Junior Officers: The Thinning Ranks.

The Army faces a growing crisis as increasing numbers of junior officers are opting to leave the Army. (See Figure 1.) In the mid- to late- 1990s and the early part of this new century, captains are choosing to return to civilian life rather than pursue careers as professional Army officers with alarming regularity. Junior officer retention has become a source of great concern for the Army.

A number of studies, results from field interview teams and research groups have identified several reasons as to why these potential senior leaders are leaving the Army. By leaving, they are voicing their dissatisfaction with current trends in the Army.

This article looks at two areas of concern that have an impact on junior officer retention: the Army's zero defects mentality and the generation gap; it then discusses mentoring and counseling, two programs that need emphasis to help stem the loss of the Army's future senior leaders.

Background. In the autumn of 1989, the Berlin Wall fell; its demise had the greatest impact on our Army in decades. The one tangible symbol of hostility between the West and the Soviet Union was gone.

As a result of the lessened threat from the Warsaw Pact, the Army was downsized from nearly 800,000 to less than a half million. We no longer had the requirement to maintain such a large standing army, an army awaiting the Red Horde's impending invasion of West Germany. The Soviets no longer posed a credible threat to Western Europe.

The hue and cry for a "peace dividend" could not be ignored. Pressing domestic social requirements dictated a dramatic reduction in defense budgets. The Pentagon was forced to downsize.

The force reduction imposed on the Army took out more troops, in terms of percentages, than some of our most calamitous battlefield disasters. Whole cohorts were decimated. Some year groups were targeted for major reductions and, at the same time, new cohorts were under assessed from the commissioning sources. These knee-jerk decisions laid the foundation for future problems.

The debate on the effectiveness of the management of the drawdown, in terms of how personnel actions were executed, continues; however, what is not debatable is the effects these methods have had on contemporary attitudes, especially those soldiers who remained on active duty.

This huge drawdown has affected the culture of the Army in many profound ways. We have witnessed dramatic changes in how we do business.

Some Challenges. Some changes have been negative. The Army has become staid, overly cautious and unforgiving. Among the reasons for these problems are the Army's adoption of zero defects and the conflicting values between generations.

Zero Defects. This mentality fosters an unforgiving attitude that allows no mistakes. Commanders are so consumed with not failing that they micro-manage virtually all aspects of operations, allowing their subordinates no opportunities to make mistakes and learn from them. Subsequently, when mistakes are made, "heads roll."

Working in such an environment is destructive to the morale of soldiers and contrary to the positive goals of leader development. It causes a ripple effect that is felt throughout the ranks.

For junior officers, this has had the chilling impact of encouraging them to take the less risky route--be overly cautious and not "rock the boat." Being so cautious has caused the undesired effect of stifling initiative.

Seizing the initiative is one of the cornerstones of our warfighting doctrine. As written in FM 100-5 Operations (1993, Page 2-6), initiative "requires a willingness and ability to act independently within the framework of the higher commander's intent" (emphasis added). As the new FM 3-0 Operations hits the field, we need to look at the updated definition: "From an individual perspective, initiative is the ability to be a self-starter, to act when there are no clear instructions or when the situation changes."

Of course, the key issue here is ability. A zero defects commander does not allow his subordinates the ability to act on their own accord.

The worst thing we can do as we transform the Army is create an officer corps that is timid--a corps of leaders who fear taking action. Some would say we're already there. In environments that foster this attitude, all too often, good officers, the risk takers, perish.

We just now are seeing the second and third order effects of this egregious situation. We have seen many dedicated and talented young officers leave the service prematurely, often as a result of the zero defects attitude. We can ill afford to lose our future senior leaders while they are still in their formative years.

It is a fact: the success of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf in 1990 and 1991 was the result of 25 years of rebuilding, training and dedication. The reason we were successful was due, in part, to the positive climate that existed in the Army between 1981 and 1991.

During this decade, we underwent a transformation that took the post-Vietnam US Army from demoralization and despair to the awesome force that devastated the Iraqi Army. However, many of the young men and women who commanded platoons and companies and helped win this victory have decided to leave active duty rather than continue to serve in an organization they see as wracked with poor morale, stifling leadership techniques and a culture of zero defects.

