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Misty FACs of the Vietnam War.

One of the most successful tactical innovations of the Vietnam War was the introduction of the F-100 Super Sabre to perform the new mission of "Fast FAC" (Forward Air Control). Under the call sign of "Misty," F-100F pilots interdicted equipment and supplies flowing into South Vietnam. Their story is important because it provides key insights into how the Air Force flies, fights, and adapts during combat.

This article reviews the early years of the Vietnam War and how the need for Fast FACs evolved. Prior to the spring of 1967, the USAF tasked O-1 and O-2 FACs to conduct visual reconnaissance missions over the southern area of North Vietnam. In response, the North Vietnamese deployed additional air defenses, driving the slow and vulnerable propeller-driven aircraft back across the border. Operation Commando Sabre was the first test of the Fast FAC concept. Jet aircraft would perform FAC duties, adapting the two-seat version of the F-100 Super Sabre to the visual reconnaissance and strike control mission. This article also highlights the build-up and operations over the Misty FACs three-year history until the unit's dissolution in May 1970. Commando Sabre operations never consisted of more than twenty-two pilots at any given time and rarely involved more than six single-ship missions per day. Yet, they succeeded in finding and destroying targets where other methods had failed. This success came at a price, though, as the low altitude Misty FAC missions proved to be among the most dangerous missions flown in the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, the tactics developed by the Misty FACs--including visual reconnaissance, strike control, and search and rescue operations--formed the foundation for FAC and Killer Scout operations employed during Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force, and remain valid today.

Vietnam: The Interdiction Campaign

Prior to August 1964, the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam was limited to an advisory role. However, instability within the South Vietnamese government led President Lyndon Johnson to question Saigon's ability to withstand the increasing threat from North Vietnam. (1) In the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin incident of August 2, 1964, Johnson's position shifted towards more aggressive and offensive measures, leading ultimately to the commencement of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in March 1965.

Johnson's primary goal for Rolling Thunder was to demonstrate the resolve of the United States, believing that a series of graduated air strikes on North Vietnam would compel Hanoi to withdraw support from the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. (2) A secondary goal was to improve morale and help stabilize the South Vietnamese government. Additionally, the air strikes were to limit the flow of reinforcements, weapons, and supplies to the Viet Cong. (3)

While Rolling Thunder was an offensive campaign, target selection was limited by the President to those approved during his Tuesday Rose Garden luncheons. This fell well short of the strategic air campaign proposed by the Air Staff, consisting of over ninety-four strategic targets. These limited air strikes alone, however, did not achieve Johnson's objectives and, by July 1965, he concluded that victory in Vietnam required a protracted campaign with more emphasis on military action in South Vietnam. (4)

As the Johnson administration shifted its emphasis toward ground operations and increased U.S. troop strength, the importance of close air support and the interdiction of supplies from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong in the south was likewise elevated. (5) Under the direction of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Commander, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. Army concentrated on direct military action in South Vietnam against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regular forces. Restricted to South Vietnam, these ground operations relied heavily on close air support. (6) While the Air Force provided CAS within South Vietnam, it was also responsible for conducting the Rolling Thunder strikes in the North, including interdiction missions.

The North Vietnamese logistics and transportation system was centered in Hanoi. Chinese supplies flowed into Hanoi along roads and the rail system leading north, while Soviet supplies reached Hanoi via ships through Haiphong Harbor. These were then moved along rail and major road routes toward the South and transferred to smaller convoys, that maneuvered along a series of redundant roads and trails. The supplies were further dispersed as they approached the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and carried by truck, bicycle, or packed on foot along trails at night. The North Vietnamese also moved supplies through the Laos panhandle and into Cambodia to more easily access Viet Cong positions in central and southern South Vietnam. Known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, this network of thousands of miles of redundant roads concealed North Vietnamese trucks under a dense triple canopy forest. (7)

The aerial interdiction campaign focused on four areas: on the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam in Route Packages IV, V and VI; on the area in southern North Vietnam near the DMZ in route Package I; on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos; and on trails within South Vietnam. (8)

The most lucrative targets were those found at the head of the transportation system around Hanoi. (9) These included railheads, major bridges, and repair and support facilities for the entire logistics systems. However, many of these targets were within the restricted and prohibited zones imposed by the Johnson administration around Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor and were thus off limits to attack for much of the war. (10)

Interdiction near the DMZ and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail proved more difficult. (11) Bombing the roads was ineffective due to the redundancy of road systems and the relative ease with which the roads were repaired. (12) For interdiction to be effective, convoys had to be attacked directly. Target identification was further complicated as the North Vietnamese adapted to traveling at night and in poor weather, while camouflaging their positions during the day.

