Namibia: Assembly rejects 'linkage', calls for sanctions.

The General Assembly on 1 December firmly rejected and condemned attempts by the United States and South Africa to establish a linkage between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, and called on the Security Council to immediately impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions and a tighter arms embargo against South Africa. The Assembly took that action in adopting five resolutions (38/36 -A-E) recommended by the United Nations Council for Namibia.

Resolution 38/36 A, which concerns the situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal occupation of the Territory by South Africa, was approved by a recorded vote of 117 in favour to none against, with 28 abstentions. Among its 62 operative paragraphs are those in which the Assembly reaffirmed its earlier commitments regarding Namibia, including the United Nations' direct responsibility for the Territory, under resolution 2145 (XXI), until "genuine self-determination and national independence are achieved". It reaffirmed the Council for Namibia's mandate as the legal Administering Authority for the Territory until independence, as well as recognition of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) as the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people.

In other paragraphs, the Assembly

Condemned South Africa for its military build-up in Namiba and its persistent acts of aggression and subversion against Angola;

Condemned "the continuing military and nuclear collaboration on the part of certain Western countries and Israel" and the increased assistance to South Africa from the major Western countries and Israel;

Declared that the European Parliament's resolution of January 1983 calling on the European Economic community to extend aid to occupied Namibia and the "so-called 'refugees from southern Angola' in Namibia" flouted international law by implying recognition of South Africa's presence in the Territory, while encouraging its aggression against Angola;

Reiterated its call on all States to take measures to prevent the recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries for service in Namibia and asked them to provide assistance, including military assistance, to the front-line States;

Called on Member States and the specialized agencies and other international organizations to render assistance to sWAPO and provide increased aid to Namibian refugees;

Asked the Secretary-General to continue to develop, in consultation with United Nations Development Programme, a comprehensive programme of assistance to neighbouring States of South Africa and Namibia, to enable them to overcome short-term difficulties and move towards complete self-reliance;

Demanded the release of all Namibian political prisoners, declared South Africa liable for compensation to the victims and their families, and demanded that all captured freedom fighters be accorded prisoner-of-war status under the terms of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 

All activities of foreign economic interests in Namibia were declared illegal and liable for payment of damages to the future lawful Government. The Assembly asked the Secretary-General to ensure that all banks and other institutions with which the United Nations had contracts were in compliance with its sanctions against South Africa.

Resolution 38/36 B concerns implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The Assembly reiterated that that resolution, in which the Council endorsed the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, was the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia and demanded its "immediate and unconditional implementation without qualification, modification or amendment or the introduction of extraneous and irrelevant issues of 'linkage', 'parallelism' or 'reciprocity' insisted upon by the United States of America and South Africa".

(The United Nations plan was based on a proposal of five Western membes, later known as the "Western Contact Group"--Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom and United States. It called for: appointment of a Special Representative to ensure establishment of conditions for free and fair elections; realese of all Namibian political prisoners and return of all refugees; a cease-fire by all parties; and restriction to base of South African and SWAPO armed forces.)

The Assembly expressed its dismay at the fact that the Security Council had been prevented by its three Western permanent members (France, United Kingdom and United States) from adopting effective measures against South Africa. It requested the Council to act decisively against any "dilatory manoeuvres and fraudulent schemes" of the South African administration in Namibia aimed at frustrating the people's legitimate struggle for independence and urged the Council to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

The text was adopted by a recorded vote of 121 in favour to none against, with 26 abstentions.

In resolution 38/36 C, the Assembly made adequate financial provision for the programme of work of the United Nations Council for Namibia, as contained in the Council's report (document A/38/24). Among other activities, the Council was requested to undertake, in consultation with SWAPO, urgent consultations with the Commission of the European Communities and the European Parliament to ensure that no action was takenimplying recognition of South Africa's illegal administration in Namibia.

The Contact Group members abstained on Part C, which was adopted by a vote of 144 in favour to none against.

In resolution 38/36 D, concerning the dissemination of information and mobiliztion of international public opinion in support of Namibia, the Secretary-General was requested to ensure that the United Nations Department of Public Information assisted the Council for Namibia in implementing its programme of disemination of information.

