Mathematical models of radar troops combat employment for commanding officers and staffs.

Decision-making and planning of combat employment are important phases in the activities of commanding officers and staffs who determine readiness of their radar troops units for the performance of combat missions. They are supposed to do that on the basis of appropriate tactical validations found using mathematical models and computational problems.

The characteristics and conditions in which radar assets and systems function are too complex and diverse to describe in one universal mathematical model meeting the requirements of reliability and operational efficiency. This is the reason why they develop, as a rule, systems of mathematical models and computational problems. The preferred approach there, however, is the so-called problem-by-problem approach where requirements of special software are formulated in a list of problems, whereas requirements of dataware are formulated in an unstructured list of data. This leads to the loss of integrity of their examination and to problems of informational blending of the system's separate components.

Given the present state of development of computer technology and mathematical methods of studying complex systems there are objective prerequisites for moving from the problem-by-problem concept of structuring automated control systems to system structuring consisting in developing effective decision-making support features that function as integral part of software on a single information base.

Thus, the principles of systems approach have been used as the basis for structuring a complex of staff mathematical models of radar troops combat employment (the Complex). The Complex is intended for estimation of reconnaissance-informational potentials and reconnaissance-informational actions of radar units in planning combat employment of troops, drills and alert duty procedures. It makes possible to greatly enhance situation evaluation objectivity and quality of decisions made.

Computational problems and models are structured on the module principle (see the figure) and constitute an aggregate of interconnected but relatively independent program blocks. All methods (individual models) are characterized by a shared methodological approach and combination of formal and informal analysis. Mathematical models and problems are coordinated in regard to objectives (designation), operational-tactical assignments, combination of factors to be taken into account, indicators and criteria, admissible alternatives and constraints, estimation methods, input and output data, structure and content of information arrays.

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The stock of models can be incremented as required. Principles of modularity, openness and build-up capability used in the Complex makes possible its modification, gradual (phased) upgrading and development alongside a planned expansion of the limits and objects of automation and the range of problems tackled and functions performed.

The basis of the Complex is a simulation combat employment model of an electronic engineering unit, or a grouping of radar troops, because models of this type are well suited for estimating the effectiveness of complex systems. Whereas simulation is a universal approach to justification of decisions in the presence of factors that are hard to formalize, it was not in wide use in practical command and control of troops (forces) owing to drawbacks inherent in it: recommendations are suited for a limited range of situations, it is hard to interpret the results obtained, it takes relatively too much computer resources and time. These drawbacks can be successfully overcome in staff mathematical models of radar troops through the joint use of simulations and analytical models.

The concept of comprehensive (system) modeling featured in staff mathematical models of radar troops implies combining simulation and analytical methods with human creative thinking based on wide use of computers. The result is the so-called simulating modeling system consisting of a simulation model reflecting the functioning of an electronic engineering force unit (grouping); hierarchically connected analytical models providing a simplified description of various aspects of phenomena being modeled; an information subsystem comprising a data base (bank) and, some time in the future, a knowledge base operating on the artificial intellect principle; a subsystem of control and interface enabling interaction between all the components of the system and interaction with the user (the maker of decisions).

The imitation model is designed above all to play back, appraise and analyze situations that are likely to arise as troops are committed to action under various situations. Analysis of these situations enables the maker of decisions to make an informed choice of controls.

Rational solutions are found through detailed variant-by-variant estimations. Variants differ from one another because of the changes taking place in the input information about the location of areas, targets, boundaries or directions of concentration of the main efforts, strength and composition of forces and assets called upon to perform combat missions, etc.

The key factor in deciding on a plan for combat employment of a radar unit is gaining a clear understanding of the mission and making sure that the existing variant of combat employment accords with the plan of the commander at next higher level. In doing so, one should compare the required radar information output points against the parameters of the created radar field and determine directions of concentration of the main efforts. If the field's parameters are found not to accord with the requirements imposed on them, one should determine areas on the terrain for the deployment of radars of mobile radar troops. The finding of rational combat disposition variants is based on solving optimization problems. Although the use of a great number of heuristic methods in the proposed estimation experiment structure imposes some constraints on holding it, it enables a flexible combination of creativity and formalized estimation patterns that lends the process of command and control automation new quality.

Dozens of information arrays are formed and used in the Complex of models. At the same time, the informational unity of the Complex is achieved by employing the concept of integrated databases (banks). A centralized control of data has a number of important advantages: rational use of computer memory resources, prompt and direct user access to needed information, information of a less contradictory nature, the possibility to develop additional application programs using the existing data bases, observation of accepted standards in representing data, protection of data (authorized access only) and their integrity (protection against corruption), application programs do not depend on the structure of data storage. The Complex features an interactive mode of operation; verification of automatic input data and the user's computation actions; learning programs for users; the possibility of repeated use of input data and of updating some of their elements.

The Complex is convenient and flexible owing to a plain architecture of computation variants. With this in mind, the developers of models (problems) reduced the total amount of information that determines some or other variant of computation. Updates of input data regarding radar systems given by the user as he looks for rational solutions are entered into the computer promptly and cause no changes in information stored in the unified database. At the same time, information about accepted variants of combat employment of electronic engineering units is memorized by it for further repeated use. Furthermore, as modeling proceeds, processes are illustrated on the graphic display (various characteristics of the system being modeled are displayed in numerical and graphic form).

Reliability of modeling results is achieved through the use of a tried and tested mathematical apparatus. The use of digital maps in the Complex greatly enhances reliability. To achieve this it was necessary to:

* develop formats for the use of digital maps for computational problems and models of radar assets and systems;

* adapt digital maps to work stations, personal computers, etc., and to operational systems used in control automation systems;

* develop converters to change different formats of digital maps (including formats of the main Russian and foreign geographic information systems) into utilization formats;

* convert digital maps from delivery formats into utilization formats while taking special measures to reduce the stored amount of cartographic information and increase access speed;

* create databases of digital maps, complexes of programs making possible visualization of this information and solution of corresponding information computational problems.

As a result, a reasonably close convergence was achieved of the results of computation of radar takeoff angles with the use of digital maps with the results of instrumental surveys. Data collected in flight inspection of radar positions and log sheets of radar units were used as reference data to appraise adequacy of computed radar detection zones. The mean value of relative error was found to be 17.6 percent and never more than 10 percent at medium and high altitudes.

A three-year trial of the Complex in line units showed that it is superior to all earlier models of combat employment of radar troops for reliability of results and speed of computations. This is evidence of effectiveness of the systems approach employed in developing the Complex.

The most important objectives of further refinement of the Complex are: a greater number of tasks that can be performed; a greater proportion of simulation, Optimization and forecasting tasks; integration of combat employment planning and direct command and control tasks; standardization and typification in the development of special software, dataware and linguistic support; the use of intelligent systems and adoption of new information technologies for effective support of command and control decisions.