The interdiction campaign in South Vietnam, Laos, and near the DMZ in North Vietnam instead relied heavily on airborne FACs for target identification and strike control. Three types of aircraft were used for these missions: slow moving, propeller-driven aircraft; armed transport aircraft; and jet fighters.

The 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) began deploying 22 Cessna O-1 Bird Dogs and 44 FAC pilots in June 1963, in support of the South Vietnamese Air Force. (13) By January 1965, the number of FAC pilots in Southeast Asia had grown to 144. An additional three TASSs were activated in March; by December, 224 FACs were in country. (14) With continued high demand for these airborne FACs their number swelled to 668 by October 1968, operating more than 324 O-1 and O-2A Super Skymaster aircraft in 5 TASSs. (14) In 1968 alone, these aircraft flew more than one-third of the total U.S. combat time in Vietnam, averaging over 29,000 flying hours a month. (15)

The single-engine O-1's slow speed proved both an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage lay in its slow speed and extended loiter capability, that allowed controllers ample time to observe enemy positions and control strikes. By June 1965, General Westmoreland divided South Vietnam into sectors that could be patrolled by the O-1 on a daily basis and all major ground units had assigned FACs. (16) Although always in high demand for CAS and visual reconnaissance missions, the O-1 had its limitations. Its slow speed delayed its response time, once alerted, it had limited target marking and night flying capability, and it was susceptible to enemy ground fire. The introduction of the two-engine O-2 in 1966 somewhat improved speed, target marking and night capability, but did little to enhance survivability. (17) The introduction of the OV-10 Bronco in 1968 brought in more firepower but, while the OV-10 was less susceptible to small arms fire, it was still vulnerable to larger antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). (18)

To increase tactical air's ability to support the U.S. Army at night, the Air Force introduced the first gunships to South Vietnam in 1965. The AC-47 Spooky was a C-47 fitted with either three six-barrel, 7.62 mm Gatling Guns or ten side-firing 30-caliber machine guns. The AC-47 had a long loiter time, could accurately fire from above 3,000 feet, and had flare dispensers. Spooky's potential was soon realized during CAS missions and its role expanded to include strike and flare missions along the Ho Chi Minh trail. (19) The success of the AC-47 led to the introduction of the AC-119K and to the development of the AC-130 by 1967. With an improved fire control system, increased firepower, and sensors for better night capability, the AC-130 proved to be the best platform for destroying trucks of the war. (20)

By spring 1967, the success of U.S. military activity in South Vietnam, Laos, and North Vietnam convinced Communist states that the North Vietnamese needed additional support. The Soviets stepped up shipments of SAMs, AAA, and small arms, making the O-1 and O-2 FAC and AC-130 operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and DMZ considerably more dangerous. (21)

Operation Commando Sabre and Misty FAC Operations in 1967

The influx of antiaircraft weapons into Route Package I and the Laos panhandle significantly increased the risk to U.S. FACs by May 1967. In response to the loss of two O-1s to SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, Seventh Air Force Commander, Lt. Gen. William W. Momyer, approved a test program to place FACs into the rear seat of fighter aircraft. (22) Their higher speed allowed fighters to operate in the high threat areas deemed too dangerous for the slow O-1s and O-2s. Codenamed Operation Commando Sabre, the initial test selected the F-100F, the two-seat version of the North American F-100 Super Sabre, to fly single-ship missions in the Route I and Tally He areas of the southern panhandle of North Vietnam. (23)

Under the call sign "Misty," the FACs mission was to "impede the enemy logistic flow within and through Route Package One/Tally Ho to the maximum extent possible." (24) They were also to "suppress enemy defenses as practicable to maintain a permissive environment for strike reconnaissance and FAC operations." (25)

On June 28, the Commando Sabre mission was assigned to Detachment 1 of the 416th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS), 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), stationed at Phu Cat AB, South Vietnam. (26) The 37th TFW consisted of two squadrons of F-100s. (27) Commando Sabre came with neither aircraft nor maintenance, relying instead on the 37th TFW to supply both.

