Mobilizing a transforming force: 32d Division Redlegs in The Great War.

  Wherever the batteries of the 32d were located they stood their ground
and fired shot-for-shot with the Germans. If rumors were true, they also
fired at targets in enemy territory which had never been shelled before.
G. W. Garlock,
Tales of the Thirty-Second, 1927

"The Yanks are coming!" These words of hope swept across the torn battlefields of France in the spring of 1918. For almost four years, the Allies had been bogged down in a murderous embrace with their German foes across no-man's land. But now, the Yanks were coming. They brought a breath of fresh air and a combative insolence born of innocence and high ideals. More importantly, their individualism, self-reliance and "can-do" spirit provided an impetus that promised to turn the tables in this terrible, tired war.

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Many incoming American combat divisions were formed from units of the National Guard. This is the story of the Artillery men in one such unit: 57th FA Brigade of the 32d Division, a division that was comprised of regiments and battalions of the Wisconsin and Michigan National Guard, many of whom had seen distinguished service in the Civil War.

The story has great relevance for today. Then, as now, America was facing national security challenges at home and abroad. Then, as now, the US Army was in the process of reorganizing to adapt to changed operational conditions and new technologies that were transforming the face of battle. (1) Then, as now, the nation had to rely on the National Guard to provide disciplined manpower--a National Guard that had to reorganize and train its citizen-Soldiers quickly to fight in a changed and lethal operational environment. By examining how these leaders and Soldiers adapted and overcame the challenges of mobilizing and reorganizing while transforming the force, we may gain insights into the present situation and be inspired by these past successes.

On the Border: Homeland Security, 1916 Style. The American Army of the early 20th century consisted of a small cadre of regular units most recently employed in the power-projection wars and peacekeeping expeditions resulting from the Spanish-American War of 1898 and America's subsequent emergence as a colonial power in the Pacific and Caribbean. (2) The organized state militias, later called the National Guard, augmented this small professional force.

In March 1916, America's southern border was disturbed by raids and violence fueled by social unrest and revolution in Mexico. Francisco "Pancho" Villa, a charismatic rebel leader, raided the town of Columbus, New Mexico, robbing and killing American citizens to finance his revolutionary forces. In response to a public outcry for assistance in securing the border and maintaining peace, President Woodrow Wilson mobilized the National Guard.

Less than a year later, a German U Boat torpedoed and sank the passenger liner Lusitania, killing many civilians, including 128 Americans. (3) This was the first in a series of attacks leading to a public outcry that caused the isolationist Wilson administration to declare war on Germany. In a short period of time. America had to react to emergency situations requiring a military response at home and abroad. The National Guard proved essential in this response.

As has frequently occurred throughout its history, the organized state militia had just survived another attempt to dismember it, emerging a stronger and more integrated force, officially known as the National Guard. (4) Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1916, state militias forming the National Guard were organized in battalions and regiments under their own officers and would be available for both state duty under each state's governor and federal duty within the United States and abroad when the president called.

The ink was still fresh on the National Security Act when President Wilson ordered a major mobilization of the National Guard on the Mexican border. (5) America's citizen-Soldiers again proved their value in time of war and national emergency as they had done throughout the nation's history.

Units from many states, including Wisconsin and Michigan, were mustered for border security duty. (6) They then organized for duty and went to military camps in the southwest to continue training on basic Soldier skills. After intensive training, including forced marches, musketry, field sanitation and small unit tactics, they were assigned to various posts along the Mexican border.

Border service mainly involved long days of guard duty under the unforgiving southwestern sun but proved invaluable to officers and men as they adapted to military life. When war came, this pool of disciplined and trained citizen-Soldiers, hardened by field conditions and discipline, formed the core of the new National Guard.

Change of Mission: Organizing and Training for a Major Theater War. When America entered The Great War in 1917, the nation had to organize quickly for a major land struggle in the European theater against a premier military--the German military machine. It required new skills and a new, larger organization. (7)

Again, the nation had short notice to respond to a major security emergency. Again, it relied on the National Guard. Many units saw border service and, thus, were more prepared than would have been otherwise.

