Marching together: after many years of keeping a distance between Canadian and U.S. defence relations, the government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper is moving towards closer cooperation.

Paul Cellucci was the U.S. Ambassador to Canada from 2001 to 2005. Ambassadors are not supposed to ruffle the feathers of their host nation. But, Mr. Cellucci appears not to have read that part of the diplomat's training manual. He was often blunt and undiplomatic.

One of his favourite topics was criticism of Canada for its meager defence spending. Canadians got very hot under the collar about being told they should spend more on their armed forces; perhaps because there was more than a grain of truth in what Mr. Cellucci was saying?

Whether because of the ambassador's goading or not, Canada did increase its defence spending. The government of Prime Minister Paul Martin put another $13 billion into the armed forces' bank account in the 2005 budget. Mr. Cellucci claimed partial credit for the increase. That's what he said in an interview with The Globe and Mail as he was leaving his ambassadorial job. He added that Washington was surprised when Prime Minister Paul Martin declined to take part in the National Missile Defence (NMD) program. This was a hot button issue in 2005 and continues to be today.

Back in 1983, then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan was told that a young scientist called Peter Hagelstein had come up with a bright idea. Mr. Hagelstein had designed a nuclear x-ray laser that was supposed to be able to destroy weapons aboard missiles while they were still in space. Mr. Reagan loved the idea and challenged the scientific community to take it from theory to practice.

What was officially known as the Strategic Defence Initiative (and popularly known as Star Wars) swallowed up billions of dollars and failed. The program was scaled back until George W. Bush moved into the White House in 2001. He ordered a speeding up of what was now called the National Missile Defence. The whole x-ray laser thing had been shelved and the system was now based on one missile destroying another missile in flight. Mr. Bush invited Canada to take a role in the development and operation of the system. Ottawa stalled on making a decision.

In February 2005, Canada told the American government it would not be involved in the NMD program. Had Canada decided to be part of the plan it would have shared in the development of the technologically challenging project. This might have led to useful high-tech spin-offs. Canada would also have had a role in the day-to-day running of the anti-missile operations, giving it some say in how and where it might be used.

Our military chiefs wanted to be in the program. It would have meant more money for the armed forces and the chance to work with the world's most powerful military force. It would have been a further step towards interoperability--that's military-speak for the integration of forces from different countries. More on this later.

By deciding to opt out of NMD, Prime Minister Paul Martin was likely reacting to public opinion. U.S. President George W. Bush is deeply unpopular in Canada (he's also become deeply unpopular in the United States) and so is any program associated with him. Two-thirds of Canadians polled said they supported the decision to stay out of the missile defence program.

The prime minister's spin doctors said the decision was based on a desire to keep weapons out of space. The U.S. government would not give a firm guarantee that deploying the NMD system would not lead to the weaponization of space. Ottawa also said that, in its view, there was no longer any need for a missile defence shield over North America.

However, Mr. Martin tossed the Americans a bone by saying "Canada remains steadfast in its support of NORAD." That's the North American Aerospace Command, a group that tracks flying objects heading our way, including planes and missiles.

Canada's involvement in NORAD costs it about $315 million annually; that's about ten percent of the organization's total budget. There are an estimated 700 Canadian Forces personnel serving in NORAD related activities in Canada and the U.S. at any given time. Historically, an American and a Canadian military officer hold the positions of Commander and Deputy Commander, respectively.

If NORAD was to pick up evidence of an airborne attack, interceptor jets, Canadian and American, would be scrambled to deal with the intruder. Changes to the NORAD pact allow it to pass on intercept information to missile defence batteries. This puts Canada inside the missile defence system anyway, which makes Mr. Martin's refusal to take part look a bit confusing. Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson offered this scornful analysis: "The missile-defence file was bungled from the beginning. The stream of events is known. Mr. Martin favoured participation, lacked the courage to argue for it, got cold feet, dithered, and watched as the critics turned Canadian public opinion from being rather evenly divided to largely opposed.

"If, on becoming Prime Minister, he had made a decision in favour of a minimal Canadian involvement ... Canada would have had a seat at the table."

Fast forward a year, and the new prime minister, Stephen Harper, appears to be looking for a chair to pull up to the NMD desk. The Conservative Party's 2006 election platform supported participation in negotiating a North American Missile Defence System.

Mr. Harper's government has already permanently renewed Canada's participation in the NORAD agreement. (Previous renewals were for a five-year time period). The accord has even been extended to include maritime surveillance. This will complete the rebirth of NORAD. It was set up during the Cold War to defend against an attack by the Soviet Union. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 that task no longer exists. Today's NORAD watches for any type of internal or external threat to both Canada and the United States. Expanding and extending the NORAD agreement is a further evolution in the Harper government's relations with the administration of President George W. Bush. Under Liberal prime ministers Jean Chretien and Paul Martin the atmosphere became very frosty. Mr. Harper has sought, successfully in his early days in office, to warm the relationship up. This will lead to closer military cooperation with the U.S.

Much of this cooperation is driven by the events of 9/11. The United States is putting up a security perimeter to protect itself from further terrorist attacks. It's very much in Canada's interests to be inside that perimeter because our economy depends heavily on the flow of trade across the border.

Canada and the United States share one of the most extensive and long-standing defence relationships in the world. It includes 80 treaty-level defence agreements, more than 250 memoranda of understanding between the two defence departments, and some 145 groups in which defence matters are reviewed. One of the issues under constant discussion is interoperability. What does it mean?

It means using the same or very similar equipment to that of our allies, particularly the U.S. It means employing the same systems of command and control so that an order issued by one ally will be understood and acted on identically by other allies.

Sometimes, it means Canadian military personnel working under the command of officers from another country.

