Military urbanistics and military geography.

A retrospective analysis of how Russian and foreign military specialists viewed the problem of struggle for cities and other settlements in forecasted wars, as well as a detailed study of the modern state of possible theaters of operations shows that the military science pays unjustifiably little attention to the investigation of military geographical aspects of urbanization.*

The case in point is studying an entire stratum of military geographical knowledge about settlements, for which purpose it makes sense, in my view, to single it out from military geography as a separate subject, military geourbanistics, with the aim of pursuing more profound scientific investigations in this area. The necessity of this approach is confirmed by an analysis of combat practices in line units, the content of current guideline documents, views, and ideas on the training and employment of armed forces in the leading world countries (U.S.A., Germany, France, UK, and others), as well as forecasts for how the future military conflicts on any scale will be started and conducted. In my view, the struggle for cities and other settlements becomes the dominant aspect in 21st-century armed warfare, as is evident from the experience of wars and armed conflicts that happened in the last few decades (Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti, etc). This, in turn, is due to demographic tendencies and the growing rates of urbanization both in Russia and the rest of the world.

As is common knowledge, the fight for a city is made up of combat operations waged on the far and near approaches to it and directly within city limits. The latter occur in three spheres (surface, high-rise and subsurface), and, as demonstrated by combat experience, are distinguished by extreme complexity, being accompanied with considerable destruction, fires and loss of life. This complexity aggravates owing to the military cadres possessing a low level of appropriate knowledge both in the area of military theory and the methodology of practical preparation of forces for urban operations.

That the command and rank-and-file personnel of the Armed Forces have little military geographical knowledge in the area of urbanization is a factor that holds the development and perfection of a common theory of armed warfare for different forms of settlements (Table). In essence, not a single military theory either in the West or in Russia considers in sufficient depth and detail the matters of fighting for cities and other settlements in operations. Neither are they, in practical terms, taken into account in all our mathematical models of military (combat) actions. Even the works of such prominent military theorists as W. Mitchell, J. Fuller, F. W. von Mellenthin, A.A. Svechin, G. Douhet, V.A. Trifonov, V.K. Triandafillov, L.R. von Eimannsberger and others evince a declarative approach to this problem. Two extremes are revealed in this context: either declarations at the level of strategy or a slide into tactics of urban combat actions. Nothing is said, however, about operations, even though history of wars can provide sufficiently many examples of defensive operations (to keep cities), offensive operations (to seize cities), and sealing-off operations.

The lack of a single theory of urban fighting leads to a situation where these matters find no embodiment in plans and programs of military organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. For example, weapon programs do not envisage any R & D on and supply to the army of specialized military equipment, weapons and other appliances intended for combat use in urban conditions in different spheres (surface, high-rise and subsurface). The Armed Forces lack specialized military units whose TO & E would enable successful warfare for different forms of settlements. Besides, combat training levels are negatively affected by the absence of appropriate plans and programs for training command personnel, staffs and forces, specifically where training for actions within high-rise and subsurface structures is concerned. Neither are there any specialized training centers whose equipment would permit to drill combat teamwork and coordination in urban conditions at the level of not only elements but also military units, combined units, and staffs at different echelons.

Meanwhile, each new armed conflict in this or that region of the world makes military specialists watch closely precisely those stages in armed confrontation where the struggle for cities and other settlements predominates. And almost every conflict reveals huge differences between peacetime military theories and direct combat experience. This means that a discrepancy arises between the theory and practice of military art. It comes about by reason of military specialists wrongly forecasting the nature of future wars and underestimating problems of armed struggle for cities and other settlements, which to a considerable extent is a consequence of the shortage of knowledge about military geourbanistics. All this, in turn, tends to confront the command personnel with considerable difficulties when they have to accept a plan for an operation (engagement) and control subordinated forces in urban conditions.

Singling out from military geography a new subject, military geourbanistics, and creating an appropriate handbook for the Armed Forces will in many respects, as I see it, aid a successful solution of the said problems in the area of military art theory as applied to combat operations in urban conditions.

