Motivational drivers of non-executive directors, cooperation, and engagement in board roles.
However, non-executives may not always assume their duties as expected by owners, with the consequence of potentially impeding organizational performance, since passive boards have been associated with bankruptcy, crisis or firm failure (LaMer et al., 2002). A reason why non-executives do not actively assume their duties is the motivation that drives them to be part of the board. Westphal and Stern (2007) show that cooptation of CEO supporters and appointment of non-executives who practice ingratiation and are attracted by social networks provided by boards are selection practices that keep non-executives passive on the board. As a consequence, non-executives are assigned to boards for their motivation to belong to a group they will flatter, rather than for their motivation to exert their duties and responsibilities.
In a context where a larger sense of responsibility and accountability is expected of board members, it is timely to study how non-executives' motivational drivers affect their engagement in board roles (Roberts et al., 2005; Silva, 2005). Drawing on the assumption that non-executives are assigned to boards to serve the organizational cause, this article proposes that pro-organizational motivation, defined by the desire to expend effort in order to benefit and contribute to organizational goals, is central to non-executives' engagement in board roles. However, the present research also recognizes that other motivational drivers complement non-executives' proorganizational motivation, as exemplified by results indicating that non-executives who get new appointments on boards are driven by opportunities to develop social networks (Westphal and Stern, 2007). This article studies need for achievement, need for identification, and self-oriented motivation as examples of non-executives' motivational drivers that complement pro-organizational motivation to impact cooperation and engagement in board roles. These three drivers should not directly be related to engagement in board roles because they do not focus on actions aimed at supporting organizational success. They serve individual needs and self-interests rather than organizational interests. As such, these three variables are studied as moderators of the relationship between pro-organizational motivation and cooperation and engagement in board roles (see Figure I).
[FIGURE I OMITTED]
This study extends the body of knowledge on non-executive directors' attitudes (e.g., Hillman et al., 2008) by applying motivation theories to the context of boards. The results provide insights on board member selection and development that complement existing literature focused on socio-economic factors such as compensation, board independence, and ownership (e.g., Carpenter and Westphal, 2001).
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Pro-organizational Motivation, Cooperation, and Engagement in Board Roles
Davis et al. (1997) and Roberts et al. (2005: 18) have used the term "pro-organizational motivation" to describe directors' behaviors in the board, but these authors do not provide a definition of the construct. In this research, pro-organizational motivation is defined as the desire to expend effort in order to benefit and contribute to organizational goals. Pro-organizational motivation describes the willingness to promote organizational welfare and goals shared by organizational owners (Davis et al., 1997). Non-executives who are pro-organizationally motivated are likely to show commitment and dedication to the organization they serve. They are driven by the desire to contribute to organizational success, and are willing to do their best to help the organization, whether or not their actions promote their own interests. Researchers on motivation to serve a cause argue that this motivation comes from the desire to "make world a better place" (Grant, 2007: 394). Enduring values of dedication and dispositions to serve the collective or to serve a common goal shape pro-organizational motivation (Grant, 2007), and thus represent potential antecedents of pro-organizational motivation.
As predicted by expectancy and planned behavior theories of motivation (Ajzen, 1991), non-executives who are pro-organizationally motivated are likely to orient their efforts to pursuing organizational success and to invest time and energy to perform the duties and responsibilities assigned to them. On the board, non-executives' duties and responsibilities consist of performing control and service roles (e.g., Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2008; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). In assuming the duty of controlling or monitoring the board, non-executives ensure that the CEO acts in the interests of owners. The control role includes tasks such as CEO selection, CEO compensation and benefits, managerial activities and decision supervision, and corporate strategy supervision (Daily, 1996; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2008). When assuming the responsibility to provide a service role, non-executives facilitate access to resources that will ensure the company's success; these include providing advice, developing the legitimacy of the organization, linking the firm to stakeholders, and building external relationships (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). When non-executives are motivated to serve the organization, they value organizational success, and are more likely to work for the organization without focusing on the consequences of their efforts for themselves. The espousal of the organizational cause is a strong motivational driver because helping to advance a common goal is intrinsically rewarding (Thompson and Bunderson, 2003). Thus, proorganizational motivation should be positively related to control and service roles since these roles represent the best path for non-executives to contribute to organizational Success.
