Nathalie Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution. Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus?

Nathalie Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution. Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus? (London: Ashgate, 2004) ISBN 0754643107 (hardback); 216 pages; 55 [pounds sterling].

On 21 April 2004 European Union (EU) Enlargement Commissioner, Gunter Verheugen, made an unusually strong statement. He said: "I am going to be very undiplomatic now. I feel cheated by the Greek Cypriot government. We had a clear agreement on this point. Mr Papadopoulos must respect his part of the deal. Under no circumstances was a resolution to the conflict to fail as a result of opposition from the Greek Cypriot authorities." (1) The reason for Verheugen's despair was that a large scale effort to broker a peace deal on the island of Cyprus involving the United Nations (UN) and, for the first time, the EU was about to fail. On 24 April 2004 Greek and Turkish Cypriots decided in separate and simultaneous referenda on whether a united Cyprus would join the European Union on 1 May 2004. While Turkish Cypriots accepted the UN blueprint with 64.91% in favour, Greek Cypriots rejected it with an overwhelming majority of 75.83%. The EU had hoped that the incentive of EU membership would have worked as a catalyst for a solution. While it certainly had a decisive effect on political changes both in Turkey and in Northern Cyprus the process was finally torpedoed by the Greek Cypriot side. Apparently, this came as a shock to the European Commission. How could it be that the entire Union did not anticipate this development? Was the EU wrong to think that the framework of the Union could have helped to find a solution on the island? Or did the Union's efforts simply fail because of poor management of the concept? These questions are addressed in Nathalie Tocci's study on the connection between EU accession dynamics and conflict resolution in Cyprus.

Tocci starts her study with a theoretical overview on methods of bargaining, negotiation strategies and the role of mediators in conflict resolution. She assesses the arguments on the so-called 'Conflict Settlement Approach' and emphasises the importance of the recognition of the existence of a "Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)" for parties in conflict. This BATNA constitutes the biggest obstacle to any conflict resolution approach since it provides a context in which a non-solution might be perceived as better than a mutually agreed settlement in which at least one party to a conflict perceives the solution as unsatisfactory.

Tocci introduces in the second chapter, "The Actors in the Cyprus Conflict", the principal parties involved in the Cyprus conflict. The different approaches, interests and policies of Greek-Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and Greece, the United Kingdom, other EU countries, the EU Commission, the United Nations and last but not least the United States are discussed. While both communities of Cyprus and their respective "motherlands" did have genuine interests on the island, this was only to a lesser extent true for the UK. Other EU countries and EU institutions were rather uninterested and as a result lacked indepth knowledge of the entire affair.

The following chapter, "The Emerge and Persistence of the Cyprus Conflict", provides basically a short overview of the history of the conflict from the 1930s to 1988. Based on rather weak sources on the historical aspects of the conflict this is not the strongest chapter of what is in many other respects an excellent work. It repeoduces inaccuracies in its reliance on unproven and highly disputed claims involving the Ottoman conquest in 1571: "due to the system of tribute payment (...) many Christians converted to Islam." Some of the most reliable historians of today argue that the number of conversions in Cyprus seems to have been low and the tax system did not encourage non-Muslim communities like that of the Greek-Orthodox to change their religion. Another questionable assumption (stemming from Kyriakides) (2) is the notion that the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves, which were build in 1963/4, "were concentrated in the triangular area north of Nicosia's green line to the Hillarion path outside Kyrenia and to Famagusta." If this information was correct there would have been hardly any Turkish Cypriot refugees in 1974 since most of them would already have been residing in the north. In fact there were large enclaves in the districts of Larnaca, Limassol and Paphos. Furthermore, the author argues that, particularly since 1974, failure to reach an agreement was due to the relatively high BATNA of principal parties, particularly as perceived by their leaderships. The Greek Cypriots were only prepared to accept a settlement leading to an improvement of the status quo. They were reluctant to give up their political status as effective controllers of the Government of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot administration, despite the fact that they were internationally not recognised, was relatively content with the post-1974 status quo. They exercised effective control over northern Cyprus and were recognised as a government by their own community. The post-1974 status quo provided the Turkish-Cypriot administration with the unstinting support of Turkey both in terms of financial and military resources. Tocci concludes that these were the reasons why there could not be an understanding between the two communities, and this could also explain the absence of sufficient political commitment of all parties for an independent Cyprus.

Tocci's next focus is on the EU-Cyprus-Turkey relations within the EU enlargement context. She argues that up until late 2001 this policy created a critical approach and affected the evolution of the conflict in a negative way. However, the re-launch of the peace process, starting in 2002 and lasting until Cyprus' EU accession on 1 May 2004, changed the course again. The shift in discourse and the actions of the principal parties, particularly those of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides, were directly linked to developments in the EU relations.

