NLOS battalion fires and effects in the UA of 2015.

In October 1999, the Chief of Staff of the Army announced his plans to transform the Army into an Objective Force that would be more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable. Figure 1 describes the transformational operational characteristics of the Objective Force maneuver unit of action (UA). Perhaps no better example of this transformation is the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) battalion that will be organic to this UA.

The NLOS battalion of 2015 will be nothing like the direct support (DS) battalion of current operating forces. It will transcend current and Stryker force DS artillery by applying a wider range of capabilities and being fully integrated with maneuver to conduct military operations across the conflict spectrum to achieve overmatch and decision. It will be organized with a mix of capabilities to make it more agile, lethal and survivable: extended range and enhanced targeting and counterstrike, precision and area cannon and missile effects.

Although the NLOS battalion will be smaller than today's DS battalion, it will have the lethality of today's division artillery. In large part, this lethality will be realized through advanced technologies applied to the UA's family of future combat systems (FCS).

The DS battalion today is challenged to attack high-payoff targets (HPTs) for the brigade commander while being responsive to the most dangerous targets that present themselves to maneuver companies and battalions that are not the main effort. Although Paladin is a capable cannon, it has a relatively slow rate-of-fire; in addition, it is the unit's main source of firepower.

The DS battalion lacks the mix of target acquisition (TA) systems and munitions to operate in the contemporary operational environment (COE). It must depend upon high-volume area munitions for lethality and has a limited suite of munitions: only Copperhead as a precision munition and smoke and illumination as nonlethal munitions.

Mechanized FA battalions are limited in their strategic deployability. Additionally, today's battalions do not have the fully integrated, digitized command and control system that will exist in 2015, known as "networked fires." (For more information about networked fires, see the sidebar "Networked Fires for the Objective Force" on Page 37.)

In short, the NLOS battalion will be able to provide fires with greater precision and more devastating target effects in close support while simultaneously supporting shaping and counterstrike operations.

This article describes how the Objective Force UA will fight, what the organization and capabilities of the NLOS battalion will be, what the battalion's command and support relationships will be and what warfighting tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are emerging from recent experimentation and exercises. Last, we highlight some new responsibilities of the NLOS battalion's leaders and soldiers.

The UA Fight. The UA will fight unlike tactical forces of today. It will be the decisive element in the Objective Force that closes with and destroys the enemy in any operation against any level of threat in any environment. The UA will operate within a new tactical paradigm based on "quality of firsts": the ability to see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively.

Once the National Command Authority (NCA) decides to commit a UA, operations will begin in the motor pools at home station using the battle command system (BCS) on board the FCS. With access to the global information grid (GIG), the UA will receive intelligence about the area of impending operations. With a 75-kilometer operational radius, planners will use tools built into the BCS to focus on the precise information commanders need to develop plans and orders before deploying and en route to the theater of operations.

With respect to UA fires, the decision-making process will designate specific targets for attack. Experimentation has shown that not every HPT must be attacked to begin the disintegration of an enemy force. Commanders and fires and effects personnel rapidly will input the critical elements of the commander's scheme of fires into BCS. This process will be much more dynamic than it is today.

Concurrently, higher-level assets at the joint/unit of employment (UE) level above the UA will continue to add sensor information to provide more fidelity for subordinate planners and begin shaping the battlespace with fires and effects to allow the successful entrance of the UA(s). En route (via sea, air or ground) the UA will continue to modify and rehearse plans, allowing it to arrive in the area of operations (AO) ready to start engaging the enemy.

Upon arrival, the major difference between maneuver in the Objective Force and our current operating forces can best be described as maneuver s exercising "tactical patience." Capitalizing on the success of higher-level and organic sensors and fires, the UA will develop the situation out-of-contact.

Networked fires will link relevant sensors to shooters, enabling all levels to better receive effects when required. Done correctly, the combination of fires and maneuver will create the conditions for decisive operations. Close tactical assault no longer will be the only operation to achieve combat decision. If required, the UA will execute close combat, confident that the conditions will have been set for it to achieve decision rapidly with minimal risk to forces and equipment.

Engaging the enemy out-of-contact means the UA will be able to move with speed and agility, coming at the enemy in unexpected ways from unimproved aerial/sea ports of embarkation (A/SPOEs) and arriving at a position of advantage. From that position, the UA will use fires and effects to engage the enemy beyond the range of his weapons and use sensors and effects-producing platforms to set the conditions for follow-on engagements.