Non-executives' contribution to the organizational welfare depends not only on how they perform their duties, but also on how they cooperate with board members. Roberts et al. (2003) argue that cooperation based on constructive trot critical realistic feedback is important to making sound decisions on the board, and can be achieved through behaviors such as questioning, discussing, challenging, or informing. Pro-organizational motivation is likely to be related to cooperation with board members because the ideal of serving the organization is a powerful basis for the persistence of cooperation (Thompson and Bunderson, 2003). Non-executives feel intrinsically rewarded by their cooperation with board members and their ability to support the board in making sound decisions for the company.
Hypothesis 1: Non-executives' pro-organizational motivation is positively related to engagement in control and service roles, arm to cooperation on the board.
The Moderating Role of Other Motivational Drivers
Motivation researchers have long recognized that individual actions can be understood by taking different motivational drivers into account (Grant, 2008). Non-executives' cooperation and engagement in board roles may thus be explained by the co-existence of several independent drivers which complement pro-organizational motivation.
Hypothesis 1 assumes that pro-organizational motivation is directly linked to cooperation and engagement in board roles because this form of motivation supports actions and tasks that ensure organizational success. Non-executives' responsibilities require time and effort to acquire knowledge about the firm's goals and activities, to challenge board members for better cooperation, and to represent the firm outside the board in order to increase organizational legitimacy (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). These tasks are better accomplished when non-executives show high levels of pro-organizational motivation because serving the organization is seen as intrinsically rewarding. Motivational drivers focused on the satisfaction of individual needs and self-interests are not likely to be as strongly linked to cooperation and board roles as pro-organizational motivation, since these drivers do not orient behaviors towards serving the organization, but rather, towards serving the individual. This research focuses on the need for achievement, the need for identification, and self-oriented motivation, and proposes that these three drivers moderate the relationship between pro-organizational motivation and non-executives' cooperation and board roles.
Need for Achievement. Need for achievement refers to the degree to which individuals want to achieve success and excellence through the accomplishment of challenging tasks (McClelland, 1987). Individuals having a high need for achievement look for challenges, enjoy excellence in performance, and demonstrate competitive behaviors in work activities (Liu et al., 2010). On the board, non-executives have the opportunity to accomplish challenging tasks such as strategic planning or CEO nomination, as well as tasks that develop feelings of excellence achievement, such as providing advice for strategic development and challenging board members during decision-making (Roberts et al., 2005). The board thus provides a context where non-executives are likely to satisfy their need for achievement. When need for achievement is high, pro-organizational motivation is reinforced because non-executives feel that their tasks can serve both organizational goals and the need for personal achievement as challenging tasks are completed. When need for achievement is low, non-executives' motivation rely only on the desire to contribute to organizational welfare (Grant, 2008; Grant and Sumanth, 2009). Non-executives focus on the mission they have to accomplish, but do not necessarily feel that their contribution to the board may be rewarding for themselves by satisfying their need for achievement. Pro-organizational motivation should thus be less positively associated with cooperation and engagement in board tasks when need for achievement is low.
Hypothesis 2: Need for achievement moderates the relationship between pro-organizational motivation and cooperation and engagement in control and service roles, such that the relationship is stronger when need for achievement is high.
Need for Identification. Glynn defines the need for identification as "an individual's need to maintain a social identity derived from membership in a larger, more impersonal general social category of a particular collective" (1998: 238). Individuals having a high need for identification build their self-esteem from their belonging to a social group (Mignonac et al., 2006); they define themselves as members of a specific group, and derive pride from this membership. On the board of directors, non-executives having a high need for identification will look for opportunities to derive pride from their belonging to the board. Being a director may satisfy their need for identification (Hillman et al., 2008) because the board is a context that favors ties with people having a high social status (being a CEO or being a director). When need for identification is high, cooperation and board roles are made more attractive by the opportunity to foster personal self-image through board belonging (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Thus, the link between pro-organizational motivation and outcomes should be stronger when need for identification is high. When need for identification is low, non-executives cooperate and engage in board roles only because they serve the organizational cause. In that case, pro-organizational motivation will be less associated with cooperation and engagement in board roles because working for the organizational good is not supported by the desire to satisfy the need for identification.
