Multiplicities or manna from heaven? Critical thinking and the disciplinary context.

This paper explores the nexus between epistemic culture and academic conceptions of the generic skill of critical thinking. Although generic skills are seen as being of great importance in higher education, there has been little examination into the ways in which the knowledge culture of each specific discipline influences the academic staff's conception of generic skills. This paper investigates the ways in which critical thinking is understood by academic staff in two related but distinct disciplines, history and economics. It finds that while there are some similarities, critical thinking in economics is defined primarily as the use of economic tools whereas critical thinking in history is described from a range of perspectives. Thus the epistemic culture of the discipline appears to influence conceptions of critical thinking. This has implications for the ways in which generic skills are framed within the broader university community and indeed has implications for policy at both the university and the political level.

Introduction

This paper examines the ways in which the disciplinary cultures of economics and history shape the understanding of one generic skill, critical thinking. It is a discussion of data gathered as part of a larger study on generic skills across five disciplines. The central aim of this paper is to explore the ways in which contrasting epistemic cultures shape the teaching and learning of critical thinking. It considers a central and contemporary idea in higher education, the notion of generic skills, with a view to examining the ways in which they operate in a disciplinary context.

That generic skills have become of increasing importance in a changing educational environment is clear (Assiter, 1995; Barnett, 1990; Bligh, 1990; Clanchy & Ballard, 1995; Scott, 1995); however, the nature of generic skills is unclear, as is the relationship between generic skills and the disciplinary context in which the skills are learnt. There is an implicit assumption that generic skills are independent of disciplinary contexts even though they are taught within them. This leads to a more overt expectation that generic skills will be transferable between disciplines and beyond the university into the workforce.

This paper argues that there is a need to explore how one skill, critical thinking, is defined or conceptualised by teaching staff in higher education and to explore the ways in which that conceptualisation is shaped by the epistemic culture of academic disciplines. Through examining the two related but distinct disciplinary cultures of economics and history, this paper argues that the knowledge cultures of these disciplines have a profound impact on notions of critical thinking. Further, it suggests that although critical thinking is valued across the disciplines, what constitutes this skill is shaped by the epistemic culture.

The skills landscape

Although generic skills are of great importance in higher education, there is a lack of clarity as to their characteristics. Changes in the relationship between higher education and employers reflect the considerable interest at political and educational levels in the skills which graduates take into the workforce (AC Nielsen Research Services, 1998, 2000; Association of Graduate Recruiters, 1995; Australian Council for Educational Research, 2001; Conference Board of Canada, 2000; Dearing, 1997; Gibbs, 1994; Secretary's Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills, 2000; Stanton, 1995). Generic skills are seen as meeting the needs of employers because they are thought to be flexible, transferable and applicable to a rapidly-changing and increasingly service-focused market requiring skills such as critical thinking, problem solving and communication (Bennett, Dunne, & Carre, 1999; Candy, Crebert, & O'Leary, 1994; Drummond, Nixon, & Wiltshire, 1998). The idea of generic skills, however, is based upon the assumption that there exists a set of skills which can be learned in the context of disciplinary knowledge and yet function independently of that knowledge.

It is arguable that universities have always been concerned to foster generic skills and that what has changed is that universities are now making these skills explicit (Bowden, Hart, King, Trigwell, & Watts, 2000). While generic skills are clearly central to university education there is uncertainty as to precisely which skills can be identified as generic and even more uncertainty as to how to define those skills (Bennett et al., 1999; Marginson, 1993). Furthermore, there is confusion between notions of generic and transferable skills. Because these terms are frequently used interchangeably there is an assumption that generic skills can be transferred between disciplines or from a university setting to the workplace; however, the evidence for this transferability seems limited (Bennett et al., 1999; Golding, Marginson, & Pascoe, 1996; Marginson, 1993; Perkins & Salomon, 1994). This clearly points to the need to consider the relationship between the disciplinary context and generic skills.

At present there is little reported research into any possible relationship between generic skills and the disciplines in which they are situated. Recent projects (Battle, 2004; Bowden et al., 2000) identify the graduate attributes in a number of disciplines at a range of higher education institutions and discuss practical steps toward implementation of such programs. A number of studies have considered ways in which generic skills can be taught in the context of the academic disciplines: accounting, business studies (Boyce, Williams, Kelly, & Yee, 2001; De La Harpe, Radloff, & Wyber, 2000; Humphreys, Greenan, & McIlveen, 1997; Monks, 1995), geography (Brown, 1999; Dyas & Bradley, 1999), multimedia (Oliver & McLoughlin, 2001), social science (Havard, Hughes, & Clarke, 1998), mathematics (Nyman & Berry, 2002) and biological science (Johnson, Herd, & Tisdall, 2002). These studies, however, do not consider the relationship between generic skills and the discipline in question but rather consider a set of externally devised skills which must be imposed upon the discipline.

