KAZAKHSTAN - Nursultan Nazarbayev

Elected president with over 90% of the vote on Dec. 1, 1991, with himself the only candidate, Nazarbayev is the unchallenged ruler of a country the size of western Europe. Hailing from a Kazakh family of noble lineage, something common among high-level Kazakh officials since the Communist era, Nazarbayev has managed to keep the country stable despite its ethnic, religious and regional differences. He has assured his position as president until end-2000, with a referendum held in April 1995.

All decision making powers of importance are concentrated in the hands of Nazarbayev and a small number of persons around him aided by experts and foreign consultants. Nazarbayev involves himself personally in all the big oil and gas E&P deals, pipeline agreements or downstream projects. In May 1992 he signed the deal at the White House in Washington for Chevron to develop the Tengiz supergiant oil field, when George Bush was US president. On April 27, 1996, he presided at the signing in Almaty of a protocol with Oman and eight oil companies for the construction of a $1.5 bn pipeline from western Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossyisk (see OMT). Russian President Yeltsin was present.

Nazarbayev and his Turkish counterpart Suleyman Demirel recently reached agreement for Kazakhstan to supply Turkey with 30 BCM/year of gas by pipeline to be built across the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia.

To promote Kazakhstan and attract foreign investors, Nazarbayev has travelled around the world since the country's independence and the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991. He has a Boeing 747 to take him anywhere, acquired during one of his visits to the US to replace a Tupolev-154 he had used for just two years. Now he meets foreign executives and businessmen at the presidential palace in Astana. He has close contact with Chevron Overseas Petroleum Inc. President Richard H. Matzke, who is in charge of the Tengiz project, and also meets Mobil Chairman and CEO Lucio Noto and others.

Nazarbayev's goal is to turn the country into a wealthy state rivalling those of the Arabian peninsula. He seeks to project himself as a regional leader, often coming up with ideas having wide strategic implications - such as an "alternative OPEC", or a "Euro-Asian union", or a regional military bloc involving neighbouring Asian and Central Asian states - to name just a few of his proposals. Much of this is done for domestic consumption, to boost his image as a man of global stature.

However, Nazarbayev is very careful to ensure that none of his moves is seen as a threat by Russia. Among the leaders of the former Soviet Muslim republics, he is the one closest to Moscow. This is partly a reflection of the ethnic composition of his country, but it also reflects Nazarbayev's recognition of the fact that for the foreseeable future Moscow is an indispensable partner. When Russian troops moved into Chechnya in December 1994, Nazarbayev's presidential council of advisors said the crisis was an internal matter but cautioned against a bloodbath.

On the other hand, Nazarbayev rejects re-integration with Russia, as many Russian nationalists in Kazakhstan have advocated. He gets particularly upset by people such as the ultra-nationalist Russian Vladimir Zhirinovsky (born and raised in Almaty), whom Nazarbayev referred to as a "little Hitler" after he recommended in recent years that Russia retake vast areas of northern Kazakhstan.

Authoritarian, Nazarbayev is sophisticated and cultured. With a good understanding of geo-political realities and of the local situation, he rules as a paternalistic autocrat. He often begins sentences with: "I always tell my Kazakhs..." Politically astute, he tries to undermine dissent first through legal or political tactics and only resorts to force as a last measure. Officials at lower levels are often eager in cracking down on dissent to prove their loyalty to the ruler.

Background: Aged 58, Nazarbayev is a metallurgical engineer. He became Kazakhstan Communist Party chief in 1989, and his transition to president of an independent Kazakhstan was smooth. He became ruler of Kazakhstan in 1990 as the collapse of the USSR was underway. His position was confirmed in December 1991 elections.

Right from the beginning, Nazarbayev made it clear that his top priority was economic welfare, not political reform or Western-style democracy. He prefers the benevolent authoritarianism of South-East Asia to the checks and balances of Western democracy. His unopposed election in 1991 with over 90% of the vote was not surprising. He has been able to rule without serious challenges, helped by the fact that Kazakhs look up to him as a strong ruler.

Nazarbayev has travelled widely since then to get political and economic support as well as to attract investment. He visited the US in 1992 and 1994, during which the US made a substantial boost in its aid to the country. In his latest visit to the US in November 1997, he signed two PSAs one for the Karachaganak JV in which Texaco was included and one for the huge offshore province. He visited Beijing in October 1993 to try to get a solution to their border disputes and address the question of separatist Uyghurs in China's Xinjiang province. The border disputes were settled and on Nov. 24, 1997, a visiting delegation under then Chinese premier Li Peng signed oil deals worth $9.5 bn. He met Chinese President Jiang Zemin in June 1998. On a visit to Tokyo in April 1994, he received a pledge of $125m from the Japanese government. He also visited India, Indonesia, Thailand and other countries, usually accompanied by a big ministerial and business delegation.

Despite having total control, Nazarbayev has had to face some political problems. This started after his allies won a landslide victory in

parliamentary elections in March 1994, in which there were widespread allegations of fraud. But by September 1994, many deputies had begun criticising him and drafted a message addressed to the president to express "discontent over the policy pursued". The crisis dragged on and several deputies started a hunger strike. On March 6, 1995, the constitutional court declared the March 1994 elections illegal. Then Nazarbayev used this declaration to step in and dissolve the parliament and promised fresh elections. He began ruling by decree.

In April 1995, a referendum was held in which Kazakh voters were asked the question: "Do you agree to prolong the mandate of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, elected by all the people on December 1, 1991, until December 2000?". About 95.4% of the voters, of the 91.3% who turned out to vote, agreed to the extension. The next election will be held in early 2001.

The referendum was widely criticised in the West. On June 30, 1995, constitutional reforms were introduced widening Nazarbayev's powers and 307 of the 310-seat Kazakh People's Assembly voted in favour. Nazarbayev then ended his rule by decree. In December 1995, parliamentary elections were held but again there were widespread charges of fraud.

Nazarbayev has become one of the wealthiest men in the world, with corruption and nepotism rampant, to the extent that critics call his regime a "kleptocracy". He has given his relatives key positions. One of his sons-in- law, Timur Kulibayev, is the financial boss and vice president of KazakhOil. Nazarbayev's daughter Dariga is a very wealthy figure and controls the national TV network Khabar. One of her pet projects is a Kazakh soap opera to "help educate Kazakhs in the concepts of private property and the free market". Sponsors of her venture include International Distillers and Vitners and Wrigleys Chewing Gum. Her husband, Rakhat Aliyev, is head of the tax police. A younger daughter married the son of Kyrgyzstan's President Akayev in a lavish wedding ceremony on July 25, 1998. The couple came to know each other while studying in the US.

Nazarbayev has brought to the government very young Kazakhs, like 1st Deputy Premier and SIC Chairman Jandosov and KazakhOil President Kaparov. In March 1997 he issued decrees which amounted to a turning point in economic policy and re-centralisation of state control (see profiles in DT).