Joint tactical targeting for base security in Iraq.

1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3rd Infantry Division, deployed to Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III in the Multinational Division-North Central (MND-NC). The BCT initially was attached to the 42nd Infantry Division, an Army National Guard (ARNG) division headquartered in New York, and, later, to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). It conducted stability operations while transitioning responsibility for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to Iraqi security forces and provincial and local governments throughout the Salah al Din Province. The province is north of Baghdad and covers most of what is known as the "Sunni Triangle."

The brigade's area of operations (AO) extended more than 150 miles along the corps' Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa (also known as Highway 1) and the Tigris River and included the population centers of Bayji, Tikrit, Samarra and Balad. The brigade's 10 battalions (seven maneuver, one fires, one brigade troops and one forward support) conducted operations throughout the 17,250 square miles of the AO from 13 forward operating bases (FOBs) and two patrol bases in Samarra.

In addition to providing security for these FOBs, 1st BCT was responsible for security around Logistic Support Area (LSA) Anaconda (also known as Balad Air Base), a base for more than 20,000 Coalition Forces in the southern part of the brigade AO, 20 kilometers east of Balad.

The 1st BCT established a permanent tactical command post (TAC) at LSA Anaconda to provide command and control throughout the brigade AO and manage the unique requirements of security around LSA Anaconda.

This article describes the roles and functions of the 1st BCT TAC at LSA Anaconda and how it contributed to LSA security and offers suggestions for improving future joint base defense operations.

1st BCT TAC. The TAC's purpose was to help the brigade commander command and control his expansive AO and task organization. The 1st BCT TAC performed this support role across all battlefield operating systems (BOS) except combat service support. The TAC facilitated the execution of the brigade's stability operations across all lines of operation (LOOs).

It augmented the brigade tactical operations center (TOC) in Tikrit with analysis of the southern AO and coordinated with the units on LSA Anaconda that operated in the brigade's AO. The southern AO included Task Forces (TFs) 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry (5-7 Cav), 1-128 IN and 1-442 IN.

Three TAC functions were critical to maintaining the security of LSA Anaconda: synchronizing and integrating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; running the LSA Anaconda counterstrike headquarters; and providing terminal attack control for close air support (CAS). The brigade manned this non-doctrinal permanent TAC with Soldiers from headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB), 1-41 FA, under the supervision of the brigade deputy commander.

1-41 FA's mission was to provide fires throughout the brigade AO, requiring that four firing platoons be positioned on four FOBs in direct support (DS) to the maneuver battalions based at the FOBs. The static, dispersed and decentralized nature of the battalion's DS mission created conditions that allowed 1-41 FA to provide Soldiers to the brigade's TAC with only minor disruption of its fires mission.

LSA Anaconda Units (Role, Functions and Capabilities). LSA Anaconda was the home of the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW). This wing had two fighter squadrons that flew missions throughout Iraq and a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) recovery squadron that launched and recovered Predator UAVs as directed by the combined air operations center (CAOC).

If the wing's aircraft had fuel remaining on board after being released from their air tasking order (ATO) missions, they contacted the joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) in the 1st BCT TAC and flew base defense missions as long as their fuel permitted. The brigade never relied on this "residual" capability to support deliberate operations. However, these aircraft provided additional ISR to observe enemy activities in the brigade's countermortar/rocket and counter-improvised explosive device (IED) named areas of interest (NAIs).

The 332nd AEW's security forces, the wing commander's base defense force, had capabilities that enhanced 1st BCT's operations in its AO. The security forces squadron controlled a force protection aerial surveillance system (FPASS) UAV. This battery-operated UAV flew up to 500 feet above ground level (AGL) for 45 minutes out to a range of 10 kilometers. It provided a limited reconnaissance and surveillance capability in historic mortar and rocket points of origin (POOs).

The 332nd AEW's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) gathered intelligence about threats to the base and provided a "quasi" tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) function. These investigative capabilities provided the battalions operating around LSA Anaconda additional intelligence about the local anti-Iraqi force (AIF) cells attacking Coalition Forces with mortars, rockets and IEDs.

