Maj. Gen. I.N. Vorobyov (Ret.).

Doctor of Military Sciences, Merited Scientist of the Russian Federation 

While marking the large amount of work that went into the drafting of the Field Manual, one would like to offer some suggestions as to how to improve it. In the first place, the document proves quite bulky, although it is intended for officers of the tactical echelon, battalion and company commanders, who are on duty mostly in the field conditions. It gives them a lot of inconvenience to have to use such a huge volume.

But it is only a formal aspect of the matter under consideration. The main thing, as I see it, is that the structure and contents of the draft we are discussing fall short of the tenets of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which explain the nature of modern wars and armed conflicts. The Manual should contain relevant recommendations as to actions by motorized rifle and airborne elements in different types of operations within the framework of large-scale, regional, or local wars and armed conflicts. The suggested draft reflects these tenets only in part. For example, it fails to consider actions by elements in peacekeeping operations and is not up to the mark in its recommendations on action in armed conflicts.

It seems to me it would be expedient to divide the Manual into three parts (to publish it in the form of three compact booklets). The first one ought to reflects methods of combat operations in conditions of large-scale, regional, or local wars; the second one, to consider combat operations in armed conflicts; and the third one, to set forth the basics of employment of elements in peacekeeping operations.

The suggested draft may be taken as the basis of Part One of the Manual. Proposals on how to improve it come to the following. The introductory section of the Field Manual of the Ground Forces (1989) now in effect expounds foundations of the Military Doctrine, whereas the suggested draft leaves out the doctrinal tenets. The necessity of stating them is due to the fact that the Military Doctrine, which was put into effect in 2000, is cardinally different from the Soviet Military Doctrine and that all the most important changes introduced in the new Field Manual in some way or other stem from its requirements. It is unadvisable, therefore, to interfere with the existing tradition. The introductory section of the Manual should expound the conceptual provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, specifically foundations of ensuring of the military security of the state, the nature of modern wars and armed conflicts, and the resultant objectives of the Armed Forces, which are precisely the bedrock foundation of any Field Manual.

It is a matter of principle to define in the Manual (in Part One thereof) the role and place of the offensive. I believe the Manual now in effect has committed a mistake in this sense, pushing the offensive into the background. This has done much damage to the military theory as well as the practice of training and indoctrination of troops. Defensive themes came to prevail in curricula of military educational establishments and in scientific investigations. The rationale for this state of affairs came to the following: the Military Doctrine is defensive in nature and therefore it is defense that should be taught to the troops in the first place. As I see it, that dogmatic and orthodox interpretation of the military policy of the state was automatically applied to military art. It can never be inferred from the defensive tendency of the current Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation that the Armed Forces must "pledge fealty" to one particular type of military operations, defense. The arsenal of military a rt is a rich and multifarious affair. Under all circumstances, the troops must be indoctrinated in an active and aggressive spirit, as it was during centuries of Russian military history. The Manual should stress that the offensive is the main type of combat operations for the army. Accordingly, the chapter "Offensive" ought to be placed before the chapter "Defense," which is the case in the manuals of practically all the foreign armies.

The necessity of priority training in offensive actions follows from the record of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, where the Soviet troops pursued offensive actions most of the time (a total of 928 out of 1,418 days). Two military campaigns in Chechnya, too, demonstrated approximately the same offensive-defense ratio (3:1).

In my view, the draft Manual is off balance where it defines the role and place of the indoctrination work in the army. We have been made to use, since recently, a somewhat unsuitable term, "moral-psychological support," something that has put ideological and patriotic indoctrination of the personnel on the same footing as technical and logistic support (the draft Manual places the two sections one next to the other). The term "support" per se is clearly inapplicable to working with people. The case in point after all are such sublime matters as personnel indoctrination; mobilization of the personnel to performance of combat assignments and enhancement of combat readiness; inculcation of moral principles and rules of conduct, high morale, will for victory, loyalty to the military duty, pride for one's country and for being a member of the Armed Forces, responsibility, self-denial and selflessness; nurturing of military professional qualities. It is more correct therefore to call this section "Indoctrination W ork" and to give it the pride of place the way the Manual now in effect does. This will be in conformity with the long-standing traditions of the Russian Army. N.N. Golovin, a talented Russian scientist and Professor of the Academy of the General Staff, wrote this in his time: "The great practicians of military art have long established the law of preeminent importance of the moral element in combat." (1)

A characteristic opinion regarding the role of the psychological factor in combat comes from a participant in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905), Colonel of the General Staff P.I. Izmestyev: "In our age of extreme nervousness of both the masses and the individual, weaknesses of the human nature have to be reckoned with as never before. Modern tactics makes it incumbent not only on the commander but also on the rank-anfile fighter to have knowledge, initiative, and ability to influence others, in a word, present-day tactics has become more psychological. That is the point of view that has to be used in indoctrinating the soldier..." (2) Again for comparison's sake it is proper to emphasize the importance given to ideological indoctrination in foreign armies, specifically those of NATO countries, where the military political leadership regards maintenance of high morale and good psychological state in the armed forces, indoctrination of servicemen in the spirit of patriotism as one of the main directions in its work.

