Missteps.

Despite the tragic deaths of eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu last month, the United States and UN efforts in Somalia have in fact accomplished a near miracle. Except for Mogadishu, peace and relative order have been established throughout what was once a land of anarchy and horrific suffering. A million lives may have been saved. Americans have every reason to be proud of this humanitarian achievement. Outrage over the killing of American soldiers by warlord Muhammad Farrah Aidid's clansmen is understandable, but loose talk about the "meaninglessness" of the deaths of soldiers engaged in this extraordinary enterprise strikes us as misguided, even opportunistic.

To be sure, there are legitimate questions about the scope and long-term purpose of the U.S. and UN presence in Somalia. When President George Bush sent American troops to Somalia in 1992 he defined the mission in strictly humanitarian terms. The U.S. was there to see that the starving were fed, not to impose a political solution on warring Somali factions. Bush rejected the UN's request to disarm the various clans and for an extended American military commitment to help build democracy in Somalia. Whatever the limitations of Bush's policy, it was reasonably clear.

Unfortunately that has not been the case for U.S. policy under Bill Clinton. In the aftermath of the killing of twenty-four Pakistani soldiers by General Aidid's men last June, the UN mission turned from peacekeeping into a manhunt. Apparently without much deliberation, the U.S. followed the UN's lead. But Aidid's position as a clan leader in the midst of what remains a barely dormant civil war made the UN's decision to label him a criminal dubious. In taking sides in this way, no matter how justifiably, the UN entangled itself in a situation it had neither the military might nor the political will to resolve.

Clinton has candidly admitted this mistake. As the subsequent softening of the U.S.'s attitude toward Aidid indicates - we are now ready to talk with him - only a political compromise that includes the clan leader will bring an end to the turmoil in Mogadishu. Turning away from any further military entanglement in Somalia is what Clinton seems to be aiming at in simultaneously sending more troops to Somalia as a defensive measure and announcing a March 31 pull-out date for U.S. forces. This policy, however, still leaves important questions unanswered.

Can what has been achieved in Somalia be sustained without U.S. involvement at some level? Clinton's commitment to a troop pull-out suggests that the U.S. is washing its hands of Somalia. But there are dangers in doing this, especially in a world that promises to present the U.S. with many similar political and humanitarian crises. If Clinton succumbs to the temptation to all but abandon U.S. support for the operation in Somalia, the situation there may quickly revert to open warfare. That would be a triple tragedy, fueling isolationist sentiment at home, widespread uncertainty about American resolve abroad, and almost certain deprivation for the Somalis. As the UN's limited but nevertheless significant recent success in conducting free elections in Cambodia suggests, patient international intervention can work, even amid political violence. Much has already been achieved in Somalia, but Clinton must forcefully make the case for continued U.S. participation at some level if those gains are to be preserved. Without the U.S. leading, the UN can do little.

The same ambiguity has marked Clinton's approach to Haiti. Indeed, events in Haiti, which blindsided the administration within days of the American deaths in Somalia, appeared to be an eerie replay of Clinton's reactive approach. Once again the administration was unprepared for the violent resistance of entrenched local powers, this time the Haitian military, to the UN-and OAS-brokered political arrangement for the return of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Clinton's subsequent initiation of a renewed naval blockade of Haiti as well as the seizure of Haitian assets in the U.S. are measured. Given the history of U.S.-Latin American relations, Clinton is right not to act unilaterally, but to build on the efforts of the Organization of American States and the UN to restore democracy to Haiti.

Foreign policy in the post-cold war world will take time and much effort to work out. Mistakes will be made. But President Clinton must begin to articulate for the American people, and for the international community, a coherent American position. American foreign policy must allow for decisive action but leave room for flexibility in an uncertain international environment. Until Clinton conveys a sound grasp of such an approach, his actions will appear merely ad hoc, and as such they will not generate the kind of domestic support necessary to sustain U.S. commitments in difficult and dangerous circumstances. Without that U.S. commitment, the world will only become a more violent and unstable place and any movement toward an effective multilateralism will be stillborn.