Jordan: a study of attitudes toward democratic changes.

INTRODUCTION

Jordan's transition toward democracy has lead to the rise of a multiparty system, three parliamentary elections (1989, 1993, and 1997), and the enactment of new laws to protect political liberties. While it is important to assess the impact of these changes on Jordanian politics, it is also important to study the attitudes of individuals toward democracy and their role in it. To what extent do the Jordanians believe that their state has become democratic? Do they recognize the changes around them and do they feel they can make a difference in politics? Answers to these questions will enable us to move our level of analysis from the macro level to the micro level in dealing with political culture.

Why is it important to study political attitudes? For a democratic political system to function, we need more than the relevant formal institutions: a party system, a parliament, and universal suffrage. We need a participant public with a reasonable understanding of the political process. This study thus seeks to determine whether Jordanians have the type of political culture that is conducive to democratic practices.

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

To assess the attitudes of individual Jordanians toward the political system and their role in it, survey data will be used from three surveys conducted from 1993 to 1996 by the University of Jordan Center For Strategic Studies. The 1993 survey collected data on the various social and demographic characteristics of a randomly chosen sample of 1,197 individuals. The objective of the survey was to determine respondents' evaluation of the performance of the Assembly of Deputies (Majlis al-Nawab), its role in political life, and the level of its representation of the various sectors of Jordanian society and its different levels. The survey also sought to examine the respondents' level of awareness of such laws as the Political Parties Law, Martial Law regulations, the Press and Publications Law, and the various changes in them. Finally, the survey sought to determine the extent to which Jordan has progressed in the democratization process, the measures that should be adopted to upgrade the democratic climate, and the inclination of respondents to vote in future parliamentary elections.

The 1995 survey was the second in the series with a sample of 2,000 respondents. The survey is a continuation of the 1993 survey and focused on continued changes in the relationship between the Jordanian citizen and the state. In addition, the survey examined how the changes in the relationship between the Cabinet (herein government) and the Assembly of Deputies (lower house of parliament) affect the lives of individual Jordanians. The third survey (1996) in the series continued the inquiry on attitudes toward democratic changes. In particular, the survey examined respondents' opinions on a number of topics such as the Political Parties Law and the Publications Law, changes in the election law, evaluation of the achievements of the 1993 Assembly of Deputies and its members, evaluation of political parties in general, and respondents' opinions on liberal political changes. Additional questions were asked on social participation and the extent to which respondents read daily and weekly newspapers. In all three surveys, the sample was divided evenly between males and females. Data from the three surveys will be used to gain insight into the political attitudes of Jordanians. The analysis will use four major indicators: patterns of democratic cognition, perceptions of measures to improve democracy, attitudes toward political instruments, and traditional and modern modes of participation. Each of these indicators will be divided into subcategories to gauge and assess respondents attitudes on specific topics. Analysis of the data throughout this study should collectively provide us with a reliable snap shot of the Jordanian political culture, especially as it relates to democratization and changes in it since 1993.

PATTERNS OF DEMOCRATIC COGNITION

This section is interested in finding out the extent to which Jordanian individuals are aware of democratic changes around them and any changes in their level of awareness from 1993 to 1996. The assumption here is that the degree of democratic awareness is related to the impact of political change. Thus if awareness is very low then we expect that the democratic changes may have had little impact on the individual. Substance and not only form is what makes democratic changes more meaningful to the average individual. Three measures will be used to gauge the degree of democratic awareness. They consist of awareness of democratic changes, awareness of political liberties, and awareness of democratic norms.

Awareness of Democratic Changes

Measuring respondents' opinions as to where Jordan is on the democracy scale is useful for two reasons. It enables us to determine the extent to which respondents are aware of democratic changes and the extent to which they understand what democracy means. If for example, the overwhelming majority of respondents believe that Jordan is fully democratic, this raises the prospect that Jordanians do not know what democracy really means since Jordan is clearly not yet fully democratic or even close to being so. In other words, it indirectly provides us with a synopsis of the respondents' level of democratic cognition.

It would also be useful to compare aggregate Jordanian perceptions of where Jordan is on the democracy scale with objective standards. To accomplish this, the measurement scheme of Freedom House will be used as an objective standard. Freedom House, a research institution that tracks the democratic progress of nation-states, has two separate measures, one for the form of democracy (the political structure) and the other for the substance of democracy (the prevalence of civil liberties). The measurement scheme used by Freedom House includes three categories; 1 to 2.5 is free, 3 to 5.5 is partly free and 5.5 to 7 is not free. By receiving a ranking of 4 in their 1994, 1995, and 1996 reports for each of the two types of measures, form and substance, Jordan according to Freedom House was considered partly free in these three years. If we examine the survey results shown in both Tables 1 and 2 we find that a plurality of respondents for each year consider Jordan halfway toward being fully a democracy, similar to the ratings by Freedom House. Moreover, the figures in Table 2 show that less than one-fifth of the respondents for each year consider the country almost democratic.