But a European war required a more complex organization than the companies, battalions and regiments that constituted the Regular Army and National Guard. The infantry division became the basic unit of action, structured as an integrated combined arms organization with its own artillery and logistical support. (8)

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The 32d Division was formed from traditional National Guard units from Wisconsin and Michigan, officially organized on 18 July 1917, and sent to Camp McArthur near Waco, Texas, to train. (9) (See Figure 1.)

After the division reorganized, training for war began, training that focused on battlefield conditions Soldiers might encounter in France. Three pressing challenges were basic: Artillery training, new equipment training and survivability training for the battlefield, including using protective equipment against a terrifying new weapon--poison gas.

The large-scale European war not only required more manpower, but also Soldiers and officers trained in skills other than infantry and cavalry, which represented most National Guard Soldiers. In particular, artillery would be essential to the war effort and artillerymen were in short supply. Many National Guard cavalry or infantry regiments were hastily converted into artillery to meet the new structure's needs. For example, the 1st Cavalry Regiment of the Wisconsin National Guard became an artillery regiment on 28 August 1917. (10)

As the regimental history records, "On September 28th, after a few days of intensive planning and organizing on the part of the staff, the First Wisconsin Cavalry ceased to be, the One Hundred 20th Field Artillery was born and, with the 119th from Michigan and the 121st from Wisconsin, the 57th Field Artillery Brigade was formed." (11) When the 32d Division arrived in Waco, officers and NCOs began training as artillerymen.

The new artillerymen faced daunting challenges. After the Spanish American War, the US Army reacted slowly to changes wrought by the indirect fire revolution in the science and art of war. The result was the creation of the modern fire support system. Despite resistance to change "... between 1898 and 1918, the War Department introduced new field pieces, adopted indirect fire, organized the School of Fire for Field Artillery, separated the Field Artillery from the Coast Artillery, grouped batteries into battalions and regiments, and integrated the Field Artillery into the division. Even with these reforms, the United States entered World War I in 1917 without sufficient Field Artillery and had to rely upon the Europeans to arm its batteries." (12)

The extension of the tactical battlefield in depth was perhaps the most revolutionary development of the early 20th century. The refinement of indirect fires techniques for artillery, the introduction of the airplane and new communications systems, such as reliable field telephones and radios, led to the creation of the fire support system in its modern form. (13)

Basic artillery training programs became more specialized and specific for gunners, surveyors, communications specialists, ammunition specialists, mule drovers and others. American artillerymen were given equipment, such as the famed French soixante-quinze (75-mm gun) and new communications equipment.

The training regime was stepped up, and Soldiers at all levels paid attention. The diary entry of the 120th Field Artillery for Monday, September 24, 1917, sets the tone, "New drill schedule adopted. As we are to become artillery, the 1916 Cavalry Drill Regulations, in which our units have become well schooled, must be replaced by the Artillery Drill Regulations, of which copies are at a premium." (14)

Artillery training was conducted as outlined in publications, such as the Field Artillery manuals, published by the War Department. Some incorporated doctrine based on the combat experiences of the British and French armies. (15) Despite these efforts, artillery units in the National Guard did not have enough trained leaders, especially at the higher levels, so some officers from the Regular Army were assigned command of artillery brigades. As National Guard Historian Jim Hill notes, "Through the failure of the [Army] General Staff to provide artillery equipment to the States by way of implementing the Dick Act of 1903, few, if any, of the States had a National Guard Brigadier General with artillery service or training." (16)

Battlefield conditions on the Western Front required mastery of the techniques of entrenchment, cover and concealment, and, above all, protection against poison gas, in addition to artillery training. Trainers attempted to recreate battlefield conditions, so "A trench system was constructed just outside the camp, and in this system, trench warfare was practiced. Infantry and artillery target ranges were prepared early in the training period. And a thorough course of instruction in firing was given to every man in the Division." The division history adds, "From these two features of the training program, excellent results were obtained." (17)

The knowledge, skills and cohesion developed during this time were critical in ensuring the future success of the division in combat. That the regiments of the 32d Division were well established National Guard units undoubtedly had a positive effect in shaping its character and cohesive spirit.

