Military-technical problems and main principles in the development of mobile ACS for the Air Force.

Development of automated control systems (ACS) for Air Force troops and weapons is, on the whole, a complicated military-technical problem. Three main stages can be identified in their history: first, from the mid-1950s to the late 1980s; second, from the late 1980s to the late 1990s; third, from the late 1990s to the present day. No such thing as automated equipment to control forces and weapons was developed before the mid-1950s; there were just objective prerequisites for its development. (1)

During the first period, aerospace attack weapons emerged as one of the main means of warfare. Mass-scale employment of strike aviation, as planned within the framework of practically every concept the U.S. and NATO countries accepted in that period, required that the time consumed in preparing crews to destroy air targets and in controlling SAM systems and aircraft from one center be cut down. Non-automatized command and control methods could no longer effectively control forces and assets engaged in combat air operations, nor organize coordination between them. It was mostly for that reason that the foundations of automated control theory were drawn up in that period. (2)

In the late 1950s, a combined early warning, control and targeting system was handed down to command posts of fighter aviation divisions and regiments, and first automated control systems were devised for command posts of anti-aircraft missile troops. These enhanced efficiency, promptness, stability and secrecy in controlling forces and assets engaged in combat operations in the air. In that period, stability of control systems was achieved by the creation of protected permanent command and control posts, where mostly mobile automated equipment was installed. But the ACS stability requirement changed radically with the coming into being of space-based reconnaissance systems and precision "high-penetration" weapons. These became the main means of destruction where permanent CP at different C & C echelons were concerned, and that predetermined the search for new techniques in preserving stability of control over aviation and air defense.

In the second period, Air Force and Air Defense Troops got fourth-generation aircraft (MiG-29, Su-27, MiG-31), and multi-function automated control systems based on specialized third-generation computers were phased in at command posts of fighter aviation regiments. The coming of S-300 anti-air missile system necessitated an improvement in automated control systems, and so Air Defense Troops adopted new automated control systems designed for composite units of surface-to-air missile forces.

Automation of control over combat operations involving combined units and units of surface-to-air missile forces and aviation gave a boost to their efficiency and laid the basis for better coordination. But mostly mobile ACS for troops and weapons on the basis of third-generation computers were developed in that period.

In the third period, the main problem for Russia is how to organize anti-air defenses in the face of numerical and qualitative superiority in forces and weapons distinguishing the potential adversary. The aerospace sphere becomes the main sphere of warfare.

Given the deficit of time for situational evaluation and decision-making, massive commitment of forces and assets for combat operations in the air required that those processes be automated already at the C & C operational echelon. It is for this reason that development of operational-level ACS started on the basis of new-generation technologies, and that made it possible to considerably expand the scope of their objectives. But even those systems, though originally mobile, failed to measure up to the highly fluid character of modern combat operations and the wide-scale use of PW.

The coming of new types of weapons and the change in the nature of warfare urged a substantial revision of requirements for would-be ACS. Conversion to mobile air defenses is one of possible solutions to the problem of controlling aviation and air defense troops and forces in such wars. This kind of defense arrangement provides for consistence in addressing national air defense tasks with the use of all available aviation and air defense forces and assets in combination with maneuver. (3)

Thus, modern local wars and armed conflicts confirm that ACS mobility is the main quality capable of assuring a control system's stability and survivability in present and future wars against the background of broad-scale enemy use of PW.

Mobile ACS are in no way different from fixed systems in their number of information handling and control problems. The main factors responsible for this list of problems are the following: fundamental impossibility of complete formalization of the creative component in C & C process; restricted computing capacities of automation equipment systems (AES); impossibility of developing an automatic command and control system on account of personal responsibility of officers at C & C agencies and posts for decisions they accept (i.e., the legal aspect imposes restraints of its own on automation of command and control).

