Joint fires: a BCD perspective in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) demonstrated the awesome lethality of joint land and air power when brought to bear in a coordinated and synchronized fashion--the most effective execution of land-air power in history. The Army's 1st Battle-field Coordination Detachment (BCD), part of the XVIII Airborne Corps out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, proved to be key to the integration of land and air operations.

During OIF, the 1st BCD functioned at the seam between the land and air components. It was located at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, at the headquarters of the Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) as the liaison for the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) headquartered at Camp Doha, Kuwait.

The BCD served as a conduit for information for CFACC support of CFLCC operations. It provided visibility of CFLCC operations to the joint force as a whole and helped coordinate joint capabilities to maximize effects in support of the Coalition Force Commander (CFC).

Never before have land operations enjoyed such visibility at the joint force level. Army and Marine aircraft and other land component airspace users operated with joint-assigned call signs, identification friend or foe (IFF) codes and airspace documented on the airspace control order (ACO); Army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) were tracked and coordinated for airspace; counterfire radars were tracked and their frequencies were coordinated; the fire support coordination line (FSCL) movement was coordinated between air and land components before implementation; there was innovative use of kill boxes to coordinate component battle-space; and land unit movements were tracked with blue force tracker (BFT).

Never before have the air and land forces supported each other as effectively. The CFACC provided flexible combat power in support of the land forces marching rapidly toward Baghdad by both shaping the battlefield and providing close air support (CAS). The land component had a solid effects-based targeting scheme incorporating land and air capabilities, while the Air Force's air battle plan leveraged the impact of operational maneuver. Operational maneuver secured battlespace that permitted air to position command and control ([C.sup.2]) and support assets, extending the reach of air power farther into Iraq. Land provided direct support to air with long-range suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) fires and indirectly by rolling up portions of the enemy integrated air defense system (IADS) as a by-product of rapid, combined arms maneuver.

When the land force's momentum was slowed by weather and heavy enemy action south of Karbala and around An Nasiriyah, the CFACC provided sustained air power against the Republican Guard divisions south of Baghdad to set conditions for the final push to Baghdad. When the enemy countered the effects of air power by dispersing his forces, the CFLCC's operational maneuver forced the enemy to either mass to defend the land approaches and be susceptible to joint fires or remain dispersed and be defeated in detail by the land juggernaut.

Despite these many successes, OIF also provided significant examples of poor communications and joint system integration that in future wars against a more capable enemy may prove disastrous. Many of the processes and systems designed to support joint targeting and operational fires interfaces between the land and air components proved unwieldy, ineffective and inefficient.

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CFLCC units had to transmit detailed air support requests (ASRs) against mobile enemy forces three days in advance with little knowledge of the status of the last two days' air requests. The land component's daily air requests far exceeded the entire theater's capacity for all available air power.

The fielded command, control, communications, computers and intelligence ([C.sup.4]I) systems did not support automated target updates or status tracking. The digital interface between the land and air components required tremendous human intervention to work.

The land component frequently rescheduled the target, timing and duration of support requests for aviation deep attack operations or CAS. These changes at times required the Coalition Air Operations Center (CAOC) to completely rework the executing air tasking order (ATO) to provide the requested support. While the CAOC did so, it was often at the cost of air support for other service components or other CFC objectives.

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For the first days of the war, the CAOC struggled to track and communicate the effects of air power. It could not tell with confidence what missions had flown or where or if the aircraft had dropped their ordnance--much less what effects may have been achieved.

The systems and processes did not adequately provide for effective communications within the air component or between the components in the early days of the conflict. As a result, when the weather cleared after the land component's operational consolidation south of Karbala, the CFLCC directed a movement-to-contact instead of a deliberate attack. This occurred, in part, because the commander lacked sufficient knowledge of the enemy's disposition or the effects of operational fires to do otherwise.