Critical thinking

One of the widely-emphasised beliefs about a university education is the importance of critical thinking (Fox, 1994; Marton, Hounsell, & Entwistle, 1997; Ramsden, 1992; van der Wal, 1999); however, what critical thinking actually entails is much less clearly defined (Johnson, 1992). Much of the literature defines critical thinking as a set of practical cognitive skills, yet this Pails to acknowledge it as part of the culturally-established structures of meaning that constitute a discipline (Jones, 2004). This definition also fails to acknowledge the role of critical thinking in examining these structures (Barnett, 1997).

Much has been written on the nature of critical thinking. In most of this literature it is understood as a cognitive skill equating to problem solving and logic (Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1996; Halpern, 1996; Kurfiss, 1988; McPeck, 1981; Paul, 1989; Siegel, 1988). Barnett (1997) expands this definition by outlining a three-tiered model of critical thinking in higher education. The first dimension is 'critical thinking' which is a set of cognitive skills usually involving problem solving. The second dimension is 'critical thought' and comprises the interchanges, debates and standards within an intellectual field, embedded within the discipline itself. The third dimension is 'critique' as metacriticism. This has a wider perspective and can operate outside the rules of the discipline itself and has a dimension of interdisciplinarity.

Disciplinary cultures

One of the central ways of understanding epistemic cultures is to consider disciplinary differences. Much of the work on disciplinary differences in higher education can be traced back to Biglan (1973a, 1973b), Lodahl & Gordon (1972) and Kolb (1985).These studies categorised the disciplines as to whether they were hard or soft (that is, the degree to which a paradigm exists within a field on the basis of consensus regarding theory, methodology, techniques and problems) and whether they were pure or applied disciplines. This model, however, may very well be an oversimplification. As Becher (1989; Becher & Trowler, 2001) pointed out, the boundaries between hard and soft, pure and applied cannot be located with much precision. Despite this, Becher concluded that the epistemic nature of a discipline has a profound effect upon the academic culture. This has implications for investigations into generic skills. If the epistemology of a discipline affects the culture of the discipline in terms of scholarship, research and teaching as well as more tacit cultural mores, then it may well also affect the understandings surrounding generic skills.

This paper considers the ways in which the disciplinary culture and its underpinning epistemology affect the teaching and assessment practices in the disciplines. Generic skills are constituted in teaching, assessment and learning. Consequently, it is necessary to explore the ways in which the epistemic culture shapes teaching practice, and then to examine how the generic skills (with a particular focus on critical thinking) fit into that teaching practice and the ways in which this teaching practice is influenced by the disciplinary epistemology.

The differences in teaching and assessment practices are influenced by the knowledge structures in the disciplines. These knowledge structures in turn affect the cognitive purposes. Some disciplines can be understood as linear and hierarchical and, hence, knowledge is built up sequentially. This means that teaching (at least in the undergraduate years) focuses on logical reasoning and the learning of facts or concepts, 'established facts and demonstrable theories, rather than uncertainties and relativities' (Neuman et al., 2002, p. 407). In contrast, in the soft, pure disciplines, knowledge is understood as qualitative, constructed and interpretive. These disciplines require the ability to synthesise, discuss and develop an argument. It is seen as important to assess the ability to think laterally, clarity of expression and the interpretation and evaluation of theoretical perspectives (Braxton, 1993).

It is important to acknowledge that not all curriculum and assessment practices are necessarily influenced by the knowledge structures of the disciplines and to be mindful that the knowledge structures may not necessarily determine teaching practice. Many teaching and assessment practices may by influenced by institutional and individual factors as well as disciplinary ones. Teaching and assessment practices may be historical as much as epistemological, and one should be wary of assuming that just because a task tends to be performed in a certain way, it is necessarily a product of the epistemic culture, rather than of elements of the broader culture. Further, it is also important to acknowledge that disciplines are not simply hard or soft, pure or applied, but can exist across the spectrum.

Method

This study is based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with academic staff members from economics and history faculties at two different institutions. The two institutions chosen are well-established, large, research-based institutions. These two institutions were chosen so that the potential differences between new or technical and older research universities did not cloud the findings.

Participants were selected to encompass a range of subject area and approaches. In selecting participants, the aim was also to cover a range of age, experience and position levels. Only one member of staff who was invited to participate declined. Initially six people from each discipline were selected (three from each institution). Further interviews where then conducted if necessary until saturation was achieved (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In history this occurred after the initial six interviews, whereas in economics a further two interviews were conducted.

Data collection and analysis formed part of an ongoing and connected process (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 1990). The analysis process began with verbatim transcription of the interviews. The transcripts were then coded using the software program Nvivo. This coding involved re-reading and validation through cross-checking across all transcripts. From this coding, themes or patterns were identified and refined. Hypothetical relationships identified in the initial coding were confirmed, modified or rejected on the basis of this process.

