Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond.

Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond. By Steven H. Newton. Modern War Studies. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, c. 1998, Pp. xiv, 278. $29.95, ISBN 0-7006-0921-0.)

Few of his contemporaries ever questioned Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston's abilities as a soldier. After the Civil War, James Longstreet characterized him as "the most accomplished and capable" of southern generals (p. 4). Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson regarded his fellow Virginian with great respect. A number of officers who served with Johnston considered him the equal of any general, including Robert E. Lee, in the art of warfare. Yet the man never has been regarded as one of the war's great captains. He was forced to share credit for the victory at First Manassas, and subsequently he won no great battles of his own. Lee, not Johnston, is credited with the ultimate success of southern arms in the Peninsula campaign. Johnston oversaw the Confederate debacle at Vicksburg, and his policy of retreat to Atlanta resulted in his removal from command. Almost from the beginning of the war to the end, he quarreled with President Jefferson Davis and other government officials over issues both trivial and important. In many respects, he resembled one of his chief opponents, George B. McClellan, who held such promise but produced so little.

Steven H. Newton concedes the faults attributed to Johnston, but he argues that the general's performance in the months prior to his near fatal wounding at Seven Pines deserves reexamination. For example, historians such as Douglas Southall Freeman, Clifford Dowdey, and Robert G. Tanner have overlooked and misinterpreted the significance of the early stages of the campaign for Richmond in 1862 and concentrated more on the emergence of Lee and the dramatic Seven Days battles. As a result, he contends, scholars have not given Johnston the credit that he deserves for contributing to a significant strategic victory for the South and saving the Confederate capital. The Rebel commander's achievement is all the more remarkable considering the difficult circumstances under which he worked. As Newton points out, Johnston had to contend with constant meddling from Davis and Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin. His relationship with Lee, who held the title of "commanding general," was complex and often confusing as it related to the chain of command. More than once, Johnston received mixed messages from Lee and the president, making it difficult to determine his next course of action. The army that he led had not developed a solid command structure of divisions and corps, and many of his unit commanders were incompetent. Perhaps the most bizarre problem confronting him came in April when he faced McClellan at Yorktown; because of a peculiar law passed by the Confederate Congress allowing soldiers to elect new officers, Johnston saw a turnover of more than half of his field officers and a third of his company commanders.

Despite these obstacles, Newton maintains that Johnston performed quite well. He contributed to the success of the Valley campaign by supporting Jackson's independent command. Over the initial objections of his superiors, he made the key decision to withdraw his army from Yorktown in the nick of time, thus avoiding probable destruction from McClellan's massive array of heavy artillery. And his retreat up the Peninsula to the outskirts of Richmond was conducted with "efficiency and aplomb" (p. 209). Most important of all, however, Johnston's leadership "bought three months of valuable time--time to produce or import weapons, time to muster and train new troops, and time to reorganize the army onto a wartime footing" (p. 207). Furthermore, Johnston's actions allowed the Confederates to consolidate their scattered forces into the mighty Army of Northern Virginia, which was able to fight on nearly equal terms with the Army of the Potomac during the Seven Days battles.

Newton's array of evidence to support his argument is not much greater than that available to earlier historians who treated Johnston harshly. But he has examined it more closely. While these scholars relied heavily on the Official Records (U.S. War Dept., The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records ..., 128 vols [Washington, D.C., 1880-1891]), the author points out that many of its entries are incomplete. By carefully studying other fragmentary evidence in scattered collections that supplement the Official Records and by closely analyzing the timing of correspondence sent and received, he makes a compelling case on behalf of Joe Johnston in his defense of Richmond.

In the final analysis, however, Johnston will remain below the level of the war's elite--Lee, Jackson, Grant, Sherman, and George Henry Thomas. A successful strategic defense of Richmond has difficulty standing on par with the likes of Chancellorsville, the March to the Sea, an overwhelming victory at Nashville, or surrender at Appomattox. Nevertheless, students of the intricacies of Civil War strategy and the Byzantine world of the Confederate high command will welcome Newton's assessment of the war in Virginia in the first five months of 1862.

CHARLES F. BRYAN JR.

Virginia Historical Society