The same factors are behind military-technical problems involved in the designing of mobile ACS for the Air Force. The main factors are these: determination of the composition and designation of an ACS, and an order for interaction between its elements; rational distribution of control functions between members of combat (operational) crew and automation equipment; organization of coordination between members of combat (operational) crew and automation equipment as they address information handling and control problems; algorithmization of control problems for AES; automation of air data retrieval, handling and transmission processes. (4)

As is common knowledge, Air Force ACS should correspond to the existing organizational structure of forces and accepted control methods. However, automation equipment, once introduced, can in turn influence the organizational structure, aid an increase in the numerical strength of subordinate forces and assets that are controlled from a single command post (CP), control element (CE) or vectoring post (VP), alter subordination order, and induce emergence of new control methods. Therefore, in order to choose a rational structure for Air Force ACS, an all-embracing efficiency analysis is needed for all variants of a control system's construction.

The problem of rational distribution of control functions between CP combat (operational) crews and ACS automation equipment is closely linked with human thinking modeling methodology, a thing of fundamental importance in cybernetics. Although computers can reproduce separate aspects of human thought processes, they are characterized by a basic limitation linked to the fact that the reproduction of those processes is possible solely at the level of formal logic. Computers convert information in keeping with their in-built laws of formal logic. Meanwhile, a commander, as he addresses some or other control problem, is based not only on rules of formal logic but a process of combat operations as a whole, complete with its indeterminacy and contradictoriness. And that is something that no machine can rise up to. It is only man who is able, while controlling troops (forces) and weapons, to take into account such factors as the morale of friendly troops, to crack the enemy's plan, etc. And this is the reason why the C-in-C (commander) is fully responsible for the outcome of an operation (engagement).

Thus, while sharing control functions between combat (operational) crews and automation equipment, we must in the first place proceed from the assumption that automation equipment should be a working tool in the hands of C-in-C (commander) and combat (operational) crews, one that provides them with exhaustive situational information and thus enables correct (well-grounded) and timely decision-making.

The principle in organizing coordination between a CP combat (operational) crew and automation equipment is that the first to be automated in a set of information-handling and control problems are problems of mass nature that lend themselves to formalization and require performance of a large number of computing and logical operations within a limited timeframe. Things taken into account, when an expedient degree of automation of some or other problems is sought to be established, are relative efficiency in their handling by man and computer, economic costs, and available reserves or time.

The main information-handling and control problems that Air Force ACS is to automate can be conditionally divided into the following: calculated problems requested by CE combat (operational) crews (preparation of data for evaluation of general air situation, navigator calculations, evaluation and forecasting of radiation situation, etc.); combat control problems regarding separate assets or lower-level CP (CE, VP) within the dynamics of combat operations (target allocation for attacking air weapons, etc.); vectoring problems that direct weapons (for example, interceptor planes) to air targets; and coordination problems.

Results of calculated problems appear on display units and serve as auxiliary material for combat crews during decision-making. Computer target allocation recommendations are also presented on display units for combat (operational) crews to estimate and adjust. It is envisaged that they may interfere in target allocation process by setting certain algorithmic parameters, altering algorithmic logic, or introducing additional restrictions with regard to certain targets. Target designation is usually automatic and accords with approved target allocation variant. Guidance commands for interceptor fighter planes are usually automatic if supervised by combat control (guidance) officers. Coordination problems may be addressed with the help of automation equipment or directly by combat crews depending on the degree of automation of CP (CE).

Specific ACS may automate all or part of the above problems in keeping with tasking designation of CP (CE, VP), their traffic capacity and strength of subordinate troops (forces) and assets.

Algorithmization of control problems consists in developing mathematical models, methods, algorithms and programs that correspond to those problems. A system of formal rules is devised in the process, which unambiguously define an ACS' behavior and control commands it generates in any situation.

Automation of data retrieval, handling and transmission processes is reduced to developing methods for automatic detection of target-reflected signals at radar output, trajectory coordination algorithms, trajectory tracking algorithms, and algorithms for combination of data from several sources; it is also reduced to construction of reliable, jamproof systems to transmit discrete information.