Findings

Much has been written on the nature of history and economics (for history, see Cart, 1964; Elton, 1969. For economics, see Galbraith, 1987; Ormerod, 1994; Toohey, 1994.) This paper, however, concentrates on the perceptions of the participants. Unsurprisingly though, much of what the participants say is reflected in the literature. The study reveals certain differences between economics and history that influence the ways in which critical thinking is conceptualised.

History is perceived as more relaxed and confident than economics with embracing multiple approaches; for example, while most historians argue that they are searching for some kind of 'truth' they also argue that there are many perspectives from which we may view history. This is not something that any of the historians in this study appear to be defensive about; in fact, they seem to revel in the eclecticism. As one replied, when asked about his approach, 'historians won't be tied down--I'll try anything'.

In contrast, the issue of consensus is more problematic for economists. Critics are divided: some claim the discipline is limited by its lack of debate and its high a level of consensus, while others argue that debate weakens or detracts from the discipline and makes economists look 'silly'. Such criticisms, at least in macroeconomics, are seen as fracturing the discipline and being negative. There is a sense from many economists that the discipline had reached some kind of paradigmatic stability that is important to maintain.

Modern economics is an interesting discipline in that it uses a mathematical methodology and likens itself to a science and yet needs to contend with the complexities and messiness of the social sciences. Fine (2000) points out that economics has become increasingly isolated from other social sciences. Further, economics appears to have gained a paradigmatic stability (Kuhn, 1970) and prestige and so is resistant to critique. In contrast, history is a highly eclectic discipline. Knowledge is contested and debate is vigorous, yet this multiplicity is seen as a strength, and is treated with tolerance and confidence.

These differences in approaches are significant for understandings of critical thinking since critical thinking can operate as an examination of logical consistency but can also operate as an exploration of the debates within a discipline. Further, it can include an interdisciplinary or 'metacritical' perspective (Barnett, 1997). Those disciplines with a more eclectic or interdisciplinary approach may incorporate a more metacritical approach to critical thinking. The following sections will examine the two disciplines separately.

History

The unifying theme for historians is expressed as a fascination with things, people, ideas and societies that were very much 'there' but are no longer; the study of history is a paradoxical combination of escapism and connection with the present, of engagement and disengagement and an interest in 'the other'. When asked why historians bothered with history, one replied with a grin 'because it is there, like Everest!'

Central to the notion of history is the importance of people and hence of empathy, an interest in difference and in what motivates human beings. Key interests that preoccupy many of the historians in this study are the reasons behind actions--what people did and could have done, what they could have known, could have thought, their fears and fantasies. This is expanded into the deeper existential concerns about why we are here and what we can say about the human life of the past and what that tells us about our current condition.

Thus the key themes in which historians are interested are change and causality. They are interested in the reasons for change from both a structural and an individual perspective. They are interested in the relationships between social, cultural, and political structures, the individual, and circumstance. While the social structures and setting are highly important, the individual voice is also important.

The centrality of the human voice is emphasised in the fascination with 'history that hasn't been written yet', an interest in people on the margins, people who do not leave diaries, letters or public statements and people who are often 'only glimpsed when they are in trouble'. Thus there is an interest in the marginal of various kinds: Indigenous people, women, the poor, those on the fringes of society for reasons of class, race, sex, ethnicity, sexuality, illness and so on. One historian commented that it is important to consider 'who was in the crowd, who was not speaking and how you find them'.

Perhaps one of the most striking features of history is its breadth of time, place, social milieu and methodology. Historians point out that they happily draw on other disciplines and characterise their discipline as complex but grounded, necessarily interpretative and peculiar because what historians are studying has gone irretrievably, leaving only traces. History is something that is 'there but it is amorphous, we can't touch it anymore'. As a consequence it is necessary to use detective work to construct a plausible argument yet be aware that there will be many histories and that we will 'never really know'.

In history, the same event or time period can be seen from a number of perspectives, even in opposing ways, creating heated debate, as the recent 'history wars' regarding Australian history attest (Macintyre & Clarke, 2003; Reynolds, 2001; Windschuttle, 2002).Thus history is seen as multiple and often contradictory, as one research interviewee explained: 'Of course there is a past out there but it is such a complicated, multi-layered, multi-woven thing. There is a coherent story but actually there are many, not just the one.'

Historical 'stories' may be constructed, but the historians I spoke to are very reluctant to claim that a totally relativist position is defensible. They argue against the notion that 'one story is as good as any other' and claim instead that it is the job of the historian to marshal the evidence to see which is the most convincing.

Although historians maintain that there is very little consensus within history, there is paradoxically a high level of agreement amongst the historians in this study. While they claim that the only thing that unites them is a fascination with the past, there is very little difference of opinion regarding the nature of their discipline. All agree that the discipline embraces a wide range of approaches, that history is about interpretation and hence that individual positions are varied; yet all are of the view that these varieties in method and interpretation sit very comfortably in departments, particularly now, although the older participants pointed out that twenty or so years ago this was not always the case. They relish their diversity in a way that unifies them.