However, there was an increase in the percentage of respondents who believe that Jordan did make democratic progress from 1993 to 1995, with 6.3% of respondents in 1995 perceiving the country to be fully democratic compared to 3.1% in 1993. But the data for 1996 shows a reversal in people's perception of where the country was on the democracy scale. According to Table 2 only 11.0% of respondents believed the country was almost democratic and 5.5% believed it was fully democratic in 1996, compared to the 1995 figures which show that 18.5% of respondents believed the country to be almost democratic while 6.3% believed it was fully democratic.

Moreover, if we add the percentages of respondents who believed the country was more than halfway democratic (items 6 to 10) in Table 1 for each year, the reversal in people's perception of the country's democratic progress becomes more clear. Only 22.2% of the respondents in 1996 believed the country was more than halfway democratic compared to 30.5% for 1995 and 29.6% for 1993. In essence, respondents in 1993 believed that the country was more democratic than respondents in 1996. It is likely that the pace of democratic progress did not meet the expectations of Jordanians in 1996.

TABLE 1

10 POINT DEMOCRACY SCALE

Early Stage               1993              1995             1996

1                         15.5              19.1              18.3

2                          7.1               4.1               4.3

3                         10.4               4.9               5.8

4                          6.6               6.2               5.9

5 Halfway                 19.9              28.2              35.8

6                          8.3               7.6               5.7

7                          8.3               9.3               5.9

8                          6.1               6.7               3.3

9                          3.8               2.5               1.8

10 Democratic              3.1               6.3               5.5
to a great

Don't                      0.9               5.1               7.6
know

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Surveys, 1993, 1995, 1996.

The impact of educational levels on respondents' attitudes is also examined. Education is relevant to the study because it affects the level of democratic cognition. The more educated persons are, the more likely they will have the cognitive ability to understand what democracy means, to be aware of the political changes around them and their role in such changes.

TABLE 2

FOUR ITEM DEMOCRACY SCALE

Item         1993          1995          1996

1(*)         33.0          28.1          28.4          Early stage

2(*)         34.8          42.0          47.4          Middle stage

3(*)         18.3          18.5           11.0         Almost
                                                       democratic

4             3.1           6.3            5.5         Fully
                                                       democratic

Don't         0.9           5.1            7.6
know

* Note: Figures for Items 1, 2, & 3 of Table 2 are respectively
determined by collapsing items 1-3, 4-6, and 7-9 of Table 1. Source:
University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies. Democracy in
Jordan. Surveys, 1993, 1995, 1996.

To determine whether the level of education affects political orientations, data is acquired on the differences in attitudes between various educational groups. According to Table 3, 9.7% of respondents who were illiterate believed the country was fully democratic compared to 2.4% of respondents with post-secondary education. Moreover, the highest percentage of respondents who "did not know" were illiterate - 17.5% - compared to only .6% of respondents with post secondary education. The data suggests that the more educated respondents are, the more capable they are of critically evaluating the status of the country on the democracy scale and differentiating reality from fiction.

The differences in the impact of educational levels on democratic conditions can further be confirmed by examining the ascending percentages in the early stage category for each educational level group in Table 3. Beginning with 16.2% of illiterate respondents who believe the country is in its early stage, the percentages increase in ascending order to 17.6% for elementary school and junior high school, 19.0% for secondary education, and 23.2% for post-secondary education. Thus the more educated individuals are, the more likely they are to perceive the country as being at an early stage in its democratic development. Conversely, the strong relationship between educational levels and perceptions of where the country is on the democracy scale is also evident when we examine the percentages under item 10 (fully democratic). The higher the educational level of the respondents, the less likely they are to believe the country is fully democratic. As Almond and Verba (1963) have shown, educated individuals are more likely to read newspapers, to pay attention to the changes around them, and to comprehend such changes. Indeed, the higher the educational level of a respondent, the more likely he is to consider Jordan at an early stage in its democratic development.

TABLE 3

DEMOCRACY SCALE BY EDUCATION

                      Early              Halfway              Fully
                      Stage            Democratic

Democratic

Items:              1     2-4      5      6-7    8-9    10     Don't
                                                               know

Illiterate       16.2    11.7    24.0    14.0    6.8    9.7    17.5

Elem/Jr.         17.6    13.1    29.2    15.8   10.9    8.8     4.6

Secondary        19.0    10.0    32.0    17.8    8.8    4.5     2.2

                            7

Post-            23.2    20.4    25.3    19.5    8.6    2.4      .6
Secondary

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1993.

