NATURAL MORAL SENSE AS BASIS FOR PROFESSIONAL ETHICS: AN IMPORTANT PROPOSAL BUT UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE EXCELLENCE.

Psychologists' neglect of the very important basis for professional ethics and other ethical dimensions of psychology can be overcome, in part, by Hathaway's (2001) proposal to ground ethics, not on certain foundations provided by reason, but on natural moral sense. Strengths of this approach are discussed, including a qualified ethical realism and attention to nature and embodied ethical practice. Problems include: the extent to which it is legitimate to talk about a "natural" moral sense; a neglect of the cultural and historical origins of our moral sense; a failure to justify adequately how we can legitimately move from our sense that something is right to establishing that it really is right; a failure to provide a sufficiently substantive intellectual and motivational basis for practice; an invitation to rely on implicit and often problematic ethical assumptions; a failure to take sin seriously enough; and a failure to make room within an ethically pluralistic profession for particular ethical groundings (including those of Christian faith) for ethical practice. An approach to the ethical foundations of practice that builds upon Hathaway's approach, yet avoids its weaknesses, is sketched out briefly.

Hathaway's (2001; this issue) argument that we need to better ad dress the foundations of psychology's ethics codes is most welcome. The basis for ethical ideas and actions -- what it means to be ethical and why we should act ethically -- is a crucial topic most psychologists neglect. Hathaway also rightly emphasizes the vital role played by stories, practical experience, and an embodied (as opposed to a purely abstract) approach to questions of what is good, right, and virtuous. I also think he's right to look for a middle ground between relativism and grounding ethics on "certain" beliefs or methods. Finally, I appreciate Hathaway's valid critique of the attempt to base ethics solely on reason. As MacIntyre (1984) argued convincingly, drawing in part upon Nietzsche's devastating critique of rationalistic ethics, the Enlightenment Project in ethics has failed. The essential question, then, is this: Upon what basis should ethics for psychologists be based? Although I do nor believe Hathaway has proposed the b est alternative for reasons I will address, I think his contribution moves the field in the direction of a better approach.

The following vignette serves to illustrate my arguments: Dr. Struggling Disciple is a theologically trained Christian psychologist working in a large Christian counseling center in a local church. He is appointed by the local chapter of the United Way to a committee examining "value issues" in United Wayfunded programs. Joining him on the committee is Dr. Genial Free, a well-regarded, kind private practitioner who has no religious affiliation and who describes himself privately as a spiritual, atheistic, scientist-practitioner. Philosophically, he has been influenced by Derrida, Foucault, and Nietzsche, who see ethical assertions as veiled attempts to gain power over others rather than concern over what is really right or wrong, good or bad. The basis of his professional practice is that he feels good about himself and fulfilled when helping others. He consciously uses the language of helping others because it seems to produce greater change in clients, which makes him feel better about himself because his ethical perspective is individualistic, egoistic, and hedonistic. Acting proactively, the United Way wants values addressed in all funded programs, including psychological services, because in recent years, some on the right have withheld contributions to the United Way on ethical grounds because Planned Parenthood is funded. Others, on the left, have done the same on different ethical grounds because the Boy Scouts are funded. The United Way leadership wants the committee to analyze ethical issues in mental health programs. "Let's get at the base of the values of these programs," states the chair of the board, "so we can avoid any trouble in the future."

