Medical expert reports use of chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war.

Chemical weapons were used during March in the Iran-Iraq war, according to a report of 8 April by Dr. Manuel Dominguez, a medical specialist appointed by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar "to examine Iranian patients hospitalized in Europe, allegedly as a result of the use of such weapons".

The report (S/17127) said yperite, or bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide, had been used, "affecting Iranian soldiers". It added that it was possible that hydrocyanic gas had been used, alone or in combination with ypertie, generally known as "mustard gas". The report stated that the attacks had been made by means of bombs dropped from aircraft, according to the statements of most patients.

Dr. Dominguez had visited the Bijloke Hospital in Ghent, Belgium; the Elisabeth-Krankenhaus in Recklinghausen, Federal Republic of Germany; and the St. John-St. Elizabeth and Wellington hospitals in London, United Kingdom, from 1 to 5 April.

In a statement read out on behalf of Security Council members at a Council meeting on 25 April, Council President Javier Arias Stella (Peru) said Council members were "appalled that chemical weapons have been used against Iranian soldiers" during March in the Iran-Iraq war, as concluded in the report of the medical specialist. They "strongly condemn renewed use of chemical weapons in the conflict and any possible future use of such weapons".

The statement, issued separately as document S/17130, said Council members again urged the strict observance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, "according to which the use in war of chemical weapons is probihited and has been justly condemned by the world community". They condemned all violations of international humanitarian law and urged both parties to observe the generally recognized principles and rules of international humanitarian law which were applicable to armed conflicts and their "obligations under international conventions designed to prevent or alleviate the human suffering of warfare". At the same time, they urged a cessation of hostilities and remained convinced that a "prompt, comprehensive, just and honourable settlement acceptable to both sides is essential and in the interest of international peace and security".

According to the statement, Council members expressed their full appreciation and support to the Secretary-General for his report to the Council on his visit to Iran and Iraq from 7 to 9 April (S/17097). They were ready to issue "at the appropriate moment" an invitation to both parties to take part in a renewed examination of all aspects of the conflict. They called on the parties to co-operate with the Council and with the Secretary-General in their efforts to restore peace to the peoples of Iran and Iraq.

Specialist's report

In forwarding Dr. Dominguez's report to the Council President, the Secretary-General said his purpose in dispatching the medical specialist was to "obtain an authoritative and independent opinion on the information coming from the hospital centres concerned". He recalled that Dr. Dominguez, who was a colonel in the Spanish Army Medical Corps, a specialist in atomic, biological and chemical weapons, and professor of preventive medicine at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain, was a member of the team of specialists which had visited Iran in March 1984 and found evidence of the use of chemical weapons. (For details on that report (S/16433) see UN Chronicle, 1984, No. 3.)

Dr. Dominguez said his report was based on a direct clinical study of the patients admitted to the various hospitals, clinical records supplied by the physicians responsible for the patients, conversations with those physicians, study of the analyses made and conversations held with the patients through interpreters furnished in London by the Iranian Embassy and in Recklinghausen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. He pointed out that the patients could not state the precise date of the attack, "in view of the elapsed time and the difference in calendars". They also had difficulty in precisely locating the grographical site at which they had been hurt.

He said he had examined six patients at the St. John-St. Elizabeth Hospital, one at Wellington Hospital, three in Ghent and eight in Recklinghausen. In addition, the St. John-St. Elizabeth Hospital had another patient who had not been present and who apparently had not been seriously affected, and also a cadaver which he had not been able to examine.

The six patients in London, the three in Ghent and six of the patients in Recklinghausen had exhibited a similar set of symptoms which had varied only in the degree and extent of the lesions, Dr. Dominguez said. In all cases the time elapsed between the date of the attack and that of observation had been about 25 days. After describing in detail the patients' symptoms and signs, he stated that all of those symptoms and signs had been consistent with those observed by the specialists in the report prepared by the commission appointed in March 1984 by the Secretary-General. "From the clinical data, from the finding of yperite in the urine of the patient Moharram Firouzi, and from the statement by some patients that they had smelled garlic at the time of the attack, it may be concluded that 15 of the patients studied had been the victims of an attack with bis-(2-chloroethyl), or yperite."

The report went on "Acute hydrocyanic-gas poisoning inhibits cytochrome oxidase, an enzyme of the respiratory chain. Such poisoning results in almost instantaneous constriction of the thorax, abdominal and thoracic pain, rigidity, and loss of consciousness, and if the exposure is sufficiently severe, it causes death, without leaving any traces observable in an autopsy. The gas has a typical odour of bitter almonds."

Dr. Dominguez said the patient Bahmari Behnam, hospitalized at the Elisabeth-Krankenhaus in Recklinghausen, had no lesions attributable to yperite, nor lesions of any other kind. His medical history had revealed that he had been exposed to a possbile gas attack, "perceiving a strong odour of chocolate, followed by constriction and pain in the thorax and loss of consciousness". In the three cases hospitalized at Bijloke Hospital, "Professor Heyndrickx found blood cyanide values of 14.6, 20 and 28 micrograms per 100 ml (where the normal values are 0 to 10)". It was possible, therefore, that yperite and hydrocyanic gas had been used separately and simultaneously, "although it is difficult to see how the same bomb could carry a liquid such as yperite and a gas such as hydrocyanic gas, or a solid and a liquid, as for example a cyanide and an acid such as sulfuric acid, in order to produce the gas when the explosion took place".

