Joint fires observer.

  The USA and United States Marine Corps (USMC) have identified the need
to provide close air support (CAS) training to forward observers (FOs),
reconnaissance marines and special operators to better prepare them to
assist in the control of Type 2 and Type 3 CAS aircraft when a qualified
joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) is not collocated with the FO.
The idea is to provide a limited capability to control CAS in situations
where a qualified JTAC is not physically located with the FO and the
situation requires immediate assistance from available CAS assets. The
intent is not to circumvent the need for a qualified JTAC, but to
address the fact that a JTAC cannot be present in all locations of the
joint battlespace.
"JCAS [Joint CAS] Action Plan"
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), 2003

The Army and Air Force are moving out on creating a joint fires observer (JFO). Much has been written and discussed about the JFO; unfortunately, some of the information remains misunderstood or is just plain inaccurate.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

The purpose of this article is to clarify the facts associated with the term "JFO" and the Army's and Air Force's plans to train JFOs.

What a JFO Is and Is Not. First, we need to define joint fire support. According to Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, "Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters."

Next are the facts associated with providing the CAS portion of joint fire support. In 2004, the Rand Corporation published the monograph "Beyond Close Air Support, Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership." Figure 1 lists the monograph's key findings.

These findings illustrate the need for an asset to increase the critical combat capability the JTAC brings to the air ground battle exponentially: the JFO. Although the concept of the JFO is not new, the services' recognizing that the JFO's role in the Modular Army in light of the increased need for JTACs is a logical and effective force multiplier.

As the Army continues its transformation into a more flexible and lethal combat force, one of the determining factors of the Army's success will be its ability to leverage the full spectrum of joint fires for joint interdependency. One way to leverage these joint fires is the creation of a JFO.

As defined by the Army's Field Artillery Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and agreed upon by the Air Force's Joint Air Ground Office (JAGO) in the Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia, the JFO is a "trained service member who can request, adjust and control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting information in support of Type 2 and 3 CAS terminal attack controls and perform autonomous terminal guidance operations (TGO)."

A JFO is not a certified JTAC and will never replace a certified JTAC. However, a JFO can serve as the eyes and ears of a JTAC (or certified forward air controller-airborne, called FAC-A) to provide timely and accurate targeting information for the JTAC's terminal control of Types 2 and 3 CAS when the JTAC is not in position to see the target or the aircraft at weapons release or when attacking aircraft are not in a position to acquire the mark or target before releasing or launching their weapons.

When a JTAC is unavailable and the tactical risk mandates the use of an unqualified controller, the JFO will be capable of controlling CAS.

Field commanders must be judicious in using their JTACs to maximize their availability and avoid the exceptional situation of a JFO's controlling CAS, thus deviating from the doctrinally optimal killer combination of the JTAC and CAS platform. Figure 2 gives an example of a commander's positioning of his JTAC and JFO assets to make the most of his air power assets.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

The JFO's controlling CAS when a JTAC is unavailable and the tactical risk mandates it is not a new concept. Historically, FOs have executed "emergency" CAS. However with joint interdependency and a lack of formal CAS training for Army FOs, creating a JFO course was a necessity.

Many units have done and still do quality training and familiarization programs with their resident air support operations squadrons (ASOS). But CAS training as a whole has diminished greatly over the years--so much so that a fire support sergeant in the rank of sergeant or staff sergeant (13F20/30 Fire Support Specialist) no longer was responsible for CAS tasks on his military operational specialty (MOS) task list. This has been corrected. The next logical step was to establish a formal JFO program for new Knight or combat observation and lasing team (COLT) sergeants and company fire support sergeants to ensure they can apply the full range of joint fires.

Training the JFO. The JFO Course (JFOC) started in January 2005 as a seven-day course running in conjunction with the third week of the other resident courses at the Air Ground Operations School (AGOS) located at Nellis AFB, Nevada. (AGOS recently was renamed Joint Air-Ground Operations Group, or JAGOG.)

