Movement to contact and commitment to combat of reserve fronts (Great Patriotic War experience and modern times).

The Supreme High Command Headquarters (SHC Hq) were constantly upgrading methods of strategic operations during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The most important course of action in this field was the timely creation of reserves and their skillful use for reinforcing strategic force groupings. Reserve large strategic formations of fronts were designed to boost the efforts of troops or continue advance in newly opened sectors. The roles of reserve fronts were varied and depended first of all on their place in strategic force groupings, operational objectives, tasks of operations and the importance of sectors in which they operated. Their effective combat strength was determined on this basis.

In 1941-1942, the SHC Hq used strategic reserves (fronts and armies) mainly to disrupt and delay enemy offensives and stabilize fronts in the most important sectors.

July 1941 saw the formation of the Front of Reserve Armies and the Front of the Mozhaisk Defense Line which formed the basis for the subsequent Reserve Front. December saw the creation of the Moscow Defense Zone. All these frontal formations were preparing defense lines for repulsing enemy attacks.

The Reserve Front formed on 30 July 1941 in the western sector carried out the Yelnya offensive operation in early September. At the start of the Battle of Moscow, it took part in repulsing the enemy offensive, sustained considerable losses and was integrated into the Western Front. In 1943, the Reserve Front was recreated, albeit briefly (it was known as the Kursk Front on 24-27 March, and as the Orel Front on 27-28 March), in April it was transformed into the Stepnoy Military District, which on 9 July was redesignated the Stepnoy Front.

The reserve armies were employed to reinforce fronts engaged in combat operations and create new ones. On instructions from the SHC Hq, they were moved to designated assembly areas as a rule by rail, in the absence of railroads they moved under their own power to not too distant areas. They could manage 30-40 km a day. In the initial period of war, they were infrequently committed to combat right from the line of march to carry out spoiling attacks, but more often than not, they went over to the defensive.

In July 1942, three armies (the 1st, 5th and 7th armies) out of the SHC Hq reserve were moved into the Stalingrad sector and redesignated the 64th, 63rd and 62nd armies respectively. They formed the core of the Stalingrad Front on 12 July. When active fronts undertook major offensive operations, there were usually given reinforcement from SHC Hq reserves. Thus, prior to the counteroffensive near Moscow, the Western Front was reinforced by the 1st Assault Army and the 10th Army with a mission to launch attacks along the front's flanks. The Northwestern Front was reinforced, for the Toropets-Kholm Offensive Operation, with the 3rd and 4th assault armies. The 5th Tank Army took part in the Stalingrad Offensive Operation as part of the Southwestern Front.

Three tank armies (the 1st, 3rd Guard Army and the 4th Army) from the SHC Hq reserve were transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front in anticipation of the 1944 Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive Operation.

From 1943, reserve fronts and fronts freed up after operations were as a rule used for offensive exploitation. In so doing, some reserve fronts were committed to battle in the main lines of attack as part of assault force groupings while others were committed to combat along the flanks to protect them or else they were used to perform missions in newly opened operational sectors. During the Battle of Kursk, the Stepnoy Front forces under Col. Gen. I.S. Konev were committed to combat in the course of the 19 July offensive operation, delivered a strike along the Belgorod-Kharkov axis, routed large strategic formations and units of the 9th German Field Army, liberated Belgorod and Kharkov and reached the Dnieper River as they continued their advance.

Following redeployment and moving its forces to contact in March 1944, the 2nd Belorussian Front was committed to combat in the Kovel sector.

Completing the East Pomerania Operation, forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front moved forward in April 1945, to the Oder River to take part in the Berlin Operation. The front's forces were assigned to a flank of the strategic grouping of forces to press an attack along the coastal axis and thus reliably protect the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front.