The subject of study in military geourbanistics is the supporting framework of settlement, all available settlements in the world, their organization from the point of view of military art, as well as political, economic-geographical, historical and military significance of each of these. Using the data of natural, social and military sciences, military geourbanistics estimates their influence on an engagement, operation and a war as a whole, and studies characteristics of different settlements and their peculiarities which may come to the fore in the course of possible armed conflicts. This knowledge will enable military specialists, figuratively speaking, to speak the same language instead of inventing various interpretations and terms like "economic region," "architectonics," etc. It will make it possible to correctly estimate areas of operations (engagements) and forecast the course of combat actions. The command personnel and staffs will be able to more competently prepare an operation (engagement) and efficiently control subordinated forces during combat operations on the far and near approaches to cities and other settlements and directly in urban conditions. Aside from that, knowing specific characteristics of settlements will play an important part in their purposeful military organization. It will also serve as a basis for various military theories, and R & D on specialized military equipment and weapons adapted to urban fighting.

While studying geography in this or that part of the world from the military point of view, one should right away concentrate on the economic-geographical aspect. The economic basis of any advanced state (group of states) is its supporting framework in the shape of a system of cities and other settlements and a communication infrastructure (airports, sea and river ports, roads) that links them. Therefore, in estimating an area of upcoming military operations, a strategic sector or an operational zone, one should primarily study the road network and its junctions where, as a rule, cities and other settlements were built. It is particularly important to estimate them from the point of view of unimpeded movement of military units, or movement forward of reserves or second echelons towards a chosen (threatened) sector in order to exploit success or build up efforts, deploy or relocate rear services, etc. As is evident from combat practice, whoever controls cities and other settlements, a road network and junctures of lines of communication becomes the "king of the maneuver" on the battlefield and is certain to gain success in an operation (engagement) and in warfare as a whole. During the Great Patriotic War, for example, the cities of Kiev, Kharkov, Stalingrad, Tula, and Rostov furnished a support base for troops engaged in defensive operations due to their being major junctions of lines of communication (a road network in the corresponding area) and being organized as fortified localities. Located in coastal sectors, Odessa, Sevastopol, Kerch and Novorossisk were in addition naval bases whose uninterrupted functioning made it possible to preserve maritime lines of communication and pursue naval operations.

Practically all wars in human history predominantly took place in densely populated and geographically most accessible areas of the planet. From time immemorial, populated localities were an arena of active combat actions. It is not accidental therefore that many military specialists categorize struggle for cities as a particularly difficult and specific nature of armed warfare. True enough, some of them, like A.A. Svechin and V.K. Triandafilov in Russia and Mitchell, Fuller and others in the West believed that cities in the course of a war could be objects of political importance alone or that the struggle for them could only be tactical in nature. But those assertions are overturned by war experience, particularly that of World War II, when cities were of differing importance and accordingly the objectives of struggle for them were tackled not only at the tactical but also operational and strategic levels. Quite often, insufficient knowledge about the economic-geographical aspect and underestimation of many factors of strategic, operational-strategic and operational importance placed a negative impact on efforts to achieve operation aims.

Under modern circumstances, the importance of investigating all aspects related to the efficient use of troops in the struggle for cities and other settlements is due to a number of reasons.

* First, there are cities and other settlements in all theaters of operations, and, therefore, the struggle for them will certainly be a crucial component of armed confrontation.

* Second, cities are different in status, economic development level, size of territory, population numbers and geographical location. All these details must be known and comprehensively taken into account during organization and conduct of combat operations.

* Third, all cities and other settlements are linked by different roads and other lines of communication and are major junctions of communication lines, whose capture is indispensable if success is to be attained in armed warfare and war goals are to be achieved.

* Fourth, all cities and other settlements take part in a country's economy. They are sources of vitality and, accordingly, sources of supplies for the armed forces. This is why combat capability of troops (forces) will in many respects depend on their retention and protection from air attacks.

If one analyzes industrial geography, it is easy to see that all principal production capacities are located in cities and other populated localities. Production growth inevitably results in a growing number of different settlements, areas they occupy, and populations living in them. For example, the share of urban dwellers reached 73% in Russia in 1991. Approximately the same indicators characterize other advanced countries (United States 76.2%, Brazil 78.2%, Japan 77.6%, Germany 86.5%, UK 89.5%, France 72.8%). (1) Moreover, a considerable portion of industry in those countries and consequently of urban populations is engaged in making military products. Cities are the main source of manpower acquisition, equipment, weapons and materiel (fuel and lubricants, medicines, etc.) for the armed forces. They are also centers of military educational systems.