Multinational Corps-Iraq's (MNC-I's) general support (GS) aviation brigade was headquartered at LSA Anaconda along with its attack battalion, which had one company of AH-64 Longbows. Near the end of our deployment, it also had one OH-58 Kiowa troop based with it.

These attack and reconnaissance assets provided three air weapons teams to fly counter man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), mortars, and rocket interdiction (C[M.sup.2]RI) around LSA Anaconda for approximately seven and a half hours each day. This depended on the availability of aircraft due to maintenance, weather and commitments to higher priority missions. The aviation brigade also had a lift battalion based at LSA Anaconda that, as available, reconnoitered key infrastructure or air assault operations in the area.

The other joint asset operating from LSA Anaconda was the US Navy's Mako UAV project. This UAV flew in support of the 1st BCT for approximately nine months before it lost funding at the end of the FY. The Mako provided the TAC and the battalions operating around LSA Anaconda six hours of UAV support from 1,000 feet AGL out to a range of 50 kilometers from the LSA for six days each week.

The commander of the corps support command (COSCOM) was the senior Army commander on LSA Anaconda and responsible for base security. The 29th BCT, Hawaii ARNG, was attached to the COSCOM and provided the forces to execute the functions of the joint defense operations center (JDOC) and joint intelligence center (JIC), man the LSA's entry control points (ECPs), supervise the guard towers (manned by tenant units), provide a company quick-reaction force (QRF) and conduct routine patrolling throughout the 29th BCT AO. The BCT's AO extended 300 meters beyond the installation perimeter.

The JDOC maintained and controlled a wide array of sensors to help with LSA Anaconda security mission. These cameras and radars had the ability to detect, observe and monitor activity well past the LSA perimeter that was the boundary of the 1st BCT and 29th BCT.

Joint Tactical Targeting. Each of the units on LSA Anaconda had assets that helped provide security. The preponderance of the brigade's COIN was fought at the battalion or company levels with few brigade-level combat operations to plan or control. Thus, the brigade's primary function was to resource its battalions with assets, based on the commander's assessment of likely enemy actions and his prioritized objectives for the AO.

The 1st BCT TAC coordinated the unique assets at LSA Anaconda to support the three battalions in the brigade's southern AO and ensure the task and purpose of these assets were nested with the brigade commander's priorities in the AO. The confluence of so many unique units with varied capabilities on LSA Anaconda coupled with the TAC's purpose created the need for a process to integrate assets and fires with the battalion ground maneuver plans.

The 1st BCT TAC relied on the decide, detect, deliver and assess ([D.sup.3]A) targeting methodology to synchronize ISR assets and fires with the ground maneuver plan and mobility support operations (route clearance). The TAC's targeting process was a weekly cycle with daily refinements. The TAC developed a weekly effects tasking order (ETO) that began each Friday.

Intel Huddle. Development of this ETO began each Saturday with an assessment of the effects achieved in the previous week. The Intel Huddle reviewed information requirements (IRs) that had been gathered in the previous ETO and focused on developing a common assessment of the enemy's actions in the previous week and a template of likely activity in the week that would begin that coming Friday.

The TAC S2 chaired this meeting that was attended by the battalion S2s, representatives from the JIC, the 332nd AEW Intelligence Officer, OSI commander and agents, S2s from various corps units on LSA Anaconda and the TAC staff. This forum established a collective judgment of the enemy's most likely actions and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the upcoming week.

Based on the assessment, the TAC operations officer and S2 recommended specific targeting objectives to be achieved and IRs to be answered in the next week. The deputy commanding officer's (DCO's) approval of these recommended targeting objectives and IRs began the decide portion of the targeting cycle. The battalions used the collective assessment of the Intel Huddle and the DCO's approved targeting objectives to drive their mission analysis to develop the next week's patrol schedule.

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Targeting Board Meeting. The next event in the TAC's weekly targeting process was the targeting board meeting each Tuesday. The purpose of this meeting was to consider requests from the battalions and allocate assets to achieve the approved targeting objectives and answer the approved IRs. The TAC operations officer chaired this meeting that was attended by JDOC operations officers; Predator recovery squadron, Mako, FPASS, OSI and corps GS attack battalion representatives; the 332nd AEW ground liaison officer (LNO) and weapons officer; the JIC collection manager; and the TAC staff.