The commitment to battle of reserve fronts was appreciably influenced by the organization and procedure of movement to contact of troops (using transport by rail among other modes of transport), as well as the time of year and weather conditions. To take an example, in February 1943 the Central Front comprised of three combined-arms armies and support weapons was moved by rail over a distance of 1,000 km from near Stalingrad to the Kursk sector near Yelets and it subsequently moved up under its own power to the point of commitment to battle (northwest of Kursk) 250-300 km away. Moving the front's troops by rail involved great difficulties because of the only single-track railway and limited rolling stock. In addition, planning errors made a mess of the train schedule. Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky wrote in his memoirs: "Our report on all these irregularities caused the situation to become still worse. NKVD was asked to take measures to speed the troop movement. The men of this People's Commissariat, who started on their task, showed excessive zeal putting a squeeze on the railway administration that flustered its employees even more. Whereas there had been a modicum of regularity prior to that, now it was a total mess. Combined units arriving in the assembly areas were all different. Artillery equipment was unloaded as designated whereas horses and machinery remained where they were. Sometimes equipment was unloaded at one location and the troops, at some other. Trains had to spend days waiting at some rail stations and sidings. Railcars were sent up with delays, owing to which 169 service support units never left the area of Stalingrad." (1)

All this had a negative impact on the preparedness of the front troops for commitment to battle as scheduled by the SHC Hq.

Transported by rail in March 1944 were the command element of the 2nd Belorussian Front, its 47th and 70th armies, 96th and 125th rifle corps, combined units and combat arms units. The arriving troops then headed for the points of their commitment to battle 50-80 km away under their own power.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were redeploying in an organized and planned manner in April 1945 when combined and ordinary units executed a more than 300-kilometer march. This manner of moving up troops is most typical of modern conditions.

Experience of military operations shows that a successful movement of troops over considerable distances takes careful planning, organized and thorough support of transportation and movement under their own power of large strategic formations and combined units based on the potentials of rail facilities, negotiability of roads and effective use of all forms of transport. Troops should be moved rapidly and undetectably, with reliable air cover and skilful command and control. It is especially important to prepare in advance new assembly areas, move to new areas reconnaissance, communications, engineering, road engineering, airfield, traffic control and regulation services and rear service units and subunits.

The operational situation in the future area of responsibility had a profound effect on organizing the commitment of troops to battle, this was especially true about the position and condition of the first-echelon fronts and the character of hostile operations. In 1943-1945, the position of troops of the first echelon fronts in the area of committing combined units to battle was stable as a rule. They were conducting vigorous operations. Thus, the movement to contact of Central Front forces was covered by units and combined units of the 12th Army of the Bryansk Front and the 60th Army of the Voronezh Front, and the movement to contact of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the direction of Kovel by units of the 61st Army of the 1st Belorussian Front and the 13th Army of the Ukrainian Front. This facilitated an orderly concentration and deployment of reserve front troops for launching an offensive. In February 1943, the enemy adopted a point-of-resistance defense tactics conducting a delaying operation in the Central Front commitment to battle area.

In the Berlin Operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front launched its offensive by crossing the Oder and breaching enemy deliberate defense.

There were different methods of commitment to battle and disposition of reserve front forces. They varied with the strength and composition, positioning and condition of first echelon troops, the timing of the commitment of fronts to battle, conditions of moving them up, their deployment and initiation of offensive.

More often than not, troops of the fronts were inserted into battle without a halt into the intervals between or from behind the flanks of forces operating ahead of them, or sometimes they rolled over the latter's positions. In many instances, the assigning of troops to reserve fronts called for drastically new methods of their commitment to battle and disposition. For example, in the area of upcoming operations, the Central Front was assigned the 2nd Tank Army and a mounted-and-mechanized group that, coupled with the arriving 65th Army, comprised the first echelon and were moved up to the commitment to battle area up to 300 km away. The 21st and 70th armies of the front operated in the second echelon.

The commitment to battle of first echelon armies was to be simultaneous to achieve a powerful first strike. In effect, delays in concentration and moving up their combined units, the first echelon was committed to battle unit by unit upon their arrival by inserting them in the intervals or by rolling over the weakened combined and ordinary units of the Bryansk Front.

The commitment to battle of the Stepnoy Front on 18 July 1943 proceeded along different lines. Assigned to it (in addition to the 53rd Army) were the 7th Guards Army and the 69th Army. With the launching of offensive the commander brought in the 53rd Army together with the 1st Mechanized Corps (all in all seven rifle divisions). (2)

The 2nd Belorussian Front active in the Kovel sector was assigned, when it was initiated to battle, the 61st Army from the 1st Belorussian Front, two cavalry corps and a tank brigade, in addition to the command element of the 47th Army with army units and the 77th Rifle Corps of the 13th Army from the 1st Ukrainian Front. The 70th Army (seven divisions) of the SHC Hq reserve and additional seven divisions and two rifle corps were transported by rail. The 6th Air Army was redeployed to a new base. By the beginning of its commitment to battle, the front had only 11 out of the 22 assigned divisions.

