Moot matters of tactics.

The military science, including the military art as its essential component, is in a constant state of evolution. The creation of new weapons and their adoption for service, and the changing views on the preparation and conduct of warfare necessitate a thorough analysis and a drastic revision of many provisions and propositions of the operational art and tactics.

The Combined Arms Academy of the RF Armed Forces is working consistently to deal with problems related to the theory of tactics and the operational art. Special attention is given to improving combat formation, working out more aggressive and decisive methods of warfare (including in the course of armed conflicts), flexible defense, effective engagement in a combat operation, etc.

There are different views on almost all matters that are a subject of discussion at the Academy's Tactics Department. Positive solutions have been found on some of them, but on others, e.g., methods of mobile defense and organization of effective engagement in a defensive and offensive operation, consensus has yet to be reached. Discussions also continue on a number of other disputable matters.

Methods of mobile defense. It is widely believed that in the modern conditions, when the combat capabilities of troops have increased, it is high time to intensify and streamline mobile defense. It has been proposed that along with its traditional method of combat action--firm holding of in-depth defense lines (positions)--it is necessary to introduce a new, more decisive method, which is as follows. By concentrating the main forces in the second echelons, lure an advancing enemy force into in-depth defense areas and then effectively engage and destroy it by fire, counterstrokes and counterattacks.

Opponents of this mobile defense method say that it is unrealistic, citing historical experience and the basic assumptions related to the evolution of the theory of mobile defense organization and the conditions in which it is used.

The theory of mobile defense began to be developed in the 1920s. For example, the 1929 Field Manual of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) said: "Mobile defense, comprised of incomplete defense operations and accompanied by retreat from enemy forces and the taking of new defense positions (lines), is used when it is possible to cede territory so as to gain time and preserve manpower."

The 1939 draft field manual of the RKKA said that "at every intermediate line, losses are inflicted on an offensive force; the defensive side compels it to turn around, and without waiting until the enemy attacks, withdraws to avoid attack." Nothing was said about counterattacks or counterstrokes with the aim of destroying the enemy force that has penetrated in-depth defense positions or about restoring the defense positions. Nor could there have been any such references since mobile defense was supposed to be used, as a general rule, when the enemy had considerable superiority and therefore when there were insufficient forces and assets for position defense. It is designed to conduct restraining (delaying) action by holding in-depth defense positions (lines). Meanwhile, the proposed method of mobile defense organization, based on decisive counter attacks and counter strokes, is a method of mobile defense (according to U.S. Army views) that is based on effectively engaging an advancing enemy force drawn into in-depth defense areas by decisive counterattacks and counterstrokes, and is used by troops whose combat capabilities enable them to conduct it by more decisive methods than position defense. Opponents of this method of mobile defense organization say that it is unrealistic and therefore unacceptable.

Stages and periods of effective engagement. The debate between artillery and combined arms specialists about the organization and stages of effective engagement has been going on for several years now.

On the first issue, artillery specialists, with good reason, divide effective engagement into general and direct, assigning the former to the operational and the latter to the tactical level. Combined arms specialists generally do not object to this division.

The second issue--stages of effective engagement in a combined arms operation--is more complex and divisive. For example, instead of three, and then four types of combat action (defensive and offensive) that were established during the Great Patriotic War (and afterward), two stages were defined and recorded in the field manuals: in a defensive operation, preparation fire to repulse enemy offensive and fire support for defending friendly troops; in an offensive operation, preparation fire for attack and fire support for offensive friendly forces.

Most combined arms specialists believe that this looks logical enough: Reduction in the number of stages of effective engagement is acceptable, but the description of the first two stages in both types of combat action (operation) is dubious. They do not quite reflect the actions by combined arms units and subunits. In this connection, it is essential to establish when the offensive (offensive operation) and the defensive (defensive operation) actually begin.

With the massive introduction and spread of firearms, as well as the use of tanks and aviation, preparation fire began to play an important role in the offensive operation. Offensive action still includes fire delivery, strike and maneuver. Today, it can begin with the forward movement of troops from in-depth positions or from direct contact with the enemy--i.e., not only fire delivery preceding attack but even movement forward from a certain point is an essential component of offensive action. This is also confirmed by the name of the method of offensive action--offensive with movement forward (not after movement forward) from in-depth positions.