In her chapter, "Incentives and Disincentives in the EU 'Catalytic Effect'", Tocci explains that the nature of "carrots and sticks" offered by the Union to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides, and the manner in which they were conditionally offered, had a counterproductive effect on the dynamics of the conflict. While the carrot was the offer of EU membership for Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, the stick was the accession of a divided Cyprus in which only the Greek side would have a say. However, the assumption that this policy would lead to a more flexible stance in Ankara and North-Nicosia proved wrong. Rather than aiding the search for alternative satisfiers, the accession process contributed to the entrenchment of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions. Furthermore, in their policies of conditionality, EU actors neglected and underestimated the extent to which the Greek Cypriot position was also an obstacle to the peace process. Tocci argues that they did so by raising the perceived Greek Cypriot BATNA, without inducing a reconceptualisation of traditional satisfiers. Here she refers to the decision made by the 1999 Helsinki Council to allow the Greek Cypriot community to enter the EU, even without fulfilling the conditionality of a negotiated settlement. Thus, the Greek Cypriot BATNA emerged in which a one-sided EU membership could become a position of strength in the discussions on Cyprus with Turkey. If non-EU member Turkey wished to join the Union, it was to agree to a settlement more favourable to the Greek Cypriot side. The EU carrot and stick policies finally produced a change of heart on the Turkish side. In 2002 the moderate pro-EU AKP came to power in Turkey and one year later a regime change took place in Northern Cyprus following large demonstrations in favour of the Annan Plan. While this was, at least in part, a success of EU policy, the Union had failed to follow up on developments in South Cyprus, notably the presidential election of an uncompromising nationalist, Tassos Papadopoulos. The 'catalytic effect' rested on the assumption that the EU, a principal mediator, would alter the incentives underlying the conflict. However, as Tocci explains, the EU failed to act as a single and coherent actor. Thus, she argues, the absence of a common EU strategy rendered Europe an ineffective catalyst, at least in respect to the Greek Cypriot side.

In the next chapter, titled "Explaining EU Policies Towards the Cyprus Conflict", Tocci elucidates the reasons for the EU failure to formulate a coherent policy on Cyprus. According to her EU policies were the product of the complex inter-relationship between internal EU factors, external developments and expectations. The internal factors consist of different approaches of EU member states towards Cyprus. While, with the exception of Greece, no other country had a real interest in the matter; France, Luxembourg and Ireland had from the beginning supported the Greek-Cypriot line, whereas Germany, Britain and The Netherlands were more sympathetic to Turkey's point of view. Subsequently, up to the early 1980s, the European Community (EC) followed a policy of even-handedness towards Cyprus. This changed in favour of the Greek Cypriots as a result of the following internal and international political events: the Turkish Cypriot's refusal to accept European funds transferred to the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), the Turkish Cypriot Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1983; Turkey's alienation from Europe during a period of political instability during the late 1970s and the role of its military since 1981 coupled with the EU membership of Greece. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) government under Costas Simitis played a decisive role in this as it threatened to block the entire EU enlargement process unless Cyprus was included. As a result, the Corfu European Council in 1994 included the island into the process. In February 1997 Greece vetoed a formulation brought in by Germany calling for a settlement prior to negotiations with Cyprus. At the Helsinki Council in 1999 the conditionality for Cyprus was finally lifted. Tocci draws attention to that because other member states did not take any interest in the matter; the EU policies affecting the conflict were mainly driven by Greece. This and EU ambivalence towards Turkey had played into the hands of Greek policy makers, who were thus able to play a pivotal role in the Union's approach towards Cyprus. The general neglect of Cyprus was mirrored in the conduct of EU institutions as well: The Council of Ministers, the European Council and the Presidency, with the exception of the 1994 six-month term of Greece, rarely focused on Cyprus. The European Commission addressed the problem almost exclusively as a matter of technicality of accession. The European Parliament displayed a combination of ignorance and imbalance further antagonizing the Turkish Cypriot leadership (In 2001 a European Parliament report stated that the government of Cyprus was negotiating on behalf of all Cypriots). In 1994 the European Court of Justice contributed to Turkish Cypriot perceptions that the EU's politicies were biased by effectively banning Turkish Cypriot exports to the EU. Tocci notes that as external factors were the driving force behind the EU's approach towards Cyprus, Greek Cypriot diplomacy presenting itself as the compromising party proved successful, whereas the perception of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot as one of 'Intransigence' was enforced by the UN Secretary General's reports on Cyprus. Finally, Tocci argues that the US, which as a non-member could only appeal for an even handed approach towards Turkey and Cyprus, was in fact accused of interfering in the EU's internal affairs.

