Militant Islam Set To Rear Up Amid Peace Failure & US Policy Review For Afghanistan.

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NICOSIA - With the downward spiral of the Middle East peace process now apparently unstoppable, APS sources throughout the region are expecting an upsurge in Islamic militancy in the Arab World and beyond. The targets will be the geo-political and economic interests of the US and its regional allies. The sources believe that the next wave of attacks are likely to have a high profile, like the US embassy attacks in August 1998 in East Africa, and will involve Islamist networks dispersed between North Africa and Pakistan. There is a growing awareness among the big powers about the wider ramifications of these networks, especially of their ability to undermine friendly regimes through terror, and discreet efforts are going on behind the scenes to deal with the threat.

Joint counter-terrorism initiatives are already being undertaken worldwide. At the basic level there is a great deal of intelligence co-operation and co-ordination among states affected by the problem of militancy. This co-operation is often bilateral, and sometimes multilateral as in the case of NATO.

What is new is that there are unprecedented bilateral equations emerging on the issue, between the US and Russia for instance, as well as multilateral formations - like the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO - formerly known as the Shanghai Five - including Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan). The SCO was created largely because of a perceived threat of militancy spreading out of Afghanistan into the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Xinjiang province of China.

This reflects a wider concern about militant Islam among the big powers than existed even until the mid-1990s. The implications of such bilateral and multilateral co-operative entities are deep and suggest an effort that could be globally co-ordinated if the militant threat becomes serious enough. The focus of this concern is on Afghanistan, where the Taliban regime has given safe haven to militants from all over the world, and towards the regime's ally and mentor Pakistan which declared its status as a nuclear power in May 1998.

The Bush administration, having constantly cited terrorism as a global threat as its reason for building the national missile defence (NMD) system, will complete its policy review on Afghanistan and Pakistan in the coming weeks. It is expected to set the broad outlines for a global effort to contain the export of Islamist militancy from the area (see overleaf).

According to the sources, the linkage of this review to the Middle East is clear. The current geo-political climate in the region is ripe for an upsurge of militancy, the sources point out, with the aggressive tactics of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the stand-off attitude of the Bush administration giving plenty of ammunition for those opposed to the status quo - whether in terms of the Arab-Israeli equation or in terms of undemocratic regimes who leave no room for access to power through means other than violence.

It is in this context that Osama Bin Ladin, the denationalised Saudi dissident living in exile in Afghanistan under Taliban protection, plays an important figurehead role. He is seen in much of the Arab World and its periphery as a heroic and almost mythological character single-handedly taking on the biggest power in the world and its allies on the basis of little more than faith and a willingness to die. Officials of the Bush administration complain that former president Clinton turned Bin Ladin into a legend by focusing exclusively on him in Washington's global efforts against militancy.

This does not mean, however, that the Bush team will ease the pressure on Bin Ladin; indeed, the administration contains hard-headed strategists and defence bureaucrats who combatted the Soviet empire and won. These figures are not likely to allow Bin Ladin to "win" by surviving and by continuing to challenge the US. At the very least, they would work to make life more difficult than it already is for him and for those who support him. The Bush administration is well aware of the linkages between Bin Ladin in Afghanistan and the peace process, a linkage made clear by their charge that he was behind the bombing of the warship USS Cole in Aden Port on Oct. 12, 2000 - soon after the explosion of violence as part of Al Aqsa Intifada in the Palestinian controlled territories.

By extension, the linkage goes to the Taliban regime and its backers. There are subtle differences among US policy makers: some view the Taliban's removal from power as a prerequisite to catching Bin Ladin and ending the civil war in Afghanistan, while others see a difference between the ruling clique and other more moderate elements within the Taliban. But these are tactical differences and on the broader strategic issue of containing or defeating the Taliban and its brand of extremist Islam, there is no divergence of opinion.

The US has already warned the Taliban that it will be held responsible if Bin Ladin carries out another strike. The fears of such a strike dominate thinking in Washington. On July 19, the US issued its third alert in three months that "terrorist groups sponsored by Bin Ladin" may attack American targets in the Persian Gulf. US forces in the Gulf went on the highest state of alert on June 22 - Threat Condition Delta - a move that also closed down several US embassies in the Gulf and Africa. The first alert this year went out on May 29.

It is in this environment that a global front is gradually coalescing to move against the Taliban. Apart from the SCO, and the bilateral agreements on counter-terrorism being worked out between the US and each of Russia and India (both of which are on the frontlines of Islamist militancy), there is a European dimension as well. On July 19, G8 Foreign Ministers meeting in Genoa urged the Taliban to close down training camps and demanded that those "having influence on the Taliban to act responsibly" (a clear hint to Pakistan). EU and Canadian intelligence agencies are, meanwhile, carrying out a hunt for an Algerian group belonging to the 'Meliani' militant wing, which is funded by Bin Laden.

However, getting the Taliban to disown Bin Ladin will be virtually impossible. Apart from family connections he has built up with Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar through marriage, there are now indications that Bin Laden, some of his Arab and Pakistani companions have become key decision-makers within the Taliban hierarchy. According to some experts, this explains (a) the hardening line of the Taliban since UN Security Council sanctions were imposed in January and (b) the string of religious edicts recently that have virtually banned every modern consumer item in Afghanistan. A senior US counter-terrorism official has been quoted the renowned expert on the Taliban, Ahmed Rashid, in 'The Nation' newspaper of Pakistan on July 26 as saying: "Non-Afghans, are now part of the Taliban's decision making process. We cannot accept that".