To address fully the charge given to it, the committee would need to look at a range of theoretical ethical issues broader than those pertaining to codes of professional ethics. Likewise, evaluating the adequacy of Hathaway's (2001) proposal to address the ethical dimensions of psychology in general would require considering dimensions of ethics other than codes of professional ethics. Psychologist obligations that are not addressed in codes of ethics would need to be addressed, as well as the optimal role of therapy in a society (social ethics), the relatively stable (moral and nonmoral) ideal personal qualities of psychologist and client (virtue ethics), the relationship of ethical issues to differing cultures, historical periods, and ideologies (cultural ethics), and pragmatically making good ethical decisions with particular persons (clinical ethics; Tjeltveit, 1999). Finally, ideas about the good life that are often tied to the goals of therapy would need to be included. We would likely find deeper diff erences between Dr. Disciple and Dr. Free on that broader set of issues than on professional ethics. Dr. Disciple, for instance, thinks the fullest life is found in mentally healthy people who are deeply rooted in community, actively giving of themselves to others while caring for their own basic needs, and in a right relationship with Jesus Christ. Dr. Free, by contrast, sees the best life to be freedom from obligations to others (except the obligation not to hurt them) and freedom to be themselves as individuals and meet their own needs. He may, in full harmony with codes of professional ethics, influence his clients with his winsome vision of the good life (the highest level of human flourishing) that utterly excludes God.

The codes of professional ethics are necessarily based on consensus, which is the lowest common denominator of what the "natural moral sense" of a wide range of psychologists affirms. Therefore, in ways that those other ethical dimensions of psychology are not, I think Hathaway's (2001) proposal is strongest when addressing professional ethics. Applying it to the full range of ethical dimensions of psychology would be more difficult. In this article, I will restrict myself to Hathaway's focus: the basis for professional ethics. Weaknesses will likely be areas of concern when we turn our attention to the other ethical dimensions of psychology.

I take the main thrust of Hathaway's (2001) proposal to be psychologists' need to unpack "the wisdom of embodied ethical practice" (p. 228) and draw upon our "natural moral sense" (p. 231). "Knowledge," he argues, "comes from the proper functioning of mental faculties which have been shaped to form correct judgments in a particular setting" (p. 226). Hathaway profoundly affirms the wisdom contained in the practices of ordinary people: "We naturally and normally believe many things that serve us well without first proving those things" (p. 227). In more explicitly theological terms, he argues that the externalist "trusts God's providential design of humanity that allows us to know the moral and finds no compelling epistemological reason to doubt moral perceptions in advance of any particular ethical deliberation" (p. 232). There is, he asserts, a "moral sense instilled in humanity" (p. 230). This natural moral sense is basically trustworthy, not requiring a rational foundation about which we are certain. He n otes on p. 227 that the moral sense is "not infallible," but doesn't flesh out that fallibility. And so a caveat: I will focus on Hathaway's presentation of externalist ethics in his article, a presentation whose brevity cannot do justice to the tradition upon which he draws. In their general epistemological and ethical writings, Plantinga, Reid, and others no doubt flesh out this perspective in ways that address many of my concerns.

My first critique of Hathaway's (2001) proposal has to do with the idea of a "natural" moral sense regarding therapy. It seems a good idea to answer ethical questions, such as the ethics of parenting or marriage, by drawing in part from human nature. We can make a good case that parenting (surely) and marriage (probably) are natural human relationships. But I wonder whether it is legitimate to talk about the ethics of applied psychology in the same way? After all, psychotherapy, in the modern sense of the word, is a 20th century Western invention. It is real. It is effective. But it seems to me to be contingent (not necessary) and a "social construction" (not a "natural kind"; Leahey, 2000, p. 45). The socially constructed character of psychotherapy presents a serious problem for an approach that draws upon a "natural" moral sense. How can we have a "natural" moral sense about a recently invented human "practice" that is, in fact, a melange of heterogenous theories, beliefs, techniques, and behaviors? I woul d want, at the very least, to know what "natural" means in this approach and how it applies to practices created by human beings.

Hathaway (2001) partly addresses that problem by asserting that our natural moral sense informs us at the level of basic principles, such as "do no harm." He argues that therapists know naturally not to harm others and appropriately apply that principle in therapy. But I wonder about the extent to which therapists refrain from sexually exploiting clients because of their natural moral sense? I wonder about the extent to which they refrain from doing so because of social norms, considered (reasoned) ethical reflection, fear of punishment, or ethical habits conditioned by a lifetime of reinforcements and punishments?

