LEBANON - The Campaign Against Terror - Part 9.

There are few countries in the Middle East with a population as diverse as Lebanon in terms of ethnic, religious and sectarian background, concentrated in such a small area. This in itself is a recipe for divisions within society. Yet Lebanon has, for the most part, apart from the civil war of 1975-1990, been a relatively peaceful and prosperous place. The hope among the general public after the civil war ended with the Ta'if Agreement in 1989 was that peace and prosperity would return, and that the era of warfare over social-economic issues and political factionalism would be over.

Over the past decade Lebanon has been peaceful, and a degree of prosperity has returned although the wealth disparity is great and large-scale corruption has hindered prospects for dynamic growth. The prospects for Arab-Israeli peace, which is crucial to stability in Lebanon, were positive between 1993-1996 and in January 1999-September 2000. Lebanon became the only Arab country which managed to defeat the Israelis and expel them from its territory, through a resistance organised by the Hizbollah in South Lebanon and backed by external powers Syria and Iran. In the meantime, Syria consolidated its presence in Lebanon and both countries were bound together with a series of economic and security treaties.

In the context of developments in the 1990s, a number of divisions had begun to surface (or resurface) within Lebanese society - including divisions caused by, among other things: (a) the wealth gap and corruption, (b) the sense of isolation seeping into the Christian community, and (c) resentment against the Syrian presence. These differences can potentially have a disastrous effect on Lebanon's recovery from the 15-year civil war, and depending on the way the regional geo-political situation develops in the coming years, could even lead to the return of internal strife.

However, whether or not things can take a turn for the worse depends on factors beyond the Beirut government's control. They include the way in which (1) the US expands the war against terrorism in the region, (2) regional powers respond to the expansion of the American war, (3) socio-economic conditions within Lebanon are affected by the war, (4) Israeli Prime Minister Sharon or his successor deals with what is left of the Middle East peace process, and (5) the Syrian government responds to the previous four factors.

That Lebanon itself could become a target in the war against terror is a clear possibility. As part of its campaign against terrorism, Washington has already been pressuring Beirut to turn over those suspected of having links to Al Qaida. Israel, whose opinion on these matters is highly regarded by the Bush administration, has through a leak in the Haaretz newspaper recently alleged that between 150 and 200 Al Qaida operatives, including several senior commanders, have settled in Lebanon with Syria's permission, taking refuge in the large Palestinian refugee camp of Ain Al Hilweh, near Sidon in southern Lebanon (see the latest edition of RIM).

Yet the campaign against terror will affect Lebanon only if it is incapable of preventing the divisions within its society from becoming wider. If external pressures begin to exacerbate the rifts within the country, then a return to violence cannot be ruled out. The challenge for the government, therefore, is to ensure that the pressures on Lebanon arising from the American campaign against terrorism, and the related strategic compulsions of regional powers do not undermine the relative social stability that has been achieved over the past decade (see News Service of this week).

This will not be an easy task, in view of the growing disillusionment within the country about the way governments have failed to deliver either the prosperity or the political stability that was promised at Ta'if in 1989. Consequently, the impact of the direct or indirect impact of campaign against terror on the following factors will be crucial to the stability of Lebanon: