 21st century, an awareness has for the first time emerged in Russia about the need to restore the country's status as a naval power, which became a subject of close attention on the part of the RF president and government. One important step toward advancing Russia's national interests in the World Ocean was the 2000 RF presidential decree On Improving the Naval Activity of the Russian Federation and the RF government resolution On Measures to Improve the Naval Activity of the Russian Federation. Pursuant to these decisions, the Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2020 and Fundamental Principles of RF Naval Policy for the Period until 2010 were adopted in 2001, and a maritime board was formed within the RF government. For the first time ever, Russia's national maritime policy as a long-term, comprehensive, systemic state policy in the sphere of maritime activity began to be formulated on the state level. (2)

Navy organization and development is a complex of interconnected and interdependent socio-political, economic, military-technical, and other measures and activities designed to ensure the creation, preparation, and development of the Navy with the aim of protecting the national interests of the Russian Federation and of its allies in the World Ocean (including by military methods), maintaining military-political stability in seas and oceans abutting Russia, and ensuring its military security at sea. Importantly, naval force development is part and parcel of the organizational development of the RF Armed Forces in so far as the fleets are part of RF military formations deployed in strategic sectors. Thus, studies on ways of substantiating navy organization and development should constitute a single system that at the same time is a sub-system of a comprehensive complex of studies on substantiating the organizational development of the Armed Forces as a whole.

Organizational development occupies a special place in naval force development as a system of activities designed to put in place and develop a scientifically substantiated, optimal quantitative and qualitative composition of the Navy as well as its rational structure. Problems that are addressed in this process are dialectically interconnected in so far as they depend on the forms and methods of employing naval formations.

By far the most responsible and important task in defining the quantitative/qualitative parameters of the Navy is the substantiation of its combat composition. Before, it was based on disparate methodologies used by various scientific research organizations, and fleets. They did not sufficiently take into account the comprehensive character of the employment of heterogeneous (mixed arms) naval assets or their role in fulfilling operational tasks. So the results of calculations that were made according to such methodologies did not fully reflect the reality of naval warfare, thus overstating the total needs for naval assets in performing operational tasks and in conducting operations as a whole.

Analysis of the current naval force development theory shows that any strict scientific substantiation of the Navy's combat composition and rational organization is still lacking. Today, it is theoretical work on providing scientific substantiation for the general lines for the development of naval arms and equipment that is by far the most fundamental and substantive. There are separate propositions of command and control organization theory, naval infrastructure development theory, etc. Meanwhile, the work on developing fundamental principles and methodology for substantiating the Navy's makeup and optimizing its structure and composition has yet to produce conclusive results.

The Navy's organizational structure is by far the most formidable problem. It is an extremely difficult and relatively new task as part of the traditional areas of research conducted within the Navy's military-scientific complex. The task consists in scientifically defining the optimal composition and a rational structure for each naval force formation and the fleets themselves in the interest of the Navy as a whole.

In the second half of the 20th century, formation of the Navy's makeup was based on the principal requirement--ensuring naval superiority (at least, acceptable parity) over a possible adversary. During that period scientific research into naval force development was mainly designed to put in place an apparatus for the scientific substantiation of arms and military equipment development programs as well as development programs for the priority branches of service, not organization of the Navy as an integrated system. At the same time, financial appraisal of naval force development was but of secondary importance. Amid the severe financial constraints, the single-criterion approach to substantiating the Navy's makeup with low priority given to economic indicators should be reoriented toward a multi-criterion task with cost-effectiveness par value criteria. Their par value, and in some cases the priority of the economic indicator, is one reason for the need to further improve the military-economic theoretical foundations in defining the Navy's makeup.

The Navy has traditionally been built by combat arms, homogeneous strategic formations and large units, and it was not until the 1970s-1980s that separate T/O and non-T/O combined arms formations and large units began to be built in the fleets. This trend has to do with the fact that in contemporary conditions naval forces are supposed to conduct warfare in several environments--under water, over the surface, in the air, on the ground, and in space. At the same time, not a single arm of the Navy today is in a position to single-handedly fulfill operational and operational/tactical tasks. Naval warfare is conducted not by combat composition, not by combat services, but by mixed arms naval formations of a corresponding level.

Today there is a discernible trend for integration not only of Navy combat arms but also of branches of service as a whole. In wars of the future, missions assigned to the Navy will be accomplished by mixed arms formations wherein particular combat arms and branches of service compensate for each other's shortfalls and mutually supplement each other in all spheres of warfare.

This is of principal importance in substantiating the Navy's organizational development: The fleets should be built not by combat arms, based on a certain set of priorities, but by mixed arms formations, proceeding from the specific tasks that have been set. The point is to scientifically define an optimal composition and a rational structure of each such formation, taking into account the contribution made by each combat arm to the fulfillment of the tasks in hand.