There is a related concern: in practice, I think the ethical beliefs and practices of psychologists are not likely to be based solely on natural moral sense; they derive ultimately from other sources. Therapy and professional ethics are based not just on one's environment and natural sense, but also on ethical ideas and cultural practices that influence psychologists. Some of the actual sources of professional ethics will thus be hidden, either in other live ethical traditions or in the remnants of dead ethical traditions. Dr. Free may act ethically out of habit or from the residue of some familial ethical system that shaped his character. Therefore, his ideas (and the ideas of other psychologists) about ethics may stem in part from a natural moral sense about how people should be helped; they also likely stem from a variety of cultural and ideological sources, including some sources that are incorrectly experienced as entirely "natural." Such sources may be deeply at odds with those of the Christian traditio n. Dr. Free may believe, or at least say he believes, in helping people but does nor know why; like so many other therapists, he continually preaches the "Gospel" of individualism, selfishness, and hedonism in the subtle persuasive argot of the therapist (Vitz, 1994).

If, as I am suggesting, psychological ethics are based partially on unacknowledged ethical beliefs that feel "natural," then we need to be clear about the character of those implicit ethical beliefs. More specifically, we need to be clear about their sources in culture, tradition, ideology, and practice, as well as in our "natural moral sense."

This need for conscious and explicit understanding of our ethical sources is especially important because a fundamental basis for professional ethics, beneficence, or benefiting others, has been under sustained attack in the West for some time (Taylor, 1989). Taylor notes how Nietzsche viciously attacked concern for others as a motive. Freud thought love of neighbor to be healthy only when directed toward those who had already benefited us (Browning, 1987). Schwartz (1986) and Wallach and Wallach (1983) have shown how psychologists tend to assume people are (and should be) selfish, with Schwartz noting this represents a part of a battle about human nature. Psychologists as a whole have not, I am convinced, adequately faced the challenge posed by that prolonged attack. It is an attack on one of the foundational principles of the APA Code of Ethics (1992), "concern for others' welfare" (p. 1600). I believe the profession of psychology must include at its core a concern for human beings; thus, the notion that co ncern for others is emotionally crippling and morally repugnant represents a serious threat to psychology as a profession and to professional ethics as a whole. Many postmodernist psychologists, labeled by Taylor as neo-Nietzscheans, strongly suspect any claim to benefit others as a disguised attempt to gain power over them. If Dr. Free is heir to this tradition of antibeneficence, it will seem "natural" to him to emphasize his own personal fulfillment rather than the well being of his clients. Though appearing to be interested in their well-being, he may well aid in his self-fulfillment. Furthermore, it will seem "natural" to him for "healthy" clients to be self-centered and devoted to self-fulfillment. However, as Meilaender (1999) noted, "To rake our own flourishing-rather than the neighbor's need-as our starting point for ethics is problematic" (p.55).

In summary, I believe applied psychology is predominantly a social construction, rather than a natural human development. Historically, part of the intellectual milieu of applied psychology has been a commitment to benefit others. That intellectual milieu is changing, and an ethics of beneficence is being replaced by a socially influenced ethics of individualism and selfishness (Vitz, 1994). I seriously doubt whether that eviscerated approach (although it seems natural to Dr. Free and other psychologists) can sustain psychology and professional ethics.

Hathaway (2001) doesn't make clear how we can move from the factual claim that people feel, think, or sense that some action or principle is ethical; I am less optimistic than he that a consensus exists regarding the ethical claim that an action or principle is really good, right, or virtuous. Although the justification for this move in Hathaway's brief article is too sparse, I think it is possible to make a convincing ethical case that takes seriously certain facts about human nature. I suspect that a careful reading of a more developed version of Hathaway's views, and of the sources upon which he draws, would provide some better answers to this question.