Sometime after 1991, we went from an organization that prized aggressive, imaginative leadership to one that cowed lieutenants into passivity. We have developed leaders who are scared to demonstrate any evidence of initiative.

The Generation Gap. Another aspect affecting the officer corps is the generational friction between company and field grade officers. That friction-causing gap is roughly the division between the so-called "Xers" and "Baby Boomers." This offers one view and an interesting thesis for the reasons so many junior officers are leaving the Army in the mid- to late-1990s and early part of the new decade. Apparently our junior leaders see a role expected of them in the future they find unappealing.

The fact that generational attitudes are so vastly different and so readily apparent compelled Dr. Leonard Wong, on the staff at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to write a great monograph on this topic. Dr. Wong's work, "Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps," tells the age-old story of the different values of generations.

Boomers are classified as those people born between the Second World War and about 1960. When Boomers were young, society told them they were different from their elders--that their values were vastly different from their parents. This was called the "Generation Gap." 1960s radical leaders, such as Dr. Timothy Leary, warned Boomers not to trust anyone over the age of 30. However, when Boomers became subalterns, they had no reservation in adopting the prevailing organizational mores and values of the professional officer corps. They became members of the officer's club; they joined the Field Artillery Association, the Association of the US Army and other professional organizations.

Their wives were expected to give generously of their time to their husbands' units. Spouse employment outside the home was the exception. The officers' wives were expected to attend ladies teas and other functions; at one time, there was a "dress code," such as hat and gloves for teas.

The situation today is different. Young officers often think it quaint that some spouses volunteer for Army Community Service, the Thrift Shop or other community-oriented organizations while their own spouses pursue personal careers. Volunteering and other vestiges of a previous time are relegated to history. For example, the officers' club is a thing of the past.

Boomers felt a sense of belonging to a community; they identified with the norms and values of the organization. For a variety of reasons, our junior officers have found much to be desired when it comes to "following in the foot steps" of the their superiors.

We must do a better job of teaching and coaching these young leaders. If we fail to develop these officers, they will continue to "vote with their feet." We have heard repeatedly from the Army's most senior leaders that we must stem the tide of these future leaders' leaving the Army in record numbers.

So, who are the leaders best positioned to reverse this trend? Battalion commanders. There is nothing new here; lieutenant colonels always have had a significant impact on junior officers. Their actions or lack thereof always have affected the most impressionable young people, particularly our company grade officers. To reverse this trend, we must do a better job when it comes to developing our young officers.

Reversing the Trend. To retain more junior officers in the Army, we can formalize or emphasize two programs: mentoring and counseling.

Mentoring. As the Army transforms, so too, must we transform the methods we use to develop junior officers. I propose we exercise a simple, straightforward system that exists informally--a system we know produces, but one we have half heartedly used for years: mentoring.

In the past 20 years, the Army has tinkered with this topic but only recently has encouraged its full implementation. By that, I mean we have not mandated the official implementation of a mentoring program. I know of no Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) service school that teaches mentoring as a separate subject, although some TRADOC schools' programs have faculty and staff mentor students.

Mentoring has become the current "hot topic" in the civilian sector and has bred a cottage industry of gurus cranking out best sellers and "how to" manuals. Even universities are implementing these concepts for the development of both faculty and students.

In 1985, the Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr., issued his four pillars of the Army: training, maintaining, leading and caring. Throughout his tenure, he emphasized these four points. An outgrowth of the "leading" pillar is mentoring.

General Wickham set into motion a plan designed to provide a basis for a teaching and coaching relationship between a senior and a subordinate. The concept of mentoring was widely accepted as the topic of many professional journal articles and was often an officer efficiency report (OER) objective. But, as Colonel Gail W. Wood pointed out in her 1990 article, "...the Army had not formulated an official definition of mentoring nor had it established any guidelines for instituting a mentoring program" ("Mentoring: A Useful Concept for Leader Development in the Army," US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 11 April 1990, Page 2). Not much has changed since she wrote that in 1990.

