Let it grow.

WHEN it still seemed likely that the United States would use force against Iraq, Madeleine Albright discussed the expansion of NATO with the foreign ministers of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic during a Washington meeting of the New Atlantic Initiative. On this occasion American diplomacy had a small but undoubted success. In an anteroom, the Secretary of State made last-minute changes to her speech reflecting the strong support for U.S. policy on Iraq that she had received from the three NATO applicants around the coffee table.

The incident underscored a point made both by Radek Sikorski, NR's longtime roving correspondent who is now Poland's deputy foreign minister, and by his boss, Bronislaw Geremek (also an NR contributor). NATO's potential new members, as former satellites of the Soviet Union, have a greater natural sympathy with the U.S. than do some Western European members of the alliance. Far from weakening NATO, their entry would bolster American leadership and strengthen the Atlantic ties that have preserved peace in Europe for fifty years.

Indeed, the case for expanding NATO is very like the case for establishing it in the first place. It will expand the zone of stability, and thus of prosperity, in Europe by bringing more European countries into an alliance led by the one power that no European really fears -- namely, the good old U. S. of A. This serves American interests in three ways: it prevents European wars; it creates markets for American exports and investments; and, as Mr. Sikorski argues, it creates allies who have a general incentive to support American interests elsewhere. Indeed, the mere prospect of NATO membership has persuaded Eastern European countries to make their economies freer, to introduce more democratic practices, and -- most important of all -- to settle their border and ethnic disputes. These are major gains which would be put at risk if NATO were now to reject enlargement.

Objections to NATO expansion cannot withstand serious scrutiny. The costs? The higher-end estimates, as Richard Perle has observed, are based on the extravagant assumption that the Hungarian air force must be brought up to the same level of military effectiveness as the USAF (though the Spanish air force never has been). Will Americans die for Danzig? We did last time. This century's European wars, in which Americans ultimately fought and died, began in part because the aggressors believed America would not intervene. NATO enlargement would deter that miscalculation. Driving Russia into hostility? But those in the Russian elite most opposed to NATO expansion are also the most chauvinist and anti-American. Appeasing them would encourage the hope that they could reverse the historical verdict of 1989.

A more sophisticated objection is lodged by Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft, and other certified moderates: NATO enlargement should be "linked" to the expansion of the European Union. That may sound reasonable, but it is a recipe for inaction: the EU has dragged its feet on expansion, preferring to concentrate on monetary experiments. Besides, as Secretary Albright pointed out in her NAI speech: ". . . it is not in America's interests to subordinate critical security interests of NATO to another institution. We are a leader in NATO; we're not even members of the EU." Underneath its veneer of moderation, the Nunn - Scowcroft objection amounts to a sophisticated isolationism -- a "Europe for the Europeans," when modern history suggests that Europe without Americans generally comes to grief.

These fallacies have nonetheless attracted an odd coalition including the New York Times, Pat Buchanan, the Cato Institute, and some Republican senators. Fortunately, Jesse Helms has handled the issue with skill and leadership. It is now up to Trent Lott to make clear that the GOP as a whole welcomes some of America's strongest friends into the neighborhood.