Lessons from the war in Iraq.

Maj. Gen. G.A. BEREZKIN

Doctor of Technical Sciences

Deputy head of the RF Defense Ministry Center of Military-Technical Information Studies

Military-Political Aspects

The military operation by the U.S.-British coalition force against Iraq in March-April 2003 precipitated the formation of a basically new system of international relations. It becomes clear that a substantial part of the world community is yielding to pressure from Washington that is taking radical measures to recarve the world to its pattern. Issues on the agenda already include forms of U.S. global domination, above all the establishment of U.S. control over the main hydrocarbon resources and transformation of the Islamic world that possesses these resources (according to a Washington scenario).

Analysis of official documents by the Bush administration and of statements by members of the U.S. political establishment, which were made public recently, gives cause to single out two main lines in the U.S. foreign policy course resulting from the successful military operation against Iraq. First, forced consolidation of a unipolar world order with a formal recognition of the U.S. role as the sole arbiter and policeman. In these conditions, international organizations such as the UN will apparently be assigned the role of mere extras in the game unfolding on the "world chess board" with just one active player. Even NATO will have to contend just with "peacekeeping missions" in territories "liberated" by the Americans from "international terrorists."

At the same time, Washington cannot but take into account that the idea of a multipolar world order with several regional powerhouses is evolving as well. In this connection, the second important goal of the U.S. foreign policy course is to discredit this idea per se, on the one hand, and to establish control over its proponents, on the other.

This means that the evolution of a new system will proceed in amid a sluggish global war in the absence of a containing factor--a "second superpower"-under the pretext of fighting terrorism both in its classic and unconventional manifestations. Military action in Iraq and the related developments on the international arena to a very large extent brought about various manifestations of global confrontation--from reanimation of separate elements of the Cold War to ubiquitous crises and conflicts to the revival of "energy wars" and "trade wars," typical of the era of capitalism's transition to the stage of imperialism--in the late 19th-first half of the 20th century. Another important factor is a new background of confrontation and its main component---confrontation in the information sphere.

Washington's actions, aimed to ensure domination on the international arena, including through "neutralization" or reorientation of the emerging regional powerhouses, in addition to a simplification (for the United States) of methods and means of running the world (in the foreseeable future), could result in an over-expenditure of resources, material as well as human, and ultimately in undermining the U.S. economic positions and damaging the U.S. military capability.

So, the military action against Iraq should be seen, on the one hand, as the most clear-cut manifestation of the U.S. military-political course in recent years, consisting in the flagrant violation of all rules of international law to subdue a "rebellious" regional center of power, and on the other, as one of the first steps toward ensuring Washington's unconditional hegemony in the world.

Military-Strategic Aspects

The strategic surprise factor did not play an essential role in starting the military operation owing to the overwhelming superiority of the coalition force.

The operation was planned by the U.S. Armed Forces central command headquarters which was entrusted with the operation. In the course of its preparation, several possible options for coalition force action were explored, which were checked and adjusted with computer modeling.

Apparently a decision was made to conduct a simultaneous air/land offensive operation. The land phase of the operation began at the same time as the delivery of air strikes. Three land groups were to be created in the vicinity of the border with Iraq (Northern, in Turkey; Western, in Jordan; and Southern, in Kuwait), which could act under the cover of and in interaction with air and naval groups (the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, and the Red Sea). The use of strategic delivery vehicles in effective engagement of Iraqi troops and installations was considered within the general context of the set tasks.

A group of space forces and assets was raised in advance, ready to perform the necessary missions (reconnaissance, guidance, target designation, etc.).

The total numerical strength of the coalition force was up to 280,000 (including approximately 250,000 U.S. troops).

The axes of possible strikes by U.S. and allied land forces:

* from Turkish territory to Mosul-Tikrit;

* from the west, from Jordan, to Baghdad, with a simultaneous combing of Iraq's desert areas where mobile ballistic missile launchers could have been deployed;

* from Kuwait to Basra and then on to Baghdad. This line was seen as the most convenient for maneuver by "heavy" forces.

The main task apparently was not to rout or destroy the Iraqi armed forces, as was the case in the course of Operation Desert Storm, but to eliminate Iraq's supreme leadership. The following targets were chosen for engagement: top military and state command and control installations; presumed WMD production facilities; Iraqi elite army units and subunits; and the antiaircraft system. In assessing the enemy's condition and possible action, the morale of the Iraqi troops was underestimated. The allied command expected a massive surrender after the first few strikes.

Despite their high numerical strength (375,000 to 390,000), the Iraqi armed forces were considerably weaker than on the eve of the 1991 war: International sanctions had played their role, depriving Iraq of modern weaponry.

The Iraqi leadership dispersed the elite units of the Republican Guards and special task forces in cities and towns, thus turning them into well prepared and organized defense areas---in effect, strongholds. Urban warfare could have nullified much of the U.S.-British military-technical advantage.

The conduct of combat operations was substantially affected by Ankara's refusal to allow deployment of the Northern Group on Turkey's territory. The land operation in effect began from just one (southern) direction. The active phase of the operation apparently began earlier than planned since coalition force intelligence services received information that Saddam Hussein was holding, at one of Iraq's military command and control centers, a conference with the country's top officials who were a convenient target for the allied air force.

Considering the lack of coordination of activities and functions in the majority of military operations in recent years, the coalition command decided to conduct an air/land operation. Air strikes were designed mainly to provide fire support for land forces. That became possible as a result of the coalition's air and naval superiority that was achieved in the course of the preparatory stage of the operation. Furthermore, reconnaissance and intelligence helped identify the majority of enemy targets, playing a substantial role in preparing the operation.

Land and marine units advanced along the main highways and roads in approach march formation. Iraqi strongholds and fortified areas were sealed off with a part of coalition forces. Garrisons were given some time to surrender whereupon massive preparation fire was delivered with the employment of all available forces and assets. Close-in fighting was only used in exceptional cases while the attacking force, as a rule, had superiority owing to the longer range of its fire delivery.

The role of army aviation enhanced considerably. Helicopter gunships and combat aircraft were used in the entire spectrum of missions (fire support for battle tactical groups, disruption of the enemy's command and control system, conduct of all forms of reconnaissance, escort and cover of convoys, etc.).

To ensure support for combat operations and to provide direct air support for land forces, in addition to tactical Air Force and Navy aviation, strategic aviation and cruise missiles of different basing types were widely used. The following methods of action can be singled out: patrolling of the air space in expectation of impromptu missions, including to engage lan6 targets; elimination of Iraq's military-political command; airlifting of troops and cargo, etc.

Special task units had gone into action long before the active stage of the air/land operation began. They ensured reconnaissance and follow-up reconnaissance of critical targets, tracked the movement of Iraqi leadership, ensured target designation, control over Iraqi oil fields, etc. They were dropped into the Iraqi hinterland, deep behind enemy lines by air, in populated areas, to perform special missions (tasks).

Large and well-armed air assault forces with combat hardware and equipment were parachuted to target areas (detachments of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, in the north of Iraq, and subunits of the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division, in the west of the country).

Psychological operations were marked by high intensity and were conducted both to shape a positive public opinion among the Iraqi population and to impact Iraqi military personnel. They began a long time before the active phase of ground action and continued throughout the operation.

Thus, preliminary analysis of Operation Shock and Awe points to the conclusion that combat action by coalition forces in Iraq in March-April 2003 was marked by a number of distinguishing features both in its organization and conduct. It differs from previous operations by Western states mainly in the high level of interaction and synchronization of efforts of various branches and arms of service, the employment of all forms of maneuver with forces and weapons, and further advancement of forms and methods of warfare.

Military-Technical Aspects

The weapon systems used by the U.S.-British coalition force in Iraq included types and models of arms and military equipment that had been battle-tested in previous armed conflicts. Yet never before had such a number of diverse modern arms and military equipment been used so intensively and simultaneously in the course of one military campaign, which set exceptionally high demands on the quality and performance of command and control systems, above all automated command, control, and reconnaissance systems on the tactical level.

To ensure effective interaction and synchronization of efforts of targets reconnaissance and engagement systems, modern communication, navigation, and target designation facilities were used. New radio communication systems, used in reconnaissance information sharing networks on the tactical level, proved highly effective, making it possible, for the first time in the course of real combat action, to demonstrate the effectiveness of automated electronic mapping of the tactical situation for various command and control elements. In particular, integrated JTT-B tactical terminals were used on the platoon-company level and also by reconnaissance and search groups, showing real-time data received through satellite and land communication channels on the electronic map either on the desktop terminal screen or on a PC. Combined with automated command and control facilities, that ensured automatic or semi-automatic preparation of data for effective engagement of newly identified targets in real time, thus also ensuring the highly effective employment of precision guided weapons on the tactical level.

The reconnaissance facilities used in the operation ensured effective detection of enemy targets at a long range while automated command and control systems helped synchronize the functions of various weapon systems to ensure their suppression through fire delivery within a short time span.

One distinguishing feature of the combat operation in Iraq was a large-scale use of precision guided weapons, based on data received through communication channels in real time from the Navstar global positioning system and radioelectronic and optical reconnaissance assets. The high accuracy of target designation helped raise the share of precision guided ammunition to 85 percent.

Modern reconnaissance systems and facilities used by the coalition force showed the technical feasibility of achieving information superiority over the enemy. In the course of the war in Iraq, the United States used operational data received from the KN-11 optical-electronic reconnaissance system as well as data obtained at the preparatory stage of the war from Iconos and Quick Bed commercial remote sensing space based systems. Unlike in previous armed conflicts, during the operation in Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense chose not to buy exclusive rights for the use of commercial space based remote sensing systems since it took a very long time to transfer the necessary information to strike and effective engagement systems.

For the first time ever a powerful reconnaissance aviation group was created, including U-2, RC-135, EP-3E, and JSTARS aircraft and Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, the S-130 aircraft was for the first time used to receive reconnaissance information from Predator drones and to control their operation.

Also for the first time, the AN/AAQ Litening advanced airborne targeting and navigation pod, mounted aboard F-16 and AV-8B aircraft, was used in Iraq. Featuring an accuracy of about six meters, it was used to guide such weapon systems as JDAM and JSON, which do not have their own GPS systems. The laser target designation station ensures reconnaissance and aiming and guidance at an altitude of up to 13 kilometers.

It should be noted that the NATO information systems interoperability concept proved its viability in the course of the operation. Effective interaction was ensured between U.S. and British information systems--in particular, reception of reconnaissance data from GR-4A Tornado (Britain) aircraft equipped with the Raptor pod and U.S.-made information reception and processing systems.

Owing to the complete air superiority of the coalition force, antiaircraft and missile-defense assets were not used in the combat operation. Even so, Patriot PAC-3 antiaircraft missile complexes, capable of performing air-defense missions on the operations theater, were deployed in Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan with Patriot PAC-2 systems based in Turkey. For the first time in a combat environment, a Patriot PAC-3 complex intercepted an Iraqi Scud missile. Yet due to lack of synchronization of activities and functions of the coalition command and control system, a British Air Force Tornado fighter was hit by a Patriot PAC-3 missile, as a result of a malfunction in the friend-or-foe identification system. Malfunctioning of the automated antiaircraft command and control system led a U.S. fighter to launch an anti-radar missile on the Patriot complex.

The aspiration to follow the concept of "surgical" or "pinpoint" strikes led to a wide use of precision guided weapons (air and sea launched cruise missiles, air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles, laser guided bomb units GBU-24s, GBU27s and GBU-28s; GBU-29s, GBU-31s, and GBU-37s fitted with Navstar navigation systems, and AGM-154s), which helped avoid heavy civilian casualties, also ensuring effective engagement of hard, buried targets at a long range.

It should be stressed, however, that strategic precision guided weapons did not prove effective enough, showing insufficient accuracy and yield to disable designated targets, requiring follow-up strikes.

During the military operation, the United States conducted further tests of microwave weapons (electromagnetic bombs), but there are conflicting reports about their effectiveness.

