LEBANON - Sentiment Against Syria.

A key aspect of the war against terror would be the attitude of the US against the regime in Syria. There is deep concern in Damascus that, after Iraq, the Baathist regime in Syria would be one of the next targets, if not the next target, in view of extensive lobbying by the American Jewish community as well as the pro-Israeli politicians in the US. From Lebanon's perspective, the dilemma would be how to respond to such a development.

Syria has its backers as well as those opposed to its presence in Lebanon. In the event that US action against the Damascus regime becomes likely, under the umbrella of the campaign against terror, an intense public debate can be expected to break out in Lebanon on the subject of how Lebanon should react. Beirut is bound to Damascus by a framework of security and economic co-operation treaties, which entail certain obligations. This will be highlighted by those backing Syria. The others can be expected to point out that these treaties were signed "under duress" and in a position of weakness. There will also be those who have stayed quiet, who would assess the likely outcome of any US action and act accordingly.

Observers say it can also be expected that the dividing line between those who back the Syrian regime and those who prefer to distance themselves would be broadly on a religious basis - if the group of people from both communities who have benefited enormously from links with Damascus in the post-1990 environment were set to one side. In any event, if the war on terror shifts its focus from the Persian Gulf area to the Levant, chances are high that the nature of the Syrian-Lebanese relationship will be altered significantly.

According to the observers, it is important to note that over time there have been growing indications that big sections of public opinion are shifting against the "big brother" role played by Syria. Although Damascus has been quite discreet in exercising its influence over Beirut on the political level, there is a sense that Lebanon is unable to make any significant decisions on peace with Israel, or even on internal affairs, without first consulting with Damascus.

For instance, there is one school of thought that feels, especially after Israeli forces have pulled out of Lebanon in 2000, that the time has come for the estimated 35,000-40,000 Syrian troops in the country to leave as well. Sensitive to this, Syria has been redeploying its troops outside the capital, and has sometimes done so quicker than expected. It is also important to note that the line of thinking that it is time for Syrian troops to leave does not yet have the degree of domestic political backing or spontaneous internal support to cause any major concern to Damascus or pro-Syrian leaders in Beirut. There are many Lebanese who point out that the country would still be fighting a sectarian war if Syrian forces had not intervened dramatically in October 1990 to put an end to the fighting.

Resentment over the increasing influx of Syrian workers into Lebanon is far more widespread, however, and this feeling is widespread among Christians as well as Muslims in Lebanon. It is estimated conservatively that over 1.4 million Syrian unskilled and semi-skilled workers have entered Lebanon in recent years and virtually swept away the Lebanese citizens who fall into the same category. The Syrians, facing much worse conditions back home, are willing to work for less leaving many Lebanese jobless.

The influx of Syrians began in 1991 after the first post-civil war government, backed by Syria, announced the official removal of most travel restrictions between the two countries. According to Lebanese economic experts, cited by the 'Middle East Intelligence Bulletin' in their February 2001 issue, the Syrian labour force is roughly distributed as follows: construction (39%), seasonal agriculture (33%), municipal and sanitation jobs (20%), services, including street vendors and taxi drivers (8%) and industry (2%). The influx of Syrian workers benefits, apart from the workers themselves, mainly Lebanese elites who own businesses that require unskilled labour. Lebanese employers prefer to hire unskilled Syrian workers over their Lebanese counterparts because the transaction is off the books, allowing them to avoid paying the required minimum wage, evade the social security system and demand long working hours. For the Syrian workers, the benefits are huge. It is estimated that a Syrian taxi driver in Beirut can earn up to $200 per month - around twice the salary of a university professor in Damascus.

Working class Lebanese have suffered, consequently. Over the last several years, the unemployment rate has hovered around 30% for the Lebanese labour force as a whole. The situation is regarded as being worse for unskilled workers, who cannot compete with their Syrian counterparts. Those who manage to get jobs are often forced to accept wages driven down by Syrian competition and dismal working conditions, and to forgo health insurance and other benefits they once enjoyed.

Opposition is spreading among the poorer sections of the public, observers say. This could become a crucial factor which can be exploited by external forces in the event that the war against terror shifts its focus towards the Levant. The problem is that the Lebanese government is in no position to reverse the situation. And the Syrian government cannot afford to do so either, without risking domestic instability if those currently working in Lebanon are forced to return to an economic situation that does not offer any positive prospects.