The purpose of the position of advantage is to present the enemy with a dilemma. He will be able to remain in place and be destroyed by fires and effects or move and be destroyed by maneuver forces assaulting at the time and place of their choosing and supported by fires.

Although not necessarily sequential, it is the combination of fires (precision and volume) and maneuver (with tactical assault, if required) that will make the enemy's dilemma so difficult. The cumulative effects of simultaneous, multi-dimensional operations will enable the UA to dominate an adversary by destroying, dislocating or disintegrating him and then transition to the next engagement.

NLOS Battalion Organization. For the battalion to fight as part of a UA, the NLOS battalion must have a unique design and increased capabilities.

At first glance, many may be disturbed by the reduced size of the NLOS battalion without considering its increased capabilities. The battalion will have 176 personnel organized into a headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) and three NLOS batteries. Figure 2 depicts the command group that will include the command integration cell (GIG) with human resource (51), sustainment (S4), signal and operations personnel. Figure 3 shows HHB, and Figure 4 on Page 36 shows a firing battery.

While technological innovations enable the reduction of some personnel in the UA, there are three main reasons why the NLOS battalion will be significantly smaller than the DS battalion of today: it will need fewer sustainment personnel for more reliable FCS systems, need a smaller number of crew/ support personnel who use more automation and robotics, and have no fire support personnel.

Sustainment and Reliability. First, with the exception of a battalion sustainment officer and NGO (S4) and battery supply sergeants, there will be no sustainment or maintenance personnel in the NLOS battalion.

BCS will track the NLOS battalion's supply needs for the forward support battalion (FSB) to provide all classes of supply, maintenance and recovery directly or deliver a smaller artillery-specific portion to an NLOS battery that is part of a combined arms battalion (CAB). The latter would be through the CAB' s sustainment replenishment operations (SROs).

The facts that the FCS family of vehicles will be more reliable and that the NLOS battalion (and UA) will have a fewer number and types of vehicles will reduce maintenance requirements.

Automation and Robotics. Second, enabled by significant improvements in automation and robotics, the NLOS battalion will operate more efficiently and at a different level of performance for certain tasks.

A few of these technology enablers are as follows.

* The FCS cannon in the NLOS battalion will have a crew of two. This compares with a Paladin crew of four and what would have been a Crusader crew of three. The crew will direct/operate the cannon from the cab and no longer handle ammunition or operate the cannon manually.

Because the cannon will be self-locating, it won't need conventional survey teams. However, there still will be a need for common grid throughout the battlespace. A future version of the improved position and azimuth determining system (IPADS) will be on command and control vehicles interspersed throughout the UA to provide initial control for common grid. The future WADS will be a non--global positioning system (GPS) inertial survey system.

Because the FCS cannon will provide its own technical fire control and limited tactical fire direction for other cannons, there will be no need for battery fire direction centers (FDCs) and platoon and battery operations centers (POCs/BOCs). Additionally, the fires application of BCS will perform tactical fire direction and disseminate data throughout the network.

* Enhanced automation via the BCS and networked fires will reduce the need for a large battalion staff. The counterfire responsibilities performed by the current cannon battalion tactical operations center (TOC) will migrate to the fires and effects cell (FEC) at the UA headquarters; the FEC routinely will have access to UE and joint capabilities.

* Profiler-like technology in the UA will allow the battalion to download meteorological data directly to its platforms to ensure accurate fires.

* The future tactical truck system-maneuver sustainment (FTTS-MS) robotics will allow one soldier to operate the vehicle. Every second vehicle will be able to operate as an unmanned vehicle controlled by a manned FTTS-MS, using its "robotic follower" capability.

Coordination of Fires. Third, no fire support personnel will be in the NLOS battalion. FEC personnel will be in the UA headquarters, and fires personnel will be assigned to the CABs, aviation detachment and maneuver companies.

However, these fires personnel will not perform the same duties as those in current forces. Using BCS, fewer fires personnel will be required to coordinate and synchronize all external and organic resources to execute fires. They also will execute special purpose fires, such as smoke, illumination, etc.

NLOS Battalion Capabilities. The NLOS battalion will have enhanced sensors, command and control systems, and weapons.

Sensors. There will be multiple layers of sensors in the UA. They will include humans, platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), robots and other sensors. The robotic sensors will be able to sense and then change its data into useable information on board.

All these systems will be linked to BCS via communications systems to provide the battalion leadership situational awareness to better integrate maneuver and fires after operations begin.

The NLOS battalion's sensor platoon will have two types of sensors: six multi-mission radars (MMRs) and 24 Class III UAVs.