The "bad" of the air-ground efforts during OIF was due, at least in part, to the complexity and pace of the operations, many communications challenges and inherent difficulty of planning, coordinating and executing joint operations over significant distances. Most of the bad of the operational fires peaked in the first days of OIF. Operations improved dramatically over time but often only through the Herculean efforts of joint and Coalition warfighters throughout the force who addressed the major problems before the final offensive push to secure Baghdad.

In the final analysis, OIF secured an impressive military victory for the Coalition Force. In the flush of our OIF victory, however, the joint force must not forget that in this conflict we enjoyed the luxury of abundant operational fires resources and enough time to overcome our initial operational fires challenges. In future conflicts, we may not enjoy such luxuries. As we assess OIF operations and prepare the force for future conflicts, we must address the joint operational fires challenges identified in OIF, so we can start the next joint campaign as effectively as we finished OIF.

Although operational fires and maneuver between the land and air components likely will never be completely seamless, there are several areas the joint force can improve in the near-term to significantly aid the planning, coordination and execution of air-ground integration at the operational level: invest in joint and service [C.sup.4]I systems to improve the processes and interfaces for communications and coordination between components and improve the way the Army and Air Force train together at the operational level to allow both services to become even more effective in the joint fight. In addition, the Army needs to reinforce the BCD organizational structure as a critical interface between the land and air forces.

Joint and Service [C.sup.4]I Systems. The BCD in OIF had Army battle command systems (ABCS) as well as a number of other Army, Air Force and adapted civilian systems. ABCS includes the Army FA tactical data systems (AFATDS), the all-source analysis system remote workstation (ASAS-RWS), The Army air and missile defense workstation (AAMDWS) and the theater air integration system (TAIS).

BCD personnel also operated several applications in the Air Force theater battle management core system (TBMCS), the Air Force's system to build and distribute the ATO. The BCD was responsible for migrating data from AFATDS to TBMCS.

In addition to these systems, the 1st BCD displayed [C.sup.2] functions and blue force tracking on [C.sup.2] personal computers ([C.sup.2]PC), which is a subset of the global [C.sup.2] system-Army (GCCS-A), and the automated deep operations coordination system (ADOCS). The BCD had secure Internet protocol net (SIPRNET) and non-secure Internet protocol net (NIPRNET) and access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI)-level email, web sites and many chat programs: my Internet relay chat (MIRC), Microsoft (MS) Chat, intelligent workstation chat (IWS) and ADOCS chat. It also had daily access to SIPRNET and SCI-level video teleconferencing (VTC) facilities.

Information received from many of these sources was integrated into the ATO process through a series of briefings, meetings and transfers of electronic data. Data relating to targeting and the ATO process flowed from AFATDS into TBMCS where air planners accessed it using a software application called the interim targeting solution (ITS). 1st BCD personnel had to be proficient in specified functions on all these interrelated and partially redundant systems to ensure the Air Force received CFLCC input to the ATO accurately and in a timely manner and the input was funneled into the appropriate ATO processes.

As a general observation, the proliferation of partially redundant software tools that handled only a portion of the data management requirements created a [C.sup.4]I system that was unwieldy and inefficient. For example, various headquarters established different chat programs as their standard; every headquarters used one or more of the chats but none of these systems communicated with the other. In order to liaison between these elements, the BCD had to monitor all of them simultaneously.

Similar challenges existed with the varied common operating picture (COP) systems: [C.sup.2]PC, GCCS, ADOCS and Falcon View. Despite the multitude of systems, most headquarters defaulted to MS Office software to create decision products or to communicate ideas most effectively.

While the Army and Air Force faced a number of interface and process challenges, four stand out in OIF's joint war fight: (1) the TBMCS-AFATDS interface, (2) modernized integrated database (MIDB) management, (3) battle damage assessment (BDA)/operational analysis and (4) mobile targeting.

TBMCS-AFATDS Interface. The good news is that the TBMCS (Version 1.1.1) and AFATDS (Version. 6.3.1) interface functioned as designed. The bad news is that the design was largely inadequate to support the requirements of the Army and Air Force at the operational level during OIF.

