NGOs in CMO.

When US and Coalition Forces invaded Iraq in March 2003, the Iraqi people reacted in an unexpected fashion. They stayed in Iraq instead of becoming refugees, and the Iraqi combatants destroyed their own country's infrastructure, to include water and electric lines, government buildings and factories that provided the jobs and goods the population needed. Schools, hospitals and businesses were looted. The oil pipelines and processing facilities were sabotaged, and the workers left because no one was left to pay their wages.

Insurgents scared off the few law enforcement officers who tried to respond, and the Iraqi Army and border police quit and left their posts. The Iraqis had little leadership and plunged into lawlessness. Uncertainty became a way of life for the once powerful country.

During the stability phase that began shortly after the government of Saddam Hussein toppled, nongovernment organizations (NGOs) began working to make positive changes amid the chaos that was Iraq. The problem was that there were not enough NGOs to take care of the Iraqis' needs. A large amount of humanitarian operations fell on the shoulders of the Coalition Forces, called civil-military operations (CMO), especially in the areas the farthest away from Baghdad.

What could the US military have done to get more NGO involvement earlier to support humanitarian assistance and nation-building in Iraq? This article explores the kinds of NGOs that exist and the support the US military can offer to make NGO humanitarianism and nation-building work in conjunction with stability and support operations.

NGOs and Their Challenges. There are no easy answers for the problems involved in supporting NGOs in a combat zone. A good start is arming ground commanders with the knowledge that they need to understand what NGOs do. NGOs range from humanitarian to political to developmental in scope and are not limited to nonprofit organizations.

The US Department of State keeps a registry of several organizations with its US Agency for International Development (USAID). (1) According to Mark Palmer, Vice Chairman of Freedom House, the US spends $ 1.4 billion on NGOs that promote democracy. (2) Therefore, a commander in Iraq could expect to see any number of NGOs in his area of operations (AO). Knowing their goals and how they affect military operations are the keys to successful coordination with them.

The NGOs working in Iraq and Afghanistan face the same CMO challenges the US military faces. NGOs often have to work in areas where there is little security, and sectarian conflicts arise and put them in the middle.

The US military has coordinated with some NGOs to help with security, but often the NGOs want to distance themselves from any involvement with the US government. Some of the desire to distance themselves stems from Russian and Venezuelan governments' propaganda campaigns painting a picture of NGOs as tools of US interventionism. (3)

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In his statement before the House Government Reform Committee, Ernest O. Robbins II, Senior Vice President and Manager of the International Division of Parsons Infrastructure and Technology Group, testified that several challenges faced his organization in Iraq. A lack of trained Iraqi engineers and skilled craftsmen, the personal security of workers and NGO staff, and sectarian violence and terrorism caused many projects to go unfinished. Contractors were subjected to death threats and intimidation. Building materials were stolen from the worksites with ransom demands to get them back. Transportation to and from the worksites was dangerous for everyone. (4)

Many NGOs left Iraq because their workers were being kidnapped, threatened or killed. US military forces could not be everywhere to protect them. In places like Fallujah, Ramadi, Al Qa'im, Tikrit and Baghdad, NGOs and their contractors constantly face the possibility of death or kidnapping. In 2004 several contractors were kidnapped from Fallujah and killed as an example of what would happen to anyone who helped the Coalition Forces make life better for the Iraqi people. Even with private security contractors and armored vehicles, NGOs face an uphill battle to do their work.

The problem is that NGOs want to be autonomous and operate without US military support, whenever possible. In Iraq, that is not always possible.

Civil affairs teams (CATs) do what they can to get out and help manage reconstruction and governmental development projects, but there are not enough CATs to operate over the vast expanse of Iraq. The Army needs a closer partnership with NGOs to spread the responsibility for stability. Working some of the NGOs into operations on a wider scale could be the solution to some issues.

The "Targeting" Process as a Solution. With emphasis on nonlethal effects as a means of combating insurgent operations, the targeting process outlined in FM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process can be tailored to include NGOs. The decide, detect, deliver and assess ([D.sup.3]A) methodology for NGOs works similarly to the process that information operators are using in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some NGOs may take offense at being "targeted," but the process has its benefits. Perhaps new terms could be devised for the process that are less combat-oriented and less offensive. These could be "NGO of focus" (NGOF) for "target" or the high-payoff NGO (HPN) for high-payoff target (HPT).

Decide. With the varying types of NGOs in a theatre of operations, this phase can help commanders focus on what NGOs best meet the needs of the local population and coordinate with those NGOs. An HPT list that highlights specific NGOs working in an area would be a useful tool. Also, NGOs could be included in the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) as part of the collection management plan. The commander could set criteria for using specific NGOs in operations based on target selection standards (TSS). Just like in the lethal effects arena, staffs can develop an attack guidance matrix (AGM) to list the what, how, when and effects desired when working with a specific NGO.

All these tools can help commanders and staffs target NGOs. For example, NGOs working in a particular area could be noted on a spreadsheet and sorted by type and location and become PIRs for units on patrols.