The course consists of 25 hours of academics and 26.5 hours of simulations with a one-day field exercise. The academic instruction focuses on the integration and execution of joint fires, including artillery, mortars, naval surface fires, CAS, rotary-wing close combat attack (CCA) and AC-130 aircraft.

JFOC graduates come away with an enhanced ability to plan and execute joint fires at the tactical level. Students learn the basic doctrinal issues of JCAS and the command and control needed to employ it effectively. They learn the fundamentals of CAS execution, which include map-reading skills, brevity terms, aircraft and weapons capabilities, and types of CAS terminal attack control. They receive additional instruction on integrating surface fires with CAS, calculating the maximum ordinate (MAXORD, the highest point a projectile achieves during its trajectory) for artillery and mortars, applying naval surface fires, developing and using airspace coordination areas (ACAs), calling in and employing AC-130 aircraft and applying Army rotary-wing aircraft conducting CCA.

But the bulk of the training occurs when the JFO teams with a JTAC to coordinate an air attack. This event demonstrates the criticality of teamwork and the practical demarcation of roles between the JTAC, JFO and attacking platform. Once trained, a JFO must work with JTACs and aircraft periodically to exercise the skills he has learned. Figure 3 provides an example of how a JFO provides information to the JTAC for Type 2 CAS control.

JAGOG currently can train 12 JFOs per course under a provisional syllabus agreed upon by JAGOG and the FA School. Initially, the JFOC syllabus supports training Army FOs--to date, only those preparing for deployment have attended.

The FA School and JAGOG have established an additional JFOC at Fort Sill with the pilot course held starting on 29 August. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is adding the JFOC to the Army training requirements and resources system (ATRRS) for Soldier enrollments.

This second JFOC location will allow for an additional 17 classes a year with an annual throughput at Fort Sill of more than 500 JFOs, bringing the total throughput between the two locations to more than 600 JFOs a year.

However, at some point in the future, the intent is to modify the Army FO syllabus to train selected combat arms personnel as JFOs to increase the JFO capability for warfighting organizations. The proposed new syllabus for JFOC is at Air Combat Command for final approval, which is expected within the next few months.

The Air Force detachment at Fort Sill eventually will grow into a training squadron size, and Fort Sill is improving the installation's runway and other air-ground related facilities. Fort Sill also is in the process of increasing the number of targets in the impact area and modifying the airspace over Fort Sill and southern Oklahoma to allow for fixed-wing CAS sorties to support JFO training.

The return of fixed-wing CAS sorties to southern Oklahoma not only supports JFO training, but also supports Fort Sill's designation as the Army's Center of Excellence for Joint Fires and Effects.

The battlefield of today and tomorrow will require highly trained personnel at all echelons to be joint fires experts. Joint interdependence is not a buzzword, it is the future of our armed services, and we need a formal process to gain and maintain the degree of training needed to ensure Soldiers are capable of leveraging all available fires.

JFO training will increase the ability of Air Force JTACs to manage critical CAS fires in combat and, ultimately, allow ground commanders to win quickly and decisively on tomorrow's battlefields.

