Lieutenant Colonel Mike Snook. How can man die better: The Secrets of Isandlwana revealed.

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Snook. How can man die better: The Secrets of Isandlwana revealed, Greenhill Books, London (www.greenhillbooks.com), 2005, ISBN 1-85367-656-X. hardcover with dust jacket, 320 pp, 87 b & w photos and 8 maps, 16 x 24 cm, UK19.99 [pounds sterling] plus p&p.

It is said that even today the Sphinx-like mountain of Isandlwana exudes foreboding. How much more foreboding it must have been to part of the 24th Regiment of Foot, detachments of the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, miscellaneous Army odd-bodies, armed levies, civilians and so on when the newly established but badly planned and ill-defended campsite came under Zulu attack on Wednesday, 22 January 1879.

One doesn't actually have to visit Isandlwana, just reading this readable book, raises the hackles. Official histories have tended to gloss over this stunning disaster of Victorian British arms, and what has been written by others has tended to perpetuate fallacies and outright slanderous myths. As an officer of the Regiment (now the Royal Regiment of Wales) the author has had a prolonged and keen interest in the battle and, in several expeditions to the site, has mapped and measured the positions and movements of the companies of the stalwart regular infantry as they fought to the last man against overwhelming odds.

The reasons for the disaster were numerous and are discussed at length in the book. One factor was the terrain. As the author states, "In war the ground is everything. At Isandlwana it is particularly complex." Under this theme, some of the complexities of the battle are explained. Another reason was the incomplete intelligence gathering concerning the strengths, locations and movements of the Zulu regiments. A cardinal sin in warfare is underestimating the strength of the opposition and another is in being surprised. The Zulu regiments of Cetshwayo were tough, fit, incredibly fierce and brave, disciplined, stealthy, and past masters at lying up and concealing their presence in dongas. They also were not averse to using firearms, particularly British Army Martini-Henry rifles, which were highly prized and turned with gusto upon their hard-pressed adversaries with telling effect.

Another reason for the disaster was leadership. Chelmsford, the G.O.C. Southern Africa, was anxious to push on from the newly established Isandlwana camp to Ulundi and bring the campaign to a quick conclusion. He was noted for his snap decisions, and his decision to set off early in the morning of the 22nd with something like half his forces was a disaster in the making. The decision of the headstrong and excitable Colonel Durnford to leave the camp on some glory hunting expedition of his own also proved to be a disaster.

The denouement of the battle, including the death of the camp commander, Colonel Palleine, rolls on with almost sickening anxiety for the reader, until the last defiant shot at the camp brings a ghastly conclusion that results in looting and ritual mutilation of the fallen. Some escape, however, to spread the alarm. The most notable of the escapers were Melville, Coghill and Smith-Dorrien. Their stories of heroism would take pride of place in any boy's own adventure storybook.

The book clarifies for the uninitiated the structure, customs, protocols of behaviour, and the esprit de corps of the 24th Regiment of Foot and the British Army in general in that era. And for those with a technical slant to the proceedings, the great ammunition box controversy is laid to rest, hopefully for all time.

This is probably the definitive and irrefutable work on Isandlwana and is highly recommended for the infantryman's eye, the detailed and scholarly research, the annotated photographs of the terrain, the extensive picture gallery of personalities involved, the orders of battle, the escapers and the glossary. This reviewer looks forward to Colonel Snook's next book Like wolves on the fold, which is about Rorke's Drift.

Syd Wigzell