AWARENESS OF POLITICAL LIBERTIES

The advent of Jordan's democratic experiment was also accompanied by a Jordanian glasnost whereby civil liberties, albeit with various restrictions, were guaranteed by the government. To what extent do the people believe that their newly acquired liberties are guaranteed by the government? The assumption here is that the extent to which individuals perceive their liberties to be guaranteed and protected by the government is strongly related to patterns of political behavior. For a participant culture to arise, people must have the willingness to participate, but such a will also needs a sense of political security. The individual, in other words, must feel secure enough to exercise his civil rights without fear of being punished by the government. Hence, the greater the extent to which liberties are perceived by individuals to be guaranteed, the more likely the individuals are to exercise their civil liberties, a process which is essential for the functioning of civil society.

The data in Table 4 shows the differences in the extent to which respondents perceive that various liberties (speech, press, protest, sit-ins) are guaranteed. We find that there are clear differences between two types of liberties: passive-oriented liberties which consist of freedom of opinion and press, and action-oriented activities which consist of protests and sit-ins. For instance, the percentages for the passive activities in the "great extent" category for 1996 are 17.2% and 24.8% for freedom of opinion and press respectively. Although there are differences between the two liberties, these differences are overshadowed by the differences between the passive-oriented activities and the action-oriented ones; only 4.2% of respondents believe that freedom of protest is guaranteed to a "great extent," while 6.1% believe that sit-ins are fully guaranteed. In other words, 42% of respondents in 1996 believed that passive liberties (freedom of opinion and press) were guaranteed to a "great extent," compared to only 10.3% who believed that action-oriented activities (protests and sit-ins) were guaranteed to a "great extent." Similar results are found for 1995 with 41.2% of respondents believing that passive liberties were guaranteed to a "great extent" compared to only 9.1% who believe that action-oriented activities were guaranteed to a "great extent."

The differences can further be highlighted by examining the percentages in the "not guaranteed" category for 1996: 33.8% (20.5% + 13.3%) of respondents believe that passive-oriented activities are "not guaranteed" compared to 83.5% (44.5% + 39.0%) who believe that the action-oriented liberties are not guaranteed. Why the substantial differences between these two sets of liberties?

The differences between the passive and action-oriented liberties suggest that respondents are apprehensive about exercising the type of liberties that tend to be more physical in nature since they perceive the government to be less tolerant of these types of activities. Moreover, the relatively higher percentages in the "don't know" category for active-oriented liberties, compared to the "don't knows" for the passive ones, reflect the uncertainty that respondents have about exercising their action-oriented liberties. They were not sure what the government response would be if they did actually participate in such activities. The fact that most respondents in Table 4 did express their views on the extent to which liberties are guaranteed in Jordan suggest that they are relatively aware of these new changes.

To better measure the level of awareness of the recent political liberal changes, respondents were asked if they were aware that martial law had been lifted. According to a 1993 survey, a majority (62.7%) of respondents were aware that martial law was abolished. But, to further gauge respondents' depth of awareness, they were asked if they were aware that certain provisions of martial law were lifted. The data in Table 5 shows that less than half of the respondents were aware of the specific provisions that were abolished with the exception of censorship of publication and communications. It is likely that respondents were generally aware that martial law had been lifted, which was greatly emphasized in the media, without really knowing exactly what that really meant. Nevertheless, respondents were more likely to be aware of provisions that tend to be more noticeable to the general public. For example, censorship, unauthorized searches, and confiscation of private property are more noticeable than the deportation of individuals which is usually done discreetly.

[TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 4 OMITTED]

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS WHO KNEW THAT MARTIAL LAW
INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS

                                                              Know

a. Censorship of publications and communications               52
b. Search of ships, homes, etc.                                44
c. Right of crown prince to expel anybody from Jordan          20
d. Confiscation of private property for public purposes        42
e. Deportation of Jordanian citizens                           33

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1993.

By examining Table 6, once again we find that the level of education does have an impact on attitudes. In particular, the data suggests a strong relationship between the level of education and the degree to which one believes that the specified freedoms are guaranteed in Jordan. For instance, in the "great extent" category for each freedom, the higher the educational level the lower the percentages of respondents who believed that freedoms were guaranteed. The difference is significant if we compare the percentages of the illiterate educational group with the college educated in both the "great extent" and the "little extent" categories: 20.5% of respondents who were illiterate believed that freedom of opinion is guaranteed to a full extent compared to only 13.3% for college educated respondents.

Moreover, in the "little extent" category we conversely find that the more educated the person is the more likely he is to believe that freedoms are guaranteed to a little extent. For example, 35.6% of college-educated respondents believe that freedom of speech is guaranteed to a "little extent" compared to 23.7% of illiterate respondents. There were also greater percentages of illiterate respondents who simply "did not know" compared to the college-educated. Thus the greater the level of education the more likely the person is to critically evaluate whether liberal political reforms are being guaranteed by the government.

AWARENESS OF DEMOCRATIC NORMS

A democratic culture encompasses not only the behavioral norms but also fundamental democratic values that help sustain democratic stability. To determine to what extent Jordanians accept these values, the measures used consist of their opinion on quotas for minorities and women and on the separation of powers.

Political Equality and Minority Quotas

Political equality is an important democratic principle. It refers to equal access to political power. But even under such a principle, a minority may be unable to acquire enough power through the electoral process because of its numerical disadvantage. In societies with relatively equal size of different minority groups, the consociational system has often been the political mechanism to maintain a relative balance of group power. In the Arab world, Lebanon is the only state that sought to incorporate sectarianism into its political system - with limited success.

[TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 6 OMITTED]

In Jordan, however, minorities are small relative to the society in general. To assure their proper integration into the system, a number of seats were allocated to the Circassian, Bedouin, and Christian communities. It was a popular belief that King Hussein assured their representation because they were known to be strong supporters of the Hashemite monarchy. However, as Table 7 indicates, a majority of respondents, 56.6%, support quotas for minorities. This indicates that most people recognize the disadvantage that minorities have in democratic elections and support their integration into the system by guaranteeing them some level of representation. In essence, a majority of respondents adhere to the principle that all groups in a pluralistic society must be represented in politics.

The role of women in Jordanian politics is still very limited. Since the 1989 elections, only one woman has served in the Assembly. Male-dominated politics is not unique, most members of the U.S. congress and Europe's parliaments have historically been male. The difference, however, is in the degree of acceptance of women in politics. Although women in Jordan have been accepted into the workforce, especially as dual-income families became a necessity, their role in the political arena has encountered resistance by the traditional culture. The respondents in Table 7 seem to have recognized the disadvantage that women candidates face and most (68.8%) support quotas for women in the Assembly to remedy the problem of under-representation.

TABLE 7

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THEIR OPINIONS
ON THE NECESSITY OF QUOTOS FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN THE ASSEMBLY
OF DEPUTIES

Suggestion                 Yes            No            Don't Know
                            %             %                  %

Allocation of a            56.6          35.4               8.0
number of seats
for minorities

Allocation of a             68.8         30.2               2.0
number of seats
for women

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1995.

Separation of Power

The separation of powers as conceptualized by French philosopher Montesquieu and later refined by the American founders, especially James Madison, refers to the notion that a limited form of government can best be guaranteed by preventing the concentration of authority by means of separating the powers of government. Historically, the principle of separation of powers was first incorporated into the first draft Jordanian constitution (1935), which was rejected by the British colonial rulers. The intent of the drafters was to divide the powers of government as a means to limit executive authority, which had been used as an instrument of British control over the country. The separation of powers was eventually incorporated into the current Jordanian constitution. But to what extent do people support the separation of powers?

TABLE 8

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THE REASONS
PROVIDED FOR NOT SUPPORTING COMBINING THE JOB OF REPRESENTATIVE AND
THE JOB OF MINISTER

Does not provide enough time to do job as representatives,     94.2
Becomes partner in decision-making, not an observer of it,     93.6
Might use position as minister to be reelected,                87.0
Being a minister creates obstacles in communication
with people who elected him,                                   88.6

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1995.

According to a 1995 survey, a majority of respondents, 53%, support separation of powers. But why do these respondents support this principle? According to Table 8, 94.2% believe that there would not be enough time for the representatives to do his job; 93.6% believe that the representatives would become a partner in decision-making, not an overseer of it; 87.0% believe that the representative will use his position as minister to be reelected; and 88.6% believe that a minister's position creates obstacles for communication between the people and their representatives. All these have some degree of validity. Supporters of the separation of powers were concerned with the quality of representation, oversight capabilities of representatives, electoral advantage of a representative because of his dual role, and the quality of the electoral link with his constituents. Since 93.6% believed that the representative would be a partner in decision-making not an overseer of it, we must conclude that they had a practical understanding of separation of power's role in enabling each branch to be a check on the other, particularly of the need for the legislative oversight of the executive.

MEASURES TO IMPROVE DEMOCRACY

Another method of examining patterns of democratic cognition is to evaluate respondents' opinions on the role of political institutions, i.e., the Assembly of Deputies, the government (cabinet), and the laws. Differences in the evaluation of these institutions should provide us with information on what political instruments people are most likely to consider important in advancing the democratic transition.