In this connection, defensive action begins not with the enemy attack but much earlier--e.g., with the enemy advance from direct contact with defending troops and preparation fire for attack. As soon as the enemy begins preparation fire, the defending force will deliver air strikes on critical targets; artillery will engage the enemy's weapons systems; and direct fire systems will be brought into action, as will T/O small arms and light weapons: In other words, the defending force will conduct a defensive engagement with an advancing enemy, not an enemy preparing an offensive operation. Action will be analogous with the enemy's advancing from in-depth positions.

It is therefore wrong to refer to effective engagement of the enemy prior to attack or on the line of attack as a stage of preparation fire to repulse the offensive that can be conducted before the offensive has begun, as can the preparation of any action before the offensive. In this event the enemy offensive is already well underway. So this stage should be referred to as preparation fire to repulse the attack, not the offensive. This puts things into better perspective.

Can preparation fire be used to repulse the offensive? Yes, but only on the operational level--counter preparation fire preempting preparation fire for the enemy attack, i.e., before the enemy offensive.

As for the second stage of effective engagement of the enemy in a defensive operation--fire support for defending friendly troops--it is the view of the present authors that it is well justified if its purpose is defined as repulsing an enemy attack, effectively engaging the enemy, and providing preparation fire for counterattack and fire support for counterattacking friendly troops.

So the offensive (offensive operation) by friendly troops begins not with the line of transition to attack, as is proposed by artillery specialists, but with the movement forward from staging areas (from in-depth positions) or with the beginning of preparation fire for attack. If this is not so, the term "line of transition to the offensive" should be used with these lines apparently being identical. But the concept of "line of transition to the offensive" does not exist in any military dictionary or any other specialist source. This only shows that the description of the first stage of effective engagement of the enemy force--preparation fire for the offensive--is incorrect. The Great Patriotic War and the postwar theory of the offensive show that it should be called "preparation fire for attack," which is a component of the offensive (offensive action), not part of its preparation.

Sea coast defense and defense against amphibious landing (airborne assault). Sea coast defense is defined as coordinated, synchronized actions by units and formations of the Ground Forces, the Navy, and the Air Defense Forces designed to repulse enemy strikes from land, sea, and air, and to hold their positions. The objective of this type of defense is to repulse an enemy land force advancing along the sea coast; interdict the landing of sea or air assault forces; retain control of coastal areas; and defend important areas on the coast, as well as important military, economic, and administrative installations and facilities.

Sea coast defense includes defensive action by ground forces against enemy troops advancing along the sea coast, and sea and air assault defense of exposed coast and island areas.

Defense against amphibious landing (airborne assault) is an essential element of sea coast defense and comprises coordinated and synchronized actions by the aforementioned forces, designed to prepare and conduct defense of areas exposed to amphibious landing (airborne assault) by enemy forces, and to hold defense positions (areas) of the sea coast and islands together with the important installations that are located there.

Which defense is more characteristic of troops on the tactical level--sea coast defense or defense against amphibious landing (airborne assault), especially if this refers to repulsing a major amphibious landing force?

There is a widespread opinion that sea coast defense will prevail both on the operational and on the tactical level.

This is not always the case, however, especially in countering an operational strategic amphibious landing, e.g., a marine division. And here is why.

If a friendly combined arms formation that conducts a sea coast defense operation, for instance, uses the main forces to defend an area against an enemy force advancing along the sea coast, in its in-depth tactical defense area it will only be able to engage a tactical amphibious landing battalion (tactical group) acting in support of the enemy force advancing from the front. In these conditions, only a part of the formation's forces and assets can be employed for defense against amphibious landing. To engage this amphibious landing group, it is enough to use a combined arms reserve and, if necessary, also a part of the second echelon, to cover areas that could be used for amphibious landing, in small groups. If, however, a smaller part of the formation defends a land area, there is little point in using the main forces to conduct a defensive operation against a small amphibious landing group.

As for a large amphibious landing force, it will be used at a substantially greater depth from the front line (150 km to 200 km and more). A combined arms formation (comprised of combined arms units) will conduct an independent defensive operation against amphibious landing in its area of responsibility. This type of defense, which is the most characteristics of troops on the tactical level, should be used to repulse a large amphibious landing force. In light of the aforementioned, sea coast defense is an essential element of operational defense.

At the same time, it is important to note that the discussion of this issue is not over yet, which requires further study and analysis.