Hypothesis 3: Need for identification moderates the relationship between pro-organizational motivation and cooperation and engagement in control and service roles, such that the relationship is stronger when need for identification is high.
Self-oriented Motivation. Theories of organizational behavior traditionally assume that individuals act to serve their self-interests (De Dreu and Nauta, 2009). Self-oriented motivation is the desire to act "for the sole purpose of achieving a personal benefit or benefits" (Cropanzano et al., 2005: 985). The key defining characteristic is that actions benefit only the individual, and not another person or another group (for example, the organization). On the board, non-executives who are self-oriented will spend time and energy on actions that are useful only for themselves. For example, they may be willing to develop personal ties for their own interests (Westphal and Stern, 2007). Self-oriented motivation is not the opposite of pro-organizational motivation. Social scientists have largely shown how concern for self and others (or for a cause) are two independent variables that combine together to drive individual behaviors (De Dreu and Nauta, 2009). However, when self-oriented motivation is high, organizational interests may come into conflict with personal interests. Westphal and Stern (2007) found that non-executives increase their chances of gaining further board appointments by engaging in low levels of monitoring and control. This result indicates that the exercise of board roles may not be compatible with self-interests. More generally, when the individual shows a high level of self-oriented motivation, self-interests may reduce his willingness to service the organization since responsibilities on the board may not serve his personal interests as well. When self-oriented motivation is low, non-executives are entirely dedicated to the organizational cause, and individual interest will not undermine their efforts to serve the board and the organization.
Hypothesis 4: Self-oriented motivation moderates the relationship between pro-organizational motivation and cooperation and engagement in control and service roles, such that the relationship is weaker when self-oriented motivation is high.
Sample and Procedure
A data collection procedure with a questionnaire was used to test the research hypotheses. Participants were members of a network of boards belonging to Canadian financial institutions. The network had a database of about 7,277 non-executives sitting on 530 boards located in Ontario and in Quebec. Financial institutions depending on the 530 boards serve close to 5,800,000 clients, and have a staff body of almost 40,000 employees. The average board is comprised of 13 non-executive members, plus one or two executive members (the CEO and (an)other director(s)).
The research team prepared a cover letter presenting the research objective and the confidentiality and anonymity rules associated with the research. The letter was written on the research laboratory and the research team's home university letterhead, and was accompanied by a questionnaire and a return postage-paid envelope addressed to the researchers. All the documents were sent to 2,082 of the 7,277 non-executives belonging to the network, followed by a reminder two to three weeks later. Following the reminder, 691 usable questionnaires were received, representing a 33% return rate. The participants in the final sample were 48 years old on average, with an average board tenure of 9.2 years, and 62% of the respondents were men.
All variables were measured with a Likert scale going from "1 = totally disagree" to "5 = totally agree," except for board roles, which were measured with a scale ranging from "1 = not at all" to "5 = a lot."
Pro-organizational Motivation. A five-item measure developed by the researchers was used to measure pro-organizational motivation. The final measure was built using a procedure similar to those followed by Grant (2008) and Grant and Sumanth (2009). The research team conducted six preliminary focus groups with five to ten non-executives, where group participants described their motivations for being part of their boards. Five items were built from the answers the focus groups participants provided. Sample items were (Cronbach's alpha = 0.78): "serve the mission of the organization" and "contribute to the organizational growth."
Need for Achievement. Need for achievement was measured with four items adapted from Steers and Braunstein's (1976) scale, which was revised by Yamaguchi (2003). Sample items were: "I enjoy setting and achieving meaningful goals" and "I enjoy difficult challenges and high responsibilities" (Cronbach's alpha = 0.71).
Need for Identification. Need for identification was assessed with six items from the scale developed by Kreiner and Ashforth (2004). Sample items were: "An important part of who I am would be missing if I didn't belong to a work organization" and "Generally, I do not feel a need to identify with an organization that I am working for (R)" (Cronbach's alpha = 0.73). The words "organization" and "employer" were replaced with "board."
Self-oriented Motivation. Five items were built to measure self-oriented motivation with the help of focus group participants, using the same method described for pro-organizational motivation. Sample items were: "develop ties for a personal network" and "have new responsibilities that can be useful for my CV" (Cronbach's alpha = 0.76).