The main means for dealing with the said military-technical problems involved in the development of Air Force mobile ACS are likely to be the following:

* further development of the foundations of C & C theory and verification of its main points during military and command-and-staff exercises, command-and-staff military games, as well as with the help of mathematical modeling methods geared to combat operations of Air Force combined units in operations;

* improvement in the organizational structure of C & C system; upgrading of organizational forms, techniques and methods of combat (operational) crews, technical personnel at CP (CE, VP), and staff officers;

* development and introduction of highly efficient control automation software;

* pursuance of military-scientific investigations throughout the entire life cycle of an ACS in order to obtain information necessary for acceptance of well-grounded decisions on the designing of new and modernization of effective systems.

A wrong or insufficiently grounded decision accepted at some stage in the life cycle of an ACS will impact on all subsequent stages. Decisions accepted at first two stages in the life cycle are of particular importance. The reference is to pre-design stage (the mapping of ways and means and validation of ACS characteristics in the process of applied research), as well as to design stage (ACS development proper, including subsystems and elements, in the process of appropriate R & D). The quality and degree of validation of decisions accepted at the said stages determine employment efficiency, cost and operational characteristics of Air Force ACS in course of development.

Specifically organized, continuous scientific-technical support of ACCS* during its entire life cycle is the crucial condition if high quality of the above works is to be achieved.

The totality of problems addressed in scientific-technical support of ACCS may be represented as two big interconnected groups: scientific-technical and organizational-technical problems.

The former group of problems aims to obtain investigative scientific data necessary for well-grounded decisions of operational-tactical, technical, military-economic and organizational nature; also it is meant to give information and methodological support for measures intended to achieve, secure and maintain the necessary ACCS quality and for other measures in all types of support throughout a system's entire life cycle.

The latter group of problems is directly associated with organizational-technical measures in coordinated modification of an ACCS' state from the start of the investigative and validation stage to the final day of its operation.

Generally, the scientific-technical support of an ACCS calls for scientific investigations and organizational-technical measures connected with quality management and efficient employment in accordance with its tasking designation.

Realization of the main ACCS construction principles during design and development process is an important additional prerequisite in a highly efficient Air Force ACCS. In this context, operational-tactical requirements for a system may serve as operational-tactical principles of its construction. As I see it, the main of these are the following.

First. ACCS' capabilities should correspond to the organizational structure and combat capabilities of troops (forces) and weapons, as well as to the composition and structure of C & C system. This principle reflects the evolutionary nature of control systems. Automated control, in turn, has a reverse influence on the organizational structure of forces, as well as command elements and posts.

Second. C-in-C (commander) keeps his leading role in the process of controlling troops (forces) and combat weapons. This principle reflects the necessity of creating automated, not automatic, command and control systems, the intentional restriction of the measure of automation, and preservation of the dominant human influence in man-machine control arrangement. Man should always be in charge of decision-making and selection of the optimal (rational) plan of combat operations from all possible variants.

Third. Handiness of automated equipment where officers at control elements and posts are concerned. This principle reflects the necessity of creating conditions for maximum intellectual efficiency of officers operating automation equipment.

Fourth. Preservation of the main algorithms in the work of commanders, staffs, and control elements and posts at the stage of introduction of automated equipment. This principle implies continuity in work methods of officers at different-level control elements and posts during a transition from non-automated to automated command and control; it also implies reasonable standardization of the algorithms of their handling of automated workstations.

Fifth. Rational combination of centralized and decentralized control, and a possibility of rapid change-over from one to the other and from automated to non-automated control and back. This principle reflects ultimate reliability of ACCS and inadvisability of complete automation at all levels in the activities of all officers at control elements and posts.

Sixth. Stability, adaptability and self-organization of ACCS in line with changes in internal and external parameters of its functioning. This principle implies the following: development and coordinated employment of principal, back-up and reserve ACCS systems; a possibility of controlling troops (forces) and weapons over one level of command (and in certain cases, over several levels); a possibility of redistributing control functions between command posts (control elements) and vectoring posts within same control echelon, and in certain cases, of handing them down to lower-level CP (CE) and VP; a possibility of modifying ACCS configuration if troops (forces) are reassigned to new command, or if some of its subsystems and elements turn inoperative.