The historians in the study argue that history is not the past but is a way of organising knowledge about the past, and it is important to acknowledge that that this always involves a notion that history is 'made'. Historians are self-conscious and aware of their own role in the construction of history. They are humbled by the awareness of their own role, in that they do not see themselves as discovering one immutable truth, but they are also assured regarding their role within that complexity, as one participant said: 'Everything that we read about the past is already inflected in certain kinds of ways.'

This theme is continued into the interest in ideology and power. The historians in this study argue that they are not just telling 'objective' stories or providing facts about the past but are conscious that certain stories get told and gain prominence and others do not: that certain voices are heard and recorded while others are not. Thus they are interested in examining what matters and more importantly why something is important. There is an interest amongst the historians in examining the gaps and silences as well as the overt, and in exploring stories that are not being told.

A further important element of history is its connection with the present. Although a divide is referred to between those historians who are interested in the past for its own sake and those who are interested in the past because it helps us understand to our own times, history is spoken of in terms of its connection with the present: 'We used to hate presentism but the present and the past are integrally connected,' commented one participant. History is seen as a process rather than 'the past' and there is a dialogue between the past and the present. By examining the choices made in the past it may be possible to get some idea about how to deal with similar dilemmas and predicaments in our own experience.

From the above discussion, it is apparent that ideas of critical thinking are embedded in the nature of history. MI the historians interviewed are concerned with carefully examining a number of the following: evidence, argument, assumptions, implications, power relations, bias, gaps and silences, ideology. Clearly critical thinking is part of the ways in which historians conceptualise their discipline. The following section will examine the ways in which this translates into teaching.

Content and skills in history

While skills are seen as very important, there is a clearly-articulated tension between content and skills. The need to teach skills is seen as taking time away from content. Teaching skills such as analysis of evidence, understanding of context, theoretical approaches to history are part of the job of the academic historian; however, there is ambivalence about skills such as writing. Content is clear, concrete and manageable whereas teaching skills overtly is much more difficult, as one historian explained:

   We focus on conveying packets of knowledge, but we have to move
   away from that if we really want to teach these skills in a
   systematic way. We'd have to take more time away from the lecture and
   that is difficult to do; it is easy once you have written a lecture
   to present the material. Sacrificing more content, something
   has to be dropped out, make a series of trade-offs. And I think it
   is easier to keep content than teach skills.

Despite the difficulties of teaching skills, historians express a sense that, in practice, history is about skills as much as it is about content. What students carry with them is a way of thinking rather than specific knowledge, according to one interviewee, who said that 'two years from now I don't think students remember ninety per cent of the content'. What is important for all the historians in this study is that students develop the ability to question and an interest and ability to go on learning after they leave university. Central to this is critical thinking or critical reading, which both mean asking the right questions. So the growing knowledge students acquire in history, while important, is a basis for skills development. The tension between content and skills, however, is magnified because students see themselves as learning information, rather than analytical skills. Thus the relationship between skills and content is a complex one.

Critical thinking in history

The integration of critical thinking into the content of history poses some problems, as students are expected to pick up the skill intuitively rather than being taught it overtly. In addition, the implicit, embedded and complex nature of generic skills makes evaluation of the teaching of critical thinking difficult.

Like history itself, critical thinking is understood as a complex and multilayered entity. It is conceptualised as having a number of dimensions that involve an examination of logic, evidence, difference, ambiguities, power, gaps and the nature of history itself. These dimensions will be examined separately although they are not necessarily separate activities but are merely different angles on the notion of critical thinking.

Firstly, critical thinking is seen as an ability to examine the logic of an argument. While this is seen as an important skill, it is not the most significant way in which critical thinking is understood. More important is the ability to examine the evidence. This means understanding and discussing it in its context. It also means the ability to take a text apart and explore its relevance, author, audience, purpose, the claims made on knowledge and truth. Further, critical thinking involves examining the biases of the text in question.

Next, critical thinking introduces an element of otherness. This means firstly seeking other evidence, other voices and other perspectives. It is also a bigger project as it aims to develop students' openness to other ways of seeing the world and so is both directed at the evidence or task at hand but also directed at students' worldviews.

Critical thinking also involves exploring contradictions, ambiguities and ambivalence. This means not only finding a way through contradictions but also being conscious that there may not be a definitive answer and hence understanding complexity. The historians argue that students need to learn to appreciate contradictions rather than aim to reduce them. They see critical thinking as an ability to challenge one's own presuppositions and examine one's own biases. Hence it is an activity that is directed both inward and outward.

The skill of critical thinking requires an awareness of a political dimension and comprises an understanding of the nature and structures of power, essential in order to examine what has become established, why certain perspectives are current while others are marginalised, and what might be a better way of 'telling the story'.