Engagement in Control and Service Roles. Board role engagement was measured with twelve items. Data collected during the six preliminary focus groups were partially used to adapt the measures of board roles previously tested by Carpenter and Westphal (2001), Silva (2005), and Zona and Zattoni (2007). Six items measured engagement in the control tasks such as "strategic planning" or "financial results analysis" (Cronbach's alpha = 0.76). Six items measured engagement in service roles such as "ensure board participation in the community" and "develop networks with stakeholders" (Cronbach's alpha = 0.76).
Cooperation. Five items measured cooperation with other board members. Sample items were: "I find new ways to better execute tasks with the other board members" and "I cooperate with the other board members" (Cronbach's alpha = 0.85).
Finally, age, gender, experience as board director, and level of education were included in the questionnaire as control variables. These variables have been used in past research as antecedents of board roles (for example, Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).
The distinctiveness of the variables measured in the study was first examined. To ensure that each scale measured a separate concept, confirmatory factor analyses using AMOS 16.0 software were carried ont. A seven-factor model was first tested, in which each variable was drawn as a second-order construct ([chi square]=386.39, p<0.01; CFI=0.95; NFI=0.93; RMSEA=0.06). This model was compared to three nested models: a single-factor model ([DELTA][chi square]=4613.31, p<0.001, CFI=0.03; NFI=0.04; RMSEA=0.22); a two-factor model bringing together dependent variables (cooperation, engagement in control and service roles) and other variables (pro-organizational motivation, need for achievement, need for identification, and self-oriented motivation) ([DELTA][chi square] = 4172.90, p<0.001 ; CFI =0.12; NFI=0.12; RMSEA=0.21); finally, a three-factor model bringing together dependent variables, independent variables (pro-organizational motivation), and moderators (need for achievement, need for identification, and self-oriented motivation) ([DELTA][chi square] = 3608.78, p<0.001; CFI=0.23; NFI=0.23; RMSEA=0.20). The seven-factor model fits the data better than the other three nested models.
Preliminary analyses on SPSS using means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations between the variables are presented in Table 1. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were then conducted to test hypotheses about pro-organizational motivation, cooperation, engagement in board roles, and interactive terms. Control variables were entered at Step 1 of the regressions; the main effects (e.g., pro-organizational motivation and moderators) were entered at Step 2 to test Hypothesis 1, and interaction terms were added at Step 3 to test Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. This procedure allows partial control for control variables and the main effects, and indicates the variance due to the interaction terms (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). To reduce multicollinearity associated with the use of interaction terms, the independent variables were mean-centered before the interaction terms were created.
Results of three-step multiple regressions are reported in Table 2. Pro-organizational motivation is positively and significantly related to engagement in board roles ([beta]=0.22, p<0.001; [beta]=0.23, p<0.001, for control and service roles, respectively) and cooperation ([beta]=0.26, p<0.001). Hypothesis 1 is thus supported.
Hypothesis 2, which predicts that need for achievement moderates the relationship between pro-organizational motivation and outcomes, is partially validated. The interactive term entered at Step 3 is significant for the control role ([beta]=0.09, p<0.05). Regression lines were plotted for high and low levels of need for achievement (+1 and -1 standard deviation from the mean). Figure II shows that there is a slightly stronger relationship between pro-organizational motivation and engagement in the control role when need for achievement is high ([beta]=0.27, p<0.01) than when need for achievement is low ([beta]=0.23, p<0.05).
[FIGURE II OMITTED]
Hypothesis 3 predicts that need for identification moderates the relationship between pro-organizational motivation and outcomes. The results show that at Step 3, the interaction term is significant with cooperation, but not with engagement in board roles, which partially supports Hypothesis 3. Again, regression lines were plotted for high and low levels of need for identification (+ 1 and -1 standard deviation from the mean). Figure III shows that there is a stronger relationship between pro-organizational motivation and cooperation when need for identification is high ([beta]=0.44, p<0.001) than when need for identification is low ([beta]=0.32, p<0.01).
Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicts that self-oriented motivation moderates the relationship between pro-organizational motivation and outcomes. The results show that the interaction term is significant only with cooperation. The relationship was plotted at high and low levels of self-oriented motivation (+1 and -1 standard deviation from the mean). As expected, the relationship is stronger when self-oriented motivation is low ([beta] =0.60, p<0.001), and weaker when self-oriented motivation is high ([beta]=0.26, p<0.05; cf. Figure IV).