In the words of General Haan, the Division commander and a Regular Army officer, "The 32d Division, as it went into battle, was composed of approximately three-fourths National Guard and one-fourth drafted men. The spirit of the Division was due entirely to the spirit that was built up in the Division when it was composed wholly of National Guard troops and before it left Camp MacArthur, Texas." (18) He adds, "To these officers, as well as to other National Guard officers of high grade, must also be given credit for their conscientious assistance in eliminating officers unfit for war service." (19)

"Over There": Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI), 1918 Style. By January of 1918, the advanced elements of the 32d Division were already in France and soon were joined by the main body. Once in theater, the Soldiers joined other members of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) under General John J. Pershing.

Pershing's challenge was to maintain the integrity of the AEF and ensure his Soldiers would not be committed to combat piecemeal but would be employed as an independent and effective operational command. (20) As a result, the First US Army was created and became operational in September of 1918. However, by May of 1818, some American divisions were committed to combat as part of French and British corps to help defeat furious German attacks. The 32d Division was one of these units. (21)

American artillerymen's greatest challenge in theater was to continue training in the art and science of artillery and ensure the highest state of individual and collective combat readiness. To understand the enormity of this challenge, we must remember that warfare was undergoing a remarkable transformation with the coming of the deep battle and advent of the modern fire support system. In addition, many National Guard Redlegs had seen their first real guns only a few months before.

In the shadow of war, American artillerymen had to learn their craft and master the many technical challenges required by the expanded battlefield and fire support environment. To meet these challenges, training continued at an increased pace and American Redlegs were placed under the tutelage of experienced French instructors. Most units received French equipment--including the famous rapidfiring 75-mm gun that was the workhorse of Allied Field Artillery.

For example, the Soldiers of the 120th Field Artillery Regiment were staged at a French training center in Corquidan, Brittany. There, they "acquired more artillery technique than in all other training camps together." (22)

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The training progressed to actual live-fire exercises with aerial observers. (23) By late spring, 32d Division artillerymen were as ready as they ever would be--as attested by this Soldiers' diary entry, "2d Battalion fires battalion problem, consisting of registration, zone fire for effect, destruction of M.G. [machine gun] emplacement, normal barrage and offensive counterpreparation." (24)

By late May 1917, less than a year after the citizen-Soldier cavalrymen became National Guard artillerymen, they were well on their way to mastering the latest Field Artillery equipment and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Orders assigning combat duties were imminent.

The Test of Battle. At last, all the training and preparation for combat were put to the test--the AEF, including the National Guard Redlegs of the 32d Division, took their place at the front. It is difficult to assess the relative performance of a specific combat unit vis-a-vis its sister units. Many factors influence such an assessment, including the strength and nature of the opposition, variations in weather and terrain, equipment status and the type of operations the unit is conducting.

Despite the subjective difficulties of such an endeavor, it is evident that the 32d Division performed very credibly. In his comprehensive study of the combat effectiveness of units in the AEF, Colonel Paul F. Braim ranks the 32d Division in the upper third of all American divisions committed to combat. Using indicators such as distance advanced against the enemy while under fire, awards for valor conferred on Soldiers, casualties taken and number of captured prisoners of war, the 32d ranks sixth of 18 divisions. (25)

Interestingly, the 1st Division ranks second. This was the Division to which many of the finest officers and NCOs of the 32d were assigned when it was used briefly as a replacement division. (26) Apart from these performance indicators, the 32d frequently was cited favorably in dispatches and was commended by both the French High Command and General Pershing, earning its sobriquet Les Terribles (The Terrible Ones) for its indomitable spirit in battle. (27)

The division infantrymen's courage was matched by its artillerymen's skill. Eyewitness accounts testify to the terrible effectiveness of the 32d Division artillery fires.

For several hours before the attack, a powerful artillery preparation devastated the entire area ahead of the troops. Low ground, caves, dugouts and trenches thought to conceal Germans were designated for concentrations of gas shells and high explosives. The enemy was worn down, stunned and harassed without respite during this period. (28) Later, this general fire plan changed to a rolling barrage to protect the infantry's advance.