Legislature And Executive Branch

Do people think that the Assembly of Deputies and the government can make a difference in enhancing the democratic process? The results of a 1993 survey show that about half of the respondents do believe that the Assembly can make a difference. The results are similar on the role of the government: 47.3% of respondents believed the government can improve democracy while 30.2% did not know. However, a third of the respondents did not know whether either instrument can make a difference. To gauge further the democratic cognition of respondents, they were asked to evaluate specific measures that each instrument can take to enhance democratic practices.

Differences in respondents' attitudes toward the two institutions emerge when reference is made to specific measures each can take. According to Table 9, a fairly large percentage of the respondents believed the Assembly of Deputies can improve democracy by improving economic conditions and government services (36.2%) while 22.8% believed the Assembly of Deputies can improve democracy by boosting participation and freedom and 20.3% believed the Assembly could increase democratic reforms through legislation. When compared to the measures that respondents thought the government can take (Table 10), only 7.6% believed the government can curb unemployment while half of the respondents (50.7%) believed that the government can encourage democracy and freedoms.

The data indicates that respondents are more likely to expect the Assembly of Deputies to take substantive measures to improve economic conditions and government services while they expect the government to play a greater role in improving democracy in general. Respondents may be aware that the ability of the Assembly of Deputies to enhance further the democratic process originates first with the government which in reality is acting on behalf of the King. The data also provides us with a glimpse at the secular character of respondents. A very small percentage of respondents, 1.8%, believe that the Assembly of Deputies should apply Islamic teachings. Considering the economic problems the country has been facing in recent years, respondents are considerably more concerned about their standard of living than about Islamic teachings.

TABLE 9

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THE MEASURES
THAT THE ASSEMBLY OF DEPUTIES CAN UNDERTAKE TO ENHANCE THE LEVEL OF
DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES

Curb unemployment and upgrade services                   36.2
Increase accountability                                   8.8
Boost public participation and freedom                   22.8
Expand democratic legislation package                    20.3
Apply Islamic teachings                                   1.8
Other measures                                             .7
Don't know                                               18.5

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1993.
TABLE 10

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THE MEASURES THE
GOVERNMENT CAN UNDERTAKE TO ENHANCE THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Curb unemployment, improve minimum wage                   7.6
Respond fairly to society demands                        18.9
Equal opportunity employment                              9.0
Encourage democracy and freedoms                         50.7
Limit political party licenses                            1.1
Increase government control                               2.5
Other measures                                             .7
Don't know                                               17.3

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1993

Liberal Political Laws

Since the beginning of the democratic transition in Jordan, a number of laws have been passed to improve the democratic process. To measure the extent to which respondents have confidence in the ability of these laws to improve democratic life, respondents were asked to evaluate each law separately. As the data in Table 11 shows, most respondents believe that the laws will improve democratic life to a great extent, with the exception of the Political Parties Law in which a plurality of respondents were in the "don't know" category. Since the Parties Law came into effect in 1992, a large number of political parties have emerged. But these parties have failed to take root in the electorate as less than 2% of the respondents identified themselves with any party in 1993. Most respondents either did not know what the role of political parties would be or did not think that parties have any role to play in enhancing the democratic process.

For those who did not think the laws would improve democratic life, most did not trust the government in implementing these new laws. Indeed, Table 12 indicates that, for both the Election Law (57%) and Publications Law (56.6%), a majority of respondents believed these laws would not be properly implemented, while a plurality of 48.9% believed that the Parties Law had not been properly implemented. In addition, more than one fourth of the respondents believe that these laws were not completely based on democratic practices. Respondents were either dissatisfied with the democratic substance of these laws or simply did not trust the government to implement them. Thus the data suggests that respondents generally have a reasonable understanding of what democracy means (democratic cognition). They, however, exhibit an underlying sense of political cynicism and political mistrust of the government.

ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS

Learning about the attitudes of respondents toward political instruments provides us with insight on the extent to which individuals are informed about political institutions and processes and whether they are satisfied with the efficacy of various institutions and processes in the democratic process. In this section we will examine respondents' evaluation of the party system, partisanship, the Assembly of Deputies, elected officials, and the electoral process.

TABLE 11

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THEIR OPINIONS
ON THE LAWS FOR THE ELECTION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF DEPUTIES, POLITICAL
PARTIES, AND PUBLICATIONS, AND THEIR EFFECT ON IMPROVING DEMOCRATIC
LIFE IN JORDAN

Laws           Great    Moderate   Little   Not        Don't   100%
               Degree     Degree   Degree   Fundmntl   Know

Election of      44.6      26.0      6.5      11.4      11.5   2000
Assembly

Political        24.6      14.4      6.6      21.7      32.7   2000
Parties

Publications     42.7      18.4      4.2       7.5      27.2   2000

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1995.

