Military Misfortunes: the Anatomy of Failure in War.

THE HISTORIAN AND and former cavalry commander Polybius asked, What does it profit the reader to wade through wars and battles and sieges if he is not to penetrate the knowledge of the causes which made one party succeed and another fail?" Eliot Cohen and John Gooch have answered with a set of splendid case studies which fulfill this utilitarian mission in a lively manner. Cohen teaches strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. Gooch is a military historian at the University of Lancaster, England, who has also taught at the Naval War College. Finding the NWC "an incomparable place to study strategy," they embarked on the study of military misfortunes." They argue that failure in battle is not always the result of outright incompetence among the losers, nor of genius or overwhelming numbers among the winners; that while a "military misfortune" often leads to defeat, it could merely cause a setback, or consist of a missed opportunity (a "lost victory").

Cohen and Gooch draw their examples from the twentieth century, for their theory is tied to modern military organization. Wars are no longer decided in a single decisive battle where the supreme commander leads his army on the battlefield. The resources available upon mobilization to even medium-sized nation-states are such that wars are protracted struggles during which new weapons and tactics evolve. Adversaries react to each other in a dynamic environment, changing their behavior over time. Victory or defeat is the accumulated result of a series of decisions and reactions.

The large scale and complexity of modern war requires an organization to manage it. The organization must be flexible enough to respond rapidly and correctly to changing situations while keeping focused on key objectives. The organization needs a mix of strategists, technical experts, and warriors, with a delicate balance between central command and local initiative. In such an organization communication, training, and information (intelligence) play vital roles.

The six cases Cohen and Gooch analyze are: the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor; the American anti-submarine campaign of 1942; the Israeli defense of the Suez and Golan fronts in 1973; the British expedition to Gallipoli in 1915; the defeat of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea by the Chinese in 1950; and the fall of France in 1940. These are all well-worked territories, and the book is worth reading just for the concise evaluations of the differing interpretations of them that have been given. Cohen and Gooch add their own extremely thought-provoking conclusions.

The two major approaches to military analysis that the authors are most anxious to refute are the "man in the dock" school, which seeks one particular individual (usually the senior commander) to blame, and the "intelligence failure" school, which sees surprise as the decisive factor. Holding commanders responsible is necessary to the rebuilding of morale after a defeat. A new leader can give a beaten army a second chance.

When they fail, and in particular when

they fail catastrophically, confidence in

government itself is shaken, for the first

duty of government is national defense.

. .Political authorities often have no

choice but to respond by dismissing a

senior military commander and replacing

him with another, in effect creating a

scapegoat.

However, "criminalizing military misfortune . . . by arraigning a guilty party" does not serve to clarify what actually happens in a large organization where major decisions are made at several different levels.

The authors also feel that surprise is overemphasized. Thus in regard to Pearl Harbor, the 1973 Mideast War, and Korea, the authors argue that while there were lapses in the analysis of intelligence data (primarily a reluctance to believe the enemy was actually committed to war), the real failure was not that the attacker achieved tactical surprise, but that the response by the defenders was so poor. At Pearl Harbor there had been virtually no preparation for battle despite the widespread belief that U.S.Japanese relations were at a crisis point. In 1973, the Israelis were overconfident and counterattacked piecemeal rather than in combined-arms operations, necessary against a worthy opponent. In Korea, Allied and Chinese forces were nearly equal in manpower, with the U.S. having a massive edge in firepower. But beneath the aggregate figures, the U.S. was short on infantrymen in what became an infantry battle where terrain and Chinese tactics did much to negate heavy guns and airpower.

The vital role of intelligence is not to make lucky guesses about specific future events, but to know the enemy, his capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses, so that successful operations (offensive or defensive) can be carried out against him.

Cohen and Gooch present in each case a "Matrix of Failure" flowchart that traces the mistakes through the chain of command, highlighting critical failures and the consequences on the field where the battles were lost.

In all the cases except France in 1940, the armed forces that failed rebounded to win future battles. Thus Cohen and Gooch do not analyze misfortune only, but also recovery. The key is the ability to learn from mistakes before a series of lost battles makes loss of the war inescapable.

Centralization is the major factor they identify in turning an organization around in time. Fragmented theater or operation commands impede the flow of information and prevent the full use of the forces available. Prime examples are the lack of a unified air defense system for Hawaii in 1941, and the lack of a unified anti-submarine command prior to 1943. The land, sea, air, and intelligence services are divided on the tactical and operational levels but must work as a combined arms team to win campaigns. Organization must be matched to the task.

Centralized training is important so that lessons learned in the field can be taught throughout the organization. Performance at all levels must be continually evaluated. Above all, leaders must be willing to test ideas, old and new, rigorously and objectively to determine what works and what doesn't. Institutions of government, business, and education would do well to heed this advice also, even if they are under less pressure than the military to perform or perish.