In air strikes, strategic aviation aircraft (B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s), tactical aviation aircraft (F-16s, F-15Es, F-117s, Tornadoes, and A-10s), and carrier aviation aircraft (F/A-18Cs and F-14s) were used. Hard, deeply buried targets were engaged with 2,000-kilogram GBU-37s dropped from B-1 and B-2 bombers.

In the course of combat action, coalition forces used virtually all types of helicopters currently in service (AH-64A/D; OH-58D; UH-60L/Q; CH-47D; AH-1W; UH-1N; CH-46; CH-53D/E; SH-60B/F; MH-53J; SA-330s; and various modifications of the Sea King helicopter), but they did not prove effective enough owing' to weather and climatic conditions. Air engines also happened to be highly sensitive to desert sand. Heat-vision devices mounted aboard helicopters proved utterly useless in a high temperature, hot sand, and airborne dust environment. Furthermore, tiny particles of dust caused a large number of failures in onboard radioelectronic equipment.

In the course of the military operation in Iraq, the U.S. armed forces used the following types of armor: Abrams M 1A2 main battle tanks, Bradley M2A3 fighting vehicles, and also LAV-25 light armored vehicles and AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles. British forces used Challenger-2 main battle tanks and Warrior infantry fighting vehicles. Specifics of combat employment were determined by physical, geographic, and weather conditions (desert terrain, sandstorms) as well as by earlier experience, during Operation Desert Storm. Say, the previous campaign was marked by frequent failures of gas-turbine engines installed on Abrams M1 tanks, under the impact of sand and dust, As a result, engine air cleaners were substantially modernized. One distinguishing feature of armor used in the operation was its provision with friend-or-foe identification systems to prevent friendly fire incidents.

Information Warfare Aspects

The task of winning superiority in the information space was set before the operation began. The sustained information attack, the like of which could, to a certain extent, be observed in the course of the Balkans operation, not only overwhelmed Iraq's military-political leadership, rendering it unable to mount effective counteraction, but also caused substantial damage to the originally unified policy of European states toward the use of force against Iraq. The ultimate goal of the campaign was attained quickly and decisively, with minimum losses in men and materiel.

Analysis of information warfare activities points to a number of distinguishing features and specifics. Information warfare by the coalition force against Iraq can conveniently be divided into three stages. At Stage 1, before the onset of hostilities, priority was given to building "them" and "us" images, a special thrust being placed on ideological symbols justifying the direct use of force. At that stage, a peaceful option--in fact, entirely unacceptable to ether side--was promoted as a means of winning over public opinion. Mass media manipulation was used to produce active psychological impact on the country's leadership, disrupt state administration, demoralize the population and the armed forces, and support the internal and emigre opposition as well as separatist forces in Kurdistan.

Stage 2 began when the conflict entered an open phase with a change in the thrust of information warfare: The main goal at that stage was to show that the Iraqi side was using morally unacceptable forms of action as well as to win over new allies. At that stage (with the onset of air and missile strikes and the landing of amphibious assault forces on the coast and in the north of Iraq) the main emphasis in information warfare was shifted to the operation/tactical level. It was part of the military campaign, designed to ensure Iraq's unconditional capitulation on terms dictated by the coalition force. Only separate information warfare components were used to that end, on a limited scale. That was due to the fact that Iraq's state and military command and control system lacked modern automated facilities or means to effectively impact on the information infrastructure of both coalition forces or the infrastructure of the allied countries as a whole.

The main components of information warfare at this stage were information-and-propaganda activities, EW, and measures to disable elements of civilian and military infrastructure. In addition, the coalition force targeted the enemy's computer networks, although on a very limited scale.

Information-and-propaganda activities includes radio and television broadcasting to Iraq from the territory of neighboring countries. To increase the outreach, FM receivers with fixed reception frequencies were dropped from the air over Iraqi territory. In addition, propaganda leaflets were being constantly dropped, at a rate of up to 70 million copies a week: Importantly, considering the low literacy of the Iraqi population, the leaflets were for the most part graphic (comic strips, posters, drawings, and playing cards with the likeness of Iraqi leaders).

Finally, at Stage 3 (completion of the armed conflict), information warfare entered a new phase--spinning the facts in the interest of the coalition force.

Information warfare strategy at Stages 2 and 3 allowed even for the use of provocation or manipulation of facts. Not surprisingly, television became the main striking force in information wars both on the international level and in the course of the military phase of the campaign. A cocktail of video footage highlighting visual effects and with pre-recorded comment, almost entirely ruling out feedback, is easily absorbed by viewers regardless of their political persuasions. Furthermore, manipulation of facts was initiated directly by U.S. top officials. Thus, before the operation began, George W. Bush appealed to reporters not to make public details about the preparation of the U.S. military for combat action and generally to exercise maximum restraint in covering U.S. plans to fight international terrorism. Nonetheless, U.S. and European media outlets scrambled to publish plans and schemes for the conduct of the upcoming military campaign, revealing not only the numerical strength of the allied force but also its possible tactics. Clearly, the leak was organized in the spheres of U.S. military and political administration.

Television has yet again shown that it does much better than other mass media in putting a spin on reality and shaping the necessary picture of the world. And, the stronger the brand of a particular television channel and the larger its viewership, the greater its credibility. And the greater the number of channels providing a similar interpretation of events, the more effective their spin.

The easiest way of manipulating information is to deny reporters access to events on the ground while feeding the press official handouts and video footage received from the military, armed with notebooks and cell phones with in-built photo and video cameras.

Another method is based on the use of the visual effect of the cinema and television: Among the video footage or photos or satellite and aerial imagery selected by the military to be shown at news briefings at the press center during the war in Iraq, there was not a single "bad" item. But then journalists and TV viewers could admire breathtaking views from a fighter's cockpit, from its bomb compartment or even from aboard an in-flight missile.

There was an abundance of information reported in the foreign media during the operation in Iraq. Yet it must be recognized that the majority of those reports in fact contained elements of the aforementioned information warfare. Where did the reporters get their information from? Presumably, only that information is made public that is deemed beneficial by the ideologues of the antiterrorism campaign.

Disinformation and intimidation of the enemy through mass media today is not, however, the only element of information warfare. The strategic goal of this campaign is to impede the enemy's decision-making process, disrupting its ability to act or wage war in a coordinated and effective way.

As a matter of fact, the coalition force had been preparing for information warfare with an enemy that was greatly dependent on information systems in decision-making. To that end, they created special information viruses, EW techniques, and electromagnetic impacts. None of those information warfare methods posed a serious threat to Iraq. Yet information war theory posits that even a pre-industrial or agrarian society does have vulnerabilities. After all, the Iraqis do use modern means of communication, employ aviation that depends on navigation systems, and also have electronic bank accounts abroad.

In giving such a high priority to information warfare, the United States and its allies relied on their standoff capability, minimizing losses (in the direct sense of the word). We are approaching a stage of development when no one is a soldier anymore but everyone is a participant in combat action. The task now is not to inflict losses in men and materiel but to thwart an enemy's plans, demoralize it, undermine its worldview, and destroy its intrinsic values.

Lt. Gen. V. V. BARVINENKO

Deputy Chief of Military University of Air Defense

Doctor of Military Sciences

Honored Scientist of the RF

In terms of forces and fires, Iraq's air combat and air defense forces were rather big by the start of the war. They comprised 220 combat aircraft, including 80 fighter-bombers and 120 fighters, more than 100 SAM missile systems and 700 antiaircraft artillery guns. These aircraft, however (MiG-21/23/25/29s; SU-22/24/25s and Volkhov S-75 and Pechora S-125 SAMs), were old inventory and not quite suited for modern warfare. The Iraqi air defense system was composed of four air defense sectors: the Northern, Central, Western and Southern Air Defense Sectors and each sector had its own antiaircraft missile brigades, radiotechnical brigades, antiaircraft artillery brigades and separate antiaircraft battalions.

The opposing force of U.S. and British aircraft deployed at airbases of Persian Gulf countries and based on aircraft carriers in the northern part of the Mediterranean comprised approximately 1,000 combat aircraft including U.S. Air Force strategic bombers at forward bases Diego Garcia (the Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean), Thumrait (Oman) and Fairford (Great Britain).

The coalition forces' overwhelming numerical and qualitative superiority prevented Iraq from effective employment of aviation to launch strikes and its aircraft defense assets to fight off missile and air strikes.

According to press reports, there were two launches of antiaircraft missiles in the area of Baghdad during the initial hours of combat activities. As fighting progressed, coalition aircraft were fired at only by aircraft artillery guns and portable antiaircraft (SAM) systems.

According to open reports of U.S. and British military departments, the losses on April 2, 2003 included 4 planes, 6 helicopters and 2 RPVs and 5 helicopters crippled. Other sources put the losses at more than 40 aircraft.

Iraqi aircraft participation in combat was not in the reports. The chief reasons for Iraq's failure to employ its aviation and antiaircraft defense assets are said to have been: qualitative and numerical superiority of the coalition forces; malfunction of Iraq's weapons, aircraft and air defense owing to long-standing shortage of spare parts, tools and accessory kits; lack of trained air and missile system crews and demoralization of the military.

Nor is it ruled out that the feeble resistance of the air force and air defense is attributable to the fact that the Iraqi leaders managed, before the start of combat operations, to transfer to Iran and Syria the bulk of combat-ready aviation for safekeeping this combat equipment elsewhere in the Arab world.

Analysis shows, however, that neither the sorry condition of aircraft and air defense weapons, nor demoralization of the army were the main reasons for the poor performance of the Iraqi air force and air defense. Iraq almost did not employ its aviation and antiaircraft defense troops against U.S. and British offensive air weapons most likely because the Iraqi command realized it was impossible to score even insignificant results owing to the opposing side's absolute superiority. This superiority was not so much in numbers and quality. It was mostly absolute information superiority of the U.S. and British forces and their effective command and control.

The latter two reasons constitute the main lessons to be learned from the war in Iraq in 2003 and of other previous wars, which were analyzed, but proper conclusions have not been introduced in practical organizational development of the RF air force and air defense or methods and forms of their employment.

RF military art considers air operations (offensive and defensive) to be the highest form of operational employment of aviation and air defense troops (forces). The content of an air operation involving a large strategic air force and air defense formation and a disposition of armed forces in a strategic sector (theater of military operations) consists of a set of prepared and planned beforehand, coordinated and interrelated with regard to the objective, missions, place and time air and anti-air engagements and battles, massed, group, concentrated and single air strikes, and maneuver of air and air defense forces to repel enemy missile and air strikes and effectively engage enemy targets.

Despite the fact that operations in strategic sectors (theater of military operations) have been studied theoretically to a considerable extent, their implementation presents commanders of large strategic formations of air forces and air defense forces with considerable difficulties owing to the low potentials of the forces and assets of reconnaissance of hostile aircraft and ground targets, the inadequately developed communications system transmitting reconnaissance data and data about the friendly and cooperating troops (forces), the absence of simulating systems to support decision-making and plan operations and combat activities, and the limited capabilities of logistic and technical support systems.

Until recently, operations--including air operations (on theaters of military operations)--were also the highest form of operational employment of dispositions of troops (forces) of the potential adversary. Whereas the RF Armed Forces experience difficulties in implementing operations, the armed forces of advanced countries, primarily the United States and NATO countries, are switching over to what we see as fundamentally new and even more effective methods and form of military operations which they have been demonstrating in recent local wars and especially in the war with Iraq in 2003.

Transition to new methods and form of military activities has been enabled by advances in information supports of military activities implemented within the framework of information warfare concepts, as well as by developed logistic and technical support systems. Thus, the concept of building a unified information management structure of the U.S. Armed Forces says that effective conduct of operations calls for the creation of a system of information support based on the principle of functional integration of dispersed information assets based in outer space, on aircraft, ground and sea platforms (reconnaissance, EW, communications, navigation, weapons control, automatic processing, simulation and so on) with reliance on the services of global telecommunication networks both military and civilian. This will result, according to leading analysts, to an unprecedented possibility to systematically monitor the changing situation in any area on the globe, promptly appraise it and accurately guide weapons in any spot on the globe in strategic and tactical missions.