"At 4:00 p.m., the crashing fire of the artillery preparation changed to the ordered arrangement of the barrage. In front of the right came the steady, stationary falling of shells; in front on the left the same broad belt of 'hideous ruin and combustion.' From it came the drumming roar of continuous explosions as of the progress of a mighty storm. That curtain of flame and smoke and dust shot through and through with screaming shards of steel rolled majestically away toward the east." (29)

American fire planners were willing to experiment with new methods of massing effects. In one instance, the 57th FA Brigade used a technique called the triple barrage. The triple barrage was three successive lines of fire before the infantry assault; when the defenders emerged from overhead cover to man their weapons, they were caught in the fires of the second and third barrages.

Interviews with German survivors of this inferno testified to its effectiveness. Some thought the Yanks had a machine gun that sprayed 75-mm shells. Their officers characterized the American artillery fire as crazy and frankly admitted they did not know what was happening during that terrifying afternoon. The Germans' morale was badly shattered by the tremendous pounding, and prisoners expressed satisfaction with the fact that they were behind, not in front of, the American artillery. (30)

The 57th FA Brigade further fully demonstrated its technical competence when it proved fully capable of serving as controlling headquarters for additional artillery battalions. During the Aisne-Marne offensive, "The 147th Field Artillery, 41st Division, was attached to the 57th Field Artillery Brigade for the entire operation." (31) When the division was granted a reprieve and moved to the rear, the artillery continued to support the new unit in sector. (32) The technical and tactical competence of the 57th FA Brigade's leadership is illustrated in the combat order shown in Figure 2.

By 11 November 1918, when the last shot of the terrible struggle was spent, 32d Division National Guardsmen had reason to be proud. They literally had "broken every enemy line" and proved superior to the enemy and equal to their Regular Army and Allied counterparts. (33)

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The More Things Change.... "Army Records show that our Brigade, the 57th FA, fired more rounds than any other American Brigade; well over half a million shells thrown at the enemy." (34)

Because of fiscal constraints, cultural preferences and constitutional traditions, the United States rarely has fielded a standing Regular Army that could tackle worldwide crises. This was true in 1917 and remains true of our current "capabilities-based force." (35) Even the large Cold War Army relied heavily on allies, the Reserve Component and America's nuclear deterrence. Our nation always has depended on the citizen-Soldiers, especially the National Guard.

America's first large-scale overseas commitment, The Great War, posed enormous challenges to the nation. The demands of a major European war against the foremost military power in the world required an unparalleled commitment of human and material resources.

In the case of the artillery, the challenge was triple: to rapidly reorganize infantry and cavalry units into artillery battalions and brigades, train officers and enlisted men in the new indirect fire artillery techniques and integrate these units into a combined arms and multi-national team. And, for the first time, our Soldiers faced the possibility of fighting in a chemically contaminated environment.

That the division met all these challenges at all is remarkable. That it met them so successfully is incredible.

Because of a similarity in the conditions of the early 20th and early 21st century, lessons learned strongly resonate today.

A war or national emergency does not wait for an army to transform. In 1917, both the Regular Army and National Guard were forced into accelerated transformation by the pressing needs of war. The need for transformation was acute, particularly for the artillery, because of the development of the indirect fire system, new equipment and new communications technology. The lack of artillerymen and trained artillery units exacerbated the problem.

Today's process of transformation, begun in the mid-1990s, is under increased pressure because of the need to maintain a credible deterrent capability for a major land war and conduct a wide-ranging campaign against terrorists and the states that sponsor them. However, transformation remains imperative for the future force's viability.

Cohesive units enable transformation. National Guard units traditionally have displayed a special cohesiveness born of the citizen-Soldiers' long service together. Among US military organizations, National Guard battalions and regiments are the closest to a true regimental system containing long-serving members who know and trust each other. This esprit de corps always has been key in its members' motivation and battle performance. The transformation of the 1st Wisconsin Cavalry into the 120th Field Artillery shows it is much better to transform cohesive units from one type to another than to create them ex nihilo.

Battle-focused post-mobilization training is essential to success on the battlefield. The National Guard faces a critical challenge in maximizing limited training time. This is as true today as it was in the early 20th century. Intense, battle-focused post-mobilization training, both in the United States and in theater, is critical.