By design, TBMCS only parsed AFATDS information that was related to air interdiction (AI) targets. As a result, all ASRs other than AI requests remained as US message text format (USMTF) messages that TBMCS users could read but not action. In order for the Air Force CAS or electronic warfare (EW) planner to use these reader-unfriendly formats, he had to pull them up from a mailbox (that had no message alert system) and manually cut and paste the data into TBMCS data fields.

To fix this interface shortfall, the CFLCC and BCD developed standing operating procedures (SOP) during the pre-OIF training exercises. The CFLCC transmitted all ASRs as AI missions. The SOP used an ASR numbering convention to identify the actual mission type. The SOP also dictated CFLCC transmit information in a number of specific fields that the air component needed to process the requests.

The SOP decreased the amount of manual intervention by the BCD and Air Force planners but only at the expense of the lower echelon Army operators who had to follow detailed data input requirements.

AFATDS' design also prevented the BCD from editing most of the submitted ASRs without losing the ability to provide the ASR originator feedback on his request. As a result, when the BCD found even a minor error, it had to get the message originator to edit and resubmit the ASR, significantly increasing coordination and processing time.

AFATDS only provides ASR status feedback to the requestor chain and only when a completed ATO is transmitted by the CAOC. Most division and higher units not only need visibility of their own ASRs, but also need to understand the joint fires planned within their areas of interest.

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The static nature of the USMTF interface also prevents the Army from tracking the status of requests as they work their way through the two-to-three day ATO planning process. The Army cannot transmit automated target updates via AFATDS after the initial requests have been transferred into the TBMCS. The current AFATDS tools to receive, view and display ATO or ACO data are inadequate for joint fires visibility, tracking or updating.

Some TBMCS-AFATDS interface problems arose because the Air Force used ITS software. Although AFATDS was designed to input selected data elements to the target weaponeering module (TWM) in TBMCS, Air Force planners wanted to use the ITS planning tool. ITS was not in the TBMCS suite but drew data from TWM in TBMCS to perform its baseline functions.

The problem for BCD planners was AFATDS did not talk directly to ITS, and the data fields in ITS were not the same as those in TWM. As a result, the BCD had to enter the additional data manually, which required approximately a minute per target. With 200 to 300 ASRs per ATO, the effort was significant.

TBMCS-AFATDS interface problems surfaced at the "push" side of the ATO process as well. Central Command (CENTCOM) has long advocated a kill-box interdiction system for mobile targets. The entire CENTCOM theater is subdivided into discrete 30-minute-latitude-by-30-minute-longitude kill boxes. Each kill box is further subdivided into 10-by-10-minute boxes using the "telephone keypad" system. The kill-box keypad system greatly facilitates rapidly orienting aircraft on mobile target areas and provides flexibility to change the location during execution of the mission, if required. Unfortunately, the software systems designed to communicate targets earmarked for strike are not designed to communicate kill-box information.

Kill boxes within the TBMCS constitute airspace. Missions planned to airspace within the ATO do not retain the ASR number in the USMTF message sent back to AFATDS; therefore, CFACC missions to attack CFLCC targets planned to kill boxes do not parse in AFATDS to show the CFLCC and his staff the air support planned. As a result, the CFLCC could not get automated feedback from the CFACC on which of the targets he had nominated that the CFACC planned to service. This lack of feedback was a source of great consternation as the war kicked off.

The BCD developed several workarounds to address this issue. These included an attempt to get Air Force planners to include the ASR numbers for kill-box targets in the "Remarks" area of the ATO. The BCD plans section then could sort the ATO looking for the ASR numbers and manually enter data into AFATDS to show the mission was being serviced. While this allowed the BCD to identify the missions supporting the CFLCC, it did not allow the automated TBMCS-AFATDS feedback loop to work.

