Mutual Fund Directors Forum's Call to End 'Soft Dollar' Arrangements Ignores Evidence that Research Arrangements Under the Section 28e Safe Harbor Benefit Mutual Fund Investors, According to The Alliance in Support of Independent Research.WASHINGTON -- The Alliance in Support of Independent Research (www.alliance-research.org) today announced its opposition to the Mutual Fund Directors Forum's suggestion that independent directors of mutual funds should not permit fund advisers to obtain research for mutual funds through portfolio transactions. Lee A. Pickard, Counsel to the Alliance in Support of Independent Research, Managing Partner of Pickard and Djinis LLP LLP - Lower Layer Protocol and former Director of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation, said, "Without citing any quantitative or empirical evidence, the Mutual Fund Directors Forum has attacked a practice which has been used by mutual fund advisers for decades to improve the performance of managed funds." If the MFDF's position were adopted by a fund board, the adviser to the fund would not be able to receive any research, independent or proprietary, from broker-dealers in exchange for fund portfolio transactions. This would not only deprive de·prive v. 1. To take something from someone or something. 2. To keep from possessing or enjoying something. mutual funds of innovative research products, thus harming their performance, but also would put mutual funds at a distinct disadvantage in competing with other managed investment alternatives, such as hedge funds hedge fund, in finance, a highly speculative, largely unregulated investment device. Originating in the 1950s, the funds "hedge" by offsetting "short" positions (borrowing a security and then selling it at a higher price before repaying the lender) against "long" and separately managed accounts. The MFDF's position is apparently based on its conclusion that research-commission arrangements "benefit a fund's adviser because it is spared the expense of purchasing or obtaining on its own research provided by the broker-dealer Broker-Dealer A person or firm in the business of buying and selling securities operating as both a broker and dealer depending on the transaction. Notes: Technically, a broker is only an agent who executes orders on behalf of clients, whereas a dealer acts as a principal ." The fault in this premise is that research obtained through broker-dealers is used by advisers to attempt to improve the investment performance of the managed fund. Research received from broker-dealers is used to supplement, and not as a substitute for, the advisers' own in-house In-house In the context of general equities, keeping an activity within the firm. For example, rather than go to the marketplace and sell a security for a client to anyone, an attempt is made to find a buyer to complete the transaction with the firm. research efforts, and advisers are not required or compelled to expend ex·pend tr.v. ex·pend·ed, ex·pend·ing, ex·pends 1. To lay out; spend: expending tax revenues on government operations. See Synonyms at spend. 2. their own funds for outside research. Accordingly, a fund adopting the MFDF's position would only be depriving its adviser of a valuable tool for improving the fund's own performance. Indeed, studies have shown that the use of research-commission arrangements is positively correlated cor·re·late v. cor·re·lat·ed, cor·re·lat·ing, cor·re·lates v.tr. 1. To put or bring into causal, complementary, parallel, or reciprocal relation. 2. with account performance. See Stephen M. Horan and D. Bruce Bruce, Scottish royal family descended from an 11th-century Norman duke, Robert de Brus. He aided William I in his conquest of England (1066) and was given lands in England. Johnsen, Does Soft Dollar Brokerage Benefit Portfolio Investors: Agency Problem or Solution?, available on the Alliance's website at (http://www.alliance-research.org/PDFs/SoftDollarDraft.pdf ). The MFDF MFDF Medium Frequency Direction Finder/Finding also suggests that research-commission arrangements are insufficiently transparent to be examined by mutual fund directors, and that directors may have difficulty monitoring for best execution where fund advisers use such arrangements. The Alliance believes these views are belied by the structure of independent research arrangements. As stated previously by the Alliance, and cited in the MFDF report, with respect to independent research arrangements,
virtually all broker-dealers providing third party research
services . . . indicate on their customers' statements the
dollar value of the research provided to the customer, the
aggregate commissions used to pay for the research, and an
identification of the research. This method of accountability
has made the independent research dissemination process
precise and transparent . . .
Accordingly, information regarding securities transaction execution costs Execution costs The difference between the execution price of a security and the price that would have existed in the absence of a trade, which can be further divided into market impact costs and market timing costs. is readily available for independent research-commission arrangements, and fund directors have all the necessary tools to monitor the quality of executions received by the fund with respect to such arrangements. Finally, the Alliance notes that the use of research-commission arrangements by mutual funds is clearly lawful Licit; legally warranted or authorized. The terms lawful and legal differ in that the former contemplates the substance of law, whereas the latter alludes to the form of law. A lawful act is authorized, sanctioned, or not forbidden by law. and appropriate provided such arrangements comply with the safe harbor Safe Harbor 1. A legal provision to reduce or eliminate liability as long as good faith is demonstrated. 2. A form of shark repellent implemented by a target company acquiring a business that is so poorly regulated that the target itself is less attractive. of Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that such arrangements have been benefiting mutual funds and mutual fund investors for decades. The Alliance urges that mutual fund boards take these facts into consideration when determining whether to act on the MFDF's recommendation. Members of the Alliance in Support of Independent Research share a common interest in fostering a favorable fa·vor·a·ble adj. 1. Advantageous; helpful: favorable winds. 2. Encouraging; propitious: a favorable diagnosis. 3. regulatory environment in which research services and products may be furnished fur·nish tr.v. fur·nished, fur·nish·ing, fur·nish·es 1. To equip with what is needed, especially to provide furniture for. 2. to the money management community, and in preserving the umbrella of protection Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides to fiduciaries who receive all forms of investment research. The leading members of the Alliance in Support of Independent Research ("Alliance") include the following broker-dealers:
Boston Institutional Services, Incorporated
D. Ward Blodgett, President
Capital Institutional Services, Inc.
Don C. Potts, Chief Executive Officer,
Kristi P. Wetherington, President
E*Trade Securities LLC
Susan Holgate, Esq., Vice President of Institutional Brokerage
The Interstate Group,
A Division of Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc.
Grady G. Thomas, Jr., President
Knight Equity Markets, L.P.
James P. Smyth, Managing Director,
Joanne Mascellino, President, Donaldson & Company Division
LaBranche Financial Services, Inc.
Phillip Rapp, Managing Director,
Richard Fremont, Vice President
Westminster Research Associates, Inc.,
Part of BNY Securities Group
John D. Meserve, President
Our members are involved in a significant portion of the arrangements under which fiduciaries such as mutual fund managers, investment advisers, banks and other fiduciaries are provided with independent research services and products for the benefit of their managed accounts. |
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