Dr. Dominguez submitted an addendum to his report (S/17127/Add.1) based on his review of medical records of patients treated in hospitals in Ghent and London, and in Vienna, which he was unable to visit due to unavoidable circumstances. He stated "Professor Heyndrickx's analyses suggest that some patients were poisoned by organophosphorated agents not used in agriculture, because there is a great reduction in plasmatic cholinesterase, which has not been replenished although some time has elapsed between the attack and the analysis. Nor has it been replenished by hydrolysis of the phosphorylated cholinesterase or by reconstitution of new enzymes by the liver.

"The organophosphorated agent may habe been Tabun, which would explain the presence of cyanide in some organic samples, for the explosion of bombs containing Tabun may cause that substance to decompose and produce hydrocyanide." (Tabun is a nerve agent.)

Iraqi stand

In a letter of 27 April to the Secretary-General (S/17134), Iraq's Permanent Representative transmitted the text of a statement made by the spokesman of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to the Council's statement.

The statement said Iraz had noted with regret that the Council had dwelt on questions which were essentially secondary and which were the consequence of the war that Iran had launched against Iraq and which it persisted in waging. Iraq was also astonished by the position of some Council members, "whose names we will not mention for the moment", which insisted on maintaining that "mistaken position" for reasons that had nothing to do with their responsibility as Council members but which stemmed from commercial interests that had affected the way the conflict was considered.

Some Council members were strongly inclined to satisfy the party that was boycotting and scorning the Council while being set against the party that accepted that the Charter and international law served as the basis for the settlement of conflicts, complied with all Council decisions, and co-operated with it in a "responsible" manner. 'A striking example of this inclination can be seen in the efforts made in the Council to attract the party which to date has boycotted and shown its contempt for the Council, with a view to being able to negotiate with that party ... Any attitude which invokes moving further and further away from the sound, balanced position based on the Charter and international law that the Council has adopted thus far with respect to the conflict can only encourage the aggressive Iranian regime to display even greater contempt for the Council, the Charter and international law and to commit even more acts of aggression against Iraq and the other countries of the region."

The statement said that Iraq found it strange that "some circles within the Organization" were beginning to spread the notion that the Security Council had so far "displayed a bias in favour of Iraq, not following up Iran's demands". It was surprising that these "absurd arguments" should have been used during the discussions of the past few days.

If Iran negotiated with the Council, the statement continued, it was "only for propaganda purposes" and because its plans of aggression "are about to meet with complete and final failure". The real purpose of the attitude taken by certain States "which derive commercial and perhaps political profit" from the conflict's continuation was not to persuade Iran to negotiate with the Council, but to prompt Iraq to withdraw from the Council, thus enabling them to escape their responsibility as Council members and to pursue their profitable commercial activities. Iraq had consistently co-operated with the Council and the Secretary-General while Iran had constantly flouted and accused it. Therefore, the council's appeal urging the parties to cease hostilities and co-operate with it was addressed only co-operate with it was addressed only to Iran, which rejected Council resolutions and refused to co-operate with it.

Iraq, despite its reservations concerning certain parts of the Council's statement, accepted the appeals in it, "for they constitute an indivisible whole, especially the appeals for the cessation of hostilities and a prompt, comprehesive, just and honourable settlement, if Iran accepts them clearly on the same basis". Iraq, while drawing attention to the seriousness of Iranian preparations to launch a new offensive against Iraq, said it would use "all means available to it to repulse this offensive" if Iran launched a new attack or massed its troops at the border for that purpose.

Iranian view

At a press conference on 29 April, Said Rajaie-Khorassani, Permanent Representative of Iran, said Iran would go back to the Council only when it was prepared to condemn, completely and explicitly, the Iraqi aggressors for their war against Iran. The Council's action in issuing the statement was considered, on the whole, very positive and constructive in Iran, which felt that the Council was looking towards a realistic and objective understanding of the situation. However, the Council had not yet been courageous enough to name Iraq explicitly for its use of chemical warfare. Instead of producing a full-fledged and powerful resolution, it had produced only a statement. Those were the only two criticisms of the Council's action.

The Council's statement was very satisfactory in some ways. It condemned the Iraqi uses of chemical warfare in a very dramatic way. However, this way "of trying to satisfy both the aggressor and the victim may ultimately not be very fruitful". If the Council took a courageous leap, and took a stance against aggression, that would be useful because it would help bring Iran back to the Council. The Council was now behaving more reasonably, but it had been unkind in the past.

Iran would go to the Council "only when it rectifies its past mistakes", he said. The Council had previously produced resolutions, usually drafted by Iraq, without taking into account any of Iran's demands. Now the Council must demonstrate that its past positions were no longer upheld.

He observed that Iraq had said it would do whatever was necessary if another attack was launched by the Iranians. That simply means that they were prepared to continue with chemical warfare. Asked if Iran was prepared to engage in a debate in a council meeting on that subject, he said yes and no. Yes, because Iran had said it would go back to the Council when Iraq had been condemned for its aggression against Iran. No, because the Council had not yet been prepared to take that action.

In response to questions, he said Iran had the capacity to manufacture chemical weapons. He was not sure if it had already started to manufacture them. Iran had been making every effort to ensure that that did not take place, but it had to be prepared.

On 16 April, Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, told the preliminary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva that Iraq had not only repeatedly resorted to chemical warfare against Iran, but had also conducted extensive research and experiments for the development of new chemical weapons. Could the Security Council deny that its silence had not persuaded and encouraged Iraq to continue to deploy chemical weapons? The Secretary-General should station a permanent mission in Teheran to investigate and to report on the development of chemical weapons.