Critical thinking also involves an awareness of gaps and silences, the people who were not speaking, the things that were not said, and the evidence that is difficult to find. The historians are aware of the unspoken and what history's omissions can tell us about what is important and valued both by past societies and contemporary historians.

The final form that critical thinking takes is related to the sense that historians are self conscious about their craft. Their awareness of the notion that historians 'make history' means that they are honest about the limits of their own theorising. Their eclectic practices and interdisciplinarity mean that there is examination of the nature of history, its power and its constraints.

Teaching and assessing critical thinking in history

Teaching critical thinking in its various forms appears to have been made relatively explicit by the historians interviewed for this study. It is emphasised as a central understanding of the nature of historians and one of the key skills that students acquire in studying history. Academics maintain that they make the thinking process explicit. One academic commented that, 'in lectures I [talk] about contentions. I will often say this is nay contention. I am now going to take you through the process of the evidentiary basis for that contention. This is how I know what I know; this is the evidence it is based on.'

In tutorials, particularly in first year, students are taught to use a primary source and to analyse it, then to consider what historians have written, and to think critically about the relationship between the primary sources and secondary commentary. Students are also taught the skills of document analysis in first year by being given small, focused, written document analysis tasks that encourage them to think about how one evaluates what is a reliable source. Such tasks teach students how to examine the context, relevance, purpose of a document. In tasks such as these students are shown good evidence procedures and case shaping. Thus critical thinking is modelled in lectures, practiced in tutorials and assessed in formative tasks.

The participants present students with alternative perspectives or interpretations, with cultural difference, historical difference, gender, class and so on for both explicit and implicit comparison. As one lecturer put it: 'In lectures I try to say we could look at it this way and we could look at it that way. 'They also make it clear that they point out to students 'that X is arguing this way and Y is arguing that and let's think about which we see as more convincing and examine their actual point of disagreement and the basis of that.'

Students are also presented with the controversial and the ambiguous. One educator, for example, shows students an image of a 'savage' from 1570 and discusses how it is more ambivalent than might be supposed. He also challenges students by advancing contentions that are 'a bit weird'; for example, that Native Americans actually allowed settlers to stay rather than being immediate victims. This is done in order to stimulate students to examine their own and others' assumptions. Another historian exposes students to a range of sources in order to encourage them to realise what the political investment in particular stories is and to examine, for example, why the ANZAC story is central to Australian national identity and then to explore the Turkish perspective in order to be aware that the Turks were defending their homeland and hence that the story is highly complex.

The importance of historiography is also emphasised for latter year (third and fourth year) students. This makes students aware that they are not being presented with 'the facts' but an argument that uses facts in a certain way. One historian said:

   I don't try to pretend that I don't read history in a particular
   way, that I have my own biases and my own subjectivity. I don't
   give lectures where I say 'this is the objective past'. I try to
   help them understand that I am making an argument and I will
   often say to them 'you may not agree with this but it is how I
   see it'.

Critical thinking is assessed largely through essays, although small writing tasks, presentations and exams are also used. One person uses counterfactuals, in which students role play events leading up to the American Civil war in an attempt to 'prevent' it, and in so doing examine motivations and complexities of the situation. The essay is seen as the best assessment tool because it is formative and involves a range of skills. It is particularly helpful for teaching and assessing critical thinking, as students have to mount a case, come up with a contention, find and carefully examine the evidence and be aware of the complexities of the issue.

While many of the historians had developed effective teaching strategies, the teaching and assessment of critical thinking is acknowledged to be problematic. Its complex nature means that students are not always taught in a systematic manner, according to one participant, who confessed: 'I don't think I was ever taught in a systematic fashion how to read or think critically. It was something you picked up along the way.' Another argues that students are 'extraordinarily resistant' to being challenged and that she finds it difficult to make students engage in a critical way with the idea that the history they are reading is not just about accumulated information but is actually an argument.

The assessment of critical thinking is acknowledged to be difficult for a number of reasons: firstly, because critical thinking is difficult to define and 'pin down' and so difficult to assess precisely; and secondly, because while academics see going through essay proposals as an important part of student learning, this is becoming increasingly difficult because of the sheer numbers of students, combined with workload issues and an increase in other pressures. Others write extensive comments but this is time consuming in large classes. Some worry that in large classes the lecturer does not do most of the marking and hence loses control of it. While experienced lecturers write guidelines for the tutors who are marking the essays, they argue that postgraduate students have much less experience and so may mark things differently; consequently there is a danger that assessment does not always fulfil its goals.

Economics

The economists involved in this study use a range of approaches, from the highly mathematical and theoretical to more qualitative and applied. They fall into two groups, those who are 'mainstream' and those who identify themselves as 'marginal'. Those who are mainstream do not identify themselves as such but see their approach as standard, whereas those on the margins describe themselves as 'heretical' or 'soft'. Both groups describe economics in many of the same ways although those on the margins are much more critical. The participants in this study range from an almost entirely uncritical 'economists are right' stance, to those who are highly critical of their discipline.