The most important objectives expected to be achieved in the information system are: the provision in a matter of tens of minutes via a satellite communications channel--upon request from command and control elements of large strategic formations, combined and ordinary units--of detailed maps (showing objects of 10 meters and, in the future, even less in size) of the areas of operations showing the current situation and including mosaic video inserts presenting some of the important features of the terrain' targets to be designated to weapon assets and assessment of the results of previous strikes; computer-aided appraisal of the enemy's intentions and development of operational options for the friendly troops.

To date, substantial results have been obtained with regard to programs of the information-controlled infrastructure. For example, U.S. air pilots had studied targets in Baghdad using its three-D image before the start of military operations in Iraq.

The development of reconnaissance and communications systems and mathematical models supporting decision making and planning enabled the armed forces of the United States and other countries to demonstrate new elements of methods and forms of military activities in recent local wars starting with the Guff War in 1991. Analysis of the Multinational Forces' activities in the Gulf shows that the employment of offensive air weapons in that war began with a three-day offensive air operation. In subsequent combat activities, offensive air weapons demonstrated elements of a new form of military activities. They consisted in performing in succession particular missions against individual targets and groups of targets with the employment of aircraft and cruise missiles maintaining action for 35 days on the level of an air operation (400-850 combat sorties). Analysis of these activities has given rise to many theories as to their form referring to it as a traditional air operation and new forms: an EW battle and an air campaign. Unfortunately, features of the new form have remained without analysis.

The U.S. and U.K. Operation Desert Fox in Iraq went on for 73 hours (from Dec. 17 to Dec. 20, 1998). The operation also demonstrated elements of the new form--successive missile and air strikes using precision weapons that hit more than 100 targets.

Military operations in Yugoslavia (1999) opened with two massed air and missile strikes followed, like in Iraq, by a succession of selective single and group strikes with an intensity of 50-70 sorties a day. Aircraft and missiles operated in groups against a considerable number of targets with air defense targets detected visually, by radars and IR equipment having been destroyed on a top-priority basis by antimissile forces and specially assigned forces.

In its antiterrorism Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001, the U.S. command decided fight away against holding a conventional operation as being ineffective because al-Qaeda and Taliban targets were very far away from each other and concealed. The operation achieved its objectives using the principle of "central-net conduct of combat operations." The reconnaissance system enabled detailed study and appraisal of the situation in the areas of combat operations and employ the most varied forces and fires ranging from modern laser guided weapons to obsolete B-52s and coordinate their employment using the so-called "horse-mounted soldiers" method where strikes were delivered fight after the detection of targets by integrated or organic reconnaissance assets. The radically upgraded system of communication between air crews and special operations forces reduced the time between the detection of targets by special units and strikes delivered against them by aircraft from several hours to several minutes.

The above analysis of MF operations shows that they cannot be related to any of the familiar forms of military operations. These are not combat operations because they are very closely tied in together by a common objective, missions and methods of performing them. But then, they do not add up to a single operation because all separate operations, first, are not planned and coordinated in advance; second, they are not of limited duration (an air operation can last up to 3 and maximum 5-7 days). These separate activities are characterized by transition from combat operations planned in advance to "adaptive" combat operations identification of targets (refining of identification of targets) and communication of targets to weapon assets are done shortly before, or even fight before their employment.

Let's examine the algorithm of preparing for and carrying out military operations of a new form in greater detail.

The command of an offensive air weapons force designates targets. Next, based on simulating the combat and information fields of the opposing air defense force, the command selects groups of targets that can be struck immediately by certain forces and weapons. These forces and weapons are immediately assigned to strike the selected group of targets and the timing and method of their actions are determined. The method of actions is usually intended to neutralize the potentials of the opposing side's air defense system. At the same time, it is possible to use either the "evasion tactics" (bypassing the radar coverage and zone of antiaircraft fire from ground-based antiaircraft weapons, the use of Stealth offensive air weapons), or the "tactics of suppression" by electronic and weapon assets or by special operations forces.

Without diverting its efforts to the process of direct command and control of the forces and weapons performing earlier assigned missions, the planning group plans subsequent activities.

Thus, the new form applied to operations of aviation and air defense forces amounts to simultaneous and consecutive, coordinated and interconnected (with regard to objectives) air and missile strikes adaptive to developing situations, air and air defense battles and engagements to destroy enemy targets and repel its missile and air strikes. Adaptive operations can be realized only on condition that there are developed reconnaissance and communications systems and in the presence of simulating complexes for presenting information about the enemy and friendly troops (forces) in an aggregated form convenient for the perception of command-and-control assigned personnel and for developing methods of operation of forces and weapons and their appraisal. It should be stressed here that in the absence of simulation facilities, aviation wouldn't be realizing planned strikes. The commanding officers should make sure that strikes are effective and there is necessary security protection for their aircrews. The duration of adaptive operations depends on the potentials of logistic and technical support potentials provided, of course, that the assigned forces and fires sustain acceptable casualties and losses.

Military operations launched by U.S. and Britain against Iraq on March 20, 2003 also had a clear sign of being an adaptive operation with regard to [Iraq's] air defense system. Based on reconnaissance data, there were successive group and single strikes against selected targets and even the first strike was delivered by offensive air weapons suddenly and rapidly on Saddam Hussein's residence where he must have been according to intelligence reports. Due to the fact that Iraq had not deployed its ground forces, U.S. and British ground troops were brought in once the strikes commenced. They pushed into the country's interior without entering the zones of fire of Iraq's weapons before making sure that they were destroyed. With this purpose reconnaissance was carried out and tactical, airborne and army aviation, ground forces delivered strikes, and special operations forces were also active. Iraq's armed forces and air defense could not contend against such activities. Nor was Iraq been able to employ its aircraft for air defense purposes because they could be downed instantly by long-range air-to-air missiles, Patriot antiaircraft missiles, etc.

The potential of U.S. offensive air weapons with regard to planning and implementation of adaptive activities are even greater with the emergence of the "dynamic planning" concept consisting in retargeting air weapons and cruise missiles after the giving of orders to go ahead with their missions and even in flight. Appropriate technical equipment is being developed for this purpose.

Adaptive dynamic control of offensive air weapons and air defense weapons of other troops (forces) is possible only through providing command and control elements with very powerful intelligent computer systems. Such facilities can be deployed in the strategic command and control echelons far from areas of combat operations. Thus, the U.S. military command has been putting in place measures for 10 years now to transfer military operations (above all, air operations) command and control to staff elements based in the continental U.S. Such command and control of Israel's air defense forces was used in Operation Desert Storm and in controlling air forces in the war against Yugoslavia. During the latter, 93 percent of the targets were assigned by Air Force command and control elements based in the continental U.S. Once the program of a global information control infrastructure is fully in place, the U.S. Armed Forces' adaptive-activities capability will be even greater.

U.S. military art theorists have put on record a new form of military operation. It has been named an all-out operation.

It is impossible to hold out against adaptive activities of troops, forces and weapons using forms traditional to the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the air operation, in particular. Activities designed and planned in advance can prove not quite matching the developing situation. At the same time, the limited potentials of existing reconnaissance, communications, logistic and technical support systems and, most importantly, the existing methods of command and control elements, which do not have the necessary simulation facilities, are already resulting in being too late with adapting to developing situations and too slow with preparing for and realizing subsequent activities. The potential adversary is equipped to be the first to go into action and can win even with smaller forces and fires of the same quality.

In order to end the developing negative tendency, Russia's military should also switch over to adaptive forms of military operations and in particular to adaptive air operations (both defensive and offensive). This is the main lesson of the U.S. and U.K. war against Iraq to be learned. This would take, first, supplementing the information warfare concept with building information networks and developing simulating systems; second, starting work to create on a priority basis information networks and simulating systems; third, bringing the integrated automation systems structure in conformity with the new algorithm of operation of command and control elements, that is to say, to create subsystems supporting decision making and planning combat activities and implementation of plans; fourth, introducing the necessary computer equipment and simulating systems in integrated automation systems of command and control elements of the armed forces (air forces, in particular); fifth, continuing studies of the new form of military operations, formulate its principles and adopt it.

Maj. Gen. V.A. MENSHIKOV (Res.)

Director of Research Institute of Space Systems

Doctor of Technical Sciences

The war in Iraq was for the U.S. army a testing range of sorts, where it ran through their paces new models of weapons and military equipment and upgraded methods of their combat employment. This assertion is fully applicable to space systems as well.

As distinct from the earlier period, when the use of space systems in local wars and armed conflicts was, as a rule, episodic (Vietnam, Middle East, Afghanistan, the Falkland Islands, etc.)--given a satellite in orbit and a possibility of its passage at an appropriate moment over an area under observation, along with a chance to optimize space communications and navigation equipment--the situation now is radically different.

The events in the Persian Gulf (1991) were the first case of a large-scale practical employment of space systems in the course of combat operations, with the multinational force using space assets at every stage in the operation. The space command's command and control agencies in the conflict area had the assignment to secure reconnaissance and communications, evaluate the results of engagement of enemy targets with fires, and provide navigation, topographicgeodetic and meteorological support to the troops.

As estimated by specialists, the 1991 Gulf war is "the first space-era war," or "the first space war of our era."

Yugoslavia was the next stage in the context of the continued effort to test and streamline the forms and methods of employment of space assets in support of combat operations. Space data were used to plan the missile and bomb strikes, monitor results thereof, and provide topographic-geodetic and meteorological support at each stage in the operation. A particular importance attached to the space navigation system, which enabled the functioning of precision weapons at any time in the day or night and under any meteorological conditions. An analysis of the space systems' performance in Yugoslavia and in earlier conflicts finally confirmed the need for and high efficiency of so-called space support teams created at different command and control echelons. For example, a specialized space employment element was set up under NATO C-in-C in Europe during the Yugoslav conflict in order to coordinate different reconnaissance operations and optimize the data thus obtained. About two dozen mobile tactical command and control teams were sent to the area of combat operations to provide space information to air and naval tactical echelon commanders.

The 2003 war in Iraq was an even more impressive affair as to the scale of application of space data. The Americans used various military and commercial surveillance and communications satellites, navigation and meteorological spacecraft, as well as missile early warning satellites. All in all, the open sources describe the orbital group that was used in the course of the war as comprising between 50 and 59 military spacecraft of different designation, 28 GPS craft, and a big number of commercial communications satellites and distant probes.

The United States started preparations for using the space systems long before the invasion. In this context DOD paid special attention to training highly skilled military specialists capable of handling operational space support missions. That enabled the Air Force Space Command to send its trained staff to traditional joint command posts.

The Space Command was best represented at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Prince Sultan airbase in Sandi Arabia. The Space Command team there was due to promptly coordinate the use of space systems during planning and pursuance of combat operations. For example, while planning air bomb attacks Air Force staffs geared them to the most effective positioning of GPS satellites over the battlefield, received weather data and images of targets to be attacked, and requested satellite communications channels. In addition, Space Command specialists informed the staffs of the armed forces services about the current and other capabilities of both military and commercial spacecraft for their integration in combat operations.

Use of space reconnaissance systems. Latter-year investigations and particularly the experience of military conflicts helped the U.S. lay the groundwork of integrated inter-service reconnaissance and weapon systems. The concept of joint and time-space coordinated employment of air reconnaissance and engagement systems and space reconnaissance systems, the two integrated in a unified system, is a qualitatively new stage in the development of precision reconnaissance and engagement systems.

It is this kind of integrated air-space reconnaissance system that was used in the course of this year's war in Iraq. The algorithm governing the functioning of the different systems is sufficiently simple but effective. Space reconnaissance systems (electronic warfare support and optical electronic equipment) that survey designated areas with high periodicity and are quick to relay intelligence will locate targets practically in real time mode. The target data will be transmitted to troop and weapon control centers and/or directly to aircraft, which will engage in follow-up reconnaissance and deliver fire for effect. This is the "see-and-hit" concept in practice.