Finally, I am concerned that the approach Hathaway (2001) recommends is too thin. Something so insubstantial simply cannot provide the ample motivational and intellectual grounding necessary for ethical practice; it certainly does not provide what is needed to achieve excellence in practice. Trainees may draw only upon their own natural moral senses, and their moral senses have been profoundly impoverished by exposure to elements of society that reject ethics or offer only a few minimal ethical convictions (e.g., respecting others and celebrating differences). Thus, the consensus of what psychologists think about ethical matters would not be enough to inform and motivate them over the courses of their careers. As Taylor (1987) points out, "high standards need strong sources" (p. 516).

From explicitly Christian perspectives, other critiques of Hathaway's position can be raised. Perhaps the most important is that efforts to ground professional ethics on "embodied ethical practice" and "natural moral sense" may significantly underestimate the role of sin in the lives of psychologists. Hathaway touches upon this briefly, but this part of his proposal warrants further development. From some Christian perspectives, the effects of sin require that human nature be overcome, not deferred to. Christians over the centuries have found many reasons to "doubt moral perceptions" (Hathaway, 2001, p. 23).

I am also concerned that if the basis of professional ethics becomes a consensus derived from "natural moral sense," explicitly Christian themes will be excluded because they will not be included in the consensus. Christian psychologists striving to live in harmony with the fullness of Christian ethics need to take seriously themes (and realities) about which there is no consensus in the profession of psychology: the command of God, sin, Law, the relationship of human beings with God, Christian freedom, spiritual transformation and rebirth, Scripture as the Word of God, and glorifying God. Dr. Free can make the case that his approach is the only legitimate one because it is scientific and based on freedom (a popular value endorsed by society). He could argue that the United Way and all open-minded citizens everywhere should ban from legitimacy Christians, like Dr. Disciple, who draw their ethics from richer foundations than those based on a natural moral sense.

I do not believe Hathaway means to exclude Christian themes; but I fear his approach would give comfort to those who would want to. More generally, I fear that his approach could give comfort to those who want to avoid hard thinking about ethical issues, avoid changing ethically problematic behaviors that happen to be practiced widely in a particular community, and avoid facing moral obligations. For instance, therapists would not be challenged if they conform to a therapeutic culture that emphasizes individualism and selfishness as the norm for healthy human functioning. It would be all too easy to use a "natural moral sense" to justify a wide range of ethical views.

My concerns about Hathaway's approach are substantial, but so is my appreciation for certain elements of the approach he is proposing. I think he is right to take the foundations of ethical practice seriously. I think he is right to adopt a properly qualified ethically realist perspective. I think he is right to take embodied ethical practice and human nature very seriously. We are, after all, biological beings, created beings. However, one can take seriously our "natural moral sense" yet retain a sharp intellectual edge, testing moral intuitions with reason, tradition, experience, and Scripture. An approach grounded solely in practice is as problematic as one that is overly intellectual. We need, rather, intellectually and practically sophisticated approaches to Christian ethics, and we need to think through and live through the impact of Christian ethics.

We need to take seriously the consensus that exists among professionals (codes of ethics are, after all, based on such a consensus) that is partially based on natural moral sense. But I think we also need to take ethical differences seriously (Tjeltveit, 1999). Dr. Free and Dr. Disciple may well both practice in accord with APA Ethical Principles, but they do so from very different intellectual and motivational bases. I admit that we don't necessarily need complete ethical consensus to have a coherent profession; however, individual professionals do need strong sources to reach high standards. Non-Christians like Dr. Free need to draw upon whatever sources motivate them to practice well. Christians like Dr. Disciple can, and should, draw explicitly and fully on Christian ethical sources.

AUTHOR

TJELTVIT, ALAN C. Address: Department of Psychology, Muhlenberg College, 2400 Chew Street, Allentown, Pennsylvania 18104-5586, USA. Title: Associate Professor of Psychology; Licensed Psychologist. Degrees: BA, Psychology, Religion, St. Olaf College; MA, Theology, School of Theology, Fuller Theological Seminary; PhD, Clinical Psychology, Graduate School of Psychology, Fuller Theological Seminary. Specializations: Ethics and psychology; theoretical and philosophical psychology, integration of psychology and theology.

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