Maritime Security: Coast Guard Should Conduct Required Inspections of Offshore Energy Infrastructure.

GAO-12-37 October 28, 2011

Congressional interest in the security of offshore energy infrastructure has increased because of the lives lost and the substantial damages that resulted from the Deepwater Horizon incident in April 2010. The U.S. Coast Guard--a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is the lead federal agency for maritime security, including the security of offshore energy infrastructure. The Coast Guard oversees two main types of offshore energy infrastructure--facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and deepwater ports. GAO was asked to examine (1) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of OCS facilities and what additional actions, if any, are needed; (2) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports and what additional actions, if any, are needed; and (3) what limitations in oversight authority, if any, the Coast Guard faces in ensuring the security of offshore energy infrastructure. GAO reviewed Coast Guard documents, such as inspection records, and relevant laws and regulations and interviewed Coast Guard inspectors and officials, including those at Coast Guard headquarters and the two Coast Guard districts that oversee all OCS facilities and deepwater ports that are subject to security requirements.

The Coast Guard has taken actions to address the security of OCS facilities (that is, facilities regulated for security pursuant to 33 C.F.R. part 106), but could improve its process for managing security inspections. For example, the Coast Guard developed a security plan for the Gulf of Mexico, in which all 57 OCS facilities are located, and it reviews security plans developed by the owners and operators of OCS facilities. It has also issued guidance, which states that Coast Guard personnel should conduct security inspections of OCS facilities annually, but has conducted about one-third of these inspections from 2008 through 2010. Further, the Coast Guard does not have procedures in place to ensure that its field units conduct these inspections. Consequently, the Coast Guard may not be meeting one of its stated goals of reducing the risk and mitigating the potential results of an act that could threaten the security of personnel, the OCS facility, the environment, and the public. The Coast Guard also faces challenges in summarizing inspection results. Specifically, its database for storing inspection data has limitations that make it difficult to determine if security inspections were conducted. For example, there is no data field to identify OCS facilities, which makes it difficult to readily analyze whether required inspections were conducted. By addressing some of these challenges, Coast Guard managers could more easily use the data as a management tool to inform decision making. The Coast Guard has also taken actions to ensure the security of the four deepwater ports, but opportunities exist for improvement. The Coast Guard's actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports are similar to actions it has taken to ensure the security of OCS facilities. For example, Coast Guard security plans address security at deepwater ports, and the Coast Guard also reviews security plans developed by the owners and operators of the deepwater ports. However, Coast Guard guidance for deepwater ports does not call for annual security inspections, and it has conducted only one security inspection at a deepwater port from 2008 through 2010. Coast Guard officials said that the Coast Guard plans to begin annual security inspections of deepwater ports in recognition of the risk of a transportation security incident. However, limitations in the Coast Guard's inspection database and lack of guidance available to database users may complicate the Coast Guard's management and oversight of inspections at deepwater ports. For example, the data field for deepwater ports has been incorrectly applied to other types of infrastructure and some deepwater ports are recorded under multiple names. Unless the Coast Guard addresses these database limitations and issues updated guidance to database users, it will be difficult for the Coast Guard to verify that the deepwater ports are complying with applicable maritime security requirements. The Coast Guard has limited authority regarding the security of mobile offshore drilling units (MODU) registered to foreign countries, such as the Deepwater Horizon. The Coast Guard is taking action, though, to gain a fuller understanding of the security risks associated with MODUs by conducting a study to help determine whether additional actions could better ensure the security of offshore energy infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico, including MODUs. GAO recommends that the Coast Guard develop policies or guidance to ensure that (1) annual security inspections are conducted at OCS facilities and (2) information entered into its database for both OCS facilities and deepwater ports is more useful for management. DHS and the Coast Guard concurred with these recommendations.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

Director: Lisa R. Shames

Team: Government Accountability Office: Natural Resources and Environment

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Director: Alicia P. Cackley

Team: Government Accountability Office: Financial Markets and Community Investment

Phone: [phone]

Director: David J. Wise

Team: Government Accountability Office: Physical Infrastructure

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Director: Orice Williams Brown

Team: Government Accountability Office: Financial Markets and Community Investment

Phone: [phone]

Director: Steven J. Sebastian

Team: Government Accountability Office: Financial Management and Assurance

Phone: [phone]

Director: Susan Ragland

Team: Government Accountability Office: Financial Management and Assurance

Phone: [phone]

Director: Jeanette M. Franzel

Team: Government Accountability Office: Financial Management and Assurance

Phone: [phone]

Director: Valerie C. Melvin

Team: Government Accountability Office: Information Technology

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Director: William T. Woods

Team: Government Accountability Office: Acquisition and Sourcing Management

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Director: Debra A. Draper 

Team: Government Accountability Office: Health Care

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Director: Linda T. Kohn

Team: Government Accountability Office: Health Care

Phone: [phone]

Director: Carolyn L. Yocom

Team: Government Accountability Office: Natural Resources and Environment

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Director: Linda T. Kohn

Team: Government Accountability Office: Health Care

Phone: [phone]

Director: Gregory D. Kutz

Team: Government Accountability Office: Forensic Audits and Investigative Service

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Director: Marcia G. Crosse

Team: Government Accountability Office: Health Care

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Director: Randall B. Williamson

Team: Government Accountability Office: Health Care

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Director: Mark L. Goldstein

Team: Government Accountability Office: Physical Infrastructure

Phone: [phone]

Director: Stephen L. Caldwell

Team: Government Accountability Office: Homeland Security and Justice

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Recommendations for Executive Action

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Recommendation: To strengthen the Coast Guard's efforts to ensure the security of OCS facilities and deepwater ports, the Commandant of the Coast Guard should develop policies and procedures to monitor and track annual security inspections for OCS facilities to better ensure that such inspections are consistently conducted.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard 

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

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Recommendation: To strengthen the Coast Guard's efforts to ensure the security of OCS facilities and deepwater ports, the Commandant of the Coast Guard should make improvements to the Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) database or MISLE guidance to better ensure that all OCS facilities, both fixed and floating, are accurately and consistently identified and that the results of security inspections are consistently recorded to allow for better data analyses and management of the security inspections process.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

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Recommendation: To strengthen the Coast Guard's efforts to ensure the security of OCS facilities and deepwater ports, the Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that information on deepwater ports in MISLE can be used as a management tool for decision making. These actions should include (1) issuing guidance on how information on deepwater ports and their security inspections should be entered into MISLE; (2) defining deepwater ports in MISLE guidance; and (3) making any changes necessary in the database to ensure that deepwater ports regulated under 33 C.F.R. parts 148-150 can be identified within MISLE.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Categories: Homeland Security, Data integrity, Databases, Deep water ports, Facility security, Inspection, Internal controls, Maritime security, Monitoring, Offshore oil drilling, Outer Continental Shelf, Reporting requirements, Risk assessment, Security policies, Strategic planning, Terrorism