Main prerequisites for ensuring peace under present-day conditions.

Among the memorable dates, which are observed every year, there is one with particularly tragic meaning--the anniversary of the atomic bombings by U.S. aircraft of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Although, this "experience of practical application" of the new type of armament remains the only one of its kind for the time being, nevertheless this "experience" and the numerous investigations of the capabilities of nuclear weapons, which followed, allow us to say that the deployment of the sophisticated types of this armament threatens mankind with such disasters, which compared with all that it has experienced heretofore, appears exiguous. It is to be emphasized that the extensive use of nuclear weapons can lead to the destruction of earth civilization altogether. It would seem fairly reasonable to bring up the issue for the nuclear armaments to be banned and eliminated. Indeed, this issue used to be brought up. Take for instance the famous representations of the then USSR leader M.S. Gorbachev, in which he proposed to liquidate all the stocks of nuclear weapons and to ban them. However, all these fluent phrases proved to be mere words. There was nobody to ban nuclear weapons. Besides, more and more new "members of the nuclear club" join the countries, which were already in possession of nuclear weapons. This situation is brought about by the fact that nuclear weapons make their possessor immeasurably more powerful (in military context) compared to those, who do not have such weapons. This reason is deemed to be more important than certain statements about the potential nuclear catastrophe. It should be admitted that so far mankind is not ready for alternative judgments.

In this connection, measures should be sought at least to lessen the danger, which the availability of nuclear weapons is fraught with. We think that major solutions may involve the following measures: first, the reduction of the stocks of nuclear weapons and, second, the creation of conditions, which exclude their deployment. All this is applicable to all the states, which possess nuclear weapons, but it mostly concerns the U.S. and the Russian Federation, because these countries have the most powerful stockpiles of nuclear means largely composed of strategic offensive armaments (SOA), which include land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and the nuclear munitions of strategic bombers. Strategic offensive armaments are the most powerful, complex and expensive type of nuclear weapons. The balance of operational capabilities of the strategic offensive armaments of the U.S. and the USSR (the RF) has always been one of the most important factors, which underlie the specifics of their relations.

As early as the 1960s-1970s of the last century, the search began for ways to limit the strategic offensive armaments of the U.S. and the USSR. The first SOA limitation agreement was signed in 1972. A number of other SOA limitation and reduction agreements have been signed since then, but in spite of that, the strategic offensive armaments of the U.S. and the USSR continued to grow, and by 1990, the world powers possessed more than 10 thousand one-megaton nuclear charges each (dozen times more powerful than those, which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki). The last Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SOP) between the U.S. and the Russian Federation was signed in 2002. Under the Treaty, not more than 1,700-2,200 warheads must be retained in the strategic offensive potentials of both countries by 2012. Although it is considerably less (nearly five times) than what the countries had in 1990, neverthe-less it is enough to spell tremendous danger. It is possible to conclude that the SOA reductions in the format, in which they were conducted so far, cannot, however, solve the problem of the prevention of the nuclear war. In our view, different methods are needed to attain this.

Piece can be secured by the establishment of "good" relations between the states, by the conclusion of certain new agreements in this area, etc. All this is, of course, important and useful, but it cannot guarantee against aggravation of world situation including the most extreme limits. In order to effectively prevent the nuclear war, there is only one alternative--to make it dangerous (inadmissible) for those, who are going to take part in it, and especially for those, who are going to begin it. In that way, the concept of nuclear deterrence comes into being.

The meaning of deterrence is extremely simple--no country (let us call it aggressor) will start the nuclear war, if it knows that it can suffer the retaliatory blow by the party, subjected to aggression, inflicting inadmissible (unacceptable) damage. It will be observed that the idea of deterrence is not novel. Napoleon and Hitler would have hardly begun the war against Russia, unless they were sure of the favorable outcome of their actions. However, the addressing of the practical problems of deterrence gives rise to a great deal of fairly cumbersome questions. The first of them is--what damage can be deemed to be inadmissible (unacceptable) for the aggressor.

In the conditions of the potential use of nuclear weapons, the damage can be measured in different ways, for instance, by the population casualties in the aggressor-country as a result of the retaliatory strike, by the losses of the industrial potential, etc. The size of the inadmissible (unacceptable) damage depends on many factors and conditions, which are hard to reckon with--the country' military and economic might, the stability of its political regime, the morale of the population, etc. Therefore, the quantitative assessments of the inadmissible (unacceptable) damage are extremely difficult to attain, although the attempts for their quantitative expression have been undertaken long since. For instance in 1967, R. McNamara, U.S. Defense Secretary, proposed to qualify, as the damage inadmissible for the USSR, the loss of the two-thirds of its industrial capacities and of the quarter of its population. The inflicting damage would require about a thousand of explosions of one-megaton nuclear weapons. Even at that time and the more so later on, it was becoming clear that this quantity is apparently overestimated. In the course of time, this quantity was adjusted downwards. Now, according to the assessments of various specialists, not more than several hundreds of explosions are enough to inflict inadmissible (unacceptable) damage to major nuclear powers.

Thus, to answer the question put forward above, we may conclude that the condition, which effectively guarantees the world against nuclear war, is the realization of feasible mutual nuclear containment of the countries possessing strategic nuclear armaments by threatening to inflict on the aggressor the damage, which is inadmissible (unacceptable) to it. One can surmise that relatively small number of modern exploded nuclear charges will be needed for the counterstroke (sometimes called the retaliatory blow). Incidentally, significant damage can be inflicted, at the present time, on the enemy also by using non-nuclear means, mainly aircraft precision armaments. But, the Armed Forces of Russia can achieve the required counterstroke only by using strategic nuclear weapons.

The main role in the counterstroke will be played by the land-based ballistic missiles (SMF) and the sea-based ballistic missiles (the Naval Forces), because strategic (long-range) aviation is of little use for these purposes due to relatively long flying time to targets and its vulnerability to air defenses. After the last SOP reduction Treaty is fulfilled (by 2012), there will approximately remain 1,500 warheads for the intercontinental ballistic missiles that by far exceed the required mission containment margin. Sometimes, it serves as grounds for optimistic assessments of the situation. As it was noted above, several hundreds of warheads are enough for containment, but the reference was made to the warheads, which would engage targets, i.e., would inflict the inadmissible (unacceptable) damage to the aggressor, rather than to the warheads, which are installed on missiles. This is an extremely critical aspect of the containment problem. For clarity sake, let us analyze as it applies to the deployment of the SOP land-based component, i.e., the IBM of Strategic Military Forces (SMF).

Let us assume that there are [N.sub.ga] of warheads on the missiles of the entire group alignment of IBM systems. In case of their combat deployment for the retaliatory strike, fewer of those warheads will be able to engage targets. It may be due, first, to part of the IBMs failing to take-off at the right time because of the unreliability of missile complexes and of tactical control systems, or due to the fact that some of them are not in the state of maximum operational readiness. Let us call these as technical warhead losses and let us designate them by [DELTA][N.sub.tech]. Second, part of the missiles may be pre-launch destroyed by the enemy's conventional (non-nuclear) weapons. Let us designate the corresponding warhead losses by [DELTA][N.sub.cw] Third, part of the missiles will be destroyed by the enemy nuclear missile strike (warhead losses--[DELTA][N.sub.nms]). Finally, part of the warheads may be destroyed, while in the target approach path, by anti-missile defense means ([DELTA][N.sub.ABM]).

Let us call the latter categories as operational losses. Of course, depending on the situation, there may be no losses at all. For instance, if the enemy does not deploy conventional weapons, then [DELTA][N.sub.cw] = 0; and if ABM systems are not used, then [DELTA][N.sub.ABM] = 0. But in the most common case, the aggregated warhead losses, which consist of technical and operational losses, will be equal to

[DELTA]N = [DELTA][N.sub.tech] + [DELTA][N.sub.cw] + [DELTA][N.sub.nms] + [DELTA][N.sub.ABM],

Then, the number of warheads, which will engage targets, is equal to

[N.sub.tgt] = [N.sub.ga] - [DELTA][N.sub.tech] - [DELTA][N.sub.cw] - [DELTA][N.sub.nms] - [DELTA][N.sub.ABM].

Precisely this is the number of warheads for determining the damage, which may be inflicted on the aggressor in the counterstroke. If [N.sub.cont] of warheads are required for containing, then it becomes feasible, when [N.sub.tgt] is greater than [N.sub.cont], i.e., when [N.sub.tgt] [greater than or equal to] [N.sub.cont].

Thus, the condition for containing is represented in the feasibility of delivery to enemy targets of the number of warheads, which is sufficient for inflicting the inadmissible (unacceptable) damage on the enemy and which is determined by reckoning with all types of warhead losses in the course of retaliatory second-strike. Warhead losses depend on many factors and conditions, the main of which will be: first, the peculiarities of munitions of SMF (systems) and of the support systems, as well as the peculiarities of organization of their alert posture (among all the capabilities of arms materiel, especially important is its capability of survival under all possible types of enemy actions, i.e., the capability of the arms materiel to retain operational effectiveness under exposure to enemy actions); second, the peculiarities and deployment methods of the aggressor's strategic offensive potential, which are aimed at destroying the arms materiel and the support systems of the missile forces.

It follows from the case reviewed above that improving deterrence capability can be accomplished by increasing the number of warheads in the group alignment of missile systems and by reducing all types of warhead losses, which can take place in the implementation of the counterstroke.

The calculation of warhead losses is extremely complicated. Reliable data about their size is not published. But, it can be assumed that aggregate warhead losses may reach marked values, whereas only part of the warheads, which the missiles had prior to the beginning of the enemy aggression, will engage the targets of the retaliatory strike. The state (coalition of states), which is readying itself for aggression, will take all kinds of measures for those losses to increase, thereby lowering the effectiveness of SMF retaliatory strike. Precisely for this reason is the U.S. focusing so much on the improvement of non-nuclear (as well as nuclear) weapons and on the creation of the ABM systems.

Everything said above is also applicable to the second SOP element--the sea-based ballistic missiles (the Naval Forces), although some measures for arms materiel capability enhancement will be realized here in a different way (for instance, questions about providing for arms materiel survival capability). But the task of containment is common to both SOP elements. Therefore, their improvement is equally important.

Thus, to reduce the danger of nuclear war, various measures can be used--reduction of nuclear armaments, conclusion of relevant agreements, etc. But, only providing for mutual containment of the countries, which possess strategic nuclear armaments, ensures the protection of peace. Containment is practicable, if the state, which plots the aggression, is aware that in the retaliatory strike, under any scenario for the conflict to begin, inadmissible (unacceptable) damage will be inflicted upon it.

The assessments show that, at the present time, the balance of first strike opportunities of any aggressor and of the second-strike of the Armed Forces of Russia makes containment enforceable. At the same time, the development of armaments in some countries can change this balance.

The object-matter of nuclear war prevention measures must be determined by the need for improving the missile systems of Strategic Missile Forces and of Naval Forces with a glance to precision non-nuclear weapons and ABM systems developed by eventual adversaries of Russia. In the current period, Alpha and Omega here are organization and intensification of relevant scientific investigations, also inclusive of Peter the Great Strategic Missile Forces Military Academy.

Lt. Gen. Ye.B. VOLKOV (Ret.)

Peter the Great Strategic Missile Forces Military Academy

Doctor of Technical Sciences, professor