Party System and Partisanship

A major criteria of a fully developed democracy is the major role that political parties play in articulating, mobilizing, and representing interests. In Jordan, however, the impact of the parties has been minuscule since their legalization in 1992. Why have the Jordanians so rejected the party system? The results of a 1996 survey finally sheds light on the reasons why parties have not taken root among the electorate. According to Table 13, more than half of the respondents in each survey (1995 and 1996) perceived that parties had not represented their wishes, while more than a quarter did not know which party came closest to representing them. Moreover, the data in Table 14 shows a decline in party membership from 1993 (1.4%) to 1996 (0.5%) and a decline in the percentages of those who intended to join parties (6.3% for 1993 to 2.0% for 1996).

When asked why political parties were unsuccessful, a majority of respondents provide a number of reasons. The following are the major reasons according to Table 15. First, 83% do not think that parties respond to the people's real problems. In other words, they failed to articulate and represent their interests. Second, an equal percentage of respondents (83%) think that parties have no influence in politics. Since they are ineffective in bringing about the changes desired by the electorate, there is no incentive on the part of the electorate to link up with any party. Third, 82% of respondents consider that the large number of parties is an impediment to the party system. Voters are simply confused by the many parties that exist and their tendency to merge, split or disappear. Fourth, 59% of the respondents state that the government had not encouraged people to join parties. Finally, 81% of the respondents consider traditional familial and tribal ties as a major problem for the Jordanian party system.

TABLE 12

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS WHO CLAIM THAT LAWS FOR
ELECTION OF ASSEMBLY, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT
SOLID STEPS IN IMPROVING DEMOCRACY IN JORDAN ACCORDING TO REASONS

Reasons- 1995          Election         Parties         Publications
                         Law              Law                Law

Law not based            30.4             26.4               28.5
enough on
democratic
practices

Law has not              57.0             48.9               56.6
been properly
implemented

Other reasons             3.4             14.0                4.6

Don't know                9.0             10.0               10.1

Unknown                   0.2              0.1                0.2

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1995.

In sum, the major perceived reasons for the failure of parties are; the influence of familial-tribal ties within the party system, lack of representation of substantive issues of concern to constituents, lack of efficacy of the parties, and the confusion that results from the fragmentation of the party system. Furthermore, while one would expect that in time, the party system might solidify itself with the electorate, as the data in Table 14 indicate, there was in fact a decrease from 1993 to 1996 in the percentage of respondents who intended to join parties. Considering that parties had only been legalized for one year (1992), the respondents in 1993 probably had high expectations for the newly-born party system. But by 1996, they came to realize that the party system had failed to respond to their needs. The inability of the party system to take root in the electorate is an inhibiting factor for the progress of democracy.

ASSEMBLY OF DEPUTIES AND ITS MEMBERS

Confidence in the scope of representation and satisfaction with the design of the Assembly are indeed important in determining the overall legitimacy of the democratic process. As Table 16 shows, a majority of the respondents believe the Assembly of Deputies provides medium (42.2%) to high (27.7%) levels of representation for all sectors of society compared to 12.9% and 8.0% who believe it provides low to no representation respectively. Consequently, Jordanians are satisfied with the level of representation.

TABLE 13

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THE
REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES OF THEIR PERSONAL AMBITIONS

1995         1996

54.05       55.60       None of the parties represent
                        their personal ambitions.

26.20       29.10       Don't know which of the parties
                        closely represents their personal
                        ambitions.

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Surveys, 1995 & 1996.
TABLE 14

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO PARTY MEMBERSHIP

                        1993             1995               1996

Members                 1.40             1.05               0.50
of parties

Intend to               6.30             1.85               2.00
join party

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Surveys, 1993, 1995, 1996.

Despite the majority's satisfaction with the scope of representation, according to a 1993 survey, only 43% were satisfied with the performance of their representatives compared to 40.4% who were not satisfied. Table 17 reflects the respondents' attitudes for some specific aspects of the electoral design. A majority did not think that the existing number of districts and legislative seats were appropriate, while about half thought the basis for distribution of electoral districts was also improper. Under the 1993 rules, Jordan had a multi-member district form of representation whereby voters chose up to five candidates, depending on the district they resided in: Further, the number of representatives assigned to each district did not reflect the number of residents. The design of the districts and the number of representatives assigned to each were greatly slanted in favor of the rural and Bedouin regions where Hashemite support was prevalent. For example, in the city of Ma'an (predominantly Transjordanian), 7,440 voters were represented by one deputy compared to the 2nd district of Amman (predominantly Palestinian) where one deputy represented about 50,000 voters (Riedel 1994, 53). A majority of the respondents seem to have recognized the inequalities of the electoral system and did not think that they were appropriate.

