Lost perspectives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT OF February 8, 2005, between Israel and the Palestinians, followed by Israel's momentous withdrawal from Gaza, completed on September 12, has since substantially reduced the level of violence. It has failed, however, to produce the hoped-for momentum that would propel the peace process forward. The two parties remain stuck, unable to overcome the repercussions of the second Intifadah (the Palestinian uprising against Israel begun in 2000) that has left the Israelis deeply scarred psychologically and has created an unruly situation in the Palestinian territories. This explains to a large degree why, since the Gaza withdrawal, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, unable to agree on an agenda that deals with their respective priorities, haven't yet commenced formal talks.

If one speaks with Israeli and Palestinian officials and academics and observes the political and social combustion within both societies, as I have been doing, it becomes impossible to escape the fact that Israelis' and Palestinians' misconstrued perceptions of each other's positions have led them to draw incompatible conclusions about the conditions they face. Thus, for the Israelis, there is a growing sense of resignation over a Palestinian reality they cannot change, an attitude that promotes the ideas of further unilateral disengagement, while, for mainstream Palestinians, there is bewilderment over the inability of Israelis to grasp the historic opportunity to peacefully and permanently end their decades-old violent conflict. These perceptions obviously aggravate the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, affecting the policies of both sides in fundamental ways and hindering any progress. We need to examine, therefore, some of the specific issues that have created this divide and then look at possible solutions.

HAMAS' PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL ELECTION

Israeli demands that the Palestinian Authority disarm Hamas (the militant Palestinian liberation movement) and bar it from participating in the national elections scheduled for January 25, 2006, have met with stiff resistance by the Palestinian Authority. For Israel, Hamas is a terrorist organization whose actions have resulted in hundreds of Israeli casualties through suicide bombings and mortar attacks. It follows then that Hamas shouldn't become part of the political process. But, to the Palestinian Authority, Hamas represents a significant constituency and, although Abbas rejects the organization's strategy of violence, he is unwilling to challenge it at this juncture--partly because he is unable and partly because he prefers to coopt it into the political process and thus avoid more bloodshed. In addition, the Palestinians argue that they need more time to sort out their internal problems, insisting that decades of occupation and violent conflict--especially since the eruption of the second Intifadah--have left much of the Palestinian territories socially, politically, and structurally in ruin. But even though, as a Palestinian official told me, "Coopting Hamas politically may entail certain risks, because in its present form it offers an alternative to Fatah," nonetheless, "Mr. Abbas feels strongly that only through a political process will Hamas moderate its behavior, and this is a risk worth taking" Moreover, allowing political pluralism by letting everyone participate in the election makes it more legitimate, after which, as Abbas recently stated, "All groups will become a part of the Palestinian political fabric and thus create a new phase in the life of the Palestinians." Whether or not these arguments resonate with the Israelis, the truth is that Israel cannot dictate who may or may not participate in a democratic Palestinian election.

ROADBLOCKS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Another serious point of contention is caused by the Israeli roadblocks and the consequent restrictions on Palestinian mobility. The tremendous hardship, suffering, and humiliation that the roadblocks produce incite even more resistance and hatred toward Israel. Although the Israeli government agrees that many roadblocks and the construction of separate roads to reduce contact between Israelis and Palestinians traveling in the West Bank do cause hardship and aren't conducive to a neighborly relationship, it argues that they are necessary to the security of the Israeli people. In a conversation I had with Sharon's spokesperson Ra'anan Gissin, he said:

Every time we ease Palestinian mobility by removing roadblocks, as we have done many times in the past and especially in recent months, a terrorist act is attempted and often succeeds.... As long as the Palestinian Authority cannot control the situation and prevent extremists from attacking us, we are left with no choice but to take measures, however disdained they may be.

But Abbas counters such a view, insisting that "peace and security cannot be guaranteed by the construction of walls, by the erection of checkpoints and confiscation of land, but rather by recognition of rights." Sharon's response to this argument is that, after the trauma of pulling settlers out of Gaza, Israel cannot act to help the Palestinians unless Abbas does more to disarm Hamas and other militant groups.

TARGETED KILLING AND CEASEFIRE

An added source of disagreement is the Palestinian complaint that Israel is continuing with its policy of targeted killings while simultaneously demanding that Palestinian violence stop. Many Palestinians agree that no attack against any Israeli target is justified, but they add that the Israeli retaliations are disproportionate and simply inflame ordinary Palestinians and therefore perpetuate the vicious cycle of retributive violence. Naturally, the Israelis see the situation differently: they maintain that targeted killing has ended with the ceasefire agreement. But as another Sharon adviser explained to me, "When we are fired upon without provocation or when we know of a plot of a suicide bombing, we have no choice but to act and stop the perpetrator. Unfortunately, the Palestinian security forces seem incapable of doing anything about it, and we end up burying our dead."