Because these units provided assets to achieve desired effects or answer IRs in the 1st BCT AO but had no command relationship with 1st BCT, the operations officers only described their expected missions for the next ETO and projected when their assets likely would be available.

The targeting board meeting planned friendly force reactions to every templated enemy action, allocated all assets and listed asset, requests from the battalions that the TAC could not resource with LSA Anaconda assets. This informaion was forwarded to the TOC for consideration by the brigade staff.

On Wednesday, the brigade TAC convened its weekly targeting meeting. It was attended by the battalion's S3s and commanders or the operations officers of the units providing assets in the 1st BCT AO and the TAC staff. The TAC operations officer briefed the tentative asset allocation plan for the next ETO and resulting battalion asset shortfalls to the DCO for approval. After the DCO's approval, the battalion S3s refined their patrol schedules, if required.

Daily ISR Meeting. The weekly targeting process provided a valuable framework for units to plan their missions for an upcoming week. New missions, enemy actions, maintenance status and weather all disrupted the prioritization or availability of assets allocated at the Tuesday targeting board meeting. Each day, liaisons from the battalions and units providing assets met with the TAC staff and resynchronized the plan for the following day.

This daily ISR meeting occurred in the morning at the TAC and was conducted like a wargame. The S2 presented an overview of recent enemy activities and a template of his expected activities for the next 24 hours. The S3 followed with an overview of planned operations.

The synchronization occurred by conducting four six-hour "turns" of enemy templated actions followed by friendly reactions. During each turn, the TAC S2 presented a "doctrinal template" of enemy actions based on a pattern analysis of enemy actions during that period the previous year and during the previous two weeks. Then each liaison briefed the task, purpose and location of his patrols or assets during the period.

Based on friendly actions and an assessment of the enemy, the TAC S2 presented an enemy, the TAC S2 presented an enemy reaction that became the "situational template" for that period. The operations officer led a wargame of any required counter actions and changes to the established plan.

This daily ISR meeting provided all the units operating in the area around LSA Anaconda a common assessment of recent enemy activities and an understanding of planned friendly actions for the next day.

The 1st BCT TAC recorded the results of the daily ISR synchronization meeting in the Raider TAC ISR synchronization matrix. The matrix was distributed to the brigade staff, subordinate battalions, all units that participated in the synchronization meeting and dozens of commanders and staff officers throughout LSA Anaconda.

Targeting Success. LSA Anaconda has gained notoriety as the Coalition Force base in Iraq that receives the most indirect fire attacks. Although these attacks never substantially impact the base's ability to command and control logistics or provide air support throughout the theater, they are a threat to Coalition Forces. Thus, 1st BCT had the objective of reducing the frequency and effectiveness of indirect fire attacks against the base.

Proactive targeting of known insurgent cells and templated firing positions was the most effective means of disrupting the indirect fire threat to LSA Anaconda. Based on a number of common factors, we assessed that two distinct cells conducted these attacks.

The 1st BCT made the neutralization of these cells a brigade targeting objective. Using pattern analysis of the cells' previous attacks, 1st BCT developed a plan to mass ground maneuver, attack aviation and fires in POOs to deny the terrain and force the insurgent mortar cells to attack at a time and place where the brigade could conduct persistent armed surveillance.

During August 2005, the 1st BCT TAC conducted a series of crawl-walk-run mission rehearsals to improve the coordination and synchronization of ground maneuver, attack aviation, CAS and Predator UAVs. These rehearsals focused on synchronizing the response of all assets to a mortar attack against LSA Anaconda and resulted in greatly improved communications and coordination across all units capable of delivering effects against insurgent mortar cells.

On 5 September 2005 just before sunrise, two insurgent mortar cells conducted two separate attacks with 82-mm mortars against LSA Anaconda from POOs on the east side of the Tigris River. The two attacks occurred approximately 1,500 meters and five minutes apart. As a result of the 1st BCT TAC targeting process, a Predator UAV and joint land-attack cruise missile elevated netted sensor (JLENS) camera controlled by the JDOC were scanning these POOs while ground maneuver and attack aviation assets conducted operations in nearby POOs.