Commando Sabre operations initially consisted of 16 to 18 pilots and a dedicated intelligence officer. (28) The pilots, including a commander and operations officer, were drawn primarily from the 37th TFW, with other F-100 units in Vietnam providing extra pilots on a temporary duty basis. (29) Initially, four FACs from the 504th Tactical Air Support Group were also included to instruct the F-100 pilots in FAC techniques. (30) The checkout program consisted of on-the-job training in the rear cockpit with an experienced Misty FAC in the front. The FAC would also demonstrate visual reconnaissance, strike control and battle damage assessment techniques. (31)

The lengthy operations at low altitude and over heavily defended territory made the Misty FAC mission extremely dangerous. Pilots were, therefore, solicited on a volunteer basis to perform the duty for 120 days or 60 missions, whichever came first. (32) All F-100 pilots selected for Misty had combat experience in Close Air Support missions in South Vietnam. Some also had prior FAC experience.

By the beginning of July, Commando Sabre Operations were scheduling two sorties a day, with a single air refueling per sortie. (33) Initially unopposed, Misty FACs began encountering small arms and AAA fire on July 5, after which enemy ground fire became common. (34) Through July and August, the Misty FACs continued to refine their tactics and sharpened their skills at visual reconnaissance and air strike control. They located truck parks, bridges, and air defense sites. In July alone, Misty FACs flew 82 missions and directed 126 strikes. (35) Although Misty FACs could locate and mark the targets, the inability of fighters to drop unguided bombs for direct hits on such hardened targets as AAA pieces reduced the overall extent of battle damage.

The first setback for the Misty FACs occurred on August 26, when Misty commander Major George "Bud" Day and Captain Corwin M. Kippenhan were conducting visual reconnaissance of an active SAM site twenty miles north of the DMZ. They were forced to eject when their F-100F was hit by 37mm flak. (36) While Kippenhan was rescued, Day was eventually captured. (37) From July 1967 to October 1968, Misty FACs flew 1,498 sorties over Tally Ho and Route Package I, losing 9 aircraft for a loss rate of 6.01 per thousand sorties. (38) Of the 18 pilots who ejected, 12 were rescued, 3 were captured, and 3 were listed as Missing in Action. (39) From November 1968 to May 1970, interdiction operations shifted to Laos, for which Misty FACs flew a total of 3,072 sorties, losing 11 aircraft for a loss rate of 3.58. (40) Of the 22 pilots who ejected, 18 were rescued and 4 were listed as Missing in Action. (41) Misty FAC missions had a loss rate more than three times higher than the wing's other F-100s, which conducted CAS and strike missions. (42)

The Tet Offensive and Misty FAC Operations in 1968

On January 30, 1968, the North Vietnamese commenced a conventional ground offensive into Vietnam during the traditional Vietnamese holiday of Tet. (43) U.S. air efforts focused throughout January and February on close air support in South Vietnam. (44) The elevated consumption rate of supplies incurred by the offensive forced the North Vietnamese to increase the number and size of their truck convoys. Though the northeast monsoon season severely hampered Misty interdiction efforts in January and February, March ushered in clearer skies and a higher interdiction success rate. On the single most successful Misty FAC mission, "The Great Truck Massacre" of March 20, Misty FACs located and controlled strikes on a large truck convoy, damaging or destroying some 79 trucks. (45)

Misty FACs' detailed knowledge of the terrain and North Vietnamese defenses in Route Package I and Tally He proved invaluable, not only for FAC operations, but for rescue efforts as well. Misty FACs assisted in many successful Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, locating the position of downed aircrew and suppressing enemy ground fire for rescue helicopters. (46) The versatility of the Misty FACs was further demonstrated in May and July when they began spotting for naval gun fire on fixed positions in Route Package I. (47)

The capability of the Misty FAC to locate and strike trucks did not go unnoticed by the North Vietnamese. By June 1968, Tally Ho and Route Package I were free of daylight enemy truck traffic. (48) On June 12-13, Misty FACs conducted two night sorties to test the F-100F for night visual reconnaissance. The results were positive and Seventh Air Force gave immediate approval for night operations in Route Package I. While Misty FACs flew 46 night sorties in July and August, regularly scheduled night missions were discontinued on August 21. (49) Continual difficulties in marking targets and conducting attacks, coupled with the risk of mid-air collision, plagued night strike control. Night sorties were then irregularly scheduled until completely halted in October. (50)