This is the troubling part. Virtually any retiree or older civilian with military service can tell you stories of how they were shaped and molded by a senior leader. Somehow, through neglect, we lost that art. We let it slip away.

I offer some concepts and ideas on the art of mentoring that I have seen effective: the definition of a mentor and the roles he fulfills plus the goals he accomplishes. A mentor can be defined in a variety of ways. The August 1999 publication of FM 22-100 Army Leadership provides a comprehensive definition, as outlined in Figure 2. An excellent list of the five definitions of a mentor were included in Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Andrew's Strategic Research Project for the Army War College, as shown in Figure 3. No matter how you choose to define mentor, the concept is the same.

As one reads through these definitions and the roles of a mentor (Figure 4), one can't help but think of historical examples. One that comes to mind first is General John J. (BlackJack) Pershing's mentoring of his aide de camp, George C. Marshall, during World War I. Later General Marshall mentored many of the generals who led us to victory in World War II, most notably Dwight D. Eisenhower. There are many more examples from several eras of our nation's military history.

Today's Army does a feckless job of mentoring. How many Marshalls are we developing today? Think of the highly visible generals of our recent past and look for the rising stars they have mentored. Have you been mentored throughout the duration of your career? Have you mentored all of your subordinates? Have you consistently sought out young, developing officers and taken them "under your wing"?

There is no doubt that experience is the best teacher. When we can gain that experience from someone older, wiser and more mature, it has the added effect of being filtered by someone who has been able to analyze his experiences and take the lessons from them to pass on.

In our current zero defects environment, some experiences may prove fatal. If we hope to eradicate the zero defects mentality, we must make purging it from our ranks a top priority.

As a result of their pre-commissioning training plus their own motivation, the vast majority of young lieutenants want to contribute, want to succeed as a member of the team. They seek acceptance. It is incumbent upon the company commander, but more critically the battalion commander, to help these young officers transition into the Army smoothly. Senior, leaders must understand and be sensitive to these issues and make the necessary adjustments.

In most situations, the battalion commander will have the most influence on his young officers. He is the senior leader, often with 20 or more years of service, who has the experience to perform the mentoring role. His education, training, age and maturity are vital to the process. It is the duty and responsibility of the battalion commander to teach, coach and mentor his young officers and build unit cohesion.

The battalion commander also should make an effort to incorporate the young officer's family into battalion life. In doing so, the young officer will feel as if he is a valued member of the team.

For the lieutenants, clearly, the company commander plays a mentoring role as well. However, the age similarities between the lieutenants and captains hinder the full development of the captain's mentoring role.

Comments from the field indicate our junior officers too often feel ignored. We cannot afford to lose this generation of young people. As the saying goes, they are the future. The Army needs to end this half-hearted approach and make mentoring a formal, mandated part of leader development.

Counseling. Recent reports indicate the Chief of Staff of the Army General Erick K. Shinseki is greatly concerned about the rising rate of junior officers leaving the Army. He has identified a serious shortfall in our leader development program: performance counseling. On this topic, General Shinseki says, "Counseling is most important, at this time, for young officers who are feeling particularly pressured to leave the Army." General Shinseki has "put the ball in the court" of battalion commanders.

What is the bottom line? Young officers want fair, consistent counseling. This feedback must contain information they can readily understand and put into action. Platitudes and "gut feelings" are not helpful.

Each young officer wants to know the truth--wants to "see" a snapshot of where he is and be counseled on where he needs to go. More importantly, he wants his leader to give him a glide path to get there. That means the senior leader has to do his homework to counsel him: get to know him well enough to have a "picture" of his abilities and think through his development.

The officer efficiency report (OER) is nothing more than a counseling tool. It covers the full range of officer skills, attributes and accomplishments. When used as it was designed, the OER is a wonderful tool for leader development and counseling.

In addition to OER counseling, the young officer values the opportunity to learn from his superiors how to shape his own career and future schooling and assignments. For career guidance, "DA Pam 600-3 Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management" should be the document the mentor/counselor consults.