The economic factor can also become a geo-economic one, since many elements of the economy of one structure are, as a rule, linked but more often than not find themselves in different cities and other big populated localities at distances ranging from several hundred to several thousand kilometers from each other. The annihilation during a war of two or three components factories may lead to a principal plant cutting output of equipment and weapons the armed forces need or even downing tools altogether. A similar result is achieved by the demolition of a network of roads linking cities and other populated localities, where those plants are located.

This idea found an expression in a theory conceived by the Italian General G. Douhet and was tested in practice in the course of World War II and subsequent local wars. In January 1943, a conference of U.S. and British heads of state in Casablanca accepted a plan for a joint bombing onslaught on Germany (Point-blank), which was developed in detail by the British-American joint chiefs of staff in May 1943. (2) The plan envisaged destruction or long-term incapacitation of nearly 60 enemy military industrial facilities. All targets were in six groups: submarine-building shipyards and submarine bases; aircraft factories; ball-bearing plants; synthetic fuel plants and oil refineries; synthetic rubber factories; plants manufacturing military vehicles.

In accordance with the Douhe theory, the plan was calculated for a strike at the heart of Germany and sought to avoid blood-letting battles on the Western front. During preparations for Operation Overlord and in its course, the Allies subjected to intense bombing attacks lines of communication and rear services of German forces in France, while simultaneously attacking major cities in Germany (Berlin, Hamburg, etc.), where the majority of the civilian population was concentrated. By bombing the cities they also tackled the operational-strategic objective of moral and psychological intimidation of civilians. But the Allies failed to accomplish the strategic task of Germany's military-economic annihilation. The military-industrial targets accounted for a mere 18% of the total bomb tonnage dropped on Germany during the entire war. That was unable to inflict any serious damage on Germany's military industrial facilities since they were perfectly well prepared for war and protected from air impacts. Many were at all hidden under ground. (3) U.S. specialists themselves came to the conclusion that the attacks of allied bomber aviation failed to bring a decisive impact to bear on Germany's ability to produce the needed amounts of military products.

And yet the attacks resulted in the Anglo-American aviation gaining strategic air supremacy on the Western front. It managed to considerably disrupt the enemy's lines of communication and control system in France, and create favorable conditions not only for the allied landing in Normandy but also for successful offensive operations later.

Hence it follows that cities and the road network that links them will acquire a double-purpose nature, both civilian and military. Since it is very difficult to determine exactly which facility is an exclusively military one, this enables an attacker to justify his actions before the world community. In fact, all plants manufacturing military equipment and weapons form part of a country's military-industrial complex. Along with a road network that secures its operation, they form a state's military-industrial base. It is not accidental, therefore, that the U.S. FM-106 defines destruction of an enemy nation's military industrial base as one of the strategic aims of military operations. As is evident from an analysis of late 20th-century-early 21st-century events, the U.S. military-political leadership pursues precisely this goal in armed conflicts in the last decades.

In covering military-geographical aspect of urbanization, one should pay due attention to urbanization's geographical conceptual apparatus. During a protracted historical period, mankind gradually spread over the territory of the globe, developing ever new areas. By the present time almost all spaces fit for human living and economic undertakings are settled. But the concept "territorial fitness" is a historical category. Certain areas that were unfit for living at the previously existing levels of production forces are being successfully developed at the present time. In many respects this is aided by scientific and technical progress, specifically the use of new energy sources that make it possible to modify the natural environment and adapt it to economic activities.

Rapid development of urbanization is among most important and comprehensive global problems of concern to mankind. It is displayed in the rapid growth of urban population numbers (at rates double the figure of population growth as a whole); a rise in the number of towns and their size; a dramatic surge in the share of cities (over 100,000 inhabitants), particularly cities with million-strong populations; formation of urban agglomerations which occasionally merge into colossal urbanized entities that strike one by the scale of concentration of population and diversity of types of activities concentrated in them; immense "ebb-and-flow" pendulum-like population movements against the background of big city centers. This results in the creation of a specific, very intensive and deeply interpenetrated urbanized environment. The purpose is to improve the life of the population, let industry function more efficiently, develop other types of human activities, and to secure society-nature interaction. From the geographical point of view, the essence of the urbanization process consists precisely in forming this specific environment, a process that has a profound impact on all aspects of human life, human behavior, production development, interaction with nature, and accumulation of material values enabling society to move forward while defending it militarily. (4) From the point of view of warfare, this environment affords broad opportunities for satisfying the main needs of the armed forces, brings considerable influence to bear on all spheres of military activity, and is of much importance for military science.

A state's urbanization means its transformation into an urbanistic structure that has cells of highly urbanized environment capable of influencing decisively the entire course of national economic and cultural development, and in case of war--the course and outcome of military operations. In this sense, it is important to remember that it has a beginning and an end.

Urbanization's beginning implies that there is a center, a pioneer of urbanization and active factors helping to create its material foundation and stimulating its development. Militarily, the defense of this center is certain to be needed, because it is the source supplying troops with everything they need.

Urbanization's end can be seen as the attainment of such a state where the cells of highly urbanized environment, along with their direct influence zones, actually cover a state's economically active territory. In this sense, almost the entire population lives either in big populated localities (cities), agglomerations and megalopolises, or in their direct influence zones. To protect or overtake them, a much greater number of troops will be needed than under ordinary circumstances. It will also be necessary to look for new methods and means of urban warfare.

Any society, let alone future society, must have a harmonious settlement pattern. Therefore it becomes necessary already today not only to achieve this harmony but also to organize reliable protection of all forms of settlements in a putative military conflict.

For better study and investigation of urbanization processes, it makes sense to introduce into geourbanistics two new notions: "urbanistic structure" and "territorial-urbanistic structure."

Urbanistic structure of a state (country) is a correlation (in number of inhabitants) of urban settlements of different size. To a decisive degree this indicator depends on the share of big cities.

Territorial-urbanistic structure enables judgment on how a country's territory is served by big cities and on contrasts of urbanization. To characterize it, the following factors are of particular importance: correlation and reciprocal position of territories with a different degree, trends (character) and rates of urbanization; scale of development and distribution of the highly urbanized cells; place of big cities and agglomerations in a country's urban frame. Territorial-urbanistic structure reflects the main traits of the territorial structure of economy and puts its characteristic features into bold relief. For example, the CIS territorial-urbanistic structure is characterized by the following indicators: urban clots converge on sea and oceanic coasts (Baltic and Black seas, Arctic and Pacific oceans); cities and other settlements concentrate in basins of major rivers (Volga, Dnepr, Dvina, Amur, and others), in mining industry areas (Donetsk, Kuzbass, Soligorsk), in the midst of capital cities (Minsk, Kiev, Vilnius, Moscow, Tashkent, etc), as well as in areas where historically existing trade routes intersect (Lvov, Smolensk, Kharkov).

As territorial-urbanistic structure develops, the economic-geographical situation of big cities improves constantly, which in turn has a positive influence on organizational development and advancement of the armed forces. A really advanced and highly urbanized environment is not a city; it is a space. As a nucleus it includes a big center, but it also has a bigger size and diversity by comparison with it. At the same time, this space cannot be exceedingly big: it is limited by population movements. Hence it follows that the highly urbanized environment receives its fullest expression in the shape of major urban agglomerations. (5) Since these forms of settlements are coming to play an increasingly important role in the development of human society, their investigation is a most important objective facing military geourbanistics. Urban agglomeration is a compact spatial group of settlements (mostly urban) that forms a single whole due to intensive production, labor, cultural, everyday and recreational ties. (6) In the overwhelming majority of world countries, urban agglomerations are the key forms of settlement and territorial economic organization. Their formation is an objective process stimulated by the development of economy's branch and territorial structures.

It is important to stress that an urban agglomeration is not only a totality of settlements but also the space between them. It is a highly urbanized territory with a dense network of urban and rural populated localities linked by a joint suburban zone. Under modern conditions, the number of urban agglomerations constantly increases, while their functional and planning structure complicates and steadily transforms. Where the diverse and powerful forces aid the approximation of economic focuses, polycentric systems of urban settlements or agglomerations with several leading centers arise.

The next step in urbanization is an even more complicated entity called megalopolis which must also become a most important target of investigations for military urbanistics. This is the biggest form of settlement that results from the merger of a big number of neighboring urban agglomerations. (7) As a rule they have a strip-type or cluster-type form, number tens of millions of inhabitants, occupy territories measuring hundreds of thousands of square kilometers, and stretch for hundreds of kilometers. At the modern stage in urbanization, there form, as a rule, basin accumulations of agglomerations that differ from the stripe-type ones in shape but are similar in parameters. The term "megapolis" was introduced to science by Jean Gottmann in 1961. He published his book Megalopolis which covered the results of his study of the world's biggest accumulation of cities in the north-eastern United States. After his work, studies of other megalopolises appeared: Lakeside (Chipits) and California (Sansan) in the U.S.; English (London-Liverpool) and Rhine in Western Europe; and Tokaido (the biggest in the world) formed by a chain of the main economic centers (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, etc.) in Japan. The prominent urbanist Prof. K. Dzengonski wrote about Poland's prospective unified megalopolis. It is believed that megalopolises will be developed in Brazil, India, Indonesia and Italy. There are prerequisites for megalopolises in the CIS as well, as E.G. Animitz, a student of settlement problems in the Urals, writes.

Many researchers believe that the emergence of megalopolises reflects an extremely high degree of concentration of populations, cities, production, and non-production activities. It is also due to the complication of the area form of this concentration. At the same time, they so far remain strictly unique accumulations of urban settlements and emphasize, much stronger than agglomerations, the selectiveness of the urbanization process, which builds up as settlement forms become more complicated.

Based on the foregoing, it becomes obvious that the physical-geographic status of big urban settlements and their special role in a state's economic-geographical situation will have a significant influence on the character of combat actions (operations) of combined-arms large strategic formations. Major populated localities situated in crucial operational sectors, junctions of communication routes and near naval bases are not only sources of all-out supplies for troops (forces) but are also a base of sorts for maneuver and clandestine buildup of reserves. They can also serve as fortified areas. Their timely preparation for all-round defense will prevent even major advancing enemy forces from gaining success through a frontal attack and will make them resort to extensive outflanking movements. A dogged city defense will pin down considerable enemy forces, strip them of a chance to maneuver, and in separate cases stop an advance. Any attacking side will seek to capture the populated locality of this kind because that, first, will have a considerable positive effect on the operation it is conducting, and, second, will make it possible to acquire a geographically and operationally advantageous territory plus sizeable economic and military resources, including, not infrequently, manpower.

If the enemy captures a big city (agglomeration) of operational-strategic importance and defeats the force that defends it, this, as a rule, will lead to the deterioration of the operational situation in the zone of not only one army but also a large operational-strategic formation (a front, a group of fronts). The strategic situation in the theater of operations may change with the loss of several major populated localities, because agglomerations, each of which is a powerful fortified area measuring several hundred square kilometers or more, will be of much operational-strategic importance.

Thus, the importance and role of major populated localities and urban agglomerations in modern operations, both defensive and offensive, are very significant. Sometimes the attainment of aims of military operations in many respects hinges on their retention or capture, while the appropriate operations, in their concept and defeat methods, will be of extremely diverse and complex nature that requires clear coordination between combined units and units of all combat arms and services of the armed forces as they simultaneously conduct both defensive and offensive operations. As is only natural, the command personnel of the armed forces must possess vast knowledge in the area of military urbanistics to successfully organize and pursue the fight for cities.

NOTES:

1. V.P. Maksakovsky, "Geografiya," in: Ekonomicheskaya i sotsialnaya geografiya mira, Prosveshcheniye Publishers, Moscow, 2000, pp. 342-343.