The success of Misty FAC operations was somewhat offset by the limited number of F-100F airframes available and the plans to remove the jets from Vietnam by 1970. In response, Seventh Air Force turned to another multi-role fighter to augment and eventually replace the F-100F. The first F-4s to join the Fast FAC mission were those of the 366th TFW at DaNang Air Base. Misty FACs flew F-4 pilots in the back seat of F-100Fs on upgrade and area orientation sorties. Select Misty FAC pilots also went to DaNang to fly with the F-4 "Stormy" FACs to complete their checkout. (51)

Another initiative, introduced in August 1968, was the Sun Valley Test, a hunter-killer concept capitalizing on the F-100 strikers already collocated with Operation Commando Sabre at Phu Cat. (52) The F-100 strikers carried a full load of bombs and flew at medium altitude, trailing several miles behind a faster and more maneuverable Misty FAC on visual reconnaissance at low altitude. Once targets were located, the F-100 strikers were already in position for a quick attack. While the concept showed great potential, the loss of two Misty aircraft compelled the Seventh Air Force to direct a review of operations. It was concluded that the North Vietnamese restriction on daylight movement had been forcing Misty FACs to increase their exposure time in locating targets. Seventh Air Force, therefore, imposed restrictions to reduce exposure time, which temporarily halted hunter-killer operations and reduced the overall effectiveness of Misty FACs in locating valid targets. (53)

November 1968 Bombing Halt and Misty FAC Operations in Laos in 1969

Misty FACs continued flying missions into Tally Ho and Route Package I until President Johnson issued the Executive Order of November 1, 1968, prohibiting bombing in North Vietnam. (54) Attacks were then shifted into Laos, redirecting the Misty FAC mission to visual reconnaissance of the southern areas of Steel Tiger in the Laotian panhandle. The decreased AAA threat in Laos further allowed Misty FACs to perform visual reconnaissance at lower altitude and to reintroduce hunter-killer tactics. (55)

February 1969 brought the additional task of photo reconnaissance to the mission. While Misty FACs had been using 35mm high-speed cameras in the rear cockpit to photograph potential target areas for some time, Operation Search formalized a working arrangement between Misty and the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. (56) This was a four-month long effort to familiarize RF-4C crews with Misty FAC tactics. (57)

During this period the 37th TFW at Phu Cat converted from the F-100 to the F-4. In May, Misty FAC operations deployed with the 416th TFS to Tuy Hoa Air Base where F-100 operations continued with the 31st TFW. (58) Misty's area of responsibility expanded in August from the southern areas of the Laotian panhandle to include the entire Steel Tiger region. (59) However, the number of daily missions scheduled was reduced from seven to five at the behest of the 31st TFW, which was in need of additional F-100F airframes to train incoming F-100 pilots. (60) In response to the overall lower experience level of the 31st TFW F-100 pilots, the Misty FACs were forced to reevaluate their own manning and training program. Roughly half of the pilots they began receiving were inexperienced. The inexperienced pilots flew with Misty FAC instructors and completed a FAC upgrade program prior even to becoming flight leads. (61)

In October 1969, the number of daily missions scheduled was further reduced from five to four and a theater-wide shortage of tanker support cut back the length of each mission. (62) Misty FAC time on station was reduced from ten hours a day, based on a six sortie schedule, to just under three and one-half hours with the four sortie schedule. A combination of good weather, increased ground activity, and the arrival of three replacement F-100Fs in early 1970 returned the daily schedule to six missions, but the lack of tanker support continued to limit on-station times. (63)

The loss of two aircraft on January 18 and 19, along with 8 hits on aircraft in just 19 days, brought about a change of tactics for Misty operations. Whereas visual reconnaissance had been conducted at altitudes as low as treetop level, Seventh Air Force raised the altitude to 4,500 feet Above Ground Level (AGL) and confined strafing to the support of rescue missions only. (64) This greatly reduced the ability to visually acquire targets and forced Misty FACs to rely more heavily on photographs shot by the back seater.