The BCD developed a second workaround using an MS Excel spreadsheet with graphic illustration and addressed the number of sorties and types of bombs being flown against CFLCC-nominated priorities based on the counterland apportionment. (The "counterland apportionment" are those sorties apportioned for CFLCC missions.) While this product reduced some of the initial anxiety at the CFLCC headquarters, it did not totally assuage CFLCC headquarters concerns about the level of the air support it would receive.

Although the TBMCS and AFATDS system engineers have tried to resolve the TBMCS-AFATDS issues, the reality is that changing software in a system as ubiquitous and multi-echeloned as AFATDS is not simple. The joint force must reevaluate some of the fundamental aspects of the current joint and component interfaces. All services must be able to share data dynamically on the status of operational fires while planning, preparing for, executing and assessing them.

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Until mandated by the Department of Defense, the Army and Air Force need to make a coordinated effort to reevaluate the process of joint fires planning and execution in effects-based operations and revamp the [C.sup.4]I systems and architecture to support the requirements of all services.

MIDB Management. A related problem involved identification of targets using basic encyclopedia (BE) or unit identification codes (UIC) from the MIDB. All fixed-facility targets in the MIDB are assigned a BE number, so everyone has a common reference on a facility being targeted. A mobile target in the MIDB is assigned a UIC. If the CFLCC wanted to attack the same target more than once on any particular day or decided to attack the target and then drop leaflets on it, only the first use of a MIDB or UIC data would pass between the systems. The data would not pass into the TBMCS because, by MIDB design, a target only can be addressed one time in a designated ATO period in TBMCS.

One can strike the same BE multiple times as long as he attacks different desired mean points of impact (DMPIs). Fixed targets have multiple DMPIs but not mobile targets (UICs). Furthermore, ITS will not recognize a target BE or UIC for which there isn't a DMPI in the system. In order for TBMCS-AFATDS-ITS to interface better, the BCD manually built a DMPI for every mobile target in the MIDB related to the Iraqi Order of Battle.

Another MIDB issue was a debate that raged between the national intelligence community, CENTCOM and its components over control of the targeting database. The national intelligence agencies and CENTCOM wanted to control this database centrally while CENTCOM components needed to manipulate the data for targeting purposes. Ultimately, the components won the fight and modified the mobile targeting data during OIF.

The issue still looms because intelligence and component targeteers have not reconciled how different MIDB users use the data. The intelligence analyst is concerned with where a mobile target is currently located to understand the battle being fought "today." The target analysts are concerned with where a target will be in 48 to 72 hours. Because a single unit can't be in two different locations in the MIDB database, the mobile target planners needed either two databases or a multi-tiered system that would accommodate more than one location. Because targeteers work two or more future target lists in addition to fighting today's battle, the ideal MIDB database would be separated into multiple 24-hour blocks to give the targeting process fidelity.

BDA and Operational Assessment. A lack of BDA of any type from initial strikes contributed to the CFLCC's consternation in the early days of the conflict. In many cases, while the air component achieved significant air-to-ground effects on the enemy, its inability to provide Phase I BDA hindered the land component's ability to act upon those effects. A lack of usable weapon system video and poor pilot and mission reporting (MISREP) initially limited any assessment on targets struck.

The theater SOP and [C.sup.4]I automation did not support standardized MISREPs, so even when reporting did occur, it required excessive manual human effort to organize and analyze it. Better reporting discipline and the adoption of a MS Access database to manage the volume of MISREP information eventually improved the system, but the land component's realistic appreciation for air power effects came only when ground forces reached the outskirts of Baghdad.

BDA continues to be a huge issue. The joint force must develop and implement technical and system solutions to this problem if joint and component commanders are going to be able to see, decide and act faster than the enemy.

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Mobile Targeting. Some air-land integration challenges stemmed from training and process shortfalls. The land component suffered a disconnect between its well-constructed effects-based targeting scheme and the reality of the daily target nominations submitted by AFATDS. While the CFLCC daily effects board (DEB) provided clear Power Point-based products that communicated desired effects and priority over time, the actual nominations transmitted via AFATDS did not reflect this same focus or priority and often requested air resources exceeding the entire theater capacity.