Economics is described as being logical, rational, a discipline that should be approached in a scientific manner. Some participants liken it to physics because it uses mathematical modelling, physics-like concepts and has, in the words of one participant, 'an unfeeling rigour which distinguishes it from any other social science'. Another economist, however, argues that only bad economics is like physics and that it is more like biology because it is about complex and interacting systems. The parallels between physics and economics are not new (Deane, 1978; Mirowski, 1989; Walras, 1954).

Economics is seen as being more quantifiable and mathematical than other social sciences, in part because the elements that economics is concerned with, such as price, tax and inflation rates, are easily quantifiable. It is also described as being abstract, concerned with order, highly structured and a fairly formal way of thinking. Importantly, it is described as a discipline that is not afraid of making assumptions.

Economics is seen as powerful because it is a useful tool of analysis. It is contrasted with sociology, which is seen as lacking formal models and as making associations that are tenuous or cannot be well established. Most economists in this study see methodology as one of the defining features of economics.

Those who are most critical both identify themselves as at the 'softer' end of economics and began their careers in other disciplines, such as anthropology, history, and science. The criticisms of economics centre on the dominance of the neoclassical paradigm and the nature of the models used. As one participant argues, 'Economics is ideological but this is not acknowledged ... They [economists] have a basic belief that the standard neoclassical models are an actual reflection of reality.' Amongst those who are critical, the concern is that most of the conclusions in neoclassical economics are dependent upon assumptions: 'if assumptions have to be simplistic and unrealistic to get to the maths, then how useful is it?' This, however, is countered by the argument from more 'mainstream' economists that critics misunderstand the nature and strength of modelling:

   The criticism that economists get of their models being simplified
   and stylised and unrealistic and that sort of stuff, maybe
   sometimes that is true, but in general that just shows a lack of
   appreciation of what modelling is always about, which is developing
   simplified representations of things. You shouldn't criticise the
   model just because it is simplified, you should criticise the model
   if it doesn't work predicting behaviour.

There was a clear fissure between those who provided a critique of their discipline and the mainstream. Most argued that mathematical modelling provides a methodological strength that is lacking in other social sciences. Others, however, argue that it is limiting or unrealistic. They point out that economics is an investigation into social coordination and the allocation of resources in the face of ubiquitous scarcity. As a consequence, economics is a social activity, yet the combination of the neoclassical theories and mathematical modelling sideline the complex and the social and hence is limiting or unrealistic. As one economist argues: 'the mathematics misses the human dimension and choice; humans are smarter than mechanical systems. Homo economicus would go off a cliff like a lemming.'

Clearly consensus is an important issue for economists. All argue that there is a high level of consensus, although opinions differ as to whether this is positive or negative. Those 'on the margins' argue that the level of consensus is too high, particularly regarding the neoclassical approach, which they describe as the dominant paradigm. Alternative or interdisciplinary approaches are seen as 'soft', not taken seriously and not publishable in prestigious journals. Even amongst those on the margins there is disagreement as to whether or not students are exposed to a range of approaches. Some of the staff interviewed at one university argued that there is some attempt to expose students to a range of economic approaches, whereas, at the other university, there is a sense that the only approach students are systematically exposed to is the neoclassical one. Whereas in the past students might have been taught Marxist or post-Keynesian economics, they no longer are, and there is no serious debate about alternative ways of teaching economics. One economist argues that other paradigms have weakened with the collapse of socialist alternatives; however, others state that institutional, behavioural and evolutionist economics are gaining some ground.

The economists describe economics (particularly macroeconomics) as having been through a period of crisis. As one participant says: 'in macroeconomics they beat their brains out for twenty years and then got tired of the methodological arguments.' The debate had been vitriolic and a great deal of grief had been caused by the huge paradigm shifts in which people had been forced either to change or become sidelined. Others argue that the disagreements had brought the discipline into disrepute and that it is important to maintain a level of consensus. They said that mathematics had saved economics as a discipline, and that strength must be preserved.

Content and skills in economics

Content rather than generic skills is identified as the central lesson which economists aim to impart to their students. This is expressed as a love of economics, an understanding of the basic principles, functional economic literacy or an ability to apply economic approaches. Only one person identified his central goal as engendering the skill of 'critical analysis'. Acquiring the economic skills is so complex and time consuming that this becomes the central aim; without these technical skills, generic skills are peripheral or meaningless.

The key generic skills that are identified as important are critical thinking, analysis and problem solving; however there is some equivocation as to the nature and importance of critical thinking and one person remarked that there is 'precious little critical thinking in economics'. There are concerns about generic skills and, while they are important, they are thought about after the fact: 'you can't base a course on generic skills so you start off with the subject matter and then rationalise the generic skills after. You don't design a course so you teach communication skills; they are secondary.'