The additional loss of an aircraft in late March and heavy battle damage of aircraft in late April and early May compelled Seventh Air Force to review the entire Commando Sabre program. Given the limited number of available F-100F airframes and experienced pilots, Misty FAC operations were discontinued. The Commando Sabre Operation was officially terminated on May 14,1970. (65) Although the F-100F was no longer used, the F-4 continued flying Fast FAC missions through the end of the Vietnam War.

Legacy of the Misty FACs

The Fast FAC mission was introduced into the Vietnam War to fill a void for visual reconnaissance and strike control over areas of North Vietnam and Laos too heavily defended for the O-1 and 0-2 FACs. The fact that the Misty FACs conducted these missions for three years and that the Fast FAC mission expanded to the F-4 indicates that Air Force leaders in Southeast Asia considered the mission as successful. Twenty years later over the Persian Gulf, A-10 FACs and F-16 "Killer Scouts" continued the Misty tradition locating and destroying mobile targets. Likewise, over Kosovo A-10 and F-16 FACs used Misty tactics to attack the Serbian 3d Army.

The Misty FACs were a brave and courageous group of men who developed effective tactics to directly attack mobile targets over heavily defended territory. As important as their contributions were to tactical aviation has been the lasting influence on aviation and the U.S. Air Force. The 155 men who flew as Misty FACs produced several general officers including two Air Force Chiefs of Staff, Gens. Merrill A. "Tony" McPeak and Ronald "Ran" Fogleman. They also include a medal of honor winner Colonel "Bud" Day, and the first man to fly non-stop around the world, Dick Rutan.


(1.) Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1989), p. 60.

(2.) Ibid.

(3.) Ibid.

(4.) Ibid., p. 71. Johnson accepted Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's proposals, following a McNamara fact finding trip in July 1965.

(5.) Ibid., p. 70. Johnson increased U.S. troop strength to 82,000 in late April 1965 and in July further approved an increase to 175,000. John Schlight, The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965-1968 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988), p. 33.

(6.) Schlight, p. 42.

(7.) Eduard M. Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars-A Historical Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1994), p. 331.

(8.) William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars: WW II, Korea, Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, reprint, 1985), p. 174.

(9.) Ibid.

(10.) Ibid., p. 184.

(11.) Gary Lester, Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), pp. 151-57. Interdiction in southern Laos included operations Steel Tiger, Tiger Hound, Cricket, and Commando Hunt I-VII. Momyer, p. 217. Interdiction in Route Package I was known as Tally Ho.

(12.) Mark, p. 335.

(13.) Lester, p. 110.

(14.) Ibid., p. 114.

(15.) Ibid., p. 117.

(16.) Ibid., p. 121.

(17.) Ibid., p. 111.

(18.) Ibid., p. 133.

(19.) Schlight, p. 91.

(20.) Ibid., p. 237; Mark, p. 336; and Momyer, p. 211.

(21.) Lester, p. 129; Momyer, p. 217.

(22.) Ralph Rowley, The Air Force in Southeast Asia. FAC Operations 1965-1970, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1973), p. 173.

(23.) The F-100F was the two-seat variation of the single seat F-100C multi-role fighter-bomber. It was originally designed for use in initial F-100 training and for upgrade and orientation sorties. Operation Commando Sabre continually competed for the use of F-100Fs against the required upgrade sorties for newly arrived F-100C pilots.

(24.) Lester, p.170.

(25.) Extract, 7th AF OPORD (Draft) 504-67, June 28, 1967. Contained in History of Commando Sabre Operation July-September 1968, AFHRA K-WG-37 HI, document 1.

(26.) Rowley, p. 173.

(27.) 37th TFW History Jan-Mar 1968, vol. I, 17. In February, 1968 the wing expanded to three squadrons with the arrival of the 355th TFS.

(28.) The total number of pilots fluctuated over the three-year period, sometimes rising to as many as 22 or dropping to as low as 14, depending on the daily flying schedule. The schedule, in turn, was dependent on the number of F-100Fs available.

(29.) History of 37th TFW, Jul-Sep 67, 416th Detachment 1 Operation Commando Sabre Roster.

(30.) Rowley, p. 173.

