Lebanon To Be Internationalised As Arabisation Will Fail.

Assad's next move in his attempts to regain control over Lebanon was on Jan. 6 to thwart efforts by the Arab League to issue a resolution forcing Syria to stop blocking a US-backed process to elect a new president for the Lebanese republic who constitutionally must be a Maronite Christian. But failure by the Arab League to Arabise the Lebanese crisis will lead to its internationalisation - through the UN Security Council (UNSC).

The new president is required to succeed Emile Lahoud, a puppet of Assad's regime whose term ended at mid-night on Nov. 23, 2007. The men in Beirut who are blocking the process are two puppets of Assad: Maronite Gen. Michel Aoun, brought back from long exile in Paris and "determined to become president even at the expense of letting Lebanon burn by Assad's fires", as one of his critics puts it; and Shi'ite Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, having blocked the legislature for more than a year.

The Arab League's foreign ministers were due to meet in Cairo on Jan. 6. The plan was for Egypt, Jordan and the Saudi-led GCC states (the "6+2" allies of the US) to issue the motion to Arabise the crisis, i.e., letting the Lebanese to freely elect a new president - a post for which the "consensus candidate" is Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Gen. Michel Suleiman. Syrian Foreign Minister (FM) Walid al-Mu'allem was already in Cairo on Jan. 5 seeking to thward such a motion. As a result, the Cairo meeting will come up with a compromise formula which will mean the crisis will not be Arabised. The next move will come from the UNSC - thus another of Assad's tricks will be outdone by internationalisation. This will further isolate Assad's regime and will add to the reality that the Syrian ruler has become a liability to the Iran-led axis - apart from the fact that Assad's regime remains almost totally dependent on Israeli protection. Israeli protection against regime change in Syria dates back to 1974, when Assad's father signed the Golan "disengagement" deal with the Jewish state which has proved to be more viable as a "peace process" than the peace treaties which Israel has had with Egypt (since 1979) and Jordan (since 1994). Not a single bullet has been shot at Israelis from the Syrian side of the Golan "front".

Now the Israeli government of PM Ehud Olmert and the Bush administration, both weak, and their allies in the West and the Arab world are trying to wean Syria out of the Iran-led axis. This is a game most enjoyable to Assad, who find in it ample room to play with tricks he has inherited from his father, tricks allowing him to play the role of spoiler in Lebanon as well as in Palestine, Iraq, the Gulf region, the Arab League, etc. But at the same time, Assad is well contained by the Iran-led axis of anti-US/anti-Israel forces. Syria under the young Assad is far more under Iranian control than it was under his father.

While Mu'allem was in Cairo on Jan. 5-6 spoiling the Arabisation plan, Ali Larijani was in Damascus trying to work out a formula which should reduce the effects on Iran of the coming internationalisation of the Lebanese crisis, the Palestinian crisis (between Hamas & Fatah), and the Gulf crisis (between Iran's "Persian" or "Safawid" rulers and the "6+2"). Larijani now is the top national security aide to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Iranian theocracy. Until recently, Larijani used to be head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), a key institution now more under the influence of the theocracy's supremacist wing (which includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - IRGC - and is represented by President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad) than was the case before the latter was elected in June 2005. He was replaced by a supremacist figurehead. But he has remained quite powerful, close to the Supreme Leader who has the last word on any matter in Iran and its regional offshoots like Hizbullah in Lebanon (see news18-IranLarijaniQuidsOct29-07).

Larijani's task in Damascus was to persuade Assad (a) not to cause civil war in Lebanon, i.e., to soften the demands of the Hizbullah-led opposition in Beirut which wants the power to veto any decision by the Western-backed government of Fou'ad Siniora who as PM represents the March 14 Coalition; (b) not to get Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip to become a Neo-Salafi base, with Fatah al-Islam (FaI) and other creations of the Syrian intelligence have emerged there and Osama bin Laden's Qaeda has vowed to "liberate the whole of Palestine" including what is now the state of Israel (see fap1-Iraq-BetterSecurity-Jan7-08); and (c) not to incite Sunni-Shi'ite hostilities in the Middle East, including Lebanon and Iraq where Iran is co-operat-ing with the US in this respect.

Assad is not likely to respond favourable to Larijani's effort as the Syrian ruler is siding with the supremacists in their power struggle with the pragmatic wing of the theocracy. As a result, Khamenei is to side with a new coalition of pragmatists and reform-minded groups to contest the parliamentary elections in Iran next March (see news1-ME-IranUS-PerspJan1-7-08 & sbme1-IraqImprovementJan1-08). Assad needs to cause civil war in Lebanon because this seems the only way for him to escape trial by a UN court into the killing of many Lebanese VIPs including the Feb. 14, 2005, assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri. He has already made the blunder of implicating himself and his regime by asking France and other EU powers to work on delaying the UN court's proceedings as a precondition for him to stop blocking peace in Lebanon. Short of civil war, Assad wants the Hizbullah-led opposition to have veto power over any government to be formed in Lebanon if he is to allow a president to be elected.

On Jan. 6, meanwhile, all eyes were on the Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo. On Jan. 4, French President Nicholas Sarkozy met with Jordan's King Abdullah II in Aqaba and discussed the Lebanon crisis. The Lebanese government's delegation to the Cairo meeting presented a document explaining its position. The Lebanese team was headed by acting FM Tareq Mitri - despite protest from resigned Shi'ite FM Fawzi Salloukh of the Hizbullah-led opposition, who suggested that two Lebanese delegations attend the meeting. Muhammad Shattah, a seasoned Sunni diplomat who advises PM Siniora, was part of the Lebanese team. Siniora's paper stressed the need to convene a presidential election immediately and to thwart "external interference in Lebanon's internal affairs, whether from Syria or any other country". It urged Arab foreign ministers to put pressure on Syria.

The paper accused Syria of funding terror in Lebanon, paralysing constitutional life and mounting a constant attack at the government to try and topple it through violent and non-democratic means. It blamed the constant closure of the parliament on the Syrian regime. It said Lebanon's government and political system were under threat by forces loyal to Syria and Iran. It said the opposition was threatening strife and measures to harm stability. Berri told an-Nahar of Jan. 3 that, given a choice between internationalising the Lebanese crisis and Arabising it, the latter was preferred. He was worried an Arab summit scheduled for Damascus in March might by prevented by the "6+2" bloc which is led by Saudi Arabia and allied to the US.

Berri, head of the Shi'ite group Amal which is under Syrian influence but also part of the Iran-led axis, told an-Nahar: "We would have wished that matters move ahead on a purely Lebanese track and it is what I have sought to achieve many times. But given a choice between Arabising and internationalising [the Lebanese crisis], we reject the latter as it brings only ruin and destruction to Lebanon". Berri on Jan. 3 sent a verbal message to Egyptian President Husni Mubarak via Egyptian Ambassador Ahmad al-Bidyawi in which he welcomed the efforts of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to mend fences between Fatah and Hamas, and convene the Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo.

Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa on Jan. 3 told the Saudi-owned al-Arabiya TV that solving Lebanon's problem was a Lebanese, an Arab, a regional and an international responsibility. He added: "While we acknowledge there are conflicting interests and foreign [involvement], Lebanese politicians bear the responsibility first [for their country] before Arab, regional and international politicians"- a veiled warning to both Assad and Tehran that they would also be responsible for an internationalisation of the Lebanese crisis if the Arab intervention failed.