The Assembly denounced the "collusion" of the United States, certain other Western countries and Israel with South Africa and, to that end, requested the council for Namibia to include various activities in its information programme for 1984. The Council was also asked to organize a symposium at Headquarters with the participation of prominent personalities, scholars, support groups and others to mark the 100the anniversary of the heroic struggle fo the Namibian people against colonial domination. (The year 1884 marked the beginning of German occupation of the territory.)

The Assembly allocated $300,000 to the Council for its programme of co-operation with non-governmental organizations, including support for conferences in solidarity with Namibia.

The text was adopted by a vote of 122 in favour to none against, with 22 abstentions.

Under resolution 38/36 E, the Assembly called for increased assistance from States to the United Nations Fund for Namibia, which includes the Trust Funds for the Nationhood Programme for Namibia and the United Nations institute for Namibia, and, as a temporary measure, allocated $1 million to the Fund from the regular United Nations budget for 1984. The Secretary-General was asked to continue to provide the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia with the necessary resources to execute its responsibilities as co-ordinator of assistance programmes.

The vote on the resolution was 144 in favour to none against, with 5 abstentions (Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdon, United States).

The extension of Brajesh Chandra Mishra's appointment as Commissioner for Namibia for another year, beginning 1 January 1984, was approved without a vote.

Some 120 speakers participated in discussion of the question of Namibia during seven meetings, beginning on 28 November.

Most speakers reaffirmed support for implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) as the only basis for a political solution to the problem of Namibia. There was widespread rejection of attempts to introduce "irrelevant and extraneous" issues to delay implementation, particulary South Africa's "linkage" of Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The notion of "linkage" was being used as a "smokescreen", it was said, to shift the blame for thwarting Namibian independence onto others.

There was no reason to delay implementation of resolution 435 (1978), several speakers said, since the Secretary-General's report had stated that all outstanding issues had been resolved. Some urged that a deadline be set for implementation of the United Nations plan and that South Africa be called on to communicate its choice of electoral systems without delay.

Several speakers said that if South Africa continued to resist the legitimate demand to end its illegal occupation of Namibia, the Namibian people would have no alternative but to continue their armed struggle under the leadership of SWAPO. Many felt it was time to apply comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Several speakers attributed the delay in implementation of resolution 435 (1978) to the United States' policy of "constructive engagement". South Africa had been able to act with impunity, said some, because of the continued support of "ceratin Western Countries", especially the United States, and Israel. Co-operation of those States with South Africa in the nuclear field was condemned by several speakers, as was the continued support of the racist regime by the Western transnational corporations. There was concern about the continued military and other assistance rendered to South Africa by its Western allies. Several speakers condemned the economic exploitation of Namibia by those States.

Attacks on the front-line States, including Angola, were also condemned by serveral speakers. The international community was urged to provide development assistance to those countries, as well as humanitarian assistance for refugees in the region.

Although many States endorsed the recommendations of the Council for Namibia, as contained in the resolutions, some expressed opposition to what they saw as "discriminatory language" in the texts. Singling out individual countries was "divisive", they felt. Despite broad support for SWAPO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Namibian people, there were speakers who felt the United Nations should not, in its resolutions, endorse violence or armed struggle.

The South West Africa People's Organization said that recently observers had said support for SWAPO was massive and "it would easily be victorious in any free and fair election." Ironically, the Botha regime itself had discovered in a secret poll that SWAPO would win by a vote of more than 80 per cent. That was a bitter pill for South Africa to swallow; hence, the massive military build-up and incessant cycle of anti-SWAPO alliances.

South Africa had been enabled to circumvent all embargoes while using its military arsenal not only against the peoples of Namibia and South Africa but also against the independent African States with which the major Western Powers professed to maintain friendly relations. The duplicity of those Powers was even more obnoxious in the context of the Namibian independence negotiations, where their role had turned out to be that of carrying out a "mere rescue operation" in favour of the interests of the racist white-minority settlers, while undermining the interests of the African majority. The most alarming development was that the Pretoria racists had been assisted in acquiring nuclear capability.