In the U.S., the space contour of the integrated reconnaissance system includes optical electronic reconnaissance spacecraft Keyhole, radar reconnaissance spacecraft Lacrosse, electronic warfare support spacecraft Magnum and Fortex, and DMSP weather satellites. In addition, the Americans make wide use of data coming from civilian probes Iconos and QuickBird and from French-owned Spot. The air contour consists of reconnaissance drones such as Hunter, SD-289, and Predator.

These integrated systems possess a number of fundamentally important traits. First, operational flexibility inherent in the tactics of employment of air and space contours, with each contour capable of being used in a self-reliant way with regard to obtaining tactical situation. Second, a higher level of the system's ability to stand up in combat in connection with its multi-contour make-up and capacity for a continuous, all-weather, round-the-clock reconnaissance, something due to the presence of space systems and surveillance radars in both contours. There are joint space support teams organizing coordination and cooperation of the two contours. But each contour may also be used to perform independent missions. News agencies reported, for example, that the Central Command used space reconnaissance data in order to destroy Iraqi armor, the data relayed to strike aircraft in real time mode. To locate Iraqi armor and produce target designation data, the Command relied on three upgraded imaging reconnaissance satellites Keyhole-11 operating in visible and infrared spectra and on three Lacrosse satellites carrying on-board radars. The orbits were selected so as to have one of the satellites pass over Iraq's territory once every two or three hours and beam information to ground receiving stations. Thus, space information about the situation in the Iraqi TO as coming from the imaging reconnaissance satellites was updated nearly 12 times every 24 hours.

One shortcoming of the currently used imaging reconnaissance space systems is that they can be misled with the help of relatively simple countermeasures, such as camouflage, concealment and deception, as well as false targets. The Yugoslavs used these on a wide scale; the Iraqis could not but make use of them either.

Space navigation systems played an immense role in the war against Iraq. In the first place the case in point is using GPS NAVSTAR data to guide precision weapons. According to some information, the share of those weapons in this war was 95% (as against 7% in the 1991 war).

Like in the aggression against Yugoslavia, missiles and bombs beamed to target by the space navigation system, NAVSTAR, were the most effective weapons. They were not used in the 1991 war, because the system was fully deployed only by the mid-1990s.

One observes a tendency to put GPS receivers in weapons that previously used different guidance principles. Specifically these are ship-based Tomahawk cruise missiles and EGBU-27 bombs.

The conversion to satellite guidance systems dramatically increased the number of planes capable of using precision weapons against ground targets. Only 98 U.S. tactical general-purpose aircraft had the capability in 1991, whereas in 2003 practically the entire combat fleet--about 600 aircraft--carried precision weapons.

It was of an even greater importance for the coalition force that space navigation information was used for reconnaissance, command and control, air support, etc. According to some media allegations, GPS signals could be easily jammed with the help of simple jamming devices, something that made a big number of precision missiles miss the target. It is doubtful that those measures could have been highly effective. Yet it is quite obvious that some facts of employment of EW methods might have taken place.

The hostilities in Iraq confirmed once again the great importance of space communications for command and control while preparing operations in the course of the campaign. I mean the protected communications between the Central Command and the U.S. military-political leadership, the communications between 'the top military echelons and units in the field, and communications between units. Used for this purpose were both military communications satellite systems (DSCS, Milstar, Flitsatcom, etc.) and numerous commercial communications satellite systems.

A distinguishing feature of this war was pursuing operations over a huge territory without a clearly defined frontline. Under these circumstances, forces and assets got scattered quite widely and it was only the space communications that could assure prompt command and control.

Space communications are highly important where the case in point is communicating to units intelligence obtained by the integrated reconnaissance system. According to some data, satellite communications systems beamed info from reconnaissance drones.

Satellite telephones were widely used as well, assuring links between even several-strong mobile teams of servicemen and their commanders and between themselves. For this the force relied on civilian satellite personal communications systems like Globalstar, Inmarsat and Iridium.

While on the subject of prospects for military space systems, we must say that information support from outer space for 21st-century armed forces operations will remain one of the key tasks. Current studies, as well as the record of space employment in support of combat operations, including that in the Iraq war, indicate that the development of specialized space systems should follow two interactive directions.

First direction is about creating space equipment conforming to wartime requirements as regards its operational and tactical characteristics: minuteness, power, periodicity, prompt output, survivability, etc.

Second direction is about communicating space info to lower-level command-and-control echelons and prospectively to each individual combatant. The idea to communicate space info to the lower command-and-control echelon and down the line to each individual serviceman came into being only in the late 20th century, when there appeared "intellectual," highly informative, small-size hardware. The development also changed the very view on the nature of modern combat. The United States, for example, pursues, since 1993, its Soldier Modernization Plan (SMP) intended to enhance a soldier's battlefield capabilities. The SMP is about developing not only (and, one can say, not so much) specialized individual combat weapon systems but also personal gear and equipment.

This work is based on the "information war" concept that proceeds from the latest achievements of scientific and technological progress and the concurrent revolution in military affairs that occurred at the turn of the 21st century. In its consequences it can only be compared with the creation of nuclear weapons in the mid-1940s. Introducing information space technologies at all command-and-control and employment levels in fact makes it possible to speak seriously about "digitalizing combat operations." So, in keeping with the concept, each soldier's personal gear and equipment will necessarily include control (communications), navigation, and display hardware. Moreover, the hardware, rather than be in separate items, will form a light, small-size complex (kit). Its efficiency in many respects, or maybe even to a decisive degree will depend on the extent of integration of information computer and space technologies. Already there are some prototypes of its separate components as represented by modern portable computers of the notebook type, virtual reality (VR) helmets, pocket-size communications devices--pagers and cell phones--and finally individual space navigation kits. Some subsequent additions may be in the form of equipment controlling weapons, personal protection and camouflage. This will result in a multiple increase in each individual soldier's combat capabilities and self-sufficiency in whatever conditions of the situation. In terms of the effectiveness of his impact on the enemy, he will be equal, by the most conservative estimate, to a modern subunit such as a squad. True enough, his training should climb to a relevant level as well. A professional of this kind cannot be trained within the framework of the one-mouth-long course for young inductees. His training will have to go on continuously.

Latter-year scientific investigations and results of practical employment of space forces and assets in line units confirmed that developing small-size space info transceiver hardware must remain a high priority. It proved possible to define "informatively non-excessive" levels of communication of space info to various battlefield consumers, the structure and tasks of agencies responsible for its reception, treatment and transmission, and preferable configurations of orbital and ground systems.

So, what will the soldier be like in the near future? Man, regardless of his position in the army hierarchy, will still be number one, even if we agree with claims that 21st-century war or armed conflict can be regarded as a confrontation of "intellectual" information-and-weapon systems. No one will make decisions in his stead or relieve him of responsibilities. But, in order to "be up to the situation," each of them (soldiers) ought to have, apart from perfect weapons, reliable and highly productive equipment that can receive, display, treat and transmit info about the combat situation. An indispensable element of his personal gear and equipment will be high-capacity, jamproof and protected computerized space communications hardware, space navigation hardware, devices for coupling it to individual info display units, etc.

Separate subunits and, in necessity, each soldier will be given the capability for permanent communications with the command at any level regardless of distance, reliable command and control and coordination (including fire coordination) with other subunits and units, and a running exchange of reconnaissance data. This will make it possible to receive orders, coordinate them if necessary (depending on the situation), and perform combat missions in real time mode. Precise land navigation in any weather by day or night will be as commonplace as the exact time. The traditional paper maps will become a thing of the past too. These are going to be replaced by highly precise digital maps reflecting real combat situation and one's own location, which will be sent directly to individual field terminals. Even the friend-foe identification can be on the basis of coordinates taken off the terminal. Reconnaissance about the state of an area of operations, including radiation and chemical intelligence, will arrive more promptly and be easier to receive.

These advances will inevitably bring to a new qualitative level the command and control of troops and will increase their combat potential several times over. In past years, the task took several decades and generations of military equipment to accomplish. It is hard to believe that today this can be done by a miniaturized individual kit weighing several hundred grams that comprises a computer with input, display, communications, and navigation equipment. Of course, mission-specific equipment on board spacecraft and at command and control centers will have to change accordingly, too, as will the techniques and methods of situation evaluation and decision-making. Finally, the military must get used to the new level of control and execution of orders. But the key element, without an exaggeration, is precisely that tiny, by general human standards, individual kit. For the military it will be an analogue of sorts of the PC that makes its triumphant tour of the world.

A likely basic prototype is the protective monitor helmet. Its display will flash integrated info about the presence and strength of enemy forces, the state of an area of operations, disposition and strength of friendly adjacent forces necessary for combat cooperation, etc. As is natural, it will also be the receiver of the majority of combat orders and instructions. A possible problem that will have to be addressed in this connection is how an individual soldier perceives varied info that comes from the display and the real environment. It is also a problem of split attention amid a dynamically shifting combat situation, a problem of selection and distribution of data for different consumers, a problem of secrecy, protection, etc. In addition, it is still early to speak about the creation of universal prospective personal gear with elements of space equipment that will fit any soldier in any conditions. At stage one the work on its elements should be based on the modular principle, which would make it possible to promptly develop variants corresponding the most to a soldier's specialization and to conditions, in which he will have to operate. But no fundamental, "insolvable" problems are in view. Similar problems have long been tackled with success by the Air Force.

The prevalent role of outer space in achieving the aims of warfare in the 21st century will be due to an active pressure and combat support for armed forces actions from space. The task implies the development and deployment of space-based weapons for military operations in space and from space. It is also about protecting friendly satellites; ensuring access to space; interdicting the adversary from using space systems for his purposes; destroying ground stations and satellite communications equipment and channels; disabling orbiters; as well as, possibly, using space weapons against ground targets. It is likely that in future the emphasis in space weapons will shift toward this task, which will gain greater eminence.

Foreign specialists believe that a transition to space control and strikes from space is inevitable, for their role grows steadily. It is quite likely that in future, space attacks will be launched to destroy not only enemy spacecraft, but also ships, aircraft, ground targets and warheads in flight. It is for this reason that certain space powers are developing directed-energy weapons and kinetic-energy weapon systems to destroy targets. Both ground facilities and aircraft are intended for their combat employment. An indicator of the growing importance of space forces is their confinement, along with nuclear missiles, to the "combat air force" (CAF) category.

The turn of the 21st century saw the emergence of information warfare and non-lethal human impact technologies. Systems created on the basis of these technologies can be deployed aboard spacecraft and are supposed to ensure both continuous and periodic massed influence on chosen areas for the purpose of temporary manpower disablement, demoralization of the population and other things. The possibility of dealing with these tasks from space will lead to a qualitative and quantitative change in the forms and methods of combat operations and warfare organization as a whole.

It might be well to point out that the modern epoch is characterized as an epoch of information wars (information confrontation), which particularly emphasize the role and importance of space information systems.

The Gulf war (1991) was called the first "information war," which the United States won. In modern conditions information is a tool of control, which is used at all stages of the managerial cycle. Lack of information misleads decisionmakers and is a source of ungrounded and subjective decisions. To put it differently, information is as much of a military resource as soldiers and military equipment are.

Based on its analysis of Desert Storm results, DOD developed new combat influence methods, which particularly emphasize measures within the framework of the "information war" concept. Its application to warfare means a shift of emphasis in decision-making from traditional confrontation methods (fire, attack, maneuver) to the intellectual and information sphere.

The main "information war" goal is to cause disintegration of and split up a centrally controlled enemy force grouping into several isolated, disoriented and uncontrolled parts and subsequently to disable them by fire (physical) destruction. Preliminary analysis shows that the Americans achieved certain "information war" successes during the second Iraqi campaign. The search for new forms, methods and means of warfare in different areas of human activities will be continued in the 21st century.

