Maritime helicopter project: there is little disagreement that the Sea Kings need replacing.

The Canadian Department of National Defence is expected soon to advance plans to replace Canada's Sea King maritime helicopters, likely by announcing a request for proposals for new helicopters from international suppliers. There is little disagreement that the Sea Kings need replacing. Built during the 1960s by Pratt & Whitney Canada in Montreal, the Sea King helicopters have become costly to operate and difficult to maintain, despite upgrades and modernization over the years. There is less unanimity on the number, cost, and roles of new helicopters however, with the Department of National Defence relying on the 1994 Defence White Paper to advocate a larger number of more sophisticated aircraft than may be needed for current maritime tasks.

Originating in the Cold War, the Sea Kings' primary role for three decades has been anti-submarine warfare, conducted from the decks of Canadian warships by monitoring and threatening attack on Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic. More recently, Sea Kings' roles have expanded to include coastal and fishery patrols, environmental monitoring, drug interdiction, international peacekeeping, search and rescue, and even humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, such as during the 1998 Manitoba floods. The latest specifications for the Sea King replacement program, or the Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP) as it is now known, reflect the widening of Sea King tasks. They call for "a more general purpose capability" to cover the following missions:

* surface surveillance and control, with radar capable of detecting ships, including illegal fishing or drug smuggling vessels, up to 100 nautical miles away;

* sub-surface surveillance and control (that is, submarine tracking and attack, using a host of electronic and sonar equipment and weapons such as torpedoes);

* electronic support measures (to detect targets without visual or radar contact);

* utility and fleet support (such as personnel transport and medical evacuation); and

* secondary search and rescue.

Like the Sea King, the new maritime helicopters will extend the capabilities of the ships that carry them, for example by using radar to provide over-the-horizon targeting information for the frigates' Harpoon missile system. There are also expectations that the new helicopters will be used increasingly to support the army in peacekeeping missions and in disaster relief, both domestic and overseas (Hobson 1996, p. 11).

The final government decision on the number of MHP aircraft has yet to come but Department of National Defence officials have indicated 32 helicopters as a minimum requirement. This total arises from an assessed need for 14 helicopters to service the two naval Task Groups on the east and west coasts mandated in the 1994 White Paper on Defence (each involving four patrol frigates or destroyers capable of carrying helicopters). The 14 helicopters would provide each Task Group with the capacity to retain two helicopters in the air 24 hours a day, seven days a week. One additional helicopter would be assigned to continuous duty with the patrol frigate in the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, a commitment to NATO. Beyond these 15 operational aircraft, 17 more helicopters are sought for maintenance and training activities ashore and for "force generation," essentially back-up strength for projection of military force (numbers as cited in Purcell 1997-98).

Program history

The MHP began in 1986 as the "New Shipborne Aircraft (NSA)" to replace the Sea King helicopters. The following year the Defence White Paper, Challenge and Commitment, cited the NSA as part of a "vigorous naval modernization program" to acquire naval combat equipment to counter the Soviet threat, the policy paper's main focus. The function of new helicopters would be to extend the anti-Soviet submarine role of Canada's 12 new patrol frigates: "These ships will carry modern helicopters to extend the distance and speed at which they can pursue submarines." (Department of National Defence 1987, p. 51)

The new helicopter program proceeded to a "project definition" contract in 1988 before it was merged with a Canadian Forces requirement for new search and rescue helicopters in 1991. The combined program, which called for 35 shipborne and 15 search and rescue helicopters, was presented as a cost-saving measure to lower both the per unit production and the overhaul and maintenance expenses of the separate projects. Yet because the anti-submarine role still dominated the NSA project, the combined program favoured sophisticated, state-of-the-art equipment. The savings of combination were lost in the preference for a helicopter with capabilities well beyond what was needed for search and rescue. In 1992 a Department of National Defence contract was signed jointly with Montreal-based Paramax Systems Ltd. and a British-Italian company, EH Industries Limited, to supply 50 newly-developed EH-101 helicopters at a total projected cost of $5.8 billion.

After widespread public outcry at the cost, the government lowered the required number of helicopters to 43 and the projected budget by $1 billion, but the program did not survive a 1993 change of government. In one of his first announcements as new government leader, Prime Minister Chretien cancelled the EH-101 contract, noting that it called for "a Cadillac-type helicopter that is not needed because it is not based on the new reality of the Cold War being over." (Underhill 1993) The cost of cancelling the contract eventually totalled almost $500 million for research and development, early production costs, and cancellation penalties.

The new government split the joint program into its original components again and the 1994 Defence White Paper outlined two projects, one to replace Labrador search and rescue helicopters and the other to replace Sea Kings with "robust and capable new shipborne helicopters." After considerable delay, rumoured to be due to government resistance to the military's preferred choice, Defence Minister Art Eggleton announced in January 1998 that the department would purchase 15 "Cormorant" search and rescue helicopters at a projected cost of $790 million. The Cormorants, variants of the cancelled EH-101, are scheduled to be delivered between January 2001 and October 2002. Meanwhile, the renamed Maritime Helicopter Project moved even more slowly, with the call for supplier bids yet to be announced.

A soft budget

The official budget for the MHP has not been made public but recent reports anticipate a cost range from $2.8 billion to less than $2 billion for the 32 shipborne helicopters. Military officials report operational specifications for the maritime helicopters have been reduced and "modernized" from the earlier NSA program, lowering range and endurance requirements in particular (Hobson 1996, p. 10). Remaining specifications may still be costly, however. For example, the Maritime Air Group operating the new helicopter plans to maximize fitted equipment in keeping with the aircraft's multiple roles. Even if, as suggested by press reports, the project benefits from "off-the-shelf" systems that do not need to be designed specifically for the new helicopters, the cost of integrating the systems for so many missions into one airframe remains unclear. The complications have led to speculation that program costs will far exceed the budget and that the final cost could approach $4.5 billion-equivalent to the maritime portion of the original NSA program (Purcell 1997-98).

Citing the White Paper mandate, National Defence Headquarters likely will argue for an expanded budget for maritime helicopters, perhaps by spreading more money over a longer period. Yet, there is no reason the federal government need accede to the pressure. Ottawa has several options that could meet realistic program requirements within a budget of approximately $2 - 2.5 billion. Recent contracts announced by Australia and New Zealand suggest that, even if no change is made in numbers, Canada should be able to purchase 32 maritime helicopters within the targeted budget. (1) There also are existing innovative proposals that provide for the same program role mix by using alternative equipment procured at lower cost. (2) Finally, and most significantly, a close reassessment of role priorities in the post-Cold War maritime security environment could well offer cost savings. Among other things this would necessitate re-examination of the 1994 White Paper premise of two naval Task Groups with missions that suggest levels of engagement far above recent experience. Such a reassessment would have a significant impact on the Maritime Helicopter Project and would likely result in a requirement for fewer helicopters and less equipment.

References

Department of National Defence 1987, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada.

Department of National Defence 1994, 1994 Defence White Paper.

Hobson, Sharon 1996, "Canada's New Helicopter Program: Recognition of a Continuing Need," Canadian Defence Quarterly, March.

Purcell, N.D., Lt-Commander 1997-98, "Reducing the Cost of the Maritime Helicopter Project: a Combined Helicopter-Unmanned Air Vehicle Procurement Strategy," course paper, Canadian Forces College (http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca).

Underhill, Brian 1993, "Chretien Downs Helicopters," Halifax Chronicle-Herald, November 5.

(1) Australia and New Zealand signed contracts in 1997 calling for a total of 15 Kaman Super Seasprite helicopters to operate from ANZAC frigates for $785 million (US). This is equivalent to about $2.5 billion (Canadian) for 32 helicopters.

(2) Lieutenant-Commander Purcell (1997-98) proposes a mix of maritime helicopters and maritime pilotless vehicles that meet all program requirements at reduced cost. In addition, unlike the MHP, which leaves seven of Canada's fleet of frigates and destroyers without maritime aircraft, Purcell's proposal would provide equipment for all vessels.