The fleets' organizational structure that evolved in the postwar period has a serious built-in contradiction that violates an important principle of the military art: Command and control of military forces in the course of a war should be exercised by the command and control agency that prepares these forces and decides on their combat employment. Thus, submarine flotilla (now submarine squad) commanders and headquarters staffs only prepared the forces but did not exercise command and control of them in the course of combat operations. Conversely, commanders and headquarters staffs of the former Mediterranean and Indian flotillas only exercised command and control of forces that were attached to them from different fleets. The same contradiction existed in the process of configuring non-T/O mixed arms formations in the fleets.

This contradiction can only be resolved by comprehensively reviewing the current organization system and moving over to the principle of operational and administrative organization of forces. Within the bounds of this approach, the present authors believe that it will be necessary to bring the Navy's organizational structure as close as possible to operational war time force organization, thus enhancing the level of the Navy's combat and mobilization readiness as well as the quality of force command and control both in peacetime and in wartime. This has primarily to do with the fact that in modern warfare it will be practically impossible to replenish naval losses by building new warships. At the same time, the administrative organization system ensures, maintains, and prepares forces up to a basic (preliminary) level (individual and combined employment of combat arms as part of a group) while the system of operational organization prepares forces for use as part of a combined arms formation, and exercises command and control of them in the course of combat operations.

The process of substantiating the Navy's combat composition and organizational structure should be based above all on the tasks set to the fleets as the principal naval formations conducting warfare at sea as part of groupings of the RF Armed Forces in corresponding strategic sectors. Thus, today there is a marked contradiction between the old approaches to naval force organization and the new requirements for the Navy's contemporary makeup.

In light of the aforementioned, the Navy command and the naval science are faced with the problem of a radical review of the Navy's organizational and force development theory and practice.

The aim of the RF Navy's organizational development is to ensure the creation and deployment of regional fleet formations, balanced by the tasks and combat capabilities; subject to a centralized, integrated command and control system, and capable, jointly with other branches of service, other troops and military formations and security agencies, of fulfilling the tasks of protecting the state interests and security of the Russian Federation and its allies in the World Ocean.

The methodology of substantiating the Navy's organizational development is an aggregate of methodological approaches, algorithms, methods, mathematical models, and tasks helping to substantiate an optimal combat composition and a rational structure of the fleets and the Navy as a whole through a consistent, comprehensive analysis and generalization of the factors and conditions affecting organizational development, possible threats, and the character of naval warfare as well as by clarifying and developing the conceptual apparatus, regularities, patterns, and principles of formulating requirements for the Navy's organizational development (see Fig.).

The methodology is based on a systemic approach that helps to regard the Navy (a fleet) not only as an integrated hierarchic system, comprised of naval formations on different command levels that are united by a common functional objective, but also as a combat system, comprised of attack, command and control, support and combat service subsystems. The attack subsystem, which occupies a central place, is system-forming. It sets corresponding requirements for the other components. Therefore, substantiation of the attack subsystem's composition and organizational structure will lay the groundwork for substantiating the combat composition and organizational structure of naval forces on different levels of command and of the Navy as a whole. Subsequently, analysis of the operation of the attack subsystem will help to set requirements for command and control, support, and combat service subsystems and therefore, their composition.

[FIGURE OMITTED]

Practical implementation of research projects in the area of the Navy's organizational development should help to put in place a modern scientific-methodological apparatus ensuring objective substantiation of the combat composition and structure of naval formations on different command levels as well as of the Navy as a whole, in accordance with the tasks that have been set, and with the country's economic capability. The scientific-methodological apparatus for substantiating naval force development is an aggregate of algorithms, methodologies and procedures and practical recommendations adopted in the Navy for determining the composition and structure of naval formations and of the Navy as a whole at any stage of naval force development as well as on a long term basis. The present authors believe that it should be comprised of the following methodologies: systemic analysis of the objectives and tasks fulfilled by naval formations; formulation of requirements for the Navy's organizational development; determination of an optimal combat composition of naval formations for peacetime and for wartime; elaboration of a rational organizational structure of naval formations as well as of corresponding algorithms and applicable procedures.

The proposed methodology will help to continuously adjust the naval force development program as more effective models of weapons and military equipment are created, also to build the core of future naval formations (large operational units), to ensure operational preparation and accumulate experience, and as the economic situation improves, also to build them up to the required level. It also ensures, amid the uncertainty of the forecasting process, a more flexible response to changes in external and internal factors and conditions that substantially impact on the formation of the Navy's makeup and predetermine the processes of its evolution as an object of forecasting.