Colonel Michael A. Longoria, USAF, is the Director of the Joint Air/Ground Combat Office (JAGO) at the Air Combat Command (ACC), Langley AFB, Virginia. He is responsible for developing plans and programs for joint aerial strike, close attack and tactical reconnaissance systems in support of ground forces. He has commanded at every level in the Air Force up to a wing in combat. During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, he led Air Force air/ground forces in support of the Combined Force Land, Air and Special Operations Component Commanders. During Operation Allied Force, he supported special reconnaissance operations in Kosovo. During Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf, he supported the XVIII Airborne Corps, and during Operation Just Cause in Panama, he supported the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Lieutenant Colonel D. Wayne Andrews is the Chief of Joint Operations and Training in the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Until recently, he was the Senior Instructor for the Army Joint Support Team in the Air Ground Operations School (AGOS), now called the Joint Air-Ground Operations Group (JAGOG), at Nellis AFB, Nevada. He has served as an S3 and Battalion Executive Officer for the 2d Battalion, 5th Field Artillery (2-5 FA), 212th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, and as a Small Group Instructor for the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course in the Field Artillery School, both at Fort Sill. He also was a Field Artillery Battalion Observer/Controller (O/C) and Chief of the Leader Training Program (LTDP) at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven P. Milliron, Aviation (AV), is the Commandant of the Army Joint Support Team-Nellis (AJST-N), part of JAGOG at Nellis AFB. He is the Senior Army Liaison to the Air Force's JAGOG. He is responsible for the Army academics that support JAGOG's Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Course, Air Liaison Officer (ALO) Qualification Course and the Joint Firepower Course. His previous assignments include serving as the Executive Officer of the 6th Cavalry Brigade and S3 of the 3d Squadron, 6th Cavalry, (3-6 Cav), both in the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. He commanded three troops: D Troop, 3-1 Cav, Fort Polk, Louisiana, and D and F Troops, 2-1 Cav, Fort Hood, Texas.

By Colonel Michael A. Longoria, USAF, and Lieutenant Colonels D. Wayne Andrews and Steven P. Milliron, AV

RELATED ARTICLE: CAS Terminal Attack Controls

There are three types of terminal attack controls for close air support (CAS): Types 1, 2 and 3. Each type has associated risks and a set of control procedures specified.

The ground commander considers the situation and issues guidance to the joint terminal attack controller (JTAC), based on recommendations from his staff and the risks identified in the tactical risk assessment.

Within the constraints established during risk assessment, the intent is to offer the lowest level supported commander the latitude to determine which type of terminal attack control best accomplishes the mission. The three types of control are not aircraft- or ordnance-specific.

Type 1 CAS. JTACs use Type 1 control when the risk assessment requires them to visually acquire the attacking aircraft and the target under attack. The tactical risk assessment may determine that analysis of the attacking aircraft's nose position and geometry is the best method of ensuring first-pass success and mitigating fratricide in the situation.

Examples of situations making Type 1 controls the best choice are when there are language barriers when controlling Coalition aircraft; the JTAC lacks confidence in a particular platform for the situation or confidence that the pilot positively identifies the target; aircraft are operating in adverse weather; the JTAC knows the situation is demanding for the aircrew's capabilities; or troops are in contact, calling for rapid, danger-close air power. In many cases, Type 1 controls actually negate the technological capabilities of the aircraft and munitions.

Type 2 CAS. This type of control is used when the JTAC wants to control individual attacks but assesses that either the visual acquisition of the attacking aircraft or target at weapons release is not possible or when attacking aircraft are not in a position to acquire the mark or target before releasing or launching their weapons.

Examples of situations calling for Type 2 CAS controls are when the aircraft attack at night or during adverse weather, must employ tactics to counter threat aircraft or air defense weapons, or are operating at high-altitude and (or) employing standoff weapons.

Successful CAS attacks under these conditions depend on timely, accurate targeting data. When delivering global positioning system (GPS)/inertial navigation system (INS) or unguided weapons on GPS coordinates, attack aircraft confirm the target location with the JTAC or forward air controller-airborne (FACA). The JTAC takes into consideration the host aircraft's navigation/weapons system accuracy when employing unguided munitions using Type 2 control.

Time-of-flight for standoff weapons is also a consideration. The weapon's time-of-flight relative to the movement of enemy targets and friendly forces is critical when the standoff weapons cannot receive targeting updates during flight.

The JTAC and aircrew must conduct detailed planning and preparation to identify the situations and locations conducive to standoff weapons attacks and address flight profile and deconfliction considerations (aircraft/weaponry/terrain). Digital or data link systems capable of displaying aircraft track, sensor point of interest, etc. significantly enhance situational awareness, enabling the JTAC to authorize weapons release when he cannot visually acquire the attacking aircraft. (See the article "JCAS Data Link: A Prioritized Approach to Terminal Attack Control" by Perry H. Davis in the July-August edition.)