Detect. This critical targeting function may provide some challenges as many NGOs prefer to work autonomously, except when they feel their safety is at stake. Detecting an NGO's existence may be as challenging as tracking its movements and specific projects.

An example, based on my experience, is the sudden appearance of a Canadian-based civil rights organization in the Ninevah Province in Iraq that had the goal of defending the rights of the Yeziddi people. If they had not flagged down a US patrol in the area and invited them to a wedding, months could have gone by without the organization's being detected. The timing of this detection turned out to be critical because the 2005 referendum vote on the new Iraq Constitution was only a few weeks away.

By accident, we found out one of the NGO's objectives was to place monitors at the polling sites to ensure the Yeziddis could vote without intimidation from other ethnic groups. However, such a move required more coordination to make sure the validity of the monitors would not be questioned.

A system of tracking NGOs in a particular area of operations is critical for successful targeting. Knowing the needs and goals of certain NGOs can make a difference as to whether they will help or hurt CMO.

Deliver. The deliver portion of this discussion really involves what to do once the unit knows what NGOs are present. From an information operations (IO) standpoint, a formal meeting, such as a bilateral discussion or a visit to one of the NGO's project sites, can be beneficial to both sides. Some would consider "delivery" as coordinating with a specific NGO to help them with a goal, such as a medical civic-action program (MEDCAP) or a food drop.

These partnerships can be somewhat awkward due to conflicting ideologies. For instance, a bilateral meeting with Amnesty International 24 hours after a patrol detains 40 suspected insurgents in the area may not go well.

It is important in this phase for commanders and planners to understand what goals the NGO desires. When military assistance to an NGO occurs, it is important to remember that the NGO should have the lead and the military should be the enabler. (5) If the targeting process has worked, the NGO(s) selected to be supported will be the one(s) whose projects are the most effective for the Iraqi or Afghan people and that also help the unit accomplish its mission.

Assess. Determining the effectiveness of coordination with NGOs can take sometime. Some effects may be immediate, such as getting electricity turned back on in a needy village. Other measures of effectiveness (MOEs) may be harder to assess due to time constraints or the elusiveness of the NGOs.

The autonomous nature of many NGOs can make assessing the effectiveness difficult. If an NGO is training medical personnel in a specific area, assessing the level of effectiveness of that training could take years, and the military unit may never see the results.

Despite these challenges, it is still important to measure effectiveness to determine how much time and expense the unit can devote to an NGO's projects in the future. Just as in battle damage assessment (BDA), the reliability of the assessment depends greatly on the resources available to conduct the assessment. (6)

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The targeting process as outlined is a tool that fire supporters and commanders can use to plan for involvement with NGO operations. The true goal is that a greater amount of cooperation between the military and NGOs could lead to a more stable host nation environment and, eventually, help defeat insurgent operations.

As General George W. Casey, Jr., until recently, Commander of the MultiNational Forces in Iraq, told Charles Hess, the Director of the Iraq Project and Contracting Office, US Embassy, Baghdad, in 2005, "... it is a counterinsurgency campaign, and all elements of national power must work synergistically to defeat the insurgents." (7)

Captain Matthew D. Campbell is a student at the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course in the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He previously served as an Assistant Fire Support Officer (FSO) and Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Officer for 1st Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (1-3 ACR) at Fort Carson, Colorado, deploying with the unit for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III. Also during OIF III, he served as the FSO for B Troop, 1-3 ACR. In the same squadron, he was the FSO for D Company during OIF I and a Platoon Leader and the Fire Direction Officer in the Howitzer Battery. Immediately before Captain Campbell attended the Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC) at the University of Kentucky at Lexington, he was a Sergeant and served as a Cavalry Scout Instructor with C/2-397 Cavalry, 100th Division (Institutional Training) at Fort Knox, Kentucky. He holds a BA in Religion from Georgetown College in Georgetown, Kentucky, and a BA in Geography from the University of Kentucky.

By Captain Matthew D. Campbell

Endnotes:

1. FM 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003), A-11.

2. Mark Palmer, "Non-Government Organizations and Development of Democracy," "Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony," 6 June 2006, accessed online with Accession Number 32Y0082262137, "Military and Government Collection," 5 November 2006.

3. Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Non-Government Organizations and Development of Democracy," "Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony," 8 June 2006, accessed online with Accession Number 32Y1305586204, "Military and Government Collection," 5 November 2006.

4. Ernest O. Robbins II, "Reconstruction Contracting in Iraq," "Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony," 28 September 2006, accessed online with Accession Number 32Y2483957415, "Military and Government Collection," 5 November 2006.

5. FM 3-07, A-11.

6. FM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1996), 2-1 to 2-15.

7. Agency Group 09, "Construction Projects in Iraq Have Security Payoff, Official Says," "Federal Document Clearing House Regulatory Intelligence Database," 19 January 2005, accessed online with Accession Number 32W0625318162, "Military and Government Collection," 5 November 2006.