The interaction of pro-organizational motivation and need for achievement, need for identification, and self-oriented motivation accounted for modest incremental variance observed beyond the control variables and main effects in all regression equations (between 1% and 2%). As interaction effects have small effect sizes, their significance tests usually suffer from low power. Evans (1985) states that interactions explaining 1% of variance can be considered important, as exemplified in this study.
[FIGURE III OMITTED]
Scholars have claimed that non-executives' lack of motivation to serve company interests constitutes an obstacle for developing board accountability because non-executives do not engage in board roles as much as they should (Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; Roberts et al., 2005; Silva, 2005). Despite this claim, research on corporate governance has not explored how non-executives' motivational drivers are related to their cooperation and engagement in board roles. This study provides one of the first insights into non-executives' motivation on the board. The results show that pro-organizational motivation is positively linked to board roles and cooperation. Other motivation drivers act as significant moderators such that: (1) need for achievement moderates the link between pro-organizational motivation and control role, and (2) need for identification and self oriented motivation moderate the link between pro-organizational motivation and cooperation. Although a direct link is observed between moderators and some outcomes, pro-organizational motivation accounts for the greatest part of the explained variance of board roles and cooperation.
This study provides a first attempt to show that pro-organizational motivation should be taken into account in order to better understand non-executives' behaviors on the board. Research on corporate governance that adresses CEO motivation has recognized that pro-organizational motivation is a sine que non to ensure that agents serve the organization (e.g., Davis et al., 1997; Roberts et al., 2005). This study shows that pro-organizational motivation is also important for non-executives, since this motivation is significantly related to cooperation and board roles engagement. The results complement those observed by Silva (2005) about the relationship between board members' motivation and decision-making as regards CEO assessment. All together, these studies indicate that non-executives who feel important for the organization and believe that it is worthwhile to serve the organization tend to be more engaged on the board.
The results also show a direct link between need for achievement, need for identification, and outcomes, although with smaller Beta coefficients than those obtained for pro-organizational motivation. Thus need for achievement, need for identification, and pro-organizational motivation are important in predicting cooperation and board roles. It seems non-executives are motivated to realize a trade-off between personal needs (achievement and identification) and organizational objectives, and by making efforts to reach organizational goals, they are able to meet personal needs. One reason for this result is that non-executives can derive pride from their belonging to the board of a successful company when they serve the organization. However, personal goals and organizational goals are not always compatible. Self-oriented motivation is not directly linked to board roles, and weakens the relationship between pro-organizational motivation and outcomes. Purely egoistic motivation is thus not prone to develop non-executives' board roles engagement and cooperation.
Hypotheses of moderation are partially validated. A significant interaction term is observed for need for achievement with control role, but not with service role and cooperation (Hypothesis 2). Control role includes activities that are directly related to organizational performance (strategic planning, financial analysis, etc). Service role and cooperation are less focused on tasks impacting the company's success. As individuals with a high need for achievement locus on success and performance (Yamaguchi, 2003), it is logical to find a significant interaction term with control role. Need for identification moderates the link between pro-organizational motivation and cooperation, but not board roles (Hypothesis 3). According to the social identity theory, individuals having a high need for identification are motivated to be part of a prestigious group that contributes to their self-esteem. Cooperation gives the opportunity to discuss and take decisions with board members who are positively perceived in the society, and for this reason, the findings of this study are consistent with the literature on need for identification. Need for identification is also directly linked with control role. Hillman et al. (2008) have proposed that non-executives' identification with the organization and identification with being a director are positively associated with control role, while identification with the CEO is negatively associated with control role. In this study, the link is positive. This result can be interpreted as a signal that non-executives who participated in this research tended to identify with the organization and/or with other members, but not with the CEO.
This research is not without limitations. First, hypotheses were tested among non-executives in a network of financial institutions, which limits the study to one activity sector. The recent financial crisis has exposed the gap between the interests of bank managers and those of their shareholders (Bicksler, 2008). A study of pro-organizational motivation and non-executives' board role engagement in the financial sector is timely for stakeholders concerned by the health and sustainability of financial institutions. However, it is not possible to affirm that results can be extrapolated to other sectors. Gabrielsson and Winlund (2000) showed that in small and medium-sized industrial firms, directors' working styles are related to their engagement in board tasks. Future research might thus obtain similar results in boards of other activity sectors.