The draft Field Manual gives absolutely inadequate attention to protecting troops from mass destruction weapons and incendiary and non-lethal weapons. One incontrovertible latter-year thesis is this: a nuclear war is impossible, because it will have catastrophic consequences for mankind. We will not reject this assertion. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that a nuclear war may begin unintended and contrary to the wish of warring states whichever they are, being provoked by a third side. One must not disregard the passive form of a nuclear war either. For example, a dangerous radiation (chemical) situation in a theater of operations is likely to take shape as a result of conventional hits at nuclear power stations or in consequence of accidents. Chernobyl demonstrates what aftermath even one exploded power plant can bring in its wake. Meanwhile, the Western Region alone currently has 108 atomic power stations, 239 nuclear reactors, and 1,243 chemical industry facilities. The practical conclusion from the above is this: it is necessary to envisage measures protecting personnel from MDW in all types of combat while tackling any type of combat mission as well as to take into account a possibility of protracted action in vast radioactive (chemical) contamination zones. The attempt to spread anthrax in the United States is yet another reminder that the danger of an unexpected outbreak of biological war is as great as all that.

As regards the arrangement of chapters in the draft Manual, one would like to say that the chapter "Combat in Encirclement and Breaking Out of Encirclement" is clearly not in its proper place, following as it does the chapter "Meeting Engagement." It would be more logical to put it after the chapter "Defense," because combat in encirclement is a variety of defense.

As far as Part (Book) Two of the Manual is concerned (actions by elements in armed conflicts), it, in my view, ought to generalize the entire amount of rich combat experience obtained during combat operations in Afghanistan and the two Chechen military campaigns. One may suggest the following structure of Part Two of the Manual.

Chapter One should contain these sections:

Characterization of internal armed conflicts

Tactics of possible actions by enemy units.

Characterization of a joint specialized operation. Principles of its conduct.

Chapter Two ought to be devoted to an exposition of the specifics of combat employment of troops in a joint operation:

2.1. Combat employment of motorized rifle and tank elements in armed conflicts.

2.2. Combat employment of airborne elements.

2.3. Teamwork between motorized rifle and tank elements on the one hand and internal troops and border elements on the other.

2.4. Combat employment of artillery elements.

2.5. Combat employment of reconnaissance elements.

2.6. Combat employment of engineer elements.

2.7. Combat employment of radiation and chemical security elements.

In Chapter Three, it is expedient to show the preparation of motorized rifle and tank elements for combat operations:

3.1. Organization of combat operations.

3.2. Preparation of elements for combat operations.

3.3. Commanders' practical work in elements.

3.4. Movement forward by elements toward a conflict area.

Chapter Four may include the following sections:

4.1. Actions at the conflict prevention stage.

4.2. Reconnaissance and probing actions.

4.3. Sealing-off and encirclement of the adversary.

4.4. Raiding actions.

4.5. Ambush actions.

4.6. Combat team tactics.

4.7. Sniper warfare.

4.8. Opposition to sabotage and ambush actions and to fire attacks.

4.9. Combat operations in mountain terrain, forested terrain, and desert terrain.

4.10. Urban combat operations.

4.11. Protection and defense of facilities and lines of communication.

4.12. Standing duty at block-posts and outposts.

4.13. Escort duty with motor columns.

Finally the structure of Part (Book) Three of the Field Manual (on actions by elements while preparing and conducting peacekeeping operations) may be the following.

Chapter One. General premises.

1.1. Characterization of peacekeeping operations.

1.2. Principles of holding peacekeeping operations.

Assignments of elements in peacekeeping operations.

Methods of tackling assignments in peacekeeping operations.

Chapter Two. Preparation of elements for action in peacekeeping operations.

2.1. Work by commanders and staffs to organize field service in a conflict zone.

2.2. Decision-making and allocation of combat tasks.

2.3. Organization of cooperation.

2.4. Command and control system.

2.5. Combat support.

2.6. Technical and logistic support.

2.7. Work by commanders and staffs in elements.

2.8. Personnel training.

2.9. Readiness control.

Chapter Three. Actions by elements in the course of an operation.

3.1. Delivery of elements to a conflict zone.

3.2. Actions by elements to disengage opposing sides.

3.3. Actions by elements to monitor compliance with truce terms.

3.4. The checkpoint duty.

3.5. Protection of essential facilities.

3.6. Actions by elements in a designated responsibility area.

3.7. Actions while sealing off a populated locality.

3.8. Change of position and movements by personnel.

3.9. Withdrawal of elements from a conflict zone.

It is pertinent to say in conclusion that a manual is drawn up for a period of 10 to 12 years, but it may so happen that it proves out of date immediately upon publication the way the current Field Manual did in the early 1990s. The reason was that it did not contain recommendations on how to combat an "unconventional" adversary in armed conflicts. As a result, while engaging in combat operations in the two Chechen military campaigns, forces had to learn how to fight on the battlefield. A "bombshell" of this kind is planted in the draft Manual under consideration as well. Besides, it may well be expected that 10 years from now forces will handle robotized equipment, weapons based on new physical principles, and non-lethal weapons, with precision weapons playing the predominant role. As is to be regretted, the suggested draft Field Manual contains no recommendations on troop action in new environments.

NOTES:

(1.) Quoted from: G.M. Andreyev, Sotsialnaya psikhologiya, MGU Publishers, Moscow, 1994, p. 37.

(2.) N.N. Golovin, Issledovaniye deyatelnosti i svoistv cheloveka kak boytsa, St. Petersburg, 1907, p. 22.