2. A.S. Orlov, "Chudo-oruzhiye:" obmanutye nadezhdy furera, Rusich Publishers, Smolensk, 1999, p. 213.

3. Ibid., p. 216.

4. G.M. Lappo, I.M. Mayergoiz, Yu.L. Pivovarov, "Urbanizatsiya mira," in: Nauchnye sborniki: Voprosy geografiyi, Issue 96, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 6.

5. G.M. Lappo, Goroda na puti v budushcheye, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 1987, pp. 104-106, 149-152.

6. Rossiyskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar, Book 1, p. 382.

7. Ibid., p. 916.

Col. N.S. OLESIK

Candidate of Military Sciences

Nikolai Stepanovich OLESIK was born in Brest on February 1, 1952. He graduated from Minsk Suvorov Military School (1970), Tashkent Higher Tank Command School (1974), Military Armored Troops Academy (1990), post graduate study course (1993) and course of studies for the degree of doctor of sciences (1999) with the Military Armored Troops Academy.

He served with the Byelorussian Military District and the Central Group of Forces, holding positions as tank platoon commander, reconnaissance company commander, chief of staff of a detached mechanized battalion, officer and senior officer of the operational department at the staff of an independent army corps, and chief of operational department at the staff of an independent mechanized brigade.

In 1993, he became lecturer with the department of operational art at the Military Armored Troops Academy. From 1999 and to this day, he is senior lecturer with the operational art department of the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

* Urbanization (from the Latin urbanus, urban) is a process whereby the role of towns in the development of society is enhanced (Rossiyskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar, Book 2, Bolshaya Rossiyskaya Entsiklopediya Publishers, Moscow, 2001, p. 1641).

Classification of Forms of Human Settlements

                               Types of               Population Numbers
Forms of Settlements           Settlements            (thousand people)

Populated      Rural           Farmstead, little      Up to 0.05
localities     settlements     village
                               Village,   Small       Up to 0.5
                               Large      Middle      0.5-1
                               village,
                               Stanitsa,  Big         1-5
                               aul
                               Kishlak    Major       5-10
               Urban           Urban-type settlement  3-12
               settlements     Small town             12-50
                               Middle town            50-100
                               Big town               100-250
                               City                   250-500
                               Big city               500-1,000
                               City with              Over 1,000
                               million-strong
                               population
Agglomeration  Monocentrie     Small                  Up to 1,000
               (with one       Middle                 1,000-2,000
               center)         Big                    2,000-5,000
                               Major                  Over 5,000
               Polycentric or  Small                  Up to 1,000
               conurbations    Middle                 1,000-2,000
               (with several   Big                    2,000-5,000
               centers)        Major                  Over 5,000
Megalopolises  Strip-type      Small                  10,000-15,000
(megapolises)                  Middle                 15,000-20,000
                               Big                    20,000-25,000
                               Major                  Over 25,000
               Cluster-type    Small                  10,000-15,000
                               Middle                 15,000-20,000
                               Big                    20,000-25,000
                               Major                  Over 25,000

                               Types of               Area Occupied
Forms of Settlements           Settlements            ([km.sup.2])

Populated      Rural           Farmstead, little      Up to 0.5
localities     settlements     village
                               Village,   Small       Up to 3
                               Large      Middle      2-6
                               village,
                               Stanitsa,  Big         5-20
                               aul
                               Kishlak    Major       15-30
               Urban           Urban-type settlement  10-25
               settlements     Small town             20-35
                               Middle town            25-50
                               Big town               40-100
                               City                   80-150
                               Big city               120-250
                               City with              Over 250
                               million-strong
                               population
Agglomeration  Monocentrie     Small                  Up to 400
               (with one       Middle                 400-500
               center)         Big                    500-1,000
                               Major                  Over 1,000
               Polycentric or  Small                  Up to 400
               conurbations    Middle                 400-500
               (with several   Big                    500-1,000
               centers)        Major                  Over 1,000
Megalopolises  Strip-type      Small                  Up to 1,500
(megapolises)                  Middle                 1,500-3,000
                               Big                    3,000-6,000
                               Major                  6,000-12,000
               Cluster-type    Small                  Up to 1,500
                               Middle                 1,500-3,000
                               Big                    3,000-6,000
                               Major                  6,000-12,000