Interoperability gives Canada more bang for its military buck. That's because it can buy the latest weapons from its allies without having to foot the bill for all the research and development. Interoperability also allows Canada to join campaigns that would otherwise be out of the question because of distance and cost.

Canada has been moving toward full interoperability with the U.S. since the early 1940s. At that time, the two countries began sharing military intelligence and co-ordinating and focussing military industrial production. In 1947, they developed exchange programs for training and observation, common designs, and standards in arms equipment. They also committed to being available to each other militarily.

Today, interoperability is clearly the dominant perspective in the Canadian military establishment. No new equipment will be purchased or developed unless it builds interoperability. It has reached the point of allowing a U.S. commander to locate, target, and fire missiles from a Canadian ship by remote control. But, that could lead to tragic errors. In 1988, the American warship USS Vincennes misidentified and shot down an Iranian civilian Airbus, killing 290 people. Tomorrow, a similar mistake could be made, but with a missile fired from a Canadian ship. Many Canadians fear that the country is losing control of its international decision-making. As our Armed Forces move more and more in lock-step with those of the United States we might find it difficult to develop a foreign policy independent from that of Washington.

Currently, U.S. foreign policy is completely out of step with Canada's traditions. Canada has always tried to build coalitions with other nations as a check against U.S. dominance. The foreign policy of the George Bush administration has scorned consensus building in favour of a go-it-alone approach. The trick for Canadian politicians is to find a path between enjoying the advantages of close military ties with the U.S. while avoiding the appearance of sucking up to Washington.

SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES:

1. The minority government of John Diefenbaker was defeated in 1963 largely over the issue of Canada/U.S. defence cooperation. Appoint a team of students to research and report on this.

2. Organize a debate about whether or not Canada should try to develop closer military ties with the United States.

3. Canada had its own plan for invading the United States. It was drawn up by a World War I hero named James Sutherland "Buster" Brown. Brigadier Brown's "Defence Scheme No. 1" called for Canada to attack the U.S. at the first signs of a possible American invasion. Through class discussion, try to decide whether a Canadian attack on the United States would have any chance of success today.

Websites

Canada/U.S. Defence Relations--http://www.forces.gc. ca/site/focus/canada-us/ index_e.asp

NORAD--http://www. norad.mil/Home.htm Strategy for 2020--http:// www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs / strategy2k/intro_e.asp

RELATED ARTICLE: The mad theory.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its allies and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization faced off against each other. They were armed with enough nuclear weapons to wipe each other out many times over. The theory behind having so many weapons was called Mutually Assured Destruction--MAD. Neither side would risk launching an attack because they would be obliterated in retaliation.

Then, the strategists started to think about defending against an attack, If one side could limit damage to a minimum the MAD [principle no longer worked. So, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) was drawn up and signed in 1972. The treaty banned the large-scale development of missile-defence systems. Both sides would remain so scared of being blasted into eternity that they would not launch an attack.

U.S. President George W. Bush's National Missile Defence scheme broke the ABMT ban. To overcome this problem, Mr. Bush simply withdrew from the treaty in 2002.

RELATED ARTICLE: Undiplomatic incident.

Ambassador Paul Cellucci (right) really stirred Canadians up over the war in Iraq. Early in 2003, the U.S. was preparing to attack Iraq. The Americans made claims that Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, possessed weapons of mass destruction and had helped al-Qaeda launch the terror attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001. Both allegations have proven to be untrue.

At the time, the Canadian government had doubts about the U.S. claims and urged caution and delay. United Nations weapons inspectors had been looking for nuclear, biological, and chemical arms in Iraq for many months and had found none. Ottawa and many other countries said the inspectors should be given more time to complete their search. They also said that no attack on Iraq should take place without the approval of the United Nations.

U.S. President George W. Bush said the time for searching and talking was over. He started putting together what he called a "coalition of the willing;" nations ready to join the U.S. in its attack on Iraq. Canada's Prime Minister Jean Chretien said Canada was unwilling without specific United Nations authorization. No such approval came from the UN.

Canada's refusal to be part of what many observers consider to be an illegal invasion in March 2003 angered Washington. Mr. Cellucci was given the task of making America's feelings known. He gave Canada a public dressing down during a speech in Toronto. He said "There is no security threat to Canada that the United States would not be ready, willing, and able to help with. There would be no debate. There would be no hesitation. We would be there for Canada--part of our family."

Remarks such as these are usually delivered in private. Their public expression angered most Canadians, among them Edmonton publisher Mel Hurtig. In a speech at the University of Victoria a few days later, he called Mr. Cellucci "ill-mannered, obnoxious, and arrogant." Bloggers were less restrained in their comments.

RELATED ARTICLE: War plan red.

The plan called for quickly seizing the key port of Halifax, Nova Scotia. Communication between eastern and western Canada would be severed by capturing Winnipeg's rail centre. Ontario was to be attacked from Buffalo, Detroit, and Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. Quebec would fall to an invasion from New England. After taking the Great Lakes region and St. Lawrence Valley the plan was to move onto the Prairies and British Columbia.

This was the scheme drawn up in the U.S. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Red of 1930. The 94-page plan was revised a couple of times in the 1930s before being scrapped. It was removed from the secret list in 1974. The invasion of Canada was part of a larger, imagined conflict with Britain. The planners thought they would be in for a war "of long duration" because the enemy was "noted for its ability to fight to a finish."

The Washington Post published a long article on the subject in December 2005. The newspaper wanted to know if the plan had been revived at all in recent years. "The Defence Department never talks about its contingency plans for any countries," said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman.

However, it would be prudent for all armed forces to develop military plans for defence against, or attack on, any country with which it shares a border, no matter how friendly it might appear.