In line with the decision of Col. Gen. P.A. Kurochkin, the corps and divisions were to be initiated to battle between 16 and 18 March 1944 at different times as they were arriving by rail without waiting for concentration of all first-echelon forces.

In the Berlin Operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front commanded by Marshal Rokossovsky, stepping in to replace the 61st Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, went into offensive with three armies--the 65th, 70th and 49th--right from the line of contact with the enemy.

Thus, depending on the mode of enemy operations and of the friendly forces in front, the condition and positioning of armies and combined units of the fronts, they used different methods of committing them to combat: based on the timing of initiation of the first echelon--simultaneously or sequentially; based on the method of moving up and deployment--without a halt or by replacing forward forces and rolling over their positions; and in the event of assigning the latter to new command, jointly with them by committing to battle fractions of the reserve front forces and, as a rule, without a halt. Proving as the most effective was the simultaneous commitment to battle of first echelon forces of the fronts enabling the launching of the most powerful first strike and continue advance at a fast pace (one example is the Stepnoy Front in July 1943).

The sequential commitment to battle was forced owing to delays in moving up (transportation) of troops over great distances or the shortage of transportation assets and unsatisfactory condition of the lines of communication. In addition, it was supposed that delayed commitment to battle of fresh forces and equipment could make the enemy more active and stabilize the front.

Operational dispositions of reserve fronts at the time of commitment to battle also differed. The Central Front had two echelons, whereas the other fronts moved into offensive in one-echelon formations. Most first-echelon armies had two-echelon formations.

Operational dispositions of the fronts and armies varied with the situation and missions assigned them. The Central Front's two-echelon disposition was due to the fact that it was making the main effort and the depth of its mission was as far as near Smolensk. The Stepnoy Front had a one-echelon operational disposition. The reason for 2nd Belorussian Front's one-echelon disposition was that an initially comparatively weak enemy force grouping was active in its path of advance in the direction of Kovel.

Committing reserve fronts to battle was the prerogative of the SHC Hq. It determined their strength, procedure and schedule of their moving to contact, objectives and missions in operations, procedures and scheduling of reassignment of troops of first-echelon fronts and SHC Hq reserves, logistic support and other matters.

The SHC Hq organized transportation by rail to redeploy forces over great distances. In such cases the commanders of fronts were issued information regarding the situation, upcoming missions, determining the composition and strength of troops, sometimes it specified the line of advance which enabled the commanders to handle the matters of moving up and commitment to battle with foresight.

SHC Hq directives assigned the fronts missions with regard to moving to contact and offensive operations. For example, it formulated for the Central Front the objective of commitment to battle, assembly areas, points of commitment to battle, direction of the main thrust, teamwork and cooperation with adjacent units. When the 2nd Belorussian Front was about to be committed to battle, it was informed about the direction of the main thrust, the immediate and subsequent missions, the timing of offensive, without waiting for full concentration of all of its first-echelon troops.

As a rule, limited time was allowed to prepare the forces of fronts for commitment to battle. For example, the SHC Hq directive to the Central Front commander was issued 6 February near Stalingrad, and the troops were to be ready to go into battle northwest of Kursk on 15 February. Six to seven days were allowed to move the troops over a distance of more than 1,000 km.

The 2nd Tank Army was assigned to the front 12 February. Like the 65th Army, it was to execute a march to the assembly area, whence it was to go on the offensive, to a distance of between 250 and 300 kilometers. Considering the distance it was supposed to move over, the time allowed to prepare for the offensive was extremely limited. In real terms, the commanders of armies and divisions had one day or two days for decision-making and planning.

Getting the SHC Hq directive, commanders of the fronts tried to as soon as possible leave for the areas of upcoming operations and go to work before the arrival of their troops there. For example, the commanders and staffs of the Central Front arrived in the area of Yelets three days in advance; those of the Stepnoy Front arrived in the area of Korocha two days in advance, and those of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the Berlin Operation did it seven days in advance of the start of troop deployment and launching the offensive.

Commanders and staffs of the armies left for their new assembly areas (deployment lines) at the first opportunity and went to work at once, which made it possible to timely and thoroughly prepare their troops for upcoming operations in an orderly manner.

Decisions on commitment to battle were made, more often than not, in assembly areas. The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, Marshal Rokossovsky, made his decision and planning with regard to the Berlin Operation remaining in the same area and using maps.

Thus, the experience of committing to battle reserve armies points to a clear tendency of preparing them for operations on a tight schedule.

Top priority tasks facing the commanders of fronts and staffs in preparing operations were their planning and timely moving their troops to new sectors, their deployment and commitment to battle. Efficient performance of these tasks largely determined success of offensive operations.

The troops were moved up to their points of commitment to battle in accordance with operation plans. In the process, first-echelon troops were assigned assembly areas 30 to 50 kilometers away and assembly areas for commitment to battle 5 to 20 kilometers away from the frontline.

The staffs of the Central and the 2nd Belorussian fronts operating in the Kovel sector were planning their operations and simultaneously making arrangements to receive troops arriving by rail. At disembarkation points, division commanders were handed operational instructions containing knowledge about the enemy, missions, reassignments of armies, location of their headquarters, organization of reconnaissance, etc.

The staffs of fronts developed decisions and plans of operations in the form of texts and attached to them were 1:200,000 or 1:500,000 maps. Offensive operations were planned in accordance with their stages and missions of the troops.

After the SHC Hq approved his plan, Commander of the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front Marshal Rokossovsky, their commanders and chiefs of staffs arrived, 10 April 1945, at the attack position area and carried out careful reconnoitering of the terrain, sections of breakthrough, crossing the Oder and deployment areas in the zones of advance of the first-echelon armies. (3)

The painstaking planning and effective organization of impending combat operations made it possible, despite a tight schedule, successfully prepare the troops for the offensive, cross the wide water obstacle, defeat the opposing German force grouping north of Berlin and achieve the operation's objective.

Successful employment of the troops of fronts and armies was largely due to their timely preparation, their concealed movement to contact and to designated assembly areas and comprehensive support of their actions as they were committed to battle. The art of their employment consisted in the correct choice of time and place of committing fronts and armies to battle, the massing of forces and fires in vital sectors and comprehensive support of operations.

Study of past experience in moving up and committing to battle reserve fronts during the Great Patriotic War makes for more informed solutions in setting up force groupings, moving up troops and committing them to battle in modern-day operations.

As we know, during the Cold War, the Allied countries crisis situations often arose that called for moving forward major force groupings to render assistance.

Such groupings were created depending on the situation in these countries, missions assigned to the Soviet Armed Forces, the presence of troops in these regions and places of their deployment.

At the time of the antigovernment armed rebellion in Hungary in the fall of 1956, units of two Soviet divisions (the main body of forces) of the Special Corps, joined later by a rifle division from Transcarpathia and a mechanized division from Romania, entered Budapest in the morning of 24 October to fight the armed detachments, capture important facilities and restore public order in accordance with the USSR government's decision to render assistance.

In early November, owing to the worsening situation in Hungary, the seizure of power by reactionary elements in many cities and outrages committed by the rioters, the 38th Army and 8th Mechanized Army (comprising eight divisions) of the Carpathian Military District entered Hungary in response to the request for help from Janos Kadar's new revolutionary government. Also, the 7th and 31st Guards Airborne divisions were airlifted to the airfields of Veszprem and Tekel.

Combined and ordinary units of the armies were moving up under their own power over distances of 800 to 1,000 kilometers, their heavy equipment, tanks and artillery pieces being carried by rail.

Operation Vikhr [Whirlwind] on 4-11 November 1956 smashed the armed rebel detachments in Budapest and other Hungarian cities and public order was restored all over Hungary in a short space of time.

During the political crisis in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, the Soviet Union jointly with Warsaw Pact states undertook an armed operation to crush the opposition, replace the political leadership and bring to power a loyal government in Czechoslovakia.

The major operational-strategic force grouping of Warsaw Pact states to enter Czechoslovakia was set up in good time. It comprised five Soviet armies: the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 20th Army of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the 11th Guards Army of the Baltic Military District, the 28th Army of the Belorussian Military District, the 38th Army of the Carpathian Military District, as well as combined and ordinary units of the Southern Group of Forces, the Nationale Volksarmee of the GDR, Wojsko Polskie, Hungarian and Bulgarian people's armies.