Considering that artillery units in the 32d Division recently had been converted from infantry and cavalry, it is evident that intensive, purposeful training was imperative.

Today the challenge is no less formidable. Although approximately 70 percent of all the Army's artillery is in the National Guard, many units do not have adequate legacy systems and most lack the capability for digital connectivity with modernized FA units and other members of the joint fire support team. Given this situation, post-mobilization training can be an intimidating proposition.

In peacetime, units must be as near their wartime capabilities as possible because of time's importance in warfare and the demands of the contemporary operational environment.

RSOI. The process by which units are received, staged and moved to their area of operations and integrated into the order of battle remains critical to battlefield success. While the current acronym did not exist in 1917, units of the AEF faced the same deployment challenges today's expeditionary Army experiences. (36) Past experience must serve as an institutional memory to help anticipate and prepare for future challenges.

Leader development remains the most challenging and important training responsibility for the Army in peace and war. The lack of peacetime preparedness and sluggish modernization efforts caused a shortage of trained artillery officers and NCOs in 1917. The fact that the artillery and fire support systems, in particular, require an abundance of liaison officers compounded the problem. In 1917, this challenge was met by rapidly commissioning and training new officers.

Today we do not have the luxury of time. To maintain combat capability, we must continue to attract and retain quality officers and Soldiers in the Field Artillery. The future lies not so much in weapons platforms, but in the ability to acquire and engage targets in a timely manner through integrated joint fires. Trained leaders are essential to success in this task.

Human Factors continue to dominate the battlefield. Finally, the magnificent battlefield performance of the National Guard artillerymen of the 32d Division resulted from the patriotism, fighting spirit and the dedication of each individual citizen-Soldier and officer. These same factors continue to make the National Guard Artillerymen a viable force today and on future battlefields.

History confirms the value of past experience as the guide to tackling contemporary problems. We must resist the temptation to treat transformation during war as a purely technological problem and pay attention to the human dimension. By identifying commonalities with our past experiences, we may find guidelines to help solve contemporary problems rooted in the realities of human nature and the enduring values, patriotism and devotion to duty of both our Active and National Guard Redlegs.

Major Prisco R. Hernandez, Army National Guard (ARNG), is the Fires and Effects Instructor for the Combat Refresher Team at the Center for Army Tactics in the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is full-time Active Guard/Reserve (AG/R). He has served as a Training Officer in the 4th Brigade, 75th Division (Training Support) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and as the S3 in the 1st Battalion, 120th Field Artillery, an M109A5 howitzer battalion in direct support to the 32d Infantry Brigade, Wisconsin Army National Guard. Major Hernandez holds a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin. He won first place in the US Field Artillery Association's 2002 History Writing Contest and the prestigious national 2001 Distinguished Article Award from The Army Historical Foundation, Arlington, Virginia, for his 2001 History Contest Second Place article, "The Spanish Civil War: The German Kondor Legion, A Firepower Force Package in Combat."

Endnotes:

1. The most significant new technologies with military applications included the use of radios, improved telephones, trucks, long-range indirect fire artillery pieces, improved high explosives, poison gas, effective machine guns and airplanes. Taken together, these technologies produced a new battlefield paradigm--the deep battle.

2. Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars (New York, NY: McMilian, 1990).

3. S. L. A. Marshall, The American Heritage History of World War I (New York, NY: American Heritage Publishing, 1964), 106.

4. The National Defense Act of 1916 reorganized the various state militias as the National Guard of the United States and allowed its use at home and abroad when federalized by the president. This legislation marks the origin of the modern National Guard. For a concise treatment of the events that led to this legislation, see Jim Dan Hill, The Minuteman in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1964), 207-222.

5. The National Security Act was signed on 3 June 1916. But already on 9 May, due to continuing raids by Mexican rebels, the president asked the governors of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to mobilize their National Guard troops to help federal troops secure the border. Ibid., 230-231.

6. National Guard units from Wisconsin were ordered to active federal duty on 19 June 1916. Carl Penner, Frederic Sammond and H.M. Appel, The 120th Field Artillery Diary: 1880-1919 (Milwaukee, WI: Hammersmith-Kortmeyer, 1928), 23.