It should be mentioned that modern military doctrines and national security concepts accepted by the leading space powers assign a special role to space. For example, the White House's A National Security Strategy for a New Century that was published in October 1998 outlines Washington's attitudes of principle to the outside world ,and the use of outer space in the national security interests. It regards space as one of the main spheres, where the existing and would-be technologies are crucial for the defense of the United States itself, a sphere that can be of key importance in enabling the U.S. to use its might for the shaping of a favorable international climate and to be ready to react to the entire spectrum of possible threats and crisis situations.

Therefore, in keeping with A National Security Strategy for A New Century, the U.S. intends to keep its space leadership and to work to have an unhindered access to outer space and a chance to use it for the protection of its national security, which helps national welfare and prosperity. The document emphasizes that outer space has gained global information significance with serious political, diplomatic, military and economic consequences for the United States. Washington's policy consists in promoting all types of space activities in defense of vital security interests. It intends to contain threats in space and, if that fails to produce the desired results, to suppress hostile efforts that stand in the way of U.S. access to outer space and its use. It is proposed to retain the capability to combat space systems and craft, which may be used against America's ground, air and naval forces, command and control systems and other structures of national security importance. The U.S. keeps a close watch on commercial long-range surveillance satellites so that space visual information might not be used to harm U.S. security.

Thus, the preliminary analysis of space employment in the Iraq war confirms the science-based conclusion about the growing role of space in combat operations, which we have repeatedly emphasized over the last few years. Hence the need for the national military-political leadership to pay an increased attention to space, especially after it plummeted in the early 1990s and practically never revived in the early 21st century. Unlike the Americans, we in this country for some reason don't link national security with space activities, as is evident from the National Security Concept approved by the Decree of the RF President of January 10, 2000, No 24, which does not mention space at all.

Now let me turn to the concrete lessons that can be learned from the last war in Iraq and to what can be done to change for the better the situation with military space in Russia.

First. Looking for new forms and methods of combat operations. Putting into practice its National Security Doctrine, the United States is active in looking for new forms and methods of combat operations involving mass-scale use of spacecraft in future wars, both world and local, as well as in antiterrorist operations. For the U.S. army, the Iraq war was a testing ground of sorts, where it ran through their paces new models of weapons and military equipment and improved their combat employment methods. Therefore, it is urgently necessary to step up theoretical research into and practical testing of new forms and methods of combat operations, including in space and from space.

Second. Using space capability in line units.

The time has come for radical decision-making on organizing the use, in line units, of all the capabilities afforded by space reconnaissance, navigation and communications facilities. Primarily the case in point is practicing precision weapons employment methods, developing information feeder equipment for tactical subunits, and streamlining forms and methods of command and control via space.

Integration seems one possible way to deal with this problem: a unified, integrated reconnaissance, target designation and engagement system serving as an umbrella for joint, time-space coordinated employment of land, naval and air reconnaissance and engagement assets and space reconnaissance assets.

Forming space support teams might be another possible way to improve the organizational forms of line units using space reconnaissance info. The Russian army has had certain positive experience using space support teams in the operational-tactical and tactical echelons, as obtained in the course of operational training. The main tasks facing the said teams are to estimate the state and efficiency of spacecraft, to draw up proposals on how to use them for data collection, and to provide space info (reconnaissance, weather, navigation, and communications) to commanders at different command-and-control echelons along with use recommendations.

To work efficiently, the space support teams will need specialized mobile centers with a capacity to receive, process and supply satellite information in a form fit for use by consumers. Having spacecraft designed for operational deployment, the space support teams will be able to plan their targeted use and operational deployment of space systems, and to control their constituent spacecraft. The space support teams are one of the more promising ways in bridging the gap between the space potential and its practical use in line units.

Third. Upgrading space navigation assets.

Broad-scale introduction in line units of subscriber's space navigation equipment will dramatically boost weapon system efficiency. This makes introduction of subscriber's navigation terminals in units and subunits number one priority. As far as space navigation assets themselves are concerned, the task is to build up their jamproof characteristics, assuring their protection not only against "microwave ovens," but also against more powerful and complicated jamming devices.

Fourth. Upgrading capabilities of space reconnaissance assets.

As is evident from Iraq war record, it is necessary to convert to spectrozonal systems that can identify definite signs by analyzing fine target signature for space reconnaissance assets to be able to distinguish a wooden tank model or an inflatable metallized decoy target from real ones. Development effort should be directed toward the creation of space reconnaissance assets whose efficiency will not be seriously affected by sand storms, dust and smoke or by clouds and precipitation.

Fifth. Creating better EW assets.

This most serious task follows from the previous lesson. EW assets should interdict the use of precision weapons and disrupt combat command and control. An integrated EW system using, among other things, space-based assets is one of possible ways of dealing with this problem.

Sixth. Creating antisatellite weapons.

This conclusion follows naturally from the point about the necessity of boosting the importance of space-based information support assets for efficiency of military action. Antisatellite weapons may be based anywhere, in outer space included. It is worth noting that the U.S. Air Force already works closely on securing space control. It has set up 35-man Space Situational Awareness Initiative Office (SSAIO) whose business it is not only to watch outer space but also to provide for offensive and defensive counteraction in space.

Seventh. Building up orbital force.

Space support teams and other expedients will not help if there are no craft in orbit. Consequently, number one priority is to bring the orbital force to the prescribed strength level that ensures normal use of the existing space assets.

Eighth. Doing futuristic R & D.

The above-mentioned measures are for the present time; what is required for their implementation, aside from the political will, is perhaps a little money. Not so prospective R & D. If we do not want to be ditched in future, we must step up work on futuristic space technology.

One would like to say in conclusion that today the media are actively discussing military space problems. Specifically, the Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye (No 19, 2003) carried the article "Does Russia Need a Fourth Armed Forces Service?" by Doctor of Technical Sciences Colonel Baskakov, who shares his views on the growing role of space weapons in modern conditions, considers different variants of the organizational structure of the space component of the Armed Forces of Russia, and suggests his vision of its role and place. He provides sufficiently convincing arguments in favor of creating a new AF service, Rocket Space Forces, due to include Military Space Forces, Rocket Space Defense Forces, and Rocket Strategic Forces.

His arguments and proposals are not entirely indisputable, but what causes no doubt is the growing role of space assets in warfare, which requires from the Government and the Defense Ministry greater attention to space, as well as active steps designed to improve the organizational structure of space units. They also should look for new forms and methods of combat operations with regard to contribution and capabilities of the space component.

Army General M.A. GAREEV

President of the RF Academy of Military Sciences

The results of the war in Iraq need to be examined because there is much speculation and false information about it. Moreover, as a continuation of the Sept 11, 2001 developments in the United States and the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq has marked ever so much clearly a sharp turn of the U.S. policy toward dictate in international affairs and given rise to related problems that call for gaining a better understanding.

Military-Political Conclusions

Far from having exhausted all possibilities of political settlement, including the UN potentials, the American-British coalition started war against Iraq under the pretext that Saddam Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction. But it was clear to everyone from the start that the main goals were oil, finding a solution to the latest economic problems and further consolidation of geopolitical positions of the United States in the world. In particular, a task is being set to eliminate all objectionable regimes, impose order throughout the world and establish a new system of world order under the aegis of the United States. To all intents and purposes this amounts to carving up the world once more after the Cold War and first and foremost its energy resources. Not only individual political figures, political scientists and journalists but also responsible officers of state say that next in line now are Syria, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Belarus.

In these conditions, some very influential persons in Russia think that our country has no other option but to knuckle under to such an expansionist policy and participate in all military actions to subdue the other "undemocratic" states. At the same time, they never give it a thought to what is going to happen to our country both from the point of view of morals, international law and the protection of its own national interests if it is going to be in the state of permanent war with all countries that are not to the liking of some people.

As many people know, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken a principled stance on the Iraqi war. He said quite justifiably: "If we allow international law to be replaced by the law of the fist, under which the strong is always right and is unlimited in the choice of means to achieve his goals, then one of the basic principles of international law, the principle of inviolability of the sovereignty of states, will be put into question. And then no one, no country in the world will feel safe." (1)

This stance adds to Russia's international prestige and rallies those forces of the world community which advocate equitable relations between sovereign states and resolution of differences that arise in the world through peaceful political means. But this sound policy is coming under attack. There are growing resounding claims that failing to support the American-British aggression against Iraq, Russia has made a mistake and that no matter what it should side with those who would be sure winners. For example, Sergei Karaganov writes: " ... So far, there are no tendencies in sight to indicate future weakening of the United States ... Having friendly relations with the United States pays as a rule, and opposing it as doesn't pay as a rule." (2) Most surely, to be friends is always better than to be enemies, but this doesn't depend on us alone.

Incidentally, Great Britain and the United States led by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1941 did nor side with Hitler who seemed to have been on the winning side and instead they supported the USSR--the victim of the aggression, and this had largely predetermined the fate of all mankind. In our day and age, it is not necessary to follow in the wake of forces that are scoring victories today. All things considered, a farsighted and just policy will finally prove to be the most correct.

Not to be ignored, of course, is the actual balance of forces in the world. There are rather influential political and financial forces behind the transmitters of the expansion policy and their apologists. They are creating powerful information centers in various countries including Russia and "donkeys loaded with gold" have crossed not only the gates of Baghdad but also infiltrated many government and research organizations and the media.

A large-scale pseudo-scientific and information campaign has been launched in recent times to whitewash and justify the policy of expansion. I have in mind the following.

First, the war in Iraq has been proclaimed as the unveiling of a one-polar world and the deep-sixing the multipolar world. The United Nations is thought to have become obsolete and in need to be replaced with a world government of some sort. Those who are trying to impose "a new world order" believe that all countries should take orders from that new world center in which case there will he order throughout the world. The norms and rules of international affairs are being revised. They are being adapted to the interests of the aspirants for world domination.

Second, the concept of "sovereignty of states" is proclaimed obsolete. Some political scientists think that the national liberation struggle gave rise to a vast number of politically and economically failed states. They are sources of crises and instability around the world. Thus, Sergei Karaganov maintains that "it is the deep destabilization alongside, of course, the desire to consolidate its might and positions of a superpower that are mainly behind the American actions in Iraq." (3) Others think that "developed democracies" are now acquiring the right to depose unsuitable regimes in such states and forcibly convert them into "real democracies."

Third, corresponding forms of ruling conquered peoples are being developed. Oxford University Professor Neil [Niall] Ferguson published this year a book that is being broadly advertised, The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power where he is trying to prove that the British Empire was the most appropriate and civilized form of ruling backward nations. The situation deteriorated following the demise of the colonial system. The author of the book, as do some of his supporters in Russia, thinks that "the most logical method of resisting chaos, that was most frequently used in the past, is colonization, and that the possibilities and, perhaps, the need for colonization are in no way smaller than they used to be in the 19th century." (4)

There are attempts to revise our entire history for the benefit of all these ideas. Moskovsky komsomolets (No. 19, 2003) carried an article by G. Popov who writes about a campaign for [Russia] to join the West as far back as the Time of Troubles, early in the 17th century. Some folks go as far as to proclaim Minin and Pozharsky reactionaries who should not have driven the Poles from Russia thus preventing a closer contact with the West at that time. Being added to this are all manner of falsifications of the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

Such is a "scientific justification" of modern policy of the fist intended for imposing a defeatist colonialist ideology. At the same time, every effort is made to gloss over the question of how this new world policy may affect Russia. Naturally, our country should be doing its best to avoid confrontation with the United States and other Countries and build first of all cooperation with developed countries. At the same time, it should be in harmony with all public forces and countries advocating a sound, peaceful policy and rejecting extremism in international affairs.

There is no doubt that opposition to such a policy will be growing. For example, France is being slighted for its refusal to support the war with Iraq. There had been so much talk about democratizing international affairs and now all of a sudden one of the great powers is denied the right to voice its judgement. This approach is hardly acceptable. There is no and should not be indiscriminate anti-Americanism in all that. We have great respect for the American people and special respect for American WWII veterans who fought together with us against Nazism. When in the United States in April 2003 and meeting with war veterans, we could see that they and an enormous number of people spoke against the war in Iraq and voiced their disagreement with the preachers of arbitrariness in international affairs and their apologists.