(31.) Dick Durant, "Dick Durant's Observations," in Misty: First Person Stories of the F-100 Misty Fast FACs in the Vietnam War, (Austin, Tex.: The Misty FAC Foundation, 2002), Don Shepperd (ed.), p. 246. The Misty upgrade program consisted of five missions in the back seat, followed by additional missions in the front seat with a Misty instructor pilot in back. Checkout varied but, following the initial five backseat missions, pilots alternated between front and back seats for an additional 5-15 missions in training status until fully checked out.

(32.) Interview, author with Maj. Gen. Donald Shepperd, USAF (Ret.); History of 37th TFW Jul-September 1967, memo from Lt. Col. Donald Jones to Col. Edwin Schneider. These limits would later be extended, as evidenced by Capt. Dick Rutan being hit on his 104th mission after flying as a Misty from January 30-August 17, 1968. History of Commando Sabre Operation July-September 1968, History of 37th TFW, Jul-Sep 68, vol. II, p. 93.

(33.) History of 37th TFW, Jul-Sep 67, p. 20.

(34.) Rowley, p. 179.

(35.) Ibid.

(36.) History of 37th TFW, Jul-Sep 67, p. 23.

(37.) Major Day would eventually receive the Medal of Honor for his evasion efforts and conduct as a POW.

(38.) Summary of F-100 & F-4 Losses in the FAC/VR Role July 1967-July 1970, p. 7.

(39.) Ibid., table D2.

(40.) Ibid., p. 7.

(41.) Ibid., table D2.

(42.) History of 37th TFW, Jan-Mar 69, volume II, p. 21.

(43.) Schlight, p. 282.

(44.) Momyer, p. 319.

(45.) History of 37th TFW, Jan-Mar 68, p. 21.

(46.) History of 37th TFW, Jan-Mar 68, pp. 24-5.

(47.) History of 37th TFW, Jul-Sep 68, p. 25.

(48.) History of 37th TFW, Apr-Jun 68, p. 21.

(49.) Rowley, p. 181.

(50.) Ibid., p. 182.

(51.) History of Commando Sabre Operations, Jul-Sep 68, p. 40.

(52.) Ibid., p. 41.

(53.) Ibid., p. 17.

(54.) Ibid., p. viii.

(55.) History of Commando Sabre Operations Oct-Dec 1968, p. 11.

(56.) History of Commando Sabre Operations, Jan-Mar 69, p. 10.

(57.) History of Commando Sabre Operations, Apr-Jun 69, p. 16.

(58.) History of 37th TFW, Apr-Jun 69, p. 15.

(59.) History of Commando Sabre Operations, Jul-Sep 69, vii.

(60.) Ibid., p. 9.

(61.) Ibid., p. 5.

(62.) History of Commando Sabre Operations, Oct-Dec 69, p. 9.

(63.) History of Commando Sabre Operations, Jan-Mar 70, p. 8.

(64.) Ibid., p. 12.

(65.) History of Commando Sabre Operations, Apr-Jun 70, p. 13.

Lt. Col. Phil "Goldie" Haun is a command pilot with over 2,200 fighter hours in the A-10. He is currently the Director of Operations for the 355th Fighter Squadron at Eielson AFB, Alaska. Lieutenant Colonel Haun has also had A-10 operational flying assignments in England, South Korea, and Germany. During Operation Allied Force, the air war over Serbia, he served as the 81st Fighter Squadron weapons officer, flying 37 missions as a Forward Air Controller and Combat Search and Rescue. He has a bachelor's degree in engineering from Harvard University, a master's degree in economics from Vanderbilt University, and is a graduate of the USAF Weapons Instructor Course, Air Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. His publications include: "Close Ground Support-Lessons from Operation ALLIED FORCE," The Air Land Sea Bulletin, September 2000; "A-10's over Kosovo," Flight Journal Magazine, August 2001; "What Not to Take for Granted When Your Squadron Goes to War: A Weapons Officer's Top 10 List," USAF Weapons Review, Summer 2001; "Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A Construct for Air Operations in the 21st Century," Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 2001 and RAF Airpower Review, Winter 2001; "A-10 FACs over Kosovo" RAF Airpower Review, Spring 2003; and "Direct Attack: A Counterland Mission," Air and Space Power Journal Summer 2003. Lt. Col. Haun also has written a forthcoming book "A-10s over Kosovo," by Air University Press.
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Title Annotation:Forward Air Control
Author:Haun, Phil
Publication:Air Power History
Geographic Code:9VIET
Date:Dec 22, 2003
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