The nature of economics influences the ways in which critical thinking is conceptualised. The emphasis on economics as logical, the complex technical and mathematical skills that students need to acquire, and the current wariness about vitriolic debate in the discipline has an effect upon the ways in which critical thinking is perceived.

Critical thinking in economics

Broadly, critical thinking in economics is seen from two perspectives. There is agreement that critical thinking is the application of logic. It is seen principally as an examination of understanding, use and application of the theories or models. This is also expressed as examining whether something is 'true' or not. The nature of truth, however, is not examined. Included in this understanding of critical thinking is its application to policy. Economics is seen as a means for evaluating policy. Some participants in the study, particularly those on the margins, view this view of critical thinking as limited. One economist said:

   What they mean by critical thinking is logical analysis, so what
   you do is check the internal consistency of a particular model
   rather than whether the assumptions it is based on are right, so
   there is a fundamental difference in what is meant by critical
   thinking. We teach the assumptions, such as profit maximising
   behaviour, and initially we wave our hands and say, 'Of course
   these assumptions don't hold,' but we never take students back
   to critically analyse this, which is a fundamental problem. Other
   disciplines would say, 'Let's not even worry about building this
   fantastic edifice, let's look at the foundations first.' I think
   that is the real problem because after three years no-one is
   talking about them [the assumptions] and students take it for
   granted that they must be right and then go out into the world
   and start making decisions.

In addition, critical thinking in the narrow, logical sense is just 'paring things down to their bare minimum,' according to another participant. 'Clearly if you are in mathematics that is great; but the world we live in is more complex than that.'

Thus the concerns voiced about economics also surface in the context of discussions about critical thinking.

Secondly, critical thinking encompasses notions of scepticism, although this was not an aspect of critical thinking that was raised by all participants. It comprises an ability to take a contrary or sceptical view of what is being expressed, 'thinking outside the frame', 'thinking outside the box' or 'thinking sideways'. Examples of the way scepticism manifested itself were evident in students thinking for themselves in tutorials or essays and being prepared to argue with the lecturer. Some economists in the study suggest that this does not happen as much as they would like; others did not think it was of central importance to undergraduate economics. One participant related a concrete example of critical thinking:

   The lecturer writes a model up on the board and tells students the
   assumptions. The absence of critical thinking is writing it down
   and learning it. Critical thinking is asking where the assumptions
   come from, when might I apply it, when shouldn't I, how did he get
   the results, are there times when I get different results, if I
   wanted to destroy it what would I say was wrong with it?

One participant contended that critical thinking in any discipline should explore all the underpinnings, assumptions and evidence and subject it all to critical scrutiny. Another argued that the factors that drive human decision-making are very much contextual and so it is important to examine the societal environment in which these decisions are being made. Yet, in contrast to this, another economist in the study said that there are problems with criticism. He argued that, up to the 1960s, economics was taught in a 'very critical way' and that teachers would emphasise the unreality of the assumptions, but that the result was that 'everyone thought economics was useless'.

Teaching and assessing critical thinking in economics

There is agreement that teaching critical thinking is difficult, complex and problematic, as one economist explained:

   A lot of us will talk about critical thinking and analysis and
   problem solving but they are like motherhood statements; we
   don't actually know how to do it or we think it sort of wears
   off on students. I guess to some extent if you expose them to
   enough of this, seeing other people doing it, and force them to
   confront particular issues then eventually they will--but a lot
   don't. I am not sure how to do it directly.

In a similar way, another remarked 'I don't know if I teach it explicitly; you sort of imagine they would pick it up along the way perhaps.' The uncertainty regarding how to teach critical thinking is common. Others are uncertain if it is in fact a priority; one participant said, 'maybe it is not an explicit goal in my mind'.

The teaching of critical thinking in economics is largely based around understanding of the economic tools. Teaching the application of the theory involves teaching students to examine models and how they work, and how to evaluate economic policies. Economists teach the application of theory by modelling in lectures, setting practice questions for students to complete at home, and having students, often in groups, work through questions in tutorials,.

Scepticism or 'thinking outside the box' is taught (by some participants) by presenting students with instances where, for example, a model did not work. One economist used the example of an exercise he had just given his macroeconomics students of the oil shocks in the 1970s where the models were not ideal. Another 'tossed examples into tutorials'. In this case, however, the expectation is that only students 'with a predilection to do honours' will see the point. Some comment that they are merely exposing students to this sort of critical thinking but are not teaching it explicitly.