TABLE 15

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THE REASONS
PROVIDED FOR WHY POLITICAL PARTIES ARE UNSUCCESSFUL

Percentage                               Reason

83                     The political issues of the parties do not
                       deal with the realistic problems of the
                       people.

83                     The political parties have no influence on
                       the political life until now in Jordan.

82                     The large number of parties.

81                     The interference of family ties and tribal
                       ties with these parties.

81                     Some of the parties are based on personal
                       issues.

78                     Not enough organization for parties.

70                     Not enough financial support of parties.

69                     The short period of time where the parties
                       have been active.

66                     Religious reasons.

65                     The failure of the previous parties'
                       experiment.

59                     The government does not encourage
                       people to join parties.

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1995.
TABLE 16

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THE EXTENT TO
WHICH THEY THINK THE CURRENT ASSEMBLY OF DEPUTIES REPRESENTS ALL THE
VARIOUS SECTORS OF THE SOCIETY AND ITS DIFFERENT LEVELS

Value Label                                      Percent

High Representation                                27.7
Medium Representation                              42.2
Low Representation                                 12.9
Not Represented                                     8.0
Don't Know                                          9.2

Total                                             100.0

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1993.

The Electoral Process

For democracy to be perceived as a legitimate end, the electoral process must be conducted fairly. In Table 18, respondents were asked to give their opinions on a number of electoral process related activities. A plurality of respondents believed that these activities, especially vote counting, were performed adequately. However, at least a quarter of the respondents did not know whether the specified measures were suitable or not and 41.3% of the respondents did not know whether vote counting was adequate or not. These respondents were not sure or had no way of knowing whether such activities were conducted fairly. The fact that the majority of respondents believed that the measures, except for listing of the candidates, were not adequate suggests that the government needs to take further steps in raising the confidence of the people in the way it conducts electoral procedures.

TABLE 17

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THEIR OPINIONS
ON THE NUMBER OF DISTRICTS, NUMBER OF SEATS, AND DISTRIBUTION OF
ELECTORAL DISTRICTS

                          Not             Adequate            Don't
                        Adequate                               Know

Number of                 50.8              29.6               19.6
districts

Number of                 57.2              31.8               11.0
Assembly
seats

Basis upon                49.7              20.9               29.4
which
districts
were made

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1993.

PATTERNS OF PARTICIPATION

A participant culture may encompass different dimensions of civic activities - traditional and modern modes of participation. The available survey data are used to examine the prevalence of these activities in this section. For the traditional participant culture, measures relating to the practice of the Jaha (gathering of the men of a clan) will be used, while membership in nongovernment organizations (NGOs) will be used as the measure for the modern participant culture.

TABLE 18

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THEIR OPINIONS
ON THE ADEQUACY OF MEASURES TAKEN TO ELECT THE ASSEMBLY OF DEPUTIES

                             Not          Adequate          Don't
                          Adequate                          Know

Listing of                  48.5            10.5            40.9
candidates

Electoral                   62.8             8.7            28.4
Identity Cards

Measures                    58.4            11.4            30.1
taken in
Voting Room

Vote counting               50.6             7.9            41.3

Result                      64.2             6.5            28.9
announcement

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1993.

Traditional Behavior

The Jaha has an important function in traditional culture. It can be used for a number of purposes such as: inter-clan conflict resolution and marriage. In the first type of activity, clans are essential in resolving disputes where collective responsibility is prevalent. For example, if a pedestrian was hit by a car, the victim's clan holds the driver and his clan responsible. After the accident (usually one to three days), the driver's clan forms a Jaha and visits the victim's house where his clan's Jaha awaits. At the house, the elder-man of the driver's clan apologizes on behalf of his clan and asks what demands if any do the victim's clan have. The response is usually the granting of forgiveness or/and compensation for medical expenses. Whatever the agreement is, it is formalized in a written document or orally with neutral witnesses.

Another use of Jaha is in marriage. Usually, the groom's clan visits the bride's house, where the men of the bride's elan await for the arrival of the groom's Jaha, and after some social talk, the elder-man of the groom's clan requests the hand of the other clan's daughter for the groom. The response is usually acceptance, and mutual compliments of each other's clan follows. Upon acceptance, but not before, the elders from each of the two clans drink Arabic coffee to confirm the agreement. However, this practice is mostly ceremonial since the specifics of the agreement are reached in advance and usually through intermediaries.

To what extent do Jordanians use the Jaha and are there generational differences in its use? To answer these questions, we resort to a 1996 survey which for the first time included questions on traditional modes of behavior. According to this survey's results, 46.2% of the respondents were asked to participate in a Jaha, while 44.5% actually participated. The high correlation between the two figures highlights the continued strength of the sense of obligation to fulfill one's traditional civic duties.