Namibians had resorted to arms to create conditions for peace and climate for conciliation and reconciliation after all avenues for peaceful solution had been blocked and their demands for change had met with violent force from South Africa. Even so, they had agreed to participate in democratic and internationally controlled elections based on Security Council resolution 435 (1978). But South Africa had dug in its heels, thereby causing more violent.

It was the United States acting in concert with South Africa which had delayed Namibia's independence. The essence of Security Council resolution 539 (1983) was the catergorical rejection of the "obnoxious, extraneous and irrelevant notions of parallelism or reciprocity that were brought into the negotiations by the United States and embraced eagerly by the apartheid regime".

Africa was unanimous in strongly condemning the unholy alliance between Washington and Pretoria and the so-called policy of "constructive engagement". The moment of decision would come soon when the Security Concil met to review progress in implementation of the United Nations plan. It was clear the racist regime was headed towards confrontation and more bloodshed. Under the circumstances, the only viable alternative was the immediate imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Chapter. SWAPO fully endorsed the President of Angola's call for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the racist troops occupying Angolan teritory; an end to South Africa's attacks on Angola and to support for the "gangs of UNITA puppets terroizing Angolan towns"; and immediate implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

SWAPO's response to the continued military build-up and terrorism of South Africa would be to intensify the armed struggle. If and when the racists showed readiness to implement the United Nations plan, however, SWAPO would sign a cease-fire and co-operate with the Secretary-General in that implementation.

The Federal Republic of Germany, speaking on behalf of the five members of the Western Contact Group said that in light of the Group's involvement in the formulation of the United Nations settlement plan and subsequent negotiations aimed at its implementation, its policy had been not to adopt a substantive position on Assembly resolutions concerning Namibia. Therefore, although the Contact Group members had reservations on certain aspects of the texts, they would abstain in the vote on all five resolutions.

Angola said it should be a matter of shame for the entire international community that it had not yet been able to assist the Namibian people in freeing themselves from the death grip of the racist armed forces of South Africa and its imperialist allies. The racist regime's present intentions vis-a-vis Namibia were rooted in its expansionist history. Sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter were long overdue.

Some 734 million South African Rand (approximately US $873 million) were spent per year for the racist regime's troops in Namibia, said Angola. Those included "counter-insurgency forces", commandos, paramilitary police and the Koevoet Unit, an assassination squad, as well as almost 3,000 foreign mercernaries--mainly from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Austrailia, Chile and Israel. Over 100,000 occupation forces were stationed on 90 South African bases in Namibia, with special units in Walvis Bay. That was what the major Western allies of the racist regime supported, the United States policy of "constructive engagement" encouraged and the transnational corporations strengthened by supporting South Africa's military establishment.

But the racist regime's colonialism was not limited to Namibia. Al sovereign States of southern Africa had been threatened and attacked by the racist armed forces. Time and again, Angola had brought the issue of South African aggresion against it to the Security Council. O far, the Council had proved powerless to do anything to assist the victims of that aggression.

Botswana said that throughout the search for a solution to the Namibia question, the Western Five and the front-line States had understood each other's responsibilites. The front-line States were responsible for ensuring that their friends in SWAPO were not unreasonable in their approach to the negotiations, while the Five had assumed the same responsibility towards their friend, South Africa.

The front-line Sttes and SWAPO felt cheated, said Botswana. In return for their co-operation with the Western Five, they had been subjected to three years of arguing against "flying saucers and mirages such as linkage, parallelism and reciprocity". South Africa, instead of being pressured to co-operate in implementing the United Nations plan, had been handed a "golden excuse"--linkage--to remain ensconced in the Territory, in defiance of the United Nations.

Botswana called for withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and an end to attacks on that country by South Africa, using Namibia as a base. Angola could not be expected to co-operate in implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978) while it was being subjected to persistent attacks of terrorism perpetrated by South Africa. The Western Five should make clear to South Africa should make clear to South Africa that the linkage must abandoned once and for all; that speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978) was in South Africa's best interest; that continuation of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia was a threat to peace and stability in southern Africa; and that South Africa would be deluding itself if it saw its future through the prism of military invincibility.