We can and should cooperate with the current U.S. administration. Vladimir Putin's meetings with George W. Bush in St. Petersburg, the G8 Summit, the NATO-Russia Council, and the EC-Russia Council along with the other forums and agencies should be used as best as possible to expand and deepen understanding and uphold Russia's interests.

But what should be done when in a number of instances confrontation is being stoked and forced upon? For example, when the United States retains laws limiting trade with Russia, opposes cooperation of Georgia and Azerbaijan with the Russian Federation in oil and gas, and plans the largest after WWII redeployment of NATO forces closer to Russia's boarders, etc.

We may ignore the calls from such political scientists as Zbigniew Brzezinski for the need to dismember Russia as a literary and journalistic exercise, although official authorities often heeded such calls. The RAND Corporation's forecasts and scenarios of war against Russia can be attributed to errors and the special nature of its research activities. These scenarios list among the possible reasons for attacking Russia: a decline in Russia that can affect the United States' interests; actions of Russian troops in troubled regions; violations of safety rules in storing nuclear weapons, etc. Thus, there's always a pretext to be found. The above think tank is partially paid for from government funds of the U.S. Air Force. Let's assume that this corporation doesn't develop concrete war plans. But U.S. Under Secretary John Bolton accused Russia of helping Iran with its nuclear program and said pointblank that U.S. strikes could befall not only a country connected to terrorists but also states working with Iran on a program for peaceful uses of nuclear equipment.

However, many people know who funded and armed the Taliban in Afghanistan, who nurtured Osama bin Laden, who and how brought Saddam Hussein to power in Iraq, who provided him with chemical weapons and spurred him into war with Iran in the 1980s. If terrorism is nurtured on the government level to be combated later, this combat can go on forever.

Moreover, despite the seemingly easy victories in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, the goals of establishing a "new world order" have not been achieved. Far from stabilizing the situation, such military operations give rise to fresh painful problems. One of them--the Kurd problem--can detonate the situation in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey.

Throughout the 20th century, the strong point of the U.S. government policy was the ability to create the most favorable foreign-policy conditions for waging war and the employment of its armed forces. The United States entered WWI in 1917 when military operations were on the wane. During WWII, it launched its decisive Normandy Invasion in Europe in 1944 when the fate of Nazi Germany was sealed. The United States managed to involve the UN in the Korean War in the early 1950s. It only failed in Vietnam. During the war against Iraq (1991), Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan, most countries supported the United States unconditionally. Politically and diplomatically everything was so arranged that the armed forces did not have to exert themselves too much. Going to war with Iraq in 2003, the United States did not get such an unreserved support even from NATO. Even the American press therefore began to talk about a serious lapse in the foreign-policy and information support of the military operation in Iraq.

There is a saying: "There is no better way to spite a friend than to agree with him on every count." From this standpoint, the calls of apologists of American hegemony to please the United States and back it in every way are harming the interests of more than the international community. While abetting arbitrariness and adventurism in politics, they are creating dangerous long-term prospects for the American people. It is because of their respect of America that honest people should not be shy to talk about this. Already after the combat operations, the United States had to go back to some extent to bringing the UN and other countries in postwar settlement in Iraq. It had become also clear that far from all major international problems could be solved without Russia's participation. This indicates that there exist between Russia and the United States, Russia and China not only differences but also shared interests that call for joint actions. This was so during WWII when the interests of combating Nazism made it essential to put aside the differences and pool efforts for joint struggle.

At the present stage, Russia and the United States have two areas which necessitate close cooperation and partnership--security and energy resources.

In the interests of the international community it is necessary to restore and consolidate the UN role and respect the principles proclaimed by it. The UN is no abstract international organization. It is comprised of concrete countries, and it depends on them and primarily on the policy of the permanent members of the Security Council which role this organization is going to play in the affairs of the international community. It this case, Russia, France, and China will be able to become more involved in combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations and other operations to protect international security.

The Belligerents' Plans and Their Implementation

Some foreign and Russian experts expected the U.S. command to mount at the start of hostilities, like it did in 1991, a long air operation to destroy and cripple the nationally vital installations, most important military targets and centers of government and military control. Such an operation must have been planned as a possible option. But the situation discouraged a full-scale implementation of this operation and only some of its elements were implemented.

The point is that, according to some sources, U.S. special services had been in secret talks with political and military figures of Iraq, including the Presidential Guards. However, the terms advanced were not to the liking of either side. Controlled by appropriate agencies, some [Iraqi] generals refrained from going ahead with their traitorous plans for as long as Saddam Hussein stayed alive or until he reached an agreement with the Americans about his future.

Knowing about this, the U.S. command was trying to destroy the Iraqi ruler as soon as possible. One can suppose that the first missile and air strikes that were delivered ahead of the expiration of the ultimatum to the Iraqi leaders to achieve an element of surprise didn't achieve their objective. This necessitated the recourse to massive air and sea-based missile strikes against planned targets. Since no serious enemy resistance had been expected, plans called for bringing simultaneously ground forces into Iraqi territory and an airborne assault force and special units into the country's interior.

Created for invading Iraq were three operational groups of forces: first--in the South (3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division, a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, Marine units, etc.); second--in the North (special units, 173rd Separate Air Assault brigade); third in the West (mostly consisting of special operations units). There were plans to bring the total strength of forces to 300,000 personnel and 700 aircraft.

The Iraqi command hoped most of all that Arab countries and the UN would manage to prevent American invasion of the country's territory. In the event of war, there were plans to employ the available air force and air defense assets to repulse at least a fraction of enemy offensive air weapons and, most importantly, to offer resistance to enemy ground forces. Proceeding from the 1991 experience, when defensive positions of troops, armored equipment and artillery pieces were stationed out in the desert and could be easily detected by the enemy, it was decided to concentrate on defending cities and other built-up centers, carry out sudden counterattacks, set up ambushes, carry out subversion activities and launch a guerrilla war. However, the decision against building defenses out in the desert, especially on approach routes to Baghdad, was hardly justified. Careful camouflage and concealment combined with building a great number of decoy targets, minefields could have played an important role in repulsing the invasion of the American and British forces.

Military operations as part of the "Shock and Awe" phase began on March 20, 2003 with missile strikes at sites where Saddam could have been and communications and command and control centers of the Iraqi forces. As a result, much of the command and control system was disrupted right from the start. This notwithstanding, the Iraqi army offered very fierce resistance (especially in the country's south) to American and British forces until 7 and 9 of April.

For their part, the U.S. forces, which had as their objective to rapidly break through to Baghdad and other important centers around the country, were trying to avoid armed clashes with Iraqi units and storming built-up centers, and were swinging around pockets of resistance. They bottled up the defending enemy forces, immediately called for artillery fire, with helicopters and tactical air forces delivering strikes. The troops only moved forward having completely defeated the opposing side's forces and fires, mopped up and occupied the areas. Notably, Umm Qasr and Basra were surrounded by British troops during the first week of military operations. There were later several reports that these cities had been taken but there were practically no big numbers of casualties and prisoners of war. Combat operations in other places were also rather strange.

As it always does, the U.S. command paid much attention to intelligence and reconnaissance. Long before the war, a far-flung network of covert agent intelligence was established. This mission was also performed illegally to a considerable extent by some members of the IAEA Commission as they searched through Iraqi territory. Reconnaissance by spaceborne assets turned up much reliable intelligence information. But not all intelligence proved reliable. Thus, the Americans expected the Shiites to rise against the Saddam regime as soon as the coalition forces went into action. But reality proved that religious differences take a back seat infighting against a threat to a nation. Furthermore, weather conditions had not been forecast accurately enough.

One of the objectives of the American military action in Iraq was to test new types of weapons. Whereas in 1991 precision homing (guided) munitions were used on a relatively limited scale (210,000 missiles, projectiles and air bombs out of the total 227,000 were unguided), in 2003 nearly 85 percent of the munitions employed were guided. The use of satellite guidance systems made it possible to employ a considerably greater number of aircraft that can employ precision weapons. The GPS had a decisive effect on combat employment of all types of weapons. More than that, up in outer space were 60 space vehicles of various designations that beamed prompt information on the situation in the zone of military operations.

There is an ever-growing role of the Navy that launched the biggest number of precision strikes at Iraqi targets (whereas 282 Tomahawks were employed in 1991, the Navy employed close to 1,000 in 2003).

Electromagnetic bombs were also used in the war with Iraq, but they did not play any special role because the Iraqi EW assets were practically down.

At the same time, the operation of reconnaissance assets proved to be superb: reconnaissance satellites, reconnaissance helicopters, the E-8 GSTAR, DEW and E-3 AWACS aircraft, tactical electronic reconnaissance aircraft, field artillery non-visual target acquisition radars, special units, artillery observer aircraft and forward air controllers. Night-vision devices, satellite-based and other navigation equipment provided in the whole reliable terrain orientation and sufficiently accurate aiming of artillery projectiles, guidance of air bombs, air- and sea-launched missiles at night and in daytime under the most adverse weather conditions. Computerized communications and data processing facilitated continuous and prompt command and control.

But not all was smooth sailing in this area. Such cases when an airdopped assault force found itself in a swampland in Iran instead of a desert in Iraq, missiles launched on Baghdad fell in Turkey, or when on March 27 an A-10A ground-attack plane fired in poor visibility on a friendly armored convoy and requested artillery fire that killed or wounded 50 soldiers, speak for themselves. The downing by an U.S. antiaircraft crew of a British plane signals a fault in the NATO identification system. All this confirms the fact that the most perfect equipment cannot be effective without humans--commanders and ordinary soldiers. Practically all elements of the U.S. armed forces hugely depend on space communications for weapon guidance and positioning. This makes such communications facilities vulnerable because they can be neutralized through appropriate jamming.

The total air superiority of the Americans was decisive for the outcome of the war in Iraq. The Iraqi command's attempts at maneuver of troops in the directions of threat or counterattacks were frustrated through timely detection and prompt artillery and air strikes through integrated reconnaissance and strike systems with the use of precision guidance weapons.

Iraq's civilians sustained big losses. The dropping of air bombs on street markets, hospitals, hotels and other civilian facilities attest not only to insufficient "smartness" of precision weapons. The impression is that in a number of cases civilian targets were deliberately destroyed to intimidate the population and the troops and force them into prompt surrender. Despite the existing ban on the use of cluster bombs, the U.S. military continued their employment against targets that included residential blocks in Baghdad resulting in massive destruction, damage and loss for the population.

Some Conclusions from Experience of Military Operations in Iraq

First, there is a clear general pattern and sequence of politico-diplomatic, economic, information, psychological, military and other actions, in accordance with a single scenario, against undesirable states. In Iraq's instance we can see that such a country is at first proclaimed a "rogue state." Before launching a full-fledged war (military operations), there is a long spell of economic blockade, political isolation, sustained information pressure on its population, the shaping of international public opinion, neutralization of sympathizers or potential allies, and measures to weaken its military potential.

Iraq could not buy new weapons. It had been even denied the fight to buy spare parts for the maintenance and modernization of its obsolete weapons and military equipment. Which is why a considerable proportion of them was unserviceable. After 1991, no-fly zones were established in Iraq's north and south and they were periodically bombed.

Generally, the civilians and the military were subjected to such a powerful political, economic and psychological pressure that they could not even consider any resistance. Then came missile and air bomb strikes to break all the will to resist. This can be a useful lesson for other countries that still intend to stand up for their sovereignty.

How this relates to Russia's security, was noted by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov who was speaking at an Academy of Military Sciences conference: "Let's acknowledge that a war against Russia is already on, and it has been on for more than one year now. No one has declared this war on us. No one concrete nation is in a state of war with Russia. But there are persons, organizations in many countries that participate in conducting hostile actions against the Russian Federation."

