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NRC MONTHLY INSPECTION REPORT AT PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

 PLYMOUTH, Mass., Feb. 8 /PRNewswire/ -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently reported on its ongoing routine safety inspection program at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Areas relevant to the health and safety of the general public are routinely examined and reported upon.
 Inspection report 92-28 covered the period Nov. 24 through Dec. 31, 1992, which includes the storm of December 11 through 14. During the reporting period, Pilgrim Station experienced two reactor trips, one storm-related on Dec. 13 and one due to personnel error on Dec. 20.
 The report contains positive comments about the operating staff's response to the storm, and a Notice of Violation for the plant trip of Dec. 20, which resulted from improperly adjusted set points in the main steam line radiation detection instrumentation.
 The executive summary of the NRC monthly inspection report is attached to this advisory. Further details on specific items may be obtained by contacting the Nuclear Information Office.


Pilgrim Inspection Report 50-293/92-28
 Plant Operations -- Operations Section preparation for and reponse to the effects of a northeaster storm were comprehensive. Decisions to maintain reduced reactor power at the 80% rod pattern line and to separate the safety-related buses from the distribution system demonstrated a strong safety perspective.
 The immediate response by operators to two automatic reactor trips was appropriate. Communications, use of procedures, and supervisory oversight of control room operations were excellent during post-trip recovery activities and subsequent reactor startups. Also, the identification of loose or missing bolts on motor operated valve actuator limit switch covers during routine rounds indicated good questioning attitudes and attention to detail by plant operators.
 Maintenance and Surveillance -- Actions taken to verify the presence of and trend the effect of steam leakage past safety relieve valve (SRV) RV 203-3A were thorough. Although not required by Technical Specifications (TS), the decision to establish cold shutdown and replace the leaking SRV pilot valve following an unrelated plant shutdown demonstrated sound safety judgment. In addition, coordination between the materials & component engineering section, maintenance personnel, and system engineers to complete the repair during this unscheduled maintenance period was outstanding. Restoration from the backfeed electrical lineup following post trip corrective maintenance was performed. Maintenance and operations personnel demonstrated excellent procedural knowledge and communications.
 An automatic reactor trip on Dec. 20 was caused by procedural weaknesses and poor work practices by technicians changing the main steam line (MSL) high radiation protective setpoints. Also, the technicians failed to lower the MSL high radiation alarm setpoints following the reactor trip. As a result, the MSL high radiation alarm was not available to control room operators upon the subsequent plant restart. Failure to properly reestablish the MSL high radiation protective setpoints and associated failure of the management review process on two occasions indicates a need for greater management attention.
 Emergency Preparedness -- The capability to draw, analyze, and provide real time post-accident sampling system data under simulated emergency conditions was successfully demonstrated in a December drill.
 Safety Assessment and Quality Verification -- Implementation of Phase II of a planned three phase structural reorganization, to become effective January 1, 1993, was announced on December 16, 1992. Licensee event reports (LERs) were of good detail, accurate, and clearly identified root cause and corrective action, detailed and properly addressed in required reporting criteria.
 Engineering and Technical Support -- Deactivated head spray line containment isolation valves remain to be removed from the Type C local leak rate test program. Several questions regarding American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code criteria and the technical basis of certain aspects of the head spray line deactivation plant design change remain unresolved.
 Continuing NRC review of the licensee reactor vessel water level instrumentation spiking status determined the operability assessment was consistent with the guidance of NRC generic documentation for degraded or nonconforming conditions on operability.
 -0- 2/8/93
 /CONTACT: David Tarantino, Anita Flanagan or Frank Creane of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 508-224-4803 (24 hours)/


CO: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Boston Edison Company ST: Massachusetts IN: OIL SU:

TM -- NE013 -- 4190 02/08/93 14:53 EST
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