Operation and preparation of defense. There is a common view that in assigning combat missions for defense action to subordinate units, it is necessary to indicate the deadline for its preparation, as is usual in the offensive. Indeed, in assigning a combat objective for the offensive, it is necessary to indicate the deadline for its preparation since the offensive force has the initiative not only in choosing the direction of attack but also the time for the transition to the offensive.

In the defensive, the situation is somewhat different, and it is inexpedient to set a specific deadline. Consider the experience in the Great Patriotic War. During the War, a unit (sub-unit) failing to accomplish a mission assigned to it, especially in the defensive, was often a subject of thorough investigation. If it was established that the reason for that failure was not objective, the commander was called to account and sometimes prosecuted. Supposing that in assigning a combat mission to a regiment, a higher echelon commander set a deadline for the defense to be ready by 6:00 a.m. while the enemy attacked at 5:00 a.m. As a result, in the course of a defensive operation, the regiment sustains unjustifiably heavy losses, abandoning the defense area, thus exposing an adjacent friendly unit. The attempt to call the regiment commander to account is doomed to failure. After all, he was ordered to get his defense ready by 6:00 a.m. while the enemy attacked earlier, when the regiment was not yet ready to repulse the enemy attack. Hence the consequences. The regiment commander was acquitted (cleared of all charges) even though he bore some of the blame for what had happened.

In light of the aforementioned, there should be no deadline for getting the defense ready as troops should always, in any situation, be ready to conduct a defensive operation and repulse any attack by the enemy. Although the degree of this readiness will always vary. But this is a different problem.

Previously, like now, three deadlines were, as a general rule, set for defense organization: a deadline for taking defense positions, a deadline for getting the weapons (fire delivery) system ready, and a deadline for setting obstacles. These deadlines are objective and easy to verify since they conform to established standards based on military experience.

As concerns the time frame for engineer organization, it is established separately and indicated in engineer support operation orders, not in a combat mission.

Counterstrokes and counterattacks. In the course of a defensive operation (combat), unit (formation) commander can decide to deliver a counterstroke (counterattack). In so doing, commanders take into account the designation of the forces that will be performing the appropriate missions, their organization, methods of action, and the operational tactical situation on the ground.

As is known, second echelons of a large strategic formation, combined units, and units, in addition to performing various combat missions, are designed to deliver a counter stroke and carry out a counterattack, respectively. In assigning missions to a second echelon strategic formation (unit or subunit), lines of deployment for delivering a counter stroke (counterattack) are also indicated. To deliver a counter stroke, a second echelon unit builds a battle formation ensuring the delivery of a powerful first strike.

In conducting a counterattack, preparation fire and fire support is provided to counterattacking friendly units and subunits. So the second echelon is also tasked with conducting a counterattack. But in delivering a counterstroke, some experts maintain, it is necessary to provide preparation fire and fire support not for a counterstroke but for an attack. Why? After all, the decision has been made to deliver a counterstroke, not mount an offensive operation. Furthermore, counterstrokes and counterattacks are the functions of defense. Although they are offensive actions, they are part of defense organization and have their own specifics.

All of the aforementioned leads to the logical conclusion that forces employed for a counterstroke should be assigned the mission for a counterstroke, not an attack, especially since counterstroke and attack have different objectives and procedure of action. A counterstroke is, as a general rule, designed to effectively engage and destroy an enemy force that has penetrated defense lines, and restore the original situation. It has a small depth of action, a special battle order, and a relatively short time allocated to preparation fire and fire delivery. The aim of the offensive is to destroy an opposing defensive enemy force to the entire depth of its operational formation and to create favorable conditions for further aggressive (offensive) action. The depth of the offensive is substantially greater; the battle order of troops on the offensive considerably differs from their battle order in delivering a counterstroke; there is more intensive fire delivery against the enemy, etc. In other words, once a decision has been made to deliver a counterstroke, it will apparently be right to set the second echelon the mission to deliver a counterstroke, not an attack, and therefore to provide preparation fire and fire support for a counterstroke.

Retreat (retrograde movement). There is a view that the concepts of "retreat" and "retrograde movement" differ only in scale, while their content is identical, and that retreat is characteristic of the operational level, while retrograde movement is characteristic of the tactical level. Many experts are convinced that both retreat and retrograde movement consist in troops abandoning their positions (areas) and moving to new lines (positions) assigned to them in the depth of defense formation; that they are designed to withdraw troops to avoid attack by superior enemy forces, occupy more favorable positions for subsequent action, gain time, reduce the front line, and release forces and assets for other directions of operation. In tasking, the troops, along with other positions, are assigned initial, ultimate, and intermediate defense lines for rear guard and main forces.