The above-mentioned internal and external factors predominantly interacted by reinforcing each other over the course of the 1990s, and as such, crystallized the Union's 'non-strategy' towards Cyprus. Only by the turn of the century did the countervailing forces of a more concrete accession strategy for Turkey and North Cyprus begin to have some impact on EU policies. However, Tocci analyses these changes as being too little too late and, as such, they could not prevent the consolidation of partition as a divided Cyprus entered the Union.

The next main question to be tackled is whether the EU framework in the context of accession, if properly handled, could have provided a context for the solution of the Cyprus conflict. The author argues that the EU indeed had a number of assets which could have contributed towards a positive settlement. She quotes the EU constitution in which the difference between monolithic and shared sovereignty is fundamentally blurred. Many government tasks and responsibilities are transferred to Brussels. In Cyprus this would diminish the fields of direct dispute within a united federal state. Another EU feature potentially contributing to a Cyprus solution is the participation of sub-state actors in the Council of Ministers as, for example, is exercised by the federal entities of Belgium. The constituent states of Cyprus could thus have direct links with EU institutions. The model of European regions would equally benefit both parts of Cyprus and diminish the danger of confrontation on issues regarding solely one community on the island. Tocci stresses that the sub-state level of the EU would diminish the significance of annexation or succession in Cyprus, thus removing one of the historical burdens of the conflict. The EU would lessen the importance of linear borders and provide both sides with a framework of security guaranteeing (non-militarily) fundamental rights and constitutional order in Cyprus. In case of violations the EU Council could suspend certain rights deriving from the accession treaty of the party violating the constitution. Finally, Tocci stresses that the EU provides for derogations of the acquis communitaire in regard to the freedom of settlement and property. Citing the cases of the Aaland-Islands (Finland), Denmark, Malta and Poland, she explains that temporary or permanent derogations are permitted and reports that the Annan-Plan had taken these cases into consideration as regarding a numerical limitation of Greek-Cypriot settlement in the northern part of Cyprus. All these measures could have helped to diminish fears on both sides of the divide in Cyprus and contributed to a solution. Ultimately, they didn't. Identifying the flaws of EU policies, Tocci lists the lack of adequate information given to the Cypriots on the true nature of the EU, false myths on the constitutional status of Cyprus, myths on the acquis communitaire, the conflating of myth and reality concerning Turkey's relations with Cyprus, the notion that the EU would try to buy Turkish Cypriot consent through economic help and, finally, the failure to present all parties equally the possible negative effects of a non-agreement. Especially the EU's failure to implement a policy of conditionality that would have addressed intransigence on all sides contributed to the collapse of the peace process. In addition, Tocci accuses the EU of having embarked upon an accession process with Cyprus without an accompanying strategy for Turkey. This had been a key mistake at the heart of the failed 'catalytic effect'. Moreover, the author blames the EU actors for being partly responsible for the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan by lifting conditionality on the RoC. Nonetheless, Tocci reckons that the EU framework could have provided the opportunity to draw on new and mutual satisfiers, which could have increased the political will necessary to agree to and operate a federal government.

In the final chapter, "Lessons for European Foreign Policy in Ethno-Political Conflicts", Tocci introduces the determinants of European foreign policy as: external demands (i.e. the gap between external expectation and EU capabilities to respond to them), national interests (EU members trying to utilize the Union to strengthen their individual interests), institutions (complicated set up of EU institutions which in addition lack sufficient powers to take on common foreign policy) and europeanization (transformation of EU member states and their national foreign policies under the influence of the EU framework--i.e. Greece's shift from blocking to promoting the EU membership of Turkey).

Tocci concludes that "when faced with a typical foreign policy problem such as an ethno-political conflict, a traditional state actor is often far more effective at mobilising its resources, given the greater simplicity in its policy-making process" compared to a multi-level framework, like that of the EU. Such multi-level frameworks create obstacles to effective external action. Having said that, the author emphasises that, on the other hand, the unique resources offered by the non-nation state framework of the EU could actually have created the potential for a win-win agreement in Cyprus. As for the future, Tocci foresees that the role of EU lies at the heart of the matter in the progressive and endemic processes of europeanization as it was in Greece, Turkey and Northern Cyprus.

Overall Tocci managed to give a clear, well written and informed account on the mechanisms which were in place during the negotiations in Cyprus. By putting her finger right into the wounds of the EU's shortcomings in foreign policy making, she provides an extraordinary accurate narrative of the failure of the Annan Plan. Moreover, the work is essential reading for those who wish to analyse the needed institutional reforms to provide for an effective EU foreign policy that might in future function as catalyst for peace in Cyprus and elsewhere.

Endnotes

(1) Cyprus Mail, April 22, 2004.

(2) S. Kyriakides, Cyprus. Constitutionalism and Crisis Government, (Philadelphia, 1968), 112.

Jan Asmussen

Eastern Mediterranean University