The MMR's missions will include counterstrike, air defense surveillance, air defense fire control and air traffic control. (For a description of the MMR's missions, see Figure 2 on Page 22 of the article "ATACMS Fires for the Objective Force" by Lieutenant Colonel Rocky Samek in this edition.) Efforts are underway to determine if technology will allow the MMR to do all four missions concurrently.

With respect to the counterstrike mission, the MMR will have a range of 30 kilometers and be able to track 100 in-flight projectiles simultaneously in a 1600-mil sector. Compared to the Q-36 Firefinder radar, the MMR will be able to acquire targets nearly twice as far with twice the accuracy.

The 24 Class Ill UA Vs in the sensor platoon will provide the NLOS battalion robust organic TA to facilitate preemptive counterstrike. The design calls for eight Class III UAVs in each of the platoon's three UAV vehicles that can be launched and recovered by one person.

The Class III UAV will provide targetable information during day and night and limited capability in adverse weather. It will operate at 2,000 feet above ground level (AGL) to locate, identify and designate targets at a slant range of six kilometers with a target location error (TLE) of 10 meters. The Class III UAV also will provide supplemental meteorological data to support NLOS battalion precision fires.

Currently, no fire support teams (FISTs) are in the design. The premise that a call-for-fire is the exclusive domain of Career Management Field (CMF) 13 Field Artillery will change largely because of the targeting capabilities resident in the FCS.

All Objective Force soldiers--land warriors--will be able to call for fires. The laser designators on land warrior systems and FCS vehicles and the enhanced sensor packages on the UAVs and the MMRs at the UA will provide the TLE for precise effects against targets. In addition, UE sensors and those at the joint interagency and multi-national (JIM) level above the UE will provide the TLE for precise effects.

Command and Control. The Objective Force's survivability is dependent upon shared situational awareness that will enable the "quality of firsts" and the force to win decisively. The Objective Force BCS will be the mechanism for integrating and synchronizing all battlefield functional areas.

The BCS will provide the scope and be the catalyst for transforming a staff-centered and planning-focused battle command system into one that is commander-centric and execution-focused. The fires and effects application of the BCS is networked fires.

Shooters. The NLOS battalion will have two of the three organic NLOS systems in the UA: FCS cannon and non-line-of- sight launcher system (NLOS-LS). (The third is the NLOS mortar.) Both the cannon and NLOSLS will be able to fire a suite of lethal and nonlethal munitions at extended ranges as well as precision munitions for point and area targets.

The FCS cannon will have a range of 30 to 40 kilometers with a rate-of-fire of six to 10 rounds per minute. Automatic resupply will be by pre-loaded magazines to reload a cannon quickly. With its six high rate-of-fire FCS cannons and rapid resupply capability, the NLOS battery will have a throw weight that exceeds today's Paladin battalion.

The FCS cannon will be extremely accurate with probable errors (PEs) in range and deflection that are half those of Paladin. It will be able to receive and compute fire missions from all fielded and developmental TA sources and command and control systems.

Using on-board material handling equipment (MHE), the FCS cannon crew will be able to load and unload manually within five minutes while the crew remains under armor. When moving, the cannon will respond to a fire order, firing the first round within 20 seconds of the vehicle's stopping.

The FCS cannon will emplace in 15 to 20 seconds and displace in 20 to 30 seconds, which is less than half the time it takes Paladin, thus contributing to greater survivability. The howitzer will carry 30 to 48 complete rounds on board. It will compute its own firing data and provide limited tactical fire direction for the rest of the battery, when required. Finally, it will fire all current and planned lethal and nonlethal munitions.

The NLOS-LS will have an on-board technical fire control solution computer for individual munitions. It will have a loiter attack munition (LAM) capable of searching for and engaging soft-skinned targets to a range of 100 kilometers with 45 minutes of loitering time. It will have a range of 280 kilometers with no loitering time. These capabilities will allow the NLOS battalion to engage a wider set of targets at extended ranges.

NLOS-LS also will have a precision attack munition (PAM) capable of engaging armored and non-armored targets, moving or stationary, Out to 60 kilometers. The system will include an on-board sensor to provide automatic target recognition (ATR). Its munitions will be able to accept in-flight updates (target type, location and velocity vector) from an observer or other sensors to attack moving targets and receive terminal guidance from an external source. Two men will be able to reload individual munitions in less than two minutes under tactical conditions. The system will tell the network its location within two meters after emplacing and powering up.