In a surprise move, the troops of the force grouping crossed Czechoslovak border in the night of 21 August, seized in swift operations the most important administrative and political centers, industrial areas and important facilities. Two airborne divisions (7th division and the 103rd Guards division) landed at the airfields of Ruzyne (outside Prague) and Brno.

There were no combat operations in Czechoslovakia, but there was a drawn-out political struggle. The situation in the country grew gradually stable.

In preparation to move into Afghanistan, they fielded combined and ordinary units of the 40th Army in the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts. Their total strength was 80,000. The force grouping to enter Afghanistan was comprised of the 40th Army (108th and 5th motor rifle divisions, 860th Separate Mechanized Rifle Regiment, 56th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade, 36th Mixed Air Corps and other units).

Troops were brought into Afghanistan from two points: from Termez--across the Amu Darya, the Salang Pass, Kabul, Jalalabad; and from Kushka--Herat, Shindahar, Kandahar.

The troops were moving up under their own power. The first were the 108th Motorized Rifle Division to start toward Kabul and the 5th Motorized Division toward Herat. The 103rd Airborne Division landed at the airfield of Kabul. Later, two more divisions (201st and 68th motorized rifle divisions) and several separate units entered Afghanistan. The total strength of the forces was 100,000 men. The combined and ordinary units that entered the country were stationed in garrisons and with a mission to maintain order. Because of the armed attacks from the mujaheddin, the Soviet forces became drown in a number of areas into armed conflicts that subsequently deteriorated into combat operations that did not stop until the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989.

The stationing of forces after the war, considerable distances between the military districts and the groups of forces constituting the first echelon called for updating the methods and procedures of moving troops up from the country's interior for reinforcements.

Operational and strategic exercises during the 1960s and 1980s examined problems involved in moving up troops in conditions of hostile use of nuclear weapons. Commanders and staffs of fronts and armies did practical work to organize the moving up of troops and committing them to battle, check the ability of combined and ordinary units to execute long marches of up to 300 km a day.

The exercises proved that the best course of action is to move up troops during periods of threat preceding outbreak of hostilities. This precluded big losses and disruption of moving the troops up. Relatively favorable conditions could develop at the start of combat operations with the use of exclusively conventional weapons.

The moving of troops from the country's interior over great distances tended to be very problematic in nuclear environment because the enemy with nuclear weapons can employ them on a massive scale thus disrupting the moving of troops and committing them to battle. Analysis of the exercises shows that making it on time to designated areas in combat ready state takes painstaking planning for movement to contact and wideranging measures of operational support. Of special concern is the protection from weapons of mass destruction and measures to restore battleworthiness.

In view of possible use by the adversary of nuclear weapons, troops should move to contact mainly under their own power over great distances because railroads are most likely to be knocked out. At the same time, equipping combined and ordinary units with modern fighting and transport vehicles will enable them to negotiate considerable distances in short time under difficult conditions.

The commitment of forces to battle, in order to avoid big casualties and based on experience gained in exercises, was carried out without a halt, without staying long in assembly areas. The nature of operations of front troops at the time of being committed to battle varied, as they did during the last war. It varied with missions assigned them and prevailing situation.

Depending on the situation, fronts were assigned missions to defeat the main body of the enemy force grouping and approaching reserves by heavy strikes and swift continuation of advance. In defense, they were supposed to stop the enemy offensive, launch counterattacks and stabilize the situation, or, jointly with the friendly troops operating ahead of them, to turn to the counteroffensive.

Thus, front troops, under these conditions, were able to continue advance or conduct defensive operations holding advantageous positions and even to deliver counterblows. In the postwar years, nuclear missile weapons came to be viewed as the most important weaponry capable of engaging the adversary to a great depth before the friendly troops arrive at the deployment line. Such strikes were viewed in effect as a composite part of operations conducted by forces of a front.

Based on experience gained in exercises of the 1970s and 1980s, front forces were committed to battle in the wake of heavy air and missile strikes as the first echelon approached the line of commitment to battle.

As a front entered the area of commitment to battle it was usually assigned part of the troops (an army) of the fronts operating in front of it.