Generally, ACCS general systemic construction principles are formulated on the basis of expert judgment, similar development experience, and existing views on an ACCS in process of being designed. ACCS designing practice indicates that two-level systematization of principles proves sufficient, which implies isolation, at first level, of a group of principles due to underlie the entire system (or its subsystems), and at second level, a group that includes specific principles of construction of different types of ACCS support.

The ACCS main general systemic construction principles are systemic nature, openness (development), compatibility, standardization (unification), adaptability and efficiency.

Systemic principle is that decomposition should establish such ties between a system's structural elements as will secure its integrity and interaction with other systems both horizontally (at one level) and vertically (between levels).

Development (openness) principle is that ACCS should be created with regard for a possibility of replenishment and renovation of its functions and composition that will not interfere with its functioning. This principle reflects a possibility of modifying ACCS, which may be reduced to both replacement of its separate subsystems and elements and addition or withdrawal of any other subsystems and elements.

Compatibility principle is that information interfaces should be realized in an ACCS, which will permit it to interact with other control systems in accordance with the established rules. This principle rejects autonomous development of various subsystems and elements for ACCS, no matter how high their quality indicators. The compatibility principle naturally supplements the former two principles, securing chances for the development of new and better systems on the basis of existing ones.

Standardization (unification) principle is that type, unified and standardized elements, design solutions, applied software packages, complexes and components should be rationally used in ACCS. This principle also applies to all main types of ACCS support (technical, information, linguistic, mathematical, software).

Standardization and unification are always linked to an increase in excessiveness of a system's resources. The higher the standardization level, the greater the excessiveness, with excessiveness costs rising in line with system complexity growth. Therefore, "moderate" (reasonable) standardization and unification are practiced in ACCS development.

Adaptability principle is that it is necessary to develop an ACCS capable of modifying its parameters in line with changing characteristics of external environment. Adaptive behavior increases a system's survivability and stability.

The above general systemic principles can equally be applied to subsystems and elements that comprise an ACCS. This statement follows logically from a possibility of presenting each subsystem or element as a system in its own right at a lower general level of consideration. Differences may only consist in importance of this or that principle as applied to some or other subsystem.

The high level of generality of the said principles also enables them to be categorized as separate types of ACCS support. But a better idea about each support type can be made by amending the general systemic principles with some specific principles.

As regards technical support, the specific ACCS designing principles are sufficient efficiency, coordination of traffic capacity and reliability of elements, building-block approach and evolution.

Sufficient efficiency principle imposes such an approach to the choice or construction of technical equipment complexes (TEC) as is based on requirements for timely information handling, that is, introduces restrictions on minimal computer power (performance) of technical devices.

Respect for the principle of coordination of traffic capacity and reliability of elements in TEC creates conditions for equally intense operation of equipment, facilitates technical compatibility, and boosts efficiency of TEC in a system.

Building-block principle implies construction of TEC as a totality of functionally and structurally complete devices, blocks and units. Functional completeness facilitates modification of TEC and its elements during the upgrading (modernization) of ACCS. In effect, isolation of certain subsystems within technical support (central computer complex, display TEC, data transmission TEC, documenting TEC, single time TEC, etc.), as well as communication of a measure of autonomy to TEC means practical implementation of functional building-block approach. It is well to keep in mind that, usually, building-block approach, like standardization and unification, is linked to greater excessiveness in systems and complexes. It is lawful, therefore, that one should pose and address the problem of defining the optimal level in building-block approach.

Evolutionary principle implies construction of TEC on the basis of consistent automation of the elements in a control system's organizational structure. This technical support designing principle does not reject its alternative, revolutionary development, which usually involves much greater costs and occasionally may disrupt requirements for continuity of control. The importance of this principle is the higher the greater the complexity (size) of an ACCS, or the bigger the degree of sensitivity of functions it performs.