Substantiation of the combat composition and organizational structure of naval formations (the Navy) is based on the level of tasks that they are assigned. This lays the groundwork for determining the required composition of naval formations and the Navy as a whole, which helps appraise and evaluate the volume of resources that are needed for the Navy's organizational development and for its maintenance in due combat and mobilization readiness. It is important that a well-substantiated combat composition of the Navy, based on the need of ensuring the state's security, should not exceed the country's military-economic and mobilization capability. Should there be insufficient economic capability for the required naval force development, it is necessary to moderate the state's military-political ambitions and reduce the geographical scope of naval activity in peacetime and in wartime.

On the other hand, there is a need for a search for new, low-cost forms and methods of employing naval formations that would help to fulfill set tasks with the same effectiveness but with smaller assets.

The theory and practice of naval force development is based on the achievements of the military and other sciences and the propositions of the military and naval doctrines, and are developing under the impact of external and internal military-political and socio-economic factors, taking into account Russia's geostrategic situation, the physical-geographic conditions, and the operational organization of maritime theaters. Just like any complex system, the Navy is exposed to the impact of external and internal factors and conditions. The main ones of them, affecting the substantiation of the requirements for naval formations, their composition and organizational structure, are as follows: the military-political situation; the scope and character of threats in maritime (naval) sectors; the composition, status, and development of the naval forces of a possible adversary and its naval doctrine; the forms of the employment of naval formations on different levels of command; the appearance of new and the upgrading of existing models of weapon systems and military equipment; enhancement of the country's economic and military-technical capability; and military-geographic conditions in which naval formations will have to operate.

In the 21st century, naval force development will be affected by new factors and conditions, including the growing role of the World Ocean and outer space as an environment of possible warfare; the changing character of warfare--a consistent transition from the destruction of targets to the disruption or modification of their functioning; the emergence of peacetime tasks (say, war prevention) whose fulfillment can achieve objectives no less significant than war itself; a more rapid replacement of new generations of weapon systems in relation to the time that it takes to build warships; a more frequent change in forms and methods of naval warfare, resulting from a more rapid replacement of new generations of weapon systems; the growing role of general purpose forces, resulting from the development of precision guided weapons that have closely approached the effectiveness of nuclear weapons; the growing importance of information assets in the combat capability of naval formations; the need for the standardization of weapon systems, combat and technical assets, energy consumption characteristics, and fuel and lubricating materials that are used; the independent cruising capacity and seaworthiness of naval formations; and the impossibility of inter-branch (inter-arms) redeployment of naval forces (except for a small part of naval infantry and aviation) owing to the considerable distances between the fleets and an adversary's superiority along sea communication lines should a large-scale armed conflict break out.

All of this requires clarification and updating of the conceptual apparatus that is used in the naval force development theory. Definitions of naval force development that occur in dictionaries, research papers and articles give priority to the organizational development of specific combat arms.

The present authors believe that the following definition is more expedient, corresponding to the basic patterns and principles of naval force development. Naval force development is a system of scientifically substantiated and interconnected activities designed to create, prepare, and develop naval formations and troops, and to improve their composition and organizational structure, command and control, support, and maintenance assets; to provide them with weapons and military equipment; to put in place a basing and deployment system and the entire infrastructure; to prepare oceanic (maritime) operation theaters; to train highly qualified personnel, reserves, and mobilization capacity; to ensure combat and mobilization readiness; and to educate and indoctrinate military personnel.

Such concepts as "mixed arms combat force," "organizational structure," and "balanced mix" require clarification. A number of new concepts are emerging: "the Navy's makeup," "required combat composition," "possible combat composition," "operational/strategic, operational, and operational/tactical requirements," and so forth.* It does not appear possible within the confines of the present article to analyze, clarify, and spell out these concepts in detail, but this is one of the major tasks of the naval force development theory.

The naval force development theory is built on general force development patterns as well as on its specific patterns. Analysis of the naval force development process shows that there are two tiers (groups) of patterns here.

The first group is comprised of patterns that predetermine the dependence of the naval force development process on external factors and conditions. These include: the dependence of the scale and vector of force development on the state's naval policy and the character of the military-political situation in the world; the dependence of the scale and quality of force development on the state's material, financial, intellectual, and moral capacity; the dependence of the force development process on the forecasted character of naval warfare; the dependence of the quality of military equipment that is created for the Navy on the level of scientific-technical progress; and geopolitical factors (the geographic position and natural and environmental conditions) in naval force development, its character and substance.

The second group is comprised of patterns concerning specific elements of the naval force development process. These include the dependence of a fleet's combat composition and organizational structure on the tasks, forms, modes, and methods of naval force employment; the dependence of the composition and structure of naval formations on the quality and quantity of weapons and military equipment provided to the Navy; and the need for a systemic approach in substantiating the Navy's composition and organizational structure.