Table 19 indicate that the older the person, the more likely he is to have participated in a Jaha; 55.6% of male respondents 45 years or older compared to 32.3% in the 19-24 age bracket. The figures may suggest a generational effect since older cohorts were socialized during a period when traditionalism was much more prevalent than in recent times. However, the generational explanation must be modified if we consider that age is strongly related to prestige and respect. The older a person is the more likely he is to be considered wiser and extended respect.

Participation of older people in a Jaha enhances the prestige of the Jaha itself which makes it more effective in fulfilling its objective. In essence, the older person is more likely to be asked and to participate. This is supported by the evidence in Table 20 in which 57.3% of respondents 45 and older were asked to participate in the previous twelve months compared to 33.1% in the 19 24 age bracket. It is in fact rare to find a male Jordanian above the age of 45 who has never been asked to participate in a Jaha. In the absence of time series data, no conclusions can be made on whether this type of traditional behavior is decreasing or not over time. Nevertheless, it is clear that despite modernizing influences experienced by the society, almost one-half of the male respondents had participated in this traditional pattern of behavior in a one year period.

Associational Life

To what extent are Jordanians participating in NGOs? According to a 1996 survey, only 10.1% of the respondents were members of associations. The breakdown of membership according to different group types is provided in Table 21. For the non-sports groups, only three types have memberships above 1%: professional associations 1.85%, voluntary associations 1.41% and unions 1.16%. These data indicate that by whatever standards, organized civil society in Jordan is still at an embryonic stage. However, in times of crisis, the activities of an amalgam of associations have considerably more influence on the society as a whole than what their membership suggests. Moreover, the ability of associations and other organized groups to influence the state is also determined by such factors as the ability to mobilize wider support, internal coherence, financial strength, ability to work with other groups, and the nature of its relations with state authorities.

TABLE 19

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MALE RESPONDENTS BY AGE GROUP ACCORDING
TO WHETHER THEY PARTICIPATED IN A JAHA IN THE TWELVE MONTHS PRIOR
TO THE INTERVIEW

Participate                    AGE GROUP                   All age
in a Jaha?                                                  groups

                 19-24      25-34      35-44      45
                                                  and
                                                 older

Yes              32.3       43.4       43.2       55.6       44.5

No                0.8        2.3        1.5        1.8        1.7

Not asked        66.9       54.3       55.3       42.7       53.7

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1996.
TABLE 20

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MALE RESPONDENTS BY AGE GROUP ACCORDING
TO WHETHER THEY WERE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN A JAHA IN THE TWELVE
MONTHS PRIOR TO THE INTERVIEW

Have you                       AGE GROUP                     All
been asked to                                                age
participate in                                              groups
a Jaha?

                 19-24      25-34      35-44      45+

Yes              33.1       45.7       44.7       57.3       46.2

No               66.9       54.3       55.3       42.1       53.7

Not known           -          -          -        0.6        0.1
TABLE 21

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THEIR GROUP
MEMBERSHIP

Sports clubs                          3.66
Professional organizations            1.85
Charity work                          1.41
Unions (workers)                      1.16
Specialized organizations             0.83
Women's associations                  0.66
Educational associations              0.58
Religious associations                0.50
Union of business owners              0.41
Family associations                   0.33
Other                                 0.41

Source: University of Jordan. Center for Strategic Studies.
Democracy in Jordan. Survey, 1996.

CONCLUSION

A number of conclusions can be made about the participatory role of the Jordanian citizens and their perceptions of the recent democratic changes. The first is the presence of both traditional and modern attributes. Ranging from clans to modern associations, Jordanians have different avenues for engaging in civic behavior. These avenues have helped shape a participant culture that should be conducive to the further development of a democratic society. Second, most Jordanians are quite aware of political changes around them and consider their system to be less than halfway developed toward a full-fledged democracy. Third, the Jordanians indicate they understand and support democratic principles - separation of powers, political equality, and political secularism are generally supported.

Fourth, they are also aware of their new civil liberties and are apprehensive about exercising the more action-oriented ones (protest and sit-ins). Fifth, the party system, as an important mechanism of mobilization and articulation of interests, has failed to influence the political behavior of citizens. In its absence, primordial ties continue to provide a major impetus for political activity. Finally, the Jordanians associate democracy with better economic conditions and consider the government responsible for improving the status of democracy in general.

WORKS CITED

Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Prineton: University Press, 1963.

Riedel, Tim H. "The 1993 Parliamentary Elections in Jordan." Orient 35:91/51-63, 1994.

Maher J. Massis is a recent Ph.D. in political science from the University of Houston.