(For more information on the properties and characteristics of LAM and PAM, see Figure 1 on Page 21 of the article "ATACMS Fires for the Objective Force" in this edition.)

Objective Force soldiers will be able to fire NLOS-LS from tactical transport vehicles or from the ground. The system will have on-board anti-tampering devices to deny the enemy its use. It will be transportable via all helicopters and fixed-wing transport aircraft.

Each NLOS-LS will carry 15 munitions. With 60 NLOS-LS in the battalion, these 900 missiles represent a significant amount of precision firepower available to support the commander that is not present in today's DS battalion.

We are exploring a variety of additional munitions for NLOS systems. These include lethal munitions, such as air defense, artillery, intelligent munitions system (IMS) and nonlethal munitions, such as unattended ground sensors (UGS) and, conceivably, the full range of malodorants and vehicle disablers. (IMS is a mix of anti-personnel, anti-vehicular, and antitank munitions, each with integral targeting and engaging sensors that orient on and attack selected targets.)

The FCS cannon, NLOS-LS and all other Objective Force effects platforms will be linked by the BCS and enabled by networked fires to make the Objective Force significantly more lethal at greater ranges than current operating forces.

Command and Support Relationship. The NLOS battalion will be organic to the UA. This is due to the distributed nature of the battlefield that will require effects across a large, highly dispersed non-contiguous battlespace and the desire for combined arms training and deployment with fires integral to maneuver.

This is different than current operating forces and speaks to the changing nature of fires and effects for the Objective Force. Objective Force will focus on providing the desired effects by the most appropriate systems at the time and place of the commander's choosing. All echelons will be able to receive a variety of effects on demand. This demand requires fires to simultaneously support a number of echelons in a very dynamic manner.

The effects of fires will have little to do with who "owns" the system or who is part of the support relationship. The bottom line: every soldier or sensor acquiring a target in the Objective Force needs timely, accurate and effective fires and effects.

The NLOS Battalion Fight. The NLOS battalion will be responsive to the UA commander and be able to find and attack HPTs and most dangerous targets, conduct limited battle damage assessment (BDA) and reattack as needed. The UA commander will position the battalion to provide destructive, suppressive/protective and special purpose fires to best support the concept of the operations; the FEC will plan its fires and effects.

The battalion will be dynamically tailorable to support sensor-to-shooter teaming relationships with all relevant UA, UE and JIM sensors. Its firing platforms and sensor assets will be organized to fight as a fully integrated team with UA maneuver forces and routinely interact directly with troops in contact, mobile strike aviation systems and unmanned sensors.

NLOS-LS (both from the firing batteries and NLOS platoon in HHB) and the FCS cannons routinely will maneuver within two to four kilometers of CAB elements. This placement will be integral to the CABs to ensure all UA elements have access to NLOS battalion effects throughout the 75-kilometer radius of the UA AO.

FCS cannons normally will operate in pairs or platoons of three. Their interspersing with maneuver will provide protection and security to individual systems (both NLOS battalion assets and maneuver), using mutual support from a distance. When combined with MMRs (that also will be interspersed within CAB elements), the NLOS battalion will protect the entire force from enemy indirect fires.

The cannons' collocating with maneuver while still being commanded and controlled by the NLOS battalion will mitigate the effects of slowing to stop and fire, enhance the range of NLOS systems and allow massed effects from dispersed locations. While maneuver units may not necessarily be supported by fires and effects from its collocated NLOS platforms, they will receive fires from appropriate systems through networked fires.

The NLOS battalion will provide flexible and responsive fires to simultaneously engage multiple target sets on-demand while remaining fully integrated with maneuver. Generally, the on-board munitions mixture of FCS cannons will have more precision munitions than current operating forces; however, area fire munitions will continue to provide suppression and obscuration (high explosive and smoke) to allow CABs to achieve positional advantage.

The NLOS battalion will be equally adept at attacking both HPTs and the most dangerous targets, applying scaleable effects to account for the challenges of complex environments and rules of engagement (ROE). (Scaleable means that fires can be applied against targets in a measured, proportionate manner.) The NLOS battalion will have precision lethal and nonlethal munitions that will be able to attack targets with single, highly accurate shots that avoid collateral damage, do not violate the ROE and help avoid fratricide.

Although smaller, the NLOS battalion will be more agile--strategically deployable and rapidly tailorable to meet the requirements for a variety of missions. The NLOS battalion will be more lethal--the firepower from its three firing batteries (each with cannons and NLOS-LS) and the NLOS-LS platoon will exceed that of a present-day division artillery. And the NLOS battalion will be more survivable with its shared situational awareness and understanding via BCS and networked fires and the enhanced capabilities of the FCS cannon. These capabilities include faster emplacement and displacement times and the cannon's embedded active protection system.