Second, from the point of view of development of military art, the experience of the war in Iraq does not enable any far-reaching conclusions because there was no serious war with a strong adversary. There was a punishment meted out by a politically sophisticated and technologically powerful nation to a country weakened in all respects and betrayed by its own rulers. This is not war where the dispositions of forces, aircraft on airfields and headquarters of the aggressor are not subjected to enemy pressure. Iraq's air defense and airforce were paralyzed. After Baghdad was surrendered without a fight on April 9, military operations virtually stopped. It is difficult under these conditions to judge how well the American command and control, weapons or strategy and tactics have stood the test by combat.

But even in such a simplified situation resembling a one-sided exercise more than war the coalition had many problems with command and control of forces and fires in dispersed operations on wide fronts, with identification, accuracy of laying artillery guns, vectoring tactical aircraft and helicopters, and cooperation between different combat arms. Its armored vehicles proved to be insufficiently adapted to operation in desert conditions. Even such a comparatively limited war required considerably more ammunition, fuel and lubricants than planned.

Judging by some episodes of operations of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, the organizational structure of divisions comprised of 10-12 battalions without a regimental echelon does not prove to be quite worthwhile. In highly fluid operations on wide fronts, where it is essential to detail combat units for the protection of supply and communication lines, command and control becomes appreciably more difficult. Without their own logistics and technical support elements, brigade commands cannot be an efficient replacement for the regimental echelon.

Despite all those things, there is no doubt at all with regard to the huge technological superiority of the U.S. military and the importance of the well-coordinated command and control system equipped with latest technology. The arguments of some of our critics to the effect that the Iraqi war has exploded the myth of the role of precision weapons in high-tech warfare, of professionalism of the U.S. army, claims that not a single mission was performed as scheduled and some other claims seem to be at variance with what was really happening.

The strongest aspect of the U.S. military is that all of its services are equipped with long-range precision weapons which enables, in a number of cases, to conduct remote combat operations. In addition to big casualties and losses this makes the opposing side feel helpless, doomed and weakens its will to fight back. The defending side has two main methods to react to such a formidable superiority: first--to resolutely concentrate financial and military-technical efforts to create its own long-range precision weapons; second--to force upon the enemy what it avoids, to wit, aggressive and resolute contact actions.

Third, the forecasts and farfetched hasty conclusions by some so-called prominent experts in the field of future wars have proven incorrect. As was to be expected, it is not necessarily that every war should start with long air operations. The situation, as prevailed in Iraq, can also call for a different course of action. Naturally enough and despite the inventions, there continue to exist in theory and reality such objective phenomena and concepts as operation (combat), strategic deployment, redeployment, offensive and defense, concentration of main combat effort in decisive sectors and many others. But conditions, forms and methods of their implementations are changing significantly.

Combat training should take fuller account of the special nature of military operations in the zones of armed conflicts and antiterrorism operations: to make forms of combat dispositions more diverse and flexible; practice the creation of task forces; enhance the readiness of units and subunits for independent and highly mobile raiding, operations and to revive the operational maneuver groups tactics; pay greater attention to reliable protection of supply and communication lines, command and control centers and rear services units. This calls for updating the organizational structure of forces, in particular, for creating combined units capable of operational maneuver group action. All these things should be reflected as fully as possible in the field manuals.

Of lasting importance are also ground forces which the U.S., NATO, and China are extensively equipping with precision and other new types of weapons. The rash statements by some experts and journalists to the effect that the continuous missile and bombing strikes actually wiped out Iraq's regular divisions and its entire military infrastructure in a matter of three weeks cannot be confirmed by the number of casualties among the military personnel or the number of surviving crippled military equipment. Arguments to the effect that ground forces don't even merit to be destroyed by precision weapons and that once the logistics and command and control system are down, the ground forces would degrade and run away seem simply not serious. It became obvious during the first war in the Gulf in 1991 that the United States' Iraqi problem would remain unresolved without bringing in ground forces. In 2003, the objective needs made it essential right from the start of the war to employ ground troops to occupy Iraq.

Fourth, the experience of the war in Iraq refutes the contention being pushed in every way for Russia to accept that the very essence of reforming the Russian military should consist solely in adapting it to combating terrorism and that it can have no other defensive functions to perform. No NATO member follows this path, however. Apparently, the strategic nuclear forces, aircraft carriers and major dispositions of U.S. ground forces to be moved to the east and southeast are intended for more than fighting terrorists.

The problem of combating terrorists should not be portrayed only as operations by smaller units against armed bandits. The experience of Afghanistan and some other nations shows that terrorist organizations and regimes have thousands of tanks, artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft that can invade entire nations and establish their authority there. The combating of such terrorism entities takes well-equipped regular forces.

Furthermore, if one is to be perfectly honest, it is obvious to any sober-minded person that Russia faces many other threats and defensive tasks following from them. This requires a powerful and varied military that is supposed to be systematically and persistently trained for different strategic and operational-tactical missions.

Fifth, there is a clearly political agenda in all sorts of speculations and statements to the effect that a 200,000-strong army has defeated a one-million-strong army of Iraq and that it is the Soviet and Russian military system that has been defeated in Iraq. Some wordsmiths go as far as to claim that the war marks the death of the European (German, French, Russian) military school of thought that has for centuries been the generator of military ideas and that now there remains only one military system--the American military system--that has a future and everyone should worship it. One may ask: Which of the Soviet or Russian military science concepts have failed the Iraqi war test? Do these concepts propose surrender without a fight to the approaching enemy capital cities or other cities, as was the case with Singapore (1942), Tubruq (June 1943), or Baghdad (2003)? The whole world knows about the defense of Moscow, Leningrad and Sevastopol. Even in our day, the 6th Assault Company in Chechnya showed how positions should be defended. As for Iraq, did they blow up bridges and other installations, laid minefields in the path of an advancing enemy, built barricades, dug ditches, set up roadblocks, ambushes and fought for every residence block and every floor in it as was the case in Stalingrad? Some such elements of resistance did take place in defending Umm Qasr and Basra, but they were surrendering their positions without fighting in Baghdad and other cities. This was being done contrary to Russian warfare canons.

Thus, if we proceed from real facts rather than conjectures, all that has happened in Iraq only attests to how viable the foundations of Russian military science and art are. But this school of thought calls for strong will and determination of the leadership, the people and the army to fight to the end for their homeland and it requires of the warfighters enormous moral strength. But, as experience indicates, some people are not up to it. This is why the conclusions based on the Iraqi war experience that all nations and armies can be defeated as easily are rash to say the least.

As for Russia, patriotism of its people and army was its salvation in more than one difficult period. However, this invaluable source of combat power cannot be exploited limitlessly without constantly building up human potential. Even more so because there are already in Russia some ultraliberal "avant-gardists" who are making absolutely unabashedly cynical admissions on this score. Someone named Maksim Glikin says recalling his days in the forces: "At the sight of foreign aggressors, we would drop our assault rifles and got back into civvies at distant approaches of the foe to our military unit base." (5) Upset over what is happening, even some of our journalists begin to maintain: "The era of mass heroism, let's admit it, is a thing of the past. History has made such a turn that we live in a different country now. Not in the one that defended Stalingrad. Something has irrevocably gone." (6) I would not wish very much for this to happen and, perhaps, not all has been lost.

We can also learn many things from the Americans, especially their national egotism, political pragmatism, high level of technology, the ability to conduct subtle information and psychological campaigns, fit out their soldiers and organize a material welfare system in field conditions. We in our military would also like to have the same observation, surveillance and communications equipment, but .this can only be done with appropriate funds the provision of which is opposed mainly by those people who hold up as an example other armies. It would also be useful to take a better look at how American press services work with members of the mass media, how firmly they deny them information that does not accord with the interests of operations. They, for instance, forbid showing on TV American POWs or dead bodies and even untidy looking soldiers.

Even when they talk about bribing, we cannot discount that this is also an effect of the overwhelming American might, the tremendous political, psychological and military pressure. If the odds were not as heavy and if they really had chances to successfully oppose the invasion, the Iraqi leaders would not have been so easy to swing.

In principle, there is nothing shameful in bribing those persons in authority who are on the take. This is nothing new, it has been around for hundreds of years. But why does "making digs about bribes" hurt so much some of our journalists and experts and why the related admissions of Gen. Tommy Franks have provoked annoyance in some U.S. quarters? The wish to conceal or at least not to flaunt the bribing and treachery of Iraqi leaders results from the desire to portray this as a high standard of military art. But those who know a thing or two about military affairs wouldn't buy it.

Therefore, from the standpoint of interests of developing military art it is simply irrational to reject the wealth of military experience of countries like Russia, Germany, and France. This experience belongs to the whole world. Therefore, cooperation between Russia, China and other countries with the United States is intended for sharing experience and military-science knowledge. Ignoring military experience of other countries and adjusting everything to fit American and NATO standards will only lead to degradation of military affairs.

As the 60th anniversary of the joint victory over Nazism is drawing near, I would like to stress once again that the objectively growing common threats to the United States, Russia and other countries once again call for necessary cooperation and the pooling of efforts.

Such are some of the objective lessons from the war in Iraq as we see them.

Col. A.D. TSYGANOK

Head of the Military Forecasting Center

Candidate of Military Sciences

Goals Set by the U.S. Government

Main goal--to gain a springboard in the Middle East.

Military goal--to smash Iraq's armed forces to later deploy forces of occupation and establish bases; test the network-centric concept of combat operations and troop movement and the reliability of battle management and the logistical transportation system.

Political goal--to deny the enemy of the U.S. control of Middle East oil resources; establish an occupation regime for bringing back the democratic institutions of civilian authority.

Geopolitical goal to reduce the influence of the main European countries and the RF on countries in the Middle East.

Technological goal--to test on a massive scale and in actual combat environment new air defense system components, combat equipment and weapons.

Combat Operations

The war can be divided into three phases.

Phase one is the initial phase characterized by tenacious defense by two army corps of the Iraqi army of every major city. For two weeks, the U.S. and British forces could not take a single major city (Basra, Najaf, Nasiriyah, etc.) with complete supremacy in outer space, air and radar monitoring of the country's entire territory.

Phase two is the so-called "strange defense of Baghdad." The city operationally suitable for urban battle (a broad river, 12 bridges, tunnels dug under the river, radial blocks of buildings convenient in defense) did nothing to defend itself and was occupied by the U.S. troops as the Iraqi forces strangely vanished.

Concluding phase came when four Iraqi corps surrendered to the American forces within a week. The most characteristic of this phase was the surrender of a western army corps to one U.S. battalion.

The war in Iraq began March 20 at 05:35 when F-117A fighters from the Al-Udeid airbase in Qatar dropped space-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions at small building in Baghdad.

The first strike at Hussein did not kill him. Analysts believed that Iraq's political and military command and control was built on a network pattern that was tested for the first time in 1991 in Iraq and used in Yugoslavia in 1999. It is based on constant movement of top political and military leaders around the network of command centers and bunkers. All conferences use exclusively closed communications lines. More than two key leaders cannot stay in one and the same place at any time.

The strike was immediately followed up by U.S. ground forces moving in. However, real combat operations did not begin as previously planned. First, the Iraqis' morale proved higher than it was expected and there was no massive surrendering. Second, there was no popular uprising against Saddam Hussein in the south. Third, the Iraqi command had opted for the only correct tactics as far as they were concerned--to mount a defensive in well-fortified built-up centers and avoid battle with coalition forces in open terrain. Fourth, the Iraqis built a decentralized command and control system that frustrated the allied attempts to destroy it. Fifth, there was no remote fighting and the Americans sustained casualties and losses, moreover, a guerilla war began.

The British forces could not overrun Basra without losing momentum and came up against a competent system of fortifications while the many marshy locations and salt flats crisscrossed by canals became impassible as waters had risen. The coalition forces could not achieve significant success during the first two weeks of fighting despite Continued missile and air strikes. Basra, Nasiriyah, Najaf, Karbala remained in Iraqi hands.