Type 3 CAS. This level of control may be used when the tactical risk assessment indicates that CAS attacks impose a low risk of fratricide. When commanders authorize Type 3 controls, JTACs grant "blanket" weapons release clearance to aircraft or a flight of aircraft attacking a target or targets that meet the restrictions prescribed by the JTAC. Attack aircraft flight leaders then may initiate attacks within those parameters.

Observers may be equipped and in a position to provide terminal guidance to attack aircraft. The JTAC monitors the radio transmissions and other available digital information to maintain control of the attacks. The JTAC maintains abort authority throughout the attack.

Support of Observers. Because there is no requirement for the JTAC to visually acquire the target or attack aircraft in Types 2 or 3 control, JTACs may coordinate CAS attacks using targeting information from an observer. An observer may be a scout, combat observation lasing team (COLT), fire support team (FIST), or Special Operations Force (SOF) asset, any of whom may be a joint fires observer (JFO), or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or other assets in position to provide the JTAC real-time targeting information.

In Types 2 and 3 CAS, the JTAC maintains control of the attacks, making clearance or abort calls based on the information provided by the observers or targeting sensors.

1. Army transformation is increasing Army interest in air-delivered fire
   support.
2. Army transformation will increase the demand for joint terminal
   attack controllers (JTACs).
3. The JTAC program currently is not designed to generate a large number
   of certified JTACs.
4. Operational/technological trends and manpower realities, not service
   preferences, are at the heart of the JTAC debate.
5. Creative use of available technologies may free JTACs to focus on
   essential functions and give engaged ground elements greater access
   to joint fires.
6. Disaggregating the JTAC function is essential to ensuring that both
   Army and Air Force battlefield needs are met.
7. Army organic fires remain the most efficient means to meet the
   routine unplanned requests for fire support.
8. Air attack and ground maneuver should be planned as mutually enabling
   activities.

Figure 1: Findings of the 2004 Rand Corporation Monograph "Beyond Close
Air Support, Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership"