First-echelon armies were committed to battle after a brief stay in the assembly area or without a halt, together with combined units of troops operating ahead of them that used to be assigned to the first echelon of the front. Plans called for nuclear strikes and brief artillery and air preparations prior to committing the armies to battle.

The main body of forces of first-echelon armies of the front moved up on the heels of forward elements and joined battle. The first heavy strike was believed to be of decisive importance for successful operations of the front's forces.

A consecutive commitment to battle of the forces of fronts as they moved up and regained their battleworthy state after hostile nuclear strikes was not ruled out either.

A difficult operational environment could call for follow-up strikes and buildup of forces and the commitment to battle of second-echelon forces of the front. Firm, continued and flexible command and control made for organized moving up and commitment to battle of the troops.

During the exercises, the commander and the staffs of a front used for a more effective command and control the method of parallel (simultaneous) planning of operations that was implemented through issuing advance instructions, broad use of computer centers for prompt computing. There was also an aerial monitoring of troop movements and concealment and deception measures.

The manner in which troops operate and methods of reinforcing operational force groups in theaters are going to be somewhat different in armed conflicts and wars under modern conditions. During and after the war, the Soviet Union had a formidable military of a considerable strength. This made it possible to create operational-strategic force groupings in a short time, move them up over great distances and commit to battle for the performance of their missions and attaining military-political goals.

The Russian Army has no such potentials while threats to the state's security persist and possibilities of armed conflicts and wars are not ruled out. For this reason, aggressions are supposed to be repulsed by force groupings deployed in the areas where they may occur with their subsequent reinforcement (if need be) by forces and assets to be moved in from other sectors and possible participation of allied forces. The availability of combat reserves, rapid mobilization and deployment, high mobility of troops, potentialities to move them forward and transport them in a short time to different sectors will be of key importance in the outcome of conflicts. Force groupings in threatened sectors should be reinforced in the first place by aviation combined and ordinary units including army aviation and units of airborne troops. Concentration of forces in threatened sectors should be achieved mainly by massive employment of weapons. In a number of cases, new long-range weapons make possible the shifting of line of fire to deliver massed strikes at one definite enemy force grouping.

Capitalizing on the strikes made by strategic weapons, attack forces can be moved up to selected sectors at the very last moment to complete the destruction of the adversary.

Armed hostilities will develop simultaneously in all the spheres, on land, sea, in the air and outer space. The main task of engaging and defeating the adversary will be tackled both by clashes between troops and long-range fire. In our opinion, methods of operations of troops in the offensive and defensive will be combined in the future. At the same time, the offensive seems to be an aggregate of delivery of fire and EW attacks.

Operational dispositions of force groupings will have, in addition to the usual elements, automated and protected systems of command and control of troops and weapons, and reconnaissance, data collection and processing centers. They will procure and communicate the necessary knowledge about the adversary to commanders and weapon assets in short order, almost in real time.

It should be noted in conclusion that great importance during the Great Patriotic War was attached to the creation of strategic reserves and the SHC Hq used them to influence the course of fighting on the fronts.

The studying and summing up of experience of past wars and postwar conflicts helps imaginative solution of today's problems.

NOTES:

1. K.K. Rokossovskiy, Soldatskiy dolg, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1988, p. 187.

2. TsAMO RF, rec.gr. 132, inv. 2642, f. 34, sheets 173-175.

3. See: K.K. Rokossovskiy, op. cit., pp. 339-340.

Lt. Gen. Ye.I. MALASHENKO (Ret.)

Yevgeny Ivanovich MALASHENKO was born in 1924. Joined the USSR Armed Forces in 1941. Fought during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 as platoon leader; commander of a reconnaissance company; reconnaissance chief of a naval rifle brigade, a rifle and an airborne division. After the war, graduated from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy and the General Staff Military Academy. Served as deputy chief of staff of a corps, an army and a military district. He was in charge of the operational task force of the Special Corps staff in Budapest in 1956 and the staff of the Chief Military Adviser in Egypt after the 1967 Seven-Day Arab-Israeli War. He subsequently served as chief of staff of the Carpathian Military District and deputy chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Forces, worked in the Defense Ministry central apparatus, was a consultant of the Operational-Strategic Studies Center of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.