Mozambique said the Pretoria regime had demonstrated time and again that there would be no self-determination and independence for Namibia unless it were assured there would be no victory for SWAPO. Today, more than ever before, there was little chance SWAPO could be defeated in the polls.

The countries of the so-called Western Contact Group were heavily involved in the exploitation of Namibia's natural resources, said Mozambique. Three of them were partly dependent on Namibian uranium for their own energy supplies. Those activities were illegal under international law. The Five were seeking a solution that would allay their fears about a takeover by SWAPO and had been working on a plan to provide guarantees for their privileges and economic holdings in Namibia. The build-up of Western power on the African continent was designed to reverse the political and military defeats of the past two decades and annihilate the national liberation movement.

In view of the "protective shield" provided by some Western countries and the past record of South Africa on the Namibia issue, it was difficult to believe they were now sincere. Therefore, the struggle for liberation of Namibia and South Africa continued unabated, in Mozambique's view.

United Republic of Tanzania said that apart from the recalcitrance of apartheid South Africa, nothing had contributed more to the undoing of the understandings reached so far regarding Namibia than the so-called policy of "constructive engagement", of which the "notorious linkage" was an integral part. Constructive engagement was based on the erroneous assumption that the United States could exercise influence over South Africa through co-operation and close friendship with the apartheid regime. But nothing positive had come of three years of that engagement. The policy of linkage was not only inimical to Namibian independence but also undermined the future security of the region as a whole.

Complementing its political support for South Africa were American investments in the apartheid economy, a new Consular treaty and exchange of military, intelligence and policy personnel. South Africa had received the most sophisticated armaments and delivery systems, including technology and personnel to assist in developing the nuclear bomb.

It was immoral to ascribe responsibility for the non-implementation of resolution 435 (1978) to Angola. Although the United States and South Africa were primarily responsible, some of the other Contact Group members, whose "benign silence" was not accidental, were also responsible for the delay.

Zambia said that time and again, South Africa had claimed to be in favour of a negotiated "internationally acceptable settlement" of the Namibia question. But in practice, the record was replete with manoeuvres designed to perpetuate its stranglehold on Namibia. Resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) epitomized the willingness of the United Nations to help South Africa withdraw from Namibia honourably. The holding of free and fair elections was a democratic principle to which even the pretoria regime purported to be committed. Yet because if feared a SWAPO victory, South Africa had continued to procrastinate and prevaricate.

In its insistence on linking Namibia's independence to withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, South Africa sought to place a matter of decolonization in the context of East-West rivalries. How ironic that a key member of the Contact Group should now join hands with the South African regime in preventing implementation of resolution 435 (1978), which had been adopted by the Council on the initiative of that Group. The front-line States demanded that South Africa respond positively to the Council's request in resolution 539 (1983) that it urgently c ommunicate to the Secretary-General its choice of electoral system to be used in Namibia.

Zimbabwe said that by its "characteristically arrogant defiance" of the international community, the Pretoria regime had been deliberately frustrating a peaceful political solution to the Namibian question. In opting for armed struggle as the most appropriate response, the people of Namibia had not, however, slammed the door to a peaceful settlement. Thus SWAPO had thrown its maximum support behind the United Nations plan, contained in resolution 435 (1978), despite its obvious flaws. Since 1978, however, South Africa had used one pretext after another to frustrate implementation of the plan.

Linkage, parallelism or reciprocity, as it was now called by Pretoria and its allies, had been rejected by the front-line States, the General Assembly, the Seventh Summit conference of the Non-Aligned, the Paris Conference on Namibia, the OAU and the Security Council. It was also a blatant interference in the internal and external affairs of Angola and Cuba. The international community must continue to demant that South Africa co-operate immediately with the Secretary-General in his efforts to launch the United Nations plan.

Zimbabwe codemned in the strongest terms South Africa's aggression against Angola, its policies of repression and exploitation in Namibia and South Africa, and its campaigns of terror, blackmail and destabilization. No amount of appeasement, or "constructive engagement", as some euphemistically called it, would alter the Pretoria regime's brutal nature.