To the Palestinians, however, this sort of argument only proves that the Israeli government is missing the point altogether. According to Khalil Shikaki, director of the Ramallah-based Center for Policy and Survey Research, 77 percent of Palestinians strongly support the continuation of the ceasefire and, despite their attributing Israel's withdrawal from Gaza to Hamas' violent resistance, their support for the Palestinian Authority has increased from 44 to 47 percent between June and September 2005 while approval of Hamas actually decreased from 33 to 30 percent. The respected Palestinian pollster Nabil Kukali, director of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, suggests that Israel must capitalize on this dramatic public opinion shift and provide economic support to encourage greater openness so that the withdrawal from Gaza is seen by Palestinians as a political watershed and a genuine opportunity for the economic development that they so desperately need in order to move forward.

THE EXPANSION OF SETTLEMENTS

Israel's expansion of settlements in the West Bank is a critical point of contention that raises in the minds of Palestinians serious questions about Israel's ultimate intentions and about the huge effect the settlements will have on a future Palestinian state. For Israel, however, the expansion of certain settlements is needed for natural growth, specifically those settlements--such as Ma'aleh Adomim--that the Israeli government intends to incorporate into Israel proper in any final agreement.

Of course, on the whole, the settlements have been an albatross around Israel's neck, only aggravating the conflict with the Palestinians, who view every Israeli house built on Palestinian land as a usurpation of their inherited rights to that land. Thus the Palestinians argue against the Israeli view in this matter, insisting that any final accord must be negotiated by mutual agreement and no unilateral Israeli action can determine the final borders.

THE FENCE

It is in the context of the land issue that the Palestinians vehemently disagree with Israel about the building of the fence, which they say encroaches on Palestinian lands, causes undue hardship, and prevents any prospect for the development of productive and healthy relations. Israel's response has been to point to the undisputable evidence that the fence has substantially reduced terrorist infiltrations into Israel, especially by suicide bombers--and the government has a solemn responsibility to protect its citizens at whatever cost. The fence, Israel says, can be removed once the Palestinians prove that they are good and peaceful neighbors.

DEEPER DILEMMAS

Although both sides make cogent arguments, what lies behind each position are decades-long tragic experiences, culminating in the second Intifadah that shattered any semblance of mutual trust. One result of all this is that very little room exists for good faith gestures. If trust is a means by which to manage risks, Israel seems unwilling to risk trusting its security to the Palestinian Authority, especially when Hamas and Islamic Jihad continue to profess their desire to destroy Israel. Certainly the Israeli government is encouraged by Abbas' commitment to a peaceful solution; however, it hasn't seen any strong evidence that he can deliver on his promises. Sharon had also faced a rebellious party that rose against him because of his decision to withdraw from Gaza. But on November 21 he broke with the Likud party and formed a new centrist party so he could more freely pursue new peace efforts. This could help him consolidate his position before the 2006 elections, however, he will likely remain unwilling to compromise on national security as long as some Palestinian factions continue their violent resistance.

For the Palestinians, Israel's withdrawal from Gaza offers a momentous opportunity to rebuild an infrastructure decimated by five years of violent conflict. Abbas, who was among the very first Palestinians to confess out loud that the Intifadah brought only destruction to the Palestinians, correctly sought a ceasefire to begin a meaningful dialogue with the Israelis. Unfortunately, his success in this regard, although real, has fallen far short of Israel's expectations. The Gaza that Israel left is now made up of a variety of militant gangs, refugee camps, and Hamulah (traditional extended family villages); it is a place where the "democracy of the rifle" prevails.

Abbas is banking on the forthcoming Palestinian national elections to solidify his position and consolidate his security forces, but he has to demonstrate that his policy of reconciliation with Israel is paying off. For this he needs some important Israeli concessions--including release of prisoners, removal of roadblocks, and cities in the West Bank turned over to Palestinian control. One important step in this direction was fostered by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice when her negotiations led on November 25, 2005 to the reopening of the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and Gaza. But, above all, Abbas needs to improve the economic lot of ordinary Palestinians.

The present pace of change is, unfortunately, slow and frustrating, not only because violence remains prevalent and consuming but because of psychological hangups that inhibit bold initiative. Israeli goodwill is necessary for much of the needed progress. So is U.S. involvement. Unfortunately, the administration of George W. Bush has been preoccupied with Iraq, which has prevented the administration from playing a decisive role and has caused it to avoid pressuring either or both sides to meet each other's urgent requirements, The administration seems to have settled on a holding pattern aimed at avoiding a major eruption of renewed violence.

TOWARD A SOLUTION

Although both Abbas and Sharon are committed to peace and seek to promote it, their differing assessments of the prevailing political and on-the-ground conditions, both in the territories and in Israel, prevent them from seeing eye to eye on how to proceed. They are nonetheless cognizant of a historic opportunity neither can afford to miss. They need, therefore, to demonstrate a greater capacity for appreciation and understanding of each other's dilemmas and to begin to support each other by agreeing on small constructive but irreversible steps on which to build a structure for peace strong enough to withstand the test of day-to-day uncertainties.

Alon Ben-Meir is professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs and is the Middle East project director at the World Policy Institute in New York. He can be contacted at [e-mail].