The 1st BCT TAC received the POO of the attacks from the counterstrike radars on LSA Anaconda and cross-cued the Predator and JLENS to the exact POOs. The Predator UAV successfully engaged both crews with its two onboard Hellfire missiles, killing 11 insurgents.

Recommendations. We learned a number of lessons during our 12-month tour.

Counterstrike Operations. Ground patrols, air weapons team flights and interdiction fires all disrupted many planned attacks, but the disruptions merely forced the insurgent to change the time, location or method of his attack and did not have long-term effects. Reactive counterstrikes created conditions that forced insurgents to attack with low volumes of fire and inaccurate methods.

We always must improve the effectiveness of tactical units conducting counter-strike in COIN operations. The increase in the number and types of FA precision-guided munitions (PGMs) fielded in theater will help significantly.

Joint Base Defense Doctrine/TTPs. The only common headquarters for all units based at LSA Anaconda was Central Command (CENTCOM). The common headquarters of all Army units based at LSA Anaconda was MNC-I. However, neither CENTCOM nor MNC-I had any staff representation at the base. All the units based at LSA Anaconda had to establish informal coordination mechanisms to synchronize the assets into consistent COIN operations.

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There is no doctrine that addresses coordinating joint assets for base defense. The services must establish joint doctrine that makes one tactical commander responsible for base defense and security operations in an assigned AO around the base with a command or support relationship over all units conducting tactical operations in the AO. That operational headquarters must develop the AO via a thorough mission analysis and detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

Persistent Armed Surveillance for the Tactical Commander. The armed Predator was very effective. However, despite flying many residual hours in the vicinity of LSA Anaconda, the Predator did not successfully engage mortar crews until conditions permitted the CAOC to temporarily assign a Predator DS to the 1st BCT. Current resourcing limitations keep all Predators under the control of operational commanders with infrequent tactical employment.

Enemy trends indicate that the requirement for tactical employment of persistent armed surveillance assets will increase. The services need to commit resources to provide tactical commanders routine access to persistent armed surveillance.

Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and HUMINT. Insurgents disperse and hide to ensure their survival. Despite the routine dispersion, they must communicate and occasionally assemble to plan and conduct attacks. This makes them vulnerable to attack but only if tactical commanders

have access to the SIGINT and HUMINT assets necessary for exploitation.

The Army needs to commit resources to increase the amount and quality of SIGINT and HUMINT assets available to tactical commanders.

FOB or LSA security in Iraq is a challenge. Add a variety of units from multiple services stationed on the FOB or LSA with no common headquarters except at the theater level, and the challenges increase. A clear line of authority--and responsibility--and better resourcing of specific assets will diminish many of these challenges.

Major Douglas W. Winton currently is the Executive Officer (XO) of 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery (1-41 FA), 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. He deployed as the S3 for 1-41 FA in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III with duty as the Operations Officer in the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Tactical Command Post (TAC) at Logistical Supply Area (LSA) Anaconda. In previous assignments, he was the Fires and Effects Planner for the 3rd Division; Battery Commander, Assistant S3 and S4 in 1-27 FA (Multiple-Launch Rocket System), V Corps Artillery, Germany; and XO and Company Fire Support Officer (FSO) in 3-320 FA, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick M. Antonietti commanded 1-41 FA from July 2003 through June 2006, including deploying with his battalion for OIF III. Currently, he is the 3rd Infantry Division Fires and Effects Coordinator at Fort Stewart. In his assignment prior to command, he was a Political-Military Planner for Central Europe and Afghanistan in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J5, on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. He was a Brigade FSO and Battalion XO in 1-6 FA and Assistant Fire Support Coordinator, all in the 1st Infantry Division Artillery in Germany. While serving as the XO, he deployed for Kosovo Force (KFOR) 1B. He commanded B Battery/2-8 FA and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 7th Infantry Division (Light), at Fort Ord, California, and Fort Lewis, Washington. He is an Olmsted Scholar with a degree in Political Science from Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia.

By Major Douglas W. Winton and Lieutenant Colonel Patrick M. Antonietti