Often the young officer wants someone to listen to and validate his own outline of his future. As Dr. Leonard Wong suggests, the counselor's part of a session should be five percent talk and 95 percent listen ("Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps," Army War College, 2000). At some point, the young officer no longer wants to hear-he wants to be heard. The younger generation, like all previous generations of Americans, wants to have some control of their future, to shape their destinies.

Anecdotal evidence indicates the Army faces some tough times and tough choices ahead. We cannot afford to hesitate--we are losing junior officers at an alarming rate. Some very dedicated, high-quality officers are refusing commands and departing from active duty. Too many of our junior officers have lost the desire to continue to serve beyond their initial commitment.

We can ill afford to continue to lose our junior officers. Mentoring and counseling are two positive steps that can have a dramatic effect on junior officer retention and serve to preserve the legacy of our Army.

Colonel Lawrence H. Saul commands the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) Artillery at Fort Drum, New York. This article is based on research conducted for a paper titled "Inclusion XXI" he wrote as a student in the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In the 172d Infantry Brigade (Separate) in Alaska, he commanded the 4th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery; the Arctic Warrior Battalion (Provisional); and, in an earlier tour, Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Battery of the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery. He also commanded B Battery, 2d Battalion, 5th Field Artillery, and A Battery, 2d Battalion, 83d Field Artillery, both in the 41st Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, in Germany. Among other assignments, he was a Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) and Executive Officer for the 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, both in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, California, and a Brigade FSO and Battalion FSO in the 172d Brigade. He served as the US Army Liaison Officer to the Brit ish Royal School of Artillery and British Army Staff College, Camberley, England.

Figure 1

Captain Attrition Rates (Prior to Majors Board--3 to 11 Years in
Service). In the mid- to late-1980s, prior to the drawdown, the FA
captain attrition rate routinely was between 6.5 and 7 percent and fell
within the Army's "normal" attrition rate.

           Army        Field
FY       Average %  Artillery %

97         9.68        7.68
98         9.33        9.59
99        12.4        10.6
00        11.75       13.0
01 (*)    11.35       11.0
02 (**)   12.3          --

(*)Fourth Quarter projected based on the average trend of the past four
years.

(**)Percent is based on the Officer Distribution Plan (ODP) forecast for
FY02.

(Source: Field Artillery Officers Branch, Total Army Personnel Command,
Alexandria, Virginia, October 2001)
Figure 4

Roles of a Mentor (Daniel Lea and Zandy B. Leibowitz, as credited by
Michael A. Andrews in his Strategy Research  Project "Mentoring
Lieutenants," dated 23 March 1987, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania)

Role of the   For Example,
Mentor is--   the Mentor--

Role Model    Serves as a father figure
              to venerate/emulate.
Teacher       Teaches specific skills,
              assisting career development.
Guide         Helps in understanding
              "unwritten rules," social norms.
Advisor       Shares knowledge, experience.
Validator     Confirms right-wrong, good-bad.
Counselor     Helps with career planning,
              providing emotional support.
Motivator     Shares ideas, ideals, values;
              improves self-confidence.
Protector     Shields; provides a buffer,
              freedom to fail.
Communicator  Projects all other behaviors.
Sponsor       Influences opportunities,
              jobs, assignments.

RELATED ARTICLE: Mentoring [in the Army] is the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching and developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity. Mentoring is an inclusive process (not an exclusive one) for everyone under a leader's charge.

Figure 2: Definition of Mentoring (FM 22-100 Army Leadership, August 1999)

A Mentor is--

1. A wise and trusted teacher or guide.

2. A father figure, teacher, trusted advisor, protector for an inexperienced person.

3. An experienced, senior leader or manager who develops a younger less experienced leader and provides career counseling and sponsorship.

4. A senior member of an organization who establishes a relationship with a junior member of the organization and is influential in molding and shaping his career.

5. A highly placed, powerful, knowledgeable individual willing to share his experience.

Figure 3: Definitions of a Mentor (Daniel Lea and Zandy B. Leibowitz, as credited by Michael A. Andrews in his Strategy Research Project "Mentoring Lieutenants," dated 23 March 1987, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania)