MOROCCO - The Rifts Within Muslim States - Part 10.

The rifts within Moroccan society are defined by issues of socio-economic inequality and ethnic differences rather than by matters of ideology or religion. There is great disparity of wealth within the kingdom, with about 65% of the Moroccan population estimated to be living below the poverty line and widespread poverty and massive unemployment are said to affect around 34% of the population among those aged under 25. The elite, who consist about 3% of the population, control an estimated 85% of the wealth. Yet Islamist parties have never been able to gain a strong foothold in the country, in the way that they managed to do in Algeria and Egypt during the 1990s, for example.

There are several reasons for this, including Morocco's distance from the epicentre of militancy in the 1980s, the secular ethos that has spread from Europe which is within eyesight on a clear day from the northern tip of the kingdom, and the late King Hassan's shrewd leadership.

One party has managed to survive in the country with a relatively high profile - namely Al Adl Wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity) - and its spiritual leader Shaikh Abdessalam Yassine is considered as the leader of the Islamist opposition in Morocco. However, his credentials, too, have been diluted of late as some radical new tendencies have emerged.

These tendencies look upon Shaikh Yassine as being part of the "establishment opposition". They have noted, for instance, that during its two-decade-long existence, Al Adl Wal Ihsan has never challenged the four-century-old ruling Alaoui dynasty. Likewise, it has not publicly questioned the widely accepted belief that the monarch is a descendant of Prophet Mohamed.

The radicals tend to overlook the reality that no Moroccan religious leader can at the moment realistically challenge the Islamic credentials of King Mohammed, the 36th descendant of Prophet Mohammed and the 18th sovereign of the dynasty. He has inherited the symbolically important titles of "Khalifat Allah Fil Ard" (God's Deputy on Earth), an authority which comes from the old Shiite background of the Alaoui dynasty, and "Amir Al Mu'minin" (the Prince, or Commander, of the Faithful).

Moreover, to some extent King Mohammed has already undermined the Islamists platform by showing himself to be far more liberal than his father in terms of political opposition. He has indicated since ascending to the throne that he would continue with the democratisation measures started by his father, although there have been persistent complaints that the changes are not quick enough or far-reaching enough.

Mohammed has lived up to many observers' expectations that in the short-term he would take time to consolidate his hold and to put his personal imprint on the rulership. But at the same time, he took certain steps which demonstrated that some of the policies of his father's era would not be continued.

Yet radical new Islamist tendencies have spread in the country, with the traditional Islamic groups themselves seen to some extent as being out of touch with popular sentiment. While most of these tendencies do not espouse violence to overthrow the regime, there are elements that are prepared to do so.

One example is the Salafi Jihadi (Salafist Combat), a secretive movement which was born in the early 1990s as the jihadi sentiment in North Africa was peaking. This group has come under a systematic and tough crackdown in recent years, and they have virtually no room for manoeuvre in the post-Sept. 11, 2001, era (see following pages).

On the other hand, there has been no real political challenge to the ascension of King Mohammed despite initial fears that some of the key political figures may not be satisfied with the new ruler's approach. Many members of the old guard have remained to advise him although the king has his own team, and he depends more on the latter for advise. This has meant the emergence of a new way of looking at various factors related to political and economic liberalisation.

The dynamics behind liberalisation is likely to be affected by the changed global environment in the post-Sept. 11 world, however. There will not, at least in the short-term, be much pressure on the Moroccan regime to democratise. This is partly because the country is seen as a key ally in the war against Al Qaida, with several Moroccans being among those arrested and with many non-Moroccan Al Qaida members being arrested in the country as well (see the latest edition of SBME).

King Mohammed seems fairly confident, therefore, of his domestic stature and his ability to contain any threat that may be posed by the Islamists. He is also likely to have a very stable relationship with the West for the foreseeable future.

In remarks to the press after talks with visiting King Mohammed at the White House on April 23, US President Bush said: "We've had a really good discussion about a number of matters. No question that Morocco is a great friend of the United States of America and for that, Your Majesty, we are very grateful. I appreciate your steadfast support when it comes to the war on terror". The positive outlook in terms of internal and external stability should assure the continuity of the monarchy, provided efforts are made to address the socio-economic issues facing the kingdom.