  Type 2 CAS Control Scenario. The JTAC is positioned with the center
company of the battalion conducting operations in an urban environment.
The company's task is to conduct a presence patrol to Phase
Line (PL) Delta and then conduct raids to destroy the insurgent forces
at a known safe house and weapons cache site between PL Delta and PL
Fox.
  The town has been gridded partially on the map with only key buildings
numbered. Buildings 9 and 10 are on the no-strike list as they are a
government building and mosque, respectively. Like most urban
operations, the JTAC cannot see every target he is responsible for, so
he must rely on others to give him tergeting information.
  Each platoon's JFO is trained to verify a target's location and
coordinates and understands the capabilities of the aircraft and
weapons. For this vignette, the aircraft will be two A-10s with GBU-12s.
The company JTAC (Gator 21) is the primary JTAC for all controls in the
town with the battalion tactical air control party (TACP) (Gator 01) as
the back-up.
  The center platoon's lead elements are engaged with insurgents with
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and heavy machine gun fire on the
southeast corner on the roof of Building 8 and are receiving automatic
fire from the building immediately south of Building 11. The JFO (Bull
21) develops a call-for-fire for each target.
  The JTAC confers with the company commander and fire support officer
(FSO) and decides CAS is the best weapon to destroy the targets. The
JTAC submits an immediate air support request (ASR) to the air support
operations center (ASOC) on the joint air request net (JARN).
  The ASOC sends back that "Hog 11" (two A-10s) will support.
  The JTAC continues coordination with the JFO to build a picture of the
target area, establish the laser designation code and discuss ordnance
restrictions and battle damage assessment (BDA) requirements. Note: All
JTAC and JFO communications occur on an FM fire support net. If the JFO
can, he monitors the CAS strike net (usually UHF).
  The attack aircraft has checked in with the JTAC; the JTAC and JFO
coordinate:
  JTAC to JFO: "Bull 21, Hog flight has checked in. Two times A-10s with
four times GBU and 1200 rounds of 30-mm; 40 minutes play time."
  JFO to JTAC: "Gator 21, Roger. Laser target line for automatic weapon
is 300, laser code is 1234, friendlies are all east of PL Charlie."
  JTAC to Attack Aircraft: "Hog 11, this is Gator 21. Type 2 in effect;
advise when ready for 9-line."
  Attack Aircraft to JTAC: "Gator 21, Hog 11 ready to copy."
  JTAC to Attack Aircraft (9-Line Briefing):
  "Mazda" [Initial Point (IP)/Breaking Point (BP)--not shown on the City
Map]
  "340 Left" [Heading]
  "9.9" [Distance]
  "1200 Feet" [Target Elevation]
  "Dismounted personnel with automatic weapons and RPGs" [Description of
the Target]
  "NB 704726" [Target Location]
  "Laser code 1234, laser-to-target line 300" [Type of Mark, Laser Code,
Laser-to-Targe; Line]
  "East 1.3" [Position of Friendly Forces]
  "Egress east to Chevy; make your final attack heading southeast to
northwest" [Egress Route and Remarks--Route not Shown on City Map]
  Attack Aircraft to JTAC: "1200 feet, NB 704726, final attack heading
southeast to northwest."
  JTAC to Attack Aircraft: "Read back, correct; TOT 45." [Time on
Target]
  Attack Aircraft to JTAC: "Roger, TOT 45."
  [The attack aircraft plot and validate the target location.]
  Attack Aircraft to JTAC: "Hog 11, IP inbound."
  JTAC to Attack Aircraft: "Hog 11, continue."
  JTAC to JFO: "Bull 21, standby for laser calls; Hog flight is IP
inbound."
  [Both aircraft will attack the target; therefore, JTAC sends
adjustments received from JFO immediately after the lead aircraft
attacks to direct the wingman onto the next/adjacent target or sends
fighters back to the IP for a new 9-line.]
  JFO to JTAC: "Gator 21, standing by."
  Attack Aircraft to JTAC: "Hog 11, 10 seconds."
  JTAC to JFO: "Bull 21, 10 seconds."
  JFO to JTAC: "Gator 21, 10 seconds."
  Attack Aircraft to JTAC: "Hog 11, laser on."
  JTAC to JFO: "Bull 21, laser on."
  JFO to JTAC: "Gator 21, laser on."
  [Before weapons release, the attack aircraft provides the JTAC with an
"in" call--aircraft nose pointed at the target, ready to fire.]
  Attack Aircraft to JTAC: "Hog 11's in from the southwest."
  JTAC to JFO: "Bull 21, Hog 11 is in."
  JFO to JTAC: "Roger."*
  Attack Aircraft to JTAC: "Hog 11, spot."
  JTAC to Attack Aircraft: "Hog 11, cleared hot."
  JFO to JTAC: "Gator 21, Hog 11's bomb hit the target."
  JTAC to JFO: "Bull 21, terminate."
  JFO to JTAC: "Terminate."
  JTAC to Attack Aircraft: "Hog 11, good bombs."
  JFO to JTAC: "Gator 21, Hog 11's bombs neutralized the target; have
Hog return to IP and prepare for the next target."
  [The JFO provides targeting information to the JTAC for automatic fire
south of Building 11. The JTAC passes the 9-line and continues the
process. The JFO provides BDA on the second attack to the JTAC who
relays the information to the attack aircraft before they egress from
the area.]

*If required, the JFO may pass an abort call to the JTAC or, if capable,
directly to the CAS asset.

Figure 3: Example of How a JFO Provides Targeting Data to the JTAC in a
Type 2 CAS Control