There were certain errors, too. Thus, the United States and Britain had overestimated the potentials of precision weapons as the decisive factor of warfare enabling the performance of missions without, contact with the enemy in the course of airland operations. Analysis of wars in the preceding 15 years shows that the decisive factor was political isolation of leaders and not military destruction of the defending armies. This happened in Iraq in 1991, Yugoslavia in 1999 and in Afghanistan in 2001. And then, cruise-missile guidance accuracy is 62 percent. The myth has been debunked of the absolute superiority of the new weapons and of the inability of previous-generation weapons to effectively bridge a technological gap of 25-30 years, at the same time traditional forms and methods of combat operations have been used on a rather small scale.

However, the might of the air strikes was awe-inspiring. There were 12 series of missile and air strikes on the night of March 21-22 alone on targets in Iraq. Three times as many sea- and air-launched cruise missiles were launched during one night than during the entire 1991 Gulf War. Whereas 283 Tomahawks were fired in Operation Desert Storm in the space of 43 days, approximately 1,000 Tomahawks and several thousand independently-targeted bombs were used in 15 days of the present war.

A serious underrating of the enemy forces, by some 40 percent, made the U.S. government to urgently move to Iraq a 120,000-strong reinforcement. The military command was also made nervous by the absence of a second front over Turkey's uncooperative position and Jordan's refusal to permit the use of more than 5 airfields out of its 35.

On the whole, analyzing the initial phase of fighting we should recognize that the Iraqi command was relatively successful in conducting the first phase competently using the strong positions in the psychological warfare.

The main reasons for the dragged-out phase, according to analysis were: a superficial approach to the first strike on Baghdad, which denied it an element of surprise; elements of adventurism with which the operation began; the underestimation of the enemy and its ability and readiness for fierce resistance and moving over to a guerilla war; the idealization of combat operations with the use of precision weapons and the insufficient use of traditional forms; frictions between the Pentagon and the White House; taking part in urban battles forced upon by the Iraqi command; the Columbia disaster, which, according to American experts, reduced by 38 percent the capability to locate the country's military and political leadership system.

A characteristic feature in the operation of Iraq's air defense forces during the allied raids was instant cessation of operation of all radars reconnoitered by Americans and simultaneous putting into operation of more than 300 decoy radar sources up and down the country.

The coalition air electronic and space reconnaissance assets could not detect and locate defense command and control and air defense networks during the first weeks of fighting.

The casualties and losses being sustained by U.S. and Iraqi armed forces were concealed by official propaganda while at the same time ambulance helicopters on some days (March 22) made up to 30 runs indicating much heavier casualties than those reported. A direct confirmation of serious casualties was the bringing on an urgent basis of the Comfort hospital vessel toward Al-Faw peninsula, closer to the area of hostilities.

The desert storm on March 25-26 practically stopped the American offensive. In some divisions (the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division), the storm knocked out more than 100 armored vehicles. Engine malfunctions in M1A2 Abrams tanks plagued their crews. The visibility in them was not greater than 300 meters as they moved in column and up to 700-800 meters when they were stationary. Only on cold nights, visibility was 1,000-1,500 meters. For this reason the command had orders out against the movement of combat vehicles at night in conditions of likely contact with the enemy.

Especially worrying during the first two weeks was a vastly excessive expenditure of precision-guidance ammunition and cruise missiles. Their expenditure was in excess of the effect gained. "In the direct sense, we are shooting gold at the dirt," Gen. Richard Myers told a Pentagon conference. Another general, Stanly McChrystal, said that once the enemy displayed minimal staunchness and shrewdness, our technological superiority began to rapidly lose its value. Our expenditures do not pay off. Using much cheaper and affordable means, the enemy solves the same tasks for whose solution we spend billions on technological fancies of the weapons corporations.

A problem of no lesser importance that the Americans have to grapple with is cooperation between ground forces and different combat services. In conditions where time for making decisions on the employment of weapons is minimal and reconnaissance assets make it possible to locate the enemy at very great distances that do not permit visual identification, friendly flue has become a scourge of modern war. According to analysts, coalition forces fired on their own units.

All analysts and observers agree--the latter part of the war grew odd beginning with the so-called Baghdad defense and ending with the search for the main reason for this war--weapons of mass destruction, which has not been found yet.

What do all experts agree on and what kind of questions do they ask?

Saddam Hussein's forces (according to the findings of the London-based Institute for Strategic Studies) comprised nearly one million men, but only one corps of the seven was actually involved in fighting (and only in the initial period). Why? Where did the main body of Iraq's aircraft were? Most of them were presumed to have flown to Iran. Why, in the initial period, not a single aircraft took off and not a single multiple rocket launcher fired? Why did most of the tanks, APCs and artillery stay idle?

There must have been no plan to defend the capital. Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Nasiriyah were defending themselves for three weeks whereas Baghdad surrendered without a fight. No elementary defensive measures had been taken in Baghdad: no bridge had been blown up, no road blocked, no defense line built--it was plain surrender. No power stations, bridges and oilrigs were destroyed throughout the hostilities. This despite the fact that Saddam Hussein had more than one chance to do so.

Operational Concealment and Deception Lessons

Preparations for and conduct of combat operations in the Gulf yielded massive factual material, revealed both the positive aspects and drawbacks of planning, organization and practical implementation of operational support measures. Already at this stage, analysis of available information has shown that both sides paid close attention to matters of operational concealment and deception.

We should first of all note what is characteristic of both sides. Both Iraq and the United States counted on high effectiveness of their concealment and deception measures. They make their operational plans based on achieving by all means the objectives of operational concealment and deception.

For the United States and Britain such objectives were: to conceal the scale and timeframe of strategic redeployment of their forces to the Persian Gulf zone, deceive the enemy with regard to the operation's timeframe, see to it that the first strike and actions in the ground phase were unexpected.

For Iraq the objective of operational concealment and deception consisted in creating conditions to retain its war-fighting capability, increase survivability, deceiving the enemy about the extent of damage done to its armed forces' combat potential.

Both sides' operational concealment and deception scenarios called for a number of measures requiring considerable efforts and expenses. Both Iraq and the United States made extensive preparations including the launching of disinformation programs, increasing the amount of concealment and deception means, etc. Their concealment and deception efforts were supplemented by strict measures to prevent information leaks, detect, suppress and destroy enemy reconnaissance agencies and equipment. Both sides concealed not only their installations but also signatures of their activities.

It would be appropriate to look at the procedures and special features of these measures as the situation in the region was changing.

In the phase of deployment of U.S. forces in the zone of conflict, operational concealment and deception measures followed a special plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinated with bodies of national administration under the guidance of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

As Operation Iraqi Freedom was being launched, the U.S. command made wide use of the mass media to spread deliberately false information about the nature of the coalition forces' preparations. Important disinformation measures were carried out in the early part of February 2003 during the intensive buildup of the U.S. forces.

All channels broadcast deliberately overstated numbers of forces and fires moved into the region (reports spoke, among other things, about the presence of the 4th Infantry Division in Turkey), which compelled the Iraqi command to keep in the north two corps in anticipation of a strike from the north.

In order to confuse the enemy and the world public about the true objectives and time of initiation of the operation, a special group of journalists was set up who were screened for loyalty and who promised to report events in major publications and On TV only from angles benefiting the U.S.

Along with restriction on information (all information was handed out in controlled amounts only via the Central Command press center) false information began to be distributed from the latter half of January 2003 with regard to intentions, combat and numerical strength of units being moved to the zone of conflict. The principal objective of the operational concealment and deception measures was to achieve suddenness of the first strike. This was the reason for strict measures to keep secret information about planned actions.

The U.S. forces paid a good deal of attention to secure command and control. For the purposes of closed information exchange between units and crews they used the Defense Message System (DMS) based on the Pentagon's Defense Information System Network (DISN).

The main stress in operational concealment and deception measures of the Iraqi army was laid on engineering preparations.

To deceive the enemy, the Iraqi command had extensive plans for the use of highly elaborate commercially manufactured mockups of military equipment. They were Italian-made fiberglass mockups, inflatable British-made mockups and mockups manufactured by firms in other countries. It should be noted that despite their high cost--every mockup is estimated to cost between $30,000 and $40,000--the effect of using them was more than worthwhile. One of the U.S. air pilots admitted he was not sure he was aiming bombs at tank or mockups.

In its set of measures to deceive the enemy, Iraq stressed specially protection of its Scud operational-tactical missiles. In order to insure survivability of their Scud launchers, Iraqis used to take up launching positions at night several kilometers from their camouflaged underground emplacements and go back to them right after launching thus preventing enemy aircraft and satellite reconnaissance from locating the launch sites.

Coalition Forces' Strengths

One. The presence of a single information and control system and the availability to the forces of a high proportion of latest reconnaissance, communication and target-designation equipment that can quite effectively detect the enemy at great distances and enable prompt organization of cooperation between different services and arms to suppress it by fire.

Two. U.S. soldiers have generally displayed quite remarkable fortitude. Operating in extremely adverse weather conditions, the troops remained in full control, appraised the situation appropriately and their morale Was high. Most of the personnel retain self-confidence, faith in superiority of their weapons and certainty that the war is just.

Coalition Forces' Weaknesses

One. They overestimated the potentials of their airmobile forces. There was no massive employment of helicopters as a separate combat arm. All attempts by the American command to stage an airland operation using airmobile units failed. This is why, in the fourth day of action, airmobile units were included in offensive groups of forces as reconnaissance and fire-support components. The main reliance was on "heavy" motorized and armored units.

Two. An extremely weak operation of the rear services. Despite the presence of a new system of rear services support, there were serious interruptions in fuel supplies now and then. Some armored units had sometimes stand idle for 6 hours at a stretch with empty fuel tanks not unlike sitting ducks for Iraqis. Bringing up supplies of food, water, ammunition, fuel and lubricants was a headache to American commanding officers. There was massive dissatisfaction among the personnel on the ground with the quality of new food rations.

Iraq's Strengths and Weaknesses

The strengths of the Iraqis consisted in thorough knowledge of the terrain; a high standard of engineering preparation of their defenses; the ability to conceal and camouflage their main weapon assets; fortitude and determination in defense in the early phase of the war.

Among their weaknesses are, perhaps, bureaucratic inflexibility of the command where all decisions are made by the top commander alone; somewhat predictable patterns in conducting combat operations by combined-arms officers; insufficient cooperation between different services and arms. At the same time, we should single out as good the commanders of special operations forces who competently employed their forces and fires, and conducted broad-based guerilla operations behind enemy lines.

Strategic Lessons from the War for Russia

Lesson one--complete dependence of all weapons (air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, fixed wing aircraft and helicopters, fire support, tanks, multiple rocket launchers) on navigation support.

For the Russian army it is necessary to establish its own space force with its sea-, air-, and ground-based components capable of providing navigation data to naval, air and ground elements both as means of nuclear deterrent and navigation systems in operational and tactical echelons.

There is a compelling need to justify and put into operation a new system of operational support--a navigation support system that the Russian army does not have today.

Lesson two--the strategic importance of the air force as the most important combat arm in modern warfare. It is complete air supremacy of the coalition that gives the decisive edge in every battle.

Lesson three--the importance of providing forces on the battleground with powerful antitank defense weapons that can destroy enemy armored vehicles at maximal distances. The tactical echelons should have a new system of battlefield weapons that can detect the enemy at maximal distances during the day or at night and destroy modern tanks at medium distances of 800 to 1,000 meters, with a bullet or fragmentation effect upon infantry at distances between 300 meters and 500 meters despite individual protective equipment.

Lesson four--the ever-increasing importance of concealment and undetectability as one of the main types of combat support. Concealment and undetectability procedures are becoming a strategic task of defending forces in the age of precision weapons.

NOTES:

(1.) Parlamentskaya gazeta, 21 March 2003.

(2.) Izvestia, 14 May 2003.

(3.) Krasnaya zvezda, 29 May 2003.

(4.) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 June 2003.

(5.) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 April 2003.

(6.) Krasnaya zvezda, 10 April 2003.