Multi-Functional Leaders. In 2015, expectations of soldiers and leaders in the NLOS battalion will be greater because of the complexity of future operational environments. Soldiers and leaders must become more multi-functional and be comfortable with uncertainty and unpredictability. These soldiers will be trained to exercise judgment and take the initiative under stressful circumstances against a thinking enemy and be capable of learning and adapting to the demands of full-spectrum operations.

The following are three examples of the multi-functionality demands on leaders and soldiers in the NLOS battalion.

* The Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 131A TA Radar Technician warrant officer will evolve into a sensor systems warrant who knows the MMR s missions and understands meteorological, UAV and Army airspace command and control ([A.sup.2][C.sup.2]) operations. The seven warrant officers in the NLOS battalion will bring new personnel and capabilities that do not exist in today's heavy or light battalions.

* There will be one cannon/NLOS-LS MOS. This Cannoneer (13B) will not only be knowledgeable about the FCS cannon and FTTS-MS, but also be responsible for operating the NLOS-LS. MOS 13M will remain for high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) units at the UE level.

* The FCS cannon platoon leader and platoon sergeant will not only be leaders of their units like their counterparts today, but also fight the battle from their FCS cannons like their maneuver brethren.

These multi-functional leaders and soldiers will be challenged to command and control more technical systems that are widely dispersed in a larger AO. Clearly, our training and leader development programs will have to change to empower Objective Force leaders and soldiers to accomplish their missions.

Conclusion. Currently, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is designing the UB echelonment of forces. Fort Sill is designing the FCS cannon battalion and HIMARS/NLOS-LS battalion that will support UB operations.

While much work remains on the transformation of our Army, the development of the NLOS battalion organic to the UA is well on its way. As the transformation continues, the NLOS battalion of the Objective Force is becoming a reality. Although the NLOS battalion is significantly smaller than today's DS battalion, it packs an unprecedented amount of firepower and capabilities that will enable the UA commander to be successful across the full spectrum of conflict.

Responsive/Deployable

* Deploy 96 hours after first liftoff on C-130 or advanced aircraft.

* Deploy from continental US (CONUS)/overseas to anywhere in the world using in-flight refueling to arrive in coherent combined arms increments and fight upon arrival.

* Project decisive power rapidly through multiple entry points by land/air/sea for immediate employment throughout the area of operations (AO).

* Be part of a continuouos cycle of UAs for sustained momentum into engagement areas.

Agile/Versatile

* Be a full-spectrum force that can transition from small-scale contingencies (SSC) to major combat operations (MCO).

* Conduct distributed, embedded full-spectrum mission planning and rehearsals.

* Master transitions from one tactical engagement to the next across any environment based on superior situational understanding by sharing data from the battle command system (BCS).

* Have a design that is tailorable, modular and capable of rapid task organizing; be mounted, dismounted and air assault-capable at the lowest unit levels.

* Have a combined arms framework, including air-ground integration at the battalion level and the ability to task organize at the company level, as needed.

Lethal

* Develop the situation organically out to a radius of 75 kilometers.

* Assure overmatch against enemy forces in all conditions and environments, firing first with an assured kill.

* Employ small units at the right time and place based on situational understanding.

* Employ precision networked Army and joint, interagency and multi-national (JIM) fires and effects.

* Provide mutual support from a distance using the active protection system (APS) and the network-enhanced BCS.

* Generate combat power from every element--all enhanced by shared information.

Survivable

* Have highly trained, competent and capable soldiers.

* Maintain situational awareness to allow movement around the enemy and impediments.

* Have the tools to understand and use terrain in the safest manner.

* Conduct route reconnaissance with sensors, manned and unmanned, at greatly increased speeds.

* Have a superior capability to detect the presence and disposition of mines.

* Have superior dash speeds and the ability to optimize cover and concealment.

* Have an inherently offensive orientation with speed and lethality.

* Employ low-observable technologies and camouflage.

* Have active and passive protection systems.

* Have armor protection over vital crew areas.

* Fire first with an assured kill.

* Provide more effective suppressive and obscuration fires.

* Provide mutual support from dispersed, distant overwatch positions.

* Be able to accept augmentation from unit of employment (UE) plug-ins--e.g., the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS), air defense artillery (ADA) and engineers.