7. "Six of the nine infantry regiments and most of the cavalry, the artillery, engineers, and auxiliary troops had this Border experience." Joint War History Commission of Michigan and Wisconsin, The 32d Division in the World War (Milwaukee, WI: Wisconsin Printing Company, 1920), 27.

8. General Pershing, the supreme commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), decided to structure all divisions according to the "square" concept. Thus, a division consisted of four large infantry regiments of 3,720 men, each organized two regiments to a brigade. Each brigade was supported by a regiment of 75-mm guns with a third regiment of 155-mm howitzers in general support of the division. Hill, 27.

9. Joint War History Commission of Michigan and Wisconsin, 27.

10. Penner, 67.

11. Ibid., 27.

12. Boyd L. Dastrup, King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992), 145.

13. "The deep or long range battle was the creation of the First World War, made possible by new techniques of target acquisition and increased range." J. B. A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford, PA: The Military Press, 1987), 151.

14. Penner, 65.

15. For example, the series of artillery manuals that were published in Paris specifically for the AEF were direct translations of the French manuals used at the Saumur Artillery School. See Saumur Artillery School, Manual of Artillery (Paris, France: Imprimairie Nationale, 1918).

16. Hill, 268.

17. Joint War History Commission of Michigan and Wisconsin, 31.

18. Ibid., 151.

19. Ibid.

20. Historical Section, Army War College, The Genesis of the American First Army (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1938).

21. After having served in a quiet sector of the front in May, the 32d Division first saw combat in the Aisne-Marne offensive on 27 July 1918 when serving as part of the French XXXVIII Corps, Sixth French Army. American Battle Monuments Commission, The 32d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War (Washington DC: United States Printing Office, 1943), 8.

22. Penner, 29.

23. Ibid., 116.

24. Ibid., 114.

25. Paul F. Braim, The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1987), 176-183.

26. Joint War History Commission of Michigan and Wisconsin, 34-35.

27. The 32d Division patch is a Red Arrow "... signifying that the Division shot through every line the enemy put before it." Ibid., 26.

28. G. W. Garlock, Tales of the Thirty-Second (West Salem, WI: Badger Publishing Company, 1927), 216.

29. Ibid., 216-217.

30. Joint War History Commission of Michigan and Wisconsin, 85.

31. American Battle Monuments Commission, 9.

32. "The 57th Field Artillery Brigade, which, after the relief of the division, served successively with the 28th and 77th Divisions and in Ill Corps reserve." Ibid., 24.

33. The 32d Division earned its nickname Les Terribles when members of the 64th Infantry Regiment broke through a strong enemy line during the Aisne-Marne offensive in August 1918. A French corps commander apparently first used the term to describe the 32d Division doughboys, and it was soon adopted by General Mangin, French X Army Commander, and all the men of the 32d Division. Joint War History Commission of Michigan and Wisconsin, 70.

34. Penner, 10.

35. Richard Hart Sinnreich "Capabilities-Based Planning: Home Run or Humbug?" The Lawton Constitution (5 January 2003)

36. "The Army's deployment is the surest sign of America's commitment to accomplishing any mission that occurs on land." General Eric K. Shinseki, "The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation: Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War" (October, 1999), online at http://www.us.army.mil/csa/vision.htm.

By Major Prisco R. Hernandez, ARNG

Divisional Troops               63d Infantry Brigade

Headquarters Troop              125th Infantry Regiment
119th Machine-Gun Battalion     126th Infantry Regiment
107th Engineer Regiment         120th Machine-Gun Battalion
107th Field Signal Battalion
Combat Service Support Trains

57th Field Artillery Brigade    64th Infantry Brigade

119th Field Artillery Regiment  127th Infantry Regiment
  (75-mm Guns)
120th Field Artillery Regiment  128th Infantry Regiment
  (75-mm Guns)
121st Field Artillery Regiment  121st Machine-Gun Battalion
  (155-mm Howitzers)
107th Trench Mortar Battery

Figure 1: Organization of the 32d Infantry Division