China said that every time a round of negotiations on the situation in Namibia reached the stage where progress was in sight, South Africa put forward new issues and upgraded its demands. To link the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was yet another pretext to delay implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The criminal acts of the South African authorities were inseparable from the connivance and support of a certain super-Power, which pursued a policy of so-called "constructive engagement", expanding its relations with South Africa in numerous fields, further inflating the arrogance of the South African authorities.

In obdurately sticking to its position of linkage, South Africa was threatening its neighbours and "even the whole world" with confrontation. "This we certainly cannot tolerate", China said. The United Nations should call on the international community to pressure South Africa to implement Council resolution 435 (1978). It should also call on all Governments to implement Security Council resolutions on the arms embargo against South Africa and to apply comprehensive, mandatory sanctions, including an oil embargo, against it.

The USSR said the United States and some other Western Powers were protecting South Africa from effective international sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, claiming they were trying to convince Pretoria to grant independence to Namibia in a peaceful way. The concessions they were proposing would result in a neo-colonialist solution to the problems of Namibia and southern Africa as a whole. All the promises and false optimism expressed by the Western Powers in the years since resolution 435 (1978) was passed were nothing more than a smokescreen to postpone "for decades" Namibia's liberation.

If recently the Western Powers had played the role of mediator, now Washington had thrown off that mask and was threatening to use the problem of Namibia for its own hegemonistic ends in Africa, primarily by demanding "linkage" between the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and settlement of the Namibia problem. The international community had firmly rejected all attempts at linkage. The Soviet Union stressed the importance of ensuring that all States respected the arms embargo against South Africa and halted co-operation in the political, economic and military fields. The Security Council must also adopt the necessary measures to prevent South Africa from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Cuba said the so-called linkage of Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola was as "spurious and mendacious" as the arguments used by the United States to justify its "piratical" invasion of Grenada, Cuba said. Beore 1975, there had been no Cuban forces in Angola. The country was dominated by the Portuguese colonialists, close allies of the Pretoria regime. What had prevented South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia then? If, in strict compliance with resolution 435 (1978), a genuinely independent government were achieved in Namibia and all South African occupation troops were withdrawn to the other side of the Orange River, then the Angolan and Cuban Governments would begin to discuss the withdrawal of Cuban forces.

The apartheid regime continued to illegally occupy the Territory, to attack neighbouring countries and the front-line States and occupy part of Angola, Cuba said. It was therefore time to apply comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter and to give every possible support to SWAPO and "SWAPO's strong rear guard", the front-line States.

India, speaking in behalf of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, said the "seemingly interminable bondage of the Namibian people" was a matter of "anguish and anger for freedom-loving peoples everywhere". In March 1983, the Heads of State of the Non-aligned Countries had reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination and national independence in a united Namibia, including Walvis Bay, the Penguin Islands and othe adjacent offshore islands. They had reitrerated their support for the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole authentic and legitimate representative, pledging increased material, financial, military, political, humanitarian, diplomatic and moral assistance to SWAPO for the intensification of its struggle on all fronts.

The Non-Aligned had denounced the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of Namibia, stressing that it violated the Charter and posed an obstacle to the political independence of Namibia.

Regarding diplomatic efforts aimed at settlement of the Namibian question, the Non-Aligned had expressed deep concern that the Territory's independence continued to be obstructed by South Africa's persistent refusal to comply with relevant United Nations resolutions and decisions. They had reiterated their support for resolution 435 (1978) as the only basis for peaceful settlement of the Namibia question. They had categorically rejected linkage of Namibian independence to withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, deeming it an "unwarranted interference" in Angola's internal affairs.

How paradoxical it was that some who had played a leaing role in elaborating the United Nations plan should now be ambivalent on the question of linkage, India said. Distortion of a decolonization issue into one of ideological or East-West confrontation was unacceptable.

the So-called question of linakge was just another in a series of pretexts adduced by Pretoria over the years to maintain its vicelike grip on Namibia. South Africa's enormous economic stake in Namibia--shared by some other countries with the occupying Administrations's blessing--was obviously sufficient incentive to find those pretexts. India hoped that resolution 539 (1983), rejecting linkage, would be the harbinger of greater political will on the part of those in a position to pressure South Africa to abandon its present policy. They should also, said India, be prepared to join in imposing comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against that regime.