Next, this research has methodological limitations. Nunnally (1978: 245) states that Cronbach's alphas of 0.80 are acceptable for validated scales. Alphas of need for achievement and need for identification are a bit low in this study (respectively [alpha]= 0.71 and [alpha]=0.76). Directors may also have been sensitive to social desirability biases. It is likely that respondents may have underestimated their self-oriented motivation and overestimated their pro-organizational motivation. Finally, the research design is cross-sectional with self-reported data. Siemsen et al. (2010) recently investigated how common method variance influences empirical results in regression models, and demonstrated that common method bias does not create artificial effects when interaction relationships are tested. Thus, even in the presence of a common method bias, the results and conclusions of Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 are still valid. As regards Hypothesis 1, a Harman one-factor test was conducted using items of pro-organizational motivation and three outcomes (Podsakoff et al., 9003). The results show the presence of four factors, with each one clearly representing each measured variable. Common method effects are thus not likely to contaminate the present results, even for Hypothesis 1.
Finally, the research design does not include data about behaviors and performances collected from sources other than non-executives themselves. Lawler et al. (2002) established a link between engagement in board members' roles and firm performance. Judge and Zeithaml (1992) reported that board involvement in strategic formulation is related to financial performance. As engagement in board tasks has been linked to firm performance in previous studies, it is likely that pro-organizational motivation is an antecedent of firm performance via non-executives' engagement in board roles. Future research should propose more complete designs that link pro-organizational motivation to organizational performance. This link could be studied using hierarchical linear models that enable the study of hypotheses combining data collected at the individual and at the group level, and not only at the individual level, as done in the present research.
The results of the present study have two major implications for practitioners. First, individual needs and pro-organizational motivation could be used as selection criteria in making decisions about non-executive hiring. Westphal and Stern (2007) showed that directors who practice ingratiation and provide advice to CEOs tend to be those who are selected onto additional boards, while non-executives who engage in monitoring and control behavior are pushed away from the board network. It seems that current selection practices in boards are opposed to what this research suggests, since those selection practices lead to the promotion of non-executives who are self-oriented rather than those who are pro-organizationally motivated. Future research could address the following question: when and under what conditions do boards select non-executives who are pro-organizationally motivated?
Non-executives are expected to spend time and effort understanding organizational issues and serving the organizational cause without being employed by the organization they have to serve (Roberts el al., 2005). For this reason, non-executives have no clearly identified supervisor, and cannot be treated like employees. Who is therefore in charge of developing their motivation towards the organization? A second practical issue is the development of a culture that favors directors' pro-organizational motivation, and pushes them to focus on common goals (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). On this topic, much remains to be done. While corporate governance research has focused largely on investigating the effects of directors' social capital on board roles, research is yet to be conducted on leadership and group processes that contribute to the development of a pro-organizational culture on the board.
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ESG-UQAM, Departement ORH
ESG-UQAM, Departement ORH
Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations between the Variables Mean SD 1 2 1. Need for achievement 3.93 0.62 (0.71) 2. Need for identification 3.68 0.68 0.33 ** (0.73) 3. Self-oriented motivation 3.45 0.76 0.37 ** 0.14 ** 4 Pro-organizational 4.11 0.60 0.50 ** 0.40 ** motivation 5. Control role 4.39 0.43 0.38 ** 0.28 ** 6. Service role 3.98 0.58 0.39 ** 0.22 ** 7. Cooperation 3.93 0.58 0.49 ** 0.45 ** 3 4 5 6 1. Need for achievement 2. Need for identification 3. Self-oriented motivation (0.76) 4 Pro-organizational 0.21 ** (0.78) motivation 5. Control role 0.16 ** 0.41 ** (0.76) 6. Service role 0.17 ** 0.41 ** 0.57 ** (0.76) 7. Cooperation 0.21 ** 0.50 ** 0.43 ** 0.38 ** 7 1. Need for achievement 2. Need for identification 3. Self-oriented motivation 4 Pro-organizational motivation 5. Control role 6. Service role 7. Cooperation (0.85) * p <0.05; ** p <0.01 N = 691 The reliabilities (coefficients alpha) are reported in parentheses. Table 2 Multiple Regressions Predicting Outcomes Control role Step. 1 Step 2 1. Control variables Age 0.21 *** 0.16 ** Gender 0.04 0.05 Experience 0.05 0.01 Level of education -0.05 -0.03 [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.06 *** Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.05 Overall F 9.03 [DELTA]F 9.03 *** 2. Main effects Pro-organizational motivation (A) 0.22 *** Need for achievement (B) 0.21 *** Need for identification (C) 0.11 ** Self-oriented motivation (D) 0.06 [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.20 *** Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.25 Overall F 26.07 [DELTA]F 122.26 *** 3. Interactive terms AxB AxB AxD [DELTA][R.sup.2] Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] Overall F [DELTA]F Control role Step 3 1. Control variables Age 0.15 ** Gender 0.05 Experience 0.01 Level of education -0.02 [DELTA][R.sup.2] Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] Overall F [DELTA]F 2. Main effects Pro-organizational motivation (A) 0.25 *** Need for achievement (B) 0.22 *** Need for identification (C) 0.11 ** Self-oriented motivation (D) 0.05 [DELTA][R.sup.2] Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] Overall F [DELTA]F 3. Interactive terms AxB 0.09 * AxB -0.02 AxD 0.01 [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.01 * Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.26 Overall F 19.55 [DELTA]F 1.84 * Service role Step 1 Step 2 1. Control variables Age 0.20 *** 0.15 ** Gender 0.06 * 0.06 Experience -0.03 -0.08 Level of education -0.17 *** -0.15 *** [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.07 *** Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.06 Overall F 10.29 [DELTA]F 10.29 *** 2. Main effects Pro-organizational motivation (A) 0.23 *** Need for achievement (B) 0.25 *** Need for identification (C) 0.05 Self-oriented motivation (D) 0.00 [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.19 *** Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.24 Overall F 24.88 [DELTA]F 114.47 *** 3. Interactive terms AxB AxB AxD [DELTA][R.sup.2] Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] Overall F [DELTA]F Step 3 1. Control variables Age 0.14 ** Gender 0.06 Experience -0.08 Level of education -0.15 *** [DELTA][R.sup.2] Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] Overall F [DELTA]F 2. Main effects Pro-organizational motivation (A) 0.25 *** Need for achievement (B) 0.26 *** Need for identification (C) 0.05 Self-oriented motivation (D) 0.00 [DELTA][R.sup.2] Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] Overall F [DELTA]F 3. Interactive terms AxB 0.04 AxB 0.04 AxD 0.01 [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.01 ([dagger]) Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.24 Overall F 18.45 [DELTA]F 1.24 ([dagger]) Cooperation role Step 1 Step 2 1. Control variables Age 0.10 ([dagger]) 0.03 Gender -0.05 -0.04 Experience 0.13 * 0.08 ([dagger]) Level of education -0.01 0.01 [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.05 *** Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.05 Overall F 8.27 [DELTA]F 8.27 *** 2. Main effects Pro-organizational motivation (A) 0.26 *** Need for achievement (B) 0.26 *** Need for identification (C) 0.21 *** Self-oriented motivation (D) 0.08 * [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.35 *** Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.40 Overall F 98.21 [DELTA]F 40.36 *** 3. Interactive terms AxB AxB AxD [DELTA][R.sup.2] Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] Overall F [DELTA]F Step 3 1. Control variables Age 0.02 Gender -0.03 Experience 0.09 * Level of education 0.01 [DELTA][R.sup.2] Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] Overall F [DELTA]F 2. Main effects Pro-organizational motivation (A) 0.30 *** Need for achievement (B) 0.26 ** Need for identification (C) 0.20 *** Self-oriented motivation (D) 0.09 * [DELTA][R.sup.2] Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] Overall F [DELTA]F 3. Interactive terms AxB 0.06 AxB 0.12 AxD -0.07 ([dagger]) [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.02 *** Adjusted [DELTA][R.sup.2] 0.42 Overall F 39.89 [DELTA]F 6.90 *** ([dagger]) p < 0.10 * p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001; N=691; Coefficients are standardized
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|Author:||Guerrero, Sylvie; Seguin, Michel|
|Publication:||Journal of Managerial Issues|
|Date:||Mar 22, 2012|
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