As regards software (SW), the specific designing principles are the following: modularity, extensibility, predictability, ergonomic quality, compatibility, and functional excessiveness.

Modularity principle implies division of a big software complex into separate parts that are susceptible to analysis, something that facilitates development of separate programs on the whole, but requires good organization of design work.

Extensibility principle is determined by ACS dynamics. It enables the use of existing SW as a basic system in designing better systems.

Predictability principle means that existing programs should react in a definite way to any actions by officers manning control elements and posts.

Ergonomics principle (convenience in use) implies designing of a friendly and intuitively understandable interface for user-ACCS interaction. This principle takes into account man's main psychological and physiological factors involved in control activities as part of an ACCS.

Compatibility principle implies a possibility of using existing software in a different computer environment.

Functional excessiveness principle implies designing of such software assets as will contain several variants of software that realize the same functions with different parameters. The principle can give the user the choice of one of the variants of software realizing operational algorithms in accordance with the conditions in which an ACCS is used. In effect, the functional excessiveness principle realizes the adaptability principle as applied to software.

The peculiarities of information support consist in a broad use of the modern database (DB) construction concept. The dominant role of DB in the properties of this type of support enables one to make do with a consideration of its specific construction principles alone, the main of which are arbitrariness of data structures, minimization of information base, unity of information base, and independence of information base from specialized software (SSW).

Arbitrariness of data structures reflects developers' wish to create DB invariant to data structure, i.e., bases capable of storing and retrieving structurally unrestricted data. But in a number of cases this requirement may prove unrealizable. For this reason, the degree of its categoricity is diminished through introduction of final nomenclature of structures of stored data. In this context, DB are provided with capacities for generating more complex data structures on the basis of stored data.

Minimization of information base aims at reducing data amounts through elimination of excessiveness. The ultimate case of minimization is where data are stored in one copy. A fully non-excessive information base achieves, aside from obvious advantages in cutting access time and required memory amounts, the maximal simplicity of data actualization algorithms. It should be kept in mind that data excessiveness reduction is accompanied by a slide in DB stability, which means that it is difficult and occasionally impossible to restore deleted information in a distributed database.

Consequently, the strengthening of some properties and weakening of others during a shift in the degree of excessiveness of data in a base are factors that impel one to pose and address the problem of defining the optimal level of excessiveness. The minimization principle, therefore, should be perceived as a requirement to look for a minimally acceptable data excessiveness level, rather than absolutely.

The principle of unity of information base becomes topical in ACCS oriented to a sufficiently large number of different users. The principle rejects a common base in the form of a simple totality of particular bases. Data overlapping is inevitable in this case, or unintentional excessiveness, and that comes into conflict with information base minimization principle. Like every system, a unified information base should be seen as an integral totality of interconnected elements.

Respect for the principle of independence of information base from SSW secures, in a sense, universality of information base, for it becomes possible to use it in conjunction with different SSW versions. Given respect for this principle, modification of programs of separate users and reorganization of information base become independent procedures. As a result, prerequisites arise for independent development of information support and SSW.

NOTES:

1. V.P. Sinitsyn, "VVS: problemy stanovleniya i razvitiya," Voennaia mysl', 1998, No. 4, pp. 4-8.

2. Protivovozdushnaya oborona strany (1914-1995): Voenno-istoricheskiy trud, VU PVO, Tver, 1998.

3. A.P. Korabelnikov, Razrabotka teoreticheskikh osnov sozdaniya mobilnoi protivovozdushnoi oborony, VKA PVO, Kalinin, 1991.

4. P.K. Altukhov, Osnovy teorii upravleniya voiskami (silami), VAGSH, Moscow, 1980.

V.I. KOLESNICHENKO

Candidate of Technical Sciences

* Scientific-technical support of ACCS means a set of scientific, technical and organizational measures aimed to timely validate requirements for ACS, and secure efficient development, testing, operation, and identification of chances for its improvement and modernization, as planned and executed by customer in close cooperation with ACCS user and developer.