An examination of the underlying assumptions is something that is either consciously avoided or not taught because it is too difficult for undergraduates. One view is that critical thinking in economics requires a reasonable level of technical knowledge and so it is a difficult thing for first year students to do. In order to think critically one needs a serious appreciation of economics and a breadth of analytic skills because without that one could end up 'making dumb criticisms of the analysis'. Another argues that they do not get students to look at whether a model is flawed because the models used are 'not flawed'. The important factor is the assumptions, but this is a very difficult issue for students, especially in the early years of their degrees, to consider. Said one academic:

   You can't teach them something they can't do; they are not expected
   to know that this is a good model and that is a bad model. It might
   be possible to tell students the standard criticisms of the model
   and they could regurgitate them. However, in teaching it is
   important not to be negative because that destroys their motivation,
   students hate to have their time wasted so if you say 'this is a
   pretty useless model' they will ask 'why did you teach it to us?'

Only one person said that in his teaching he makes a very deliberate attempt to introduce students to a variety of approaches and theories and to look for alternative explanations to the standard economic ones--cultural explanations, development, a Marxist approach, environmental factors. He only does this with honours students, though, because he would not be popular in the department if he did not follow the standard practice with earlier year students. In this subject, honours students are taught in a seminar situation where they are given big questions with no opportunity to find a definitive answer. An essay is part of their assessment, and students are given open-ended questions and required to develop an argument that carefully examines the evidence, not only the logical consistency but also whether the assumptions are valid and whether the predictions the model made are true. This sort of approach worked with honours students because they were 'very good'.

Critical thinking is assessed as part of content assessment through essays, assignments and exams, depending upon the nature of the subject. Exam and assignment questions focus on logic and analysis, evaluation of policy propositions and interpretation of the model or application of the theory. The subjects in which the importance of essays in teaching critical thinking was central, are, on the whole, taught by those who see themselves as on the margins in their discipline; yet even these historians, with one exception, saw their central aim as teaching the skills of economic analysis.

Conclusions

The clear differences between the ways critical thinking is conceptualised and taught in history and economics suggest that the epistemic culture of the two disciplines influences the ways in which critical thinking is understood. The findings suggest that while critical thinking is a skill of central importance in higher education, the meanings attached to it may be somewhat fluid. The findings are consistent across both institutions, which seems to indicate that this has more to do with disciplinary than institutional culture. Further, the way knowledge itself is conceptualised, sought and validated in the two disciplines appears to shape the ways in which critical thinking is understood.

In this study, economics (for all but those on the margins) conceptualises critical thinking as problem solving--as applying a model to a problem or examining the workings of a model within a particular framework. Critical thinking involves knowledge of the 'tools' and application of them. In contrast, the multiplicity and the acceptance of the contested nature of knowledge of history extends to its multiple understandings of critical thinking.

This difference in the understandings of critical thinking is interesting as economics and history share, at least to some extent, a common ancestry and are concerned with some of the same issues; however, what is important when considering critical thinking is the ways in which knowledge is understood. The approach to critical thinking undertaken by history is much more political in the broad sense of the term in that it is concerned with power relationships. History has been influenced by poststructuralism whereas in contrast, economics seems to be relatively untouched by modern social theory and philosophy of science (perhaps less so than science post Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend).Thus for history the contested nature of knowledge is integral in notions of critical thinking in ways that are less apparent in economics.

The difference in the ways in which critical thinking is conceptualised has a number of very important implications. If indeed critical thinking is understood differently across disciplines, this has an impact on the ways in which we understand university-wide statements of graduate attributes, on the discipline-independent testing of generic skills, and on the expectations that employers have of the sorts of generic skills that graduates will have on entering the workforce.

While universities may aspire to producing students who achieve graduate attributes such as the capacity for independent critical thought upon graduation, what this actually means may well be discipline-dependent. Preliminary studies of the Graduate Skills Assessment (Australian Council for Educational Research, 2001) suggest that there are distinctive profiles of student performance which are related to fields of study; for example, humanities students do relatively well on critical thinking. Further, while employers are arguing for the need for graduates with generic skills, again what that means may depend at least in part upon the disciplinary background of the graduates they choose to recruit.

It may be that there are generic skills that exist beyond, alongside or integral to the skills developed in the disciplinary context. The conventional wisdom is that there are attributes that tertiary graduates possess beyond disciplinary skills; however, once academics come to articulate and then teach these skills, the relationship between them and the disciplines that form the core of a university education becomes problematic. More problematic still is how these skills are measured. While tests such as the Graduate Skills Assessment, among others, aim to measure generic skills, this is contentious.

The discipline is the central point of cultural and intellectual identification for academic staff (Becher, 1989) and students. It is within the disciplines that generic skills are taught. Thus it is essential that there is a better understanding of the ways in which the generic skills are conceptualised from a disciplinary perspective and the ways in which the epistemology underpinning the disciplines may shape notions of generic skills.

Keywords

critical thinking
generic skills
higher education
history
economics
epistemology

Acknowledgements

My thanks to Richard James for his much-appreciated advice and also to the participants of this study.

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Anna Jones is a Lecturer in the Teaching and Learning Unit of the Faculty of Economics and Commerce at the University of Melbourne. Email [e-mail]