* Have unmanned platforms perform high-risk functions.

Sustainable

* Deploy with three days' combat service support (CSS) for an MCO and seven days' CSS for a SSC.

* Have on-board water production.

* Have common structures, organizations, platforms and systems with more reliable components to reduce Class IX and maintenance requirements.

* Have the crew chief perform 80 percent of maintenance, requiring fewer repair personnel.

* Combine prognostic and diagnostic capabilities with plug-in modules to allow quicker maintenance with fewer components.

* Maximize precision fires to reduce the Class V demand for lethal effects.

* Track material in real-time via the network and employ just-in-time logistics to reduce the number of logistical bases and CSS command and control nodes.

* Have less equipment than current operating forces.

* Reduce fuel consumption at extended ranges.

RELATED ARTICLE: Networked Fires for the Objective Force

The Objective Force will only have one network and one battle command system (BCS) for command and control. The fires and effects application of BCS will be networked fires. Networked fires will be a triad of relevant sensors, effects capabilities and battle command tools/communications capabilities available across the force.

All platforms and humans will be sensors in the unit of action (UA). The data points they will provide will be transmitted to various BCS interlinks throughout the UA via the network/communications systems. Through protocols, tools, automated support and a neural network, BCS will translate the often overwhelming amount of information into information useful for awareness of what friendly, enemy and unidentified personnel are doing on the battlefield. (A neural network is one that learns from itself intelligently via pattern recognition.)

Networked fires then will act on the data to select the best platform (lethal and/or nonlethal) to produce the desired effects on the enemy target from the soldier through the joint interagency multi-national (JIM) levels. By knowing the exact location of all elements on the battlefield, the UA will be able to use precise fires and effects at the time and place of its choosing against the target set that best supports the maneuver commander's intent.

The difference between networked fires and today's digital systems will be the dynamic nature of the human-computer interface. Commanders and their fires and effects personnel will be able to rapidly change guidance in the automated system using "user-friendly" voice or automated input means to react to an adaptive enemy. When the enemy's actions make the plan obsolete, the Objective Force will be able to adjust its plan dynamically to ensure mission success.

Further, networked fires will ensure a sensor can provide the accuracy for the target location error (TLE) needed for any effects platforms to attack a target. If a sensor cannot provide the TLE accuracy, the network will either choose a different sensor that can provide the required TLE or a different effects platform that needs less precise TLE to engage the target.

Networked fires also will track the use of munitions by systems and the resupply capability of the forward support battalion (FSB) and higher support agencies. It will consider these factors when selecting the best effects platform for targets, which should help mitigate often overwhelming Class V resupply problems.

Clearance of both ground and airspace will be much improved using networked fires. Knowing where all friendly ground forces are at all times will allow much more rapid responses to enemy targets. With an ability to track every flying platform (manned, munition and unmanned), the UA networked fires will be able to open up the airspace for use by munitions and unmanned/manned air and aviation units. Simply put, networked fires will enable rather than restrict the use of airspace by all combat elements.

In summary, networked fires will provide responsive fires with the most effective application of systems and munitions against most dangerous and high-payoff targets (HPTs) in the Objective Force.

Lieutenant Colonel Brian T. Boyle is Deputy Chief of Task Force XXI in the Futures Development Integration Center (FDIC) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In his previous two assignments, he was the Division Chief of Concepts and Doctrine at the Unit of Action (UA) Maneuver Battle Lab at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and Commander of the 1st Battalion, 30th Field Artillery, 30th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Sill. He also served as a Corps Assistant Fire Support Coordinator (AFSCOORD) for the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps during entry operations into Kosovo. While in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood, Texas, he was the Executive Officer for 4th Battalion, 42d Field Artillery, and the Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 1st Brigade during the 1997 Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. He commanded C Battery, 5th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 18th Field Artillery Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps in the Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Storm.

Lieutenant Colonel William M. Raymond, Jr., is Deputy Chief of Task Force XXI in FDIC at Fort Sill. Prior to that, he was the Commander of 2d Battalion, 2d Field Artillery, 30th Field Artillery Regiment, also at Fort Sill. His other assignments include serving as the Effects Branch Chief in the Brigade Coordination Cell at Fort Lewis, Washington; Deputy Chief for Experimentation in Task Force 2000 in the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill; 53 and Executive Officer for 2d Battalion, 2d Field Artillery; Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the US Military Academy at West Point; and Commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery of 6th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery in the 1st Armored Division Artillery in Germany. He holds a Master of Arts and Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Michigan.