It is the view of the present authors that this interpretation was valid and acceptable about 20 years ago. At the time, there were two methods of retrograde movement. In the first, the main forces of a large combined formation (unit) accomplish a retrograde movement under the cover of rear guard forces, while in the second, it is accomplished through a consecutive deployment of main forces for a combat operation on in-depth intermediate positions.

Retrograde movement, however, is a kind of a maneuver by troops, while maneuver consists in the movement (redeployment) of large combined (units) with the aim of taking a more favorable position with regard to the adversary. It is accomplished in march formation, while the main forces should, under the cover of rear guard forces, reach the final line of withdrawal or a designated staging area as soon as possible. This is "pure" maneuver by troops, and this method of action does not secure any gain in time nor does it envision the conduct of combat action by main forces, including on intermediate positions. A time gain can be ensured by the second method. Analysis shows that it is the essence of mobile defense and, according to the prevailing view, was excluded from retrograde movement. As mentioned earlier, mobile defense theory was developed in the 1920s-1930, but was not widely practiced due to the low mobility of our troops at that time. Today, however, the situation has changed: All troops are mechanized and highly mobile.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, troops in retreat conducted delaying (restraining) action, consecutively holding in-depth echeloned defense positions, and conducted counterattacks with limited objectives--to stop the advance of an enemy force trying to envelop (bypass) friendly troops in defense positions, inflict losses of it, slow the pace of the advance, and gain time which was needed to achieve objectives in subsequent operations. Obviously, such methods of action will also be used in retrograde movement today. Retreat by combined arms formations will constitute an aggregate of mobile defense actions conducted by the greater part of forces and assets in combination with retrograde movement by large combined units and units.

In light of the aforementioned, it would be wrong to put an equals sign between retrograde movement and retreat, seeing only differences of scale. Retrograde movement is a form of maneuver, while retreat is predominantly a form of defensive action.

Operation orders and instructions. To ensure the fulfillment of tactical objectives, higher echelon commanders assign missions to combined formations, units, and subunits. In military practice, combat missions are assigned and operation orders are issued. Preliminary instructions are used as guidelines for upcoming actions (operations). Any missions (objectives) assigned to subunits, units, and combined units are as a general rule specified in operation orders and operation instructions. Many experts see this as perfectly acceptable. A preliminary objective--i.e., an objective that does not require immediate implementation--can be assigned in a preliminary operation order.

But is it logical that any tactical missions, e.g., those concerning redeployment or disposition of troops--i.e., those that are not directly linked to combat engagement, destruction or neutralization of enemy forces--should be assigned to troops in operation orders and operation instructions as combat missions?

What is combat mission in the first place?

The Military Encyclopedia says: "Combat mission is a task assigned by higher echelon commander to subunit, unit, combined unit, or large strategic formation for the purpose of achieving a specific objective in a combat engagement (combat operation) by a specified time. The content of a combat mission depends on the function, numerical strength, fighting efficiency and combat and combat capabilities of friendly and enemy troops (forces). A combat mission of a combined arms large strategic formation (combined unit, unit, subunit) in the offensive usually consists in destroying principal enemy forces within a designated one within a sector (area), advance to and securement of a designated line (seizure of area, objective), and may be divided into immediate and subsequent mission (objective)." (1)

As far as the march is concerned, the aforementioned dictionary says: "A march order is drawn up on the basis of the commander's decision"--a march order, not an operation order since march does not exactly fall under the definition of combat engagement (combat action): It precedes combat action. If defensive or offensive engagement, including meeting engagement, becomes imminent, troops will be assigned an appropriate combat mission in an operation order or operation instructions.

Combat missions are related to combat action by subunits, units and combined units. So operation orders and operation instructions should be issued to troops when they are assigned combat missions, while in all other instances, orders and instructions as such should be sufficient.

NOTE:

1. Voennaia entsiklopedia, Vol. 1, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1997, p. 494.

Maj. Gen. Yu.V. KALININ 

Candidate of Military Sciences

Col. G.D. IONIN (Ret.)

Hero of Russia, Candidate of Military Sciences