In accomplishing the set objectives in naval force development practice, in addition to a good knowledge of objective patterns and regularities, it is also necessary to apply an aggregate of naval force development principles--i.e., generalized, scientifically substantiated propositions, rules, procedures and recommendations that should be applied in practical activity in the course of naval force development. The basic principles here are as follows: the scientifically substantiated approach; compliance with the main propositions of the state's military and naval doctrines; conformity of the Navy's composition and structure to the character of future naval warfare as well as to its purpose; centralization and streamlining of the command and control system; conformity of the Navy's organizational structure and combat composition to its tasks, modes, and methods of combat employment; maximum harmonization between the Navy's organizational structure in peacetime and in wartime; the priority of qualitative indicators in the Navy's organization and development; the high mobility and capacity to conduct combat operations on land, at sea, in the air, and in outer space; the maximum independence of naval formations in performing their combat missions; advance preparation of the Navy for repulsing aggression, and its maintenance on a level of combat readiness sufficient to ensure reliable protection and defense of the state; ensuring the needed level of the Navy's operational efficiency with minimum outlays; a rational combination of naval manpower acquisition methods; advance stockpiling of supplies and preparation and accumulation of mobilization resources; and the use of domestic and international experience in naval force development.

These principles as well as the objectives, character, and conditions of modern naval warfare, the provisions of the RF Military and Naval Doctrines, and the state's economic capacity should lay the groundwork for formulating the requirements for naval formations under different levels of command (operational/strategic, operational, and operational/tactical). This refers to scientifically substantiated, officially established quantitative and qualitative characteristics, rules, needs, and requirements that naval formations should meet in order to fulfill the tasks that are set to them in peacetime or in wartime.

The principal requirements here are as follows: conformity of the organizational structure and combat capabilities of large combined units and units to the character of modern warfare, methods of conducting combat operations, the content and conditions of the tasks that they fulfill in different types, modes, and forms of military action conducted by mixed arms forces; the operational/tactical independence of military formations in performing combat missions and using different types of weapon systems; their high mobility and maneuverability; their ability to operate in designated areas independently or in interaction with other formations of the Navy or branches of service; the stability and standardization of the structure of troops (forces), eliminating the need for its frequent revision to adapt to changes in strength levels and the level of arms and equipment supply; the flexibility, reliability, and continuity of command and control; the ability to conduct combat operations in different physical-geographic conditions; the simplicity and economic expediency of the organizational structure of naval formations; the standardization of weapons (weapon systems) and means of their delivery that are used by these naval formations; the ability to adapt to wartime organization quickly and with minimum changes; the ability to build up the combat capability of naval formations and troops without restructuring, in proportion to the increase (intensity) in the military threat in maritime sectors; ensuring electromagnetic interoperability (compatibility) of different models of weapon systems and military equipment; putting in place a unified information area and information sharing capacity in real time; putting in place a unified weapon control system; the high degree of concealment and survivability of mixed arms forces (formations); the T/O structure should maximally measure up to wartime needs and requirements and not be subject to substantial structural changes in the course of a transition to a war footing as troops (forces) should be prepared according to the same operational training programs and be ready to perform peace time missions in any part of the World Ocean.

Methodologically, the elaboration of these requirements should be based on the basic principles of the Navy's organizational development as well as external and internal factors and conditions affecting the formulation of these requirements that in their turn are based on analysis of possible military-political options, prospects for the development of the naval forces of a possible adversary, the possible character of future armed conflicts, and forecasts of the Navy's tasks and forms, modes, and methods of their fulfillment. Special priority in substantiating these requirements is given to such factors as the creation and adoption for service of basically new models of weapons and military equipment as well as the geographical (spatial) scope and dynamism of combat action.

The present authors believe that the proposed methodology offers two ways of substantiating the Navy's organizational development while the scientific/methodological apparatus is a practical tool that will help to make expedient, scientifically substantiated decisions.

The theory of the Navy's organizational development is organically linked with practice. The principal and ultimate manifestation of practice is warfare. Combat experience provides extensive factual material for the theoretical generalization and elaboration of new propositions for upgrading the Navy's structure and combat composition. Thorough analysis of local wars and armed conflicts of the past few decades, the experience in domestic and foreign naval force development, and scientifically substantiated forecasting of the character of future warfare and trends in the evolution of weapon systems help to enrich the naval force development theory with new propositions and recommendations, and put it on a higher level.

NOTES:

1. B. Zherve, "Iz diskussii v auditorii voyenno-morskogo dela," Morskoy sbornik, No. 1-2, 1922, pp. 82-84.

2. See: V.I. Kuroyedov, M.V. Moskovenko, "O natsionalnoy morskoy politike Rossii," Voennaia mysl', No. 1, 2002, p. 15.

Vice Admiral Yu.P. GLADYSHEV

Doctor of Political Science

Rear Admiral I.Ia. PETRENKO

* These concepts were used in substantiating naval force development requirements before, and are therefore not new: Their content may need clarification though.--Ed.