Portions of this problem resulted from the bottom-up AFATDS-based ASR system. The ASRs flowed from the lowest echelons to the highest with each intervening echelon responsible for eliminating duplication and ensuring consistency with the effects-based objectives. The reality is the same that the fire support community discovered years ago from many rotations at the National Training Center (NTC): the bottom-up planning process is unworkable both because it assumes the lower echelons have the best targeting data and requires an unsupportable amount of time at every echelon to collate, validate and eliminate duplication.

A second contributor to the disconnect between the CFLCC DEB and the air support nominations flowed from a poor understanding of the realities of the theater's air capabilities and the total demands placed on the air component by the joint force as a whole as reflected in the apportionment decision. Typically, the OIF apportionment was planned based on a daily ATO capability of around a thousand strike sortie equivalents. This included bombers and fighters from all three US services--Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force--and our British allies.

On a daily basis, the CFLCC requested and the BCD processed many more targets than could be serviced by the air power available. Although the written guidance and commander's intent tightly focused CFLCC and DEB targets, the focus was broadly diluted when the target nominations were submitted. In the end, the BCD had to tie the commander's intent to the target list. Through many discussions with the CFLCC deep operations coordination cell (DOCC), the team reworked the nominations to ensure the missions met the commander's priorities and intent and focused on the targets the CFLCC most wanted struck.

The reality of Air Force attack of mobile targets is that a tasked sortie flies to a geographic area, tries to identify the target type, conducts the required [C.sup.2] to deliver the ordnance and moves on to the next target area or returns home. The enemy unit's identity is not visible from 15,000 feet, and the precise coordinates and detailed target information so carefully built and tracked in AFATDS and TBMCS are not relevant when the aircraft arrives because mobile targets have, likely as not, moved.

The USAF Central Command (CENTAF) kill-box interdiction/CAS (KICAS) SOP reflected this reality by tasking mobile target sorties not to a specific mobile target coordinate but to a geographic area with a desired target effect. It focused on providing the forward air controller-airborne (FAC-A) sufficient intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; an appropriate weapon system and a [C.sup.2] plan to maximize the efficiency of the attack.

Current [C.sup.4]I systems drive users to focus on unneeded detail. Instead of nominating 180 to 250 unit type targets in painful detail, the CFLCC needed to focus on fewer effects-based targets. This might have accomplished what the CFLCC wanted better while reducing the amount of effort put into hand-jamming UIC-based target information into Army and joint systems.

The basis for a different approach to mobile target execution may be found in the time-sensitive targeting (TST) cell. The CFACC instituted the TST cell on the floor of the CAOC to fuse current intelligence from all sources for near-real-time strikes of potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery systems, leadership targets and other time-sensitive targets.

A potential exists for a broader scoped "TST-like" cell in the CAOC to make the ATO far more responsive to mobile targeting requirements than it currently is. As all services begin to flood the battlespace with more robust ISR platforms, the opportunities for real-time targeting will skyrocket. A shorter targeting execution process will be possible by focusing air power in specific geographic areas and relying on the ISR capability to fine-tune targeting while aircraft are en route to the area.

Reinforce the BCD. Few Army and Air Force personnel truly understand what the BCD does or its importance to the success of the joint team. In order for the Army and the Air Force to work more effectively together at the operational level, the BCD must be manned with the right personnel and trained to build strong relationships with both the Army and Air Force headquarters it supports.

Manning and Training. The BCD during OIF was a 40-person, combined arms Army organization commanded by a colonel and was located in the CAOC in Prince Sultan Air Base. The four BCDs are doctrinally designed and organized to provide liaison with all the major divisions within the air operations center. (There are three active BCDs and one reserve BCD: 1st at Fort Bragg, 3d in Korea, 19th BCD in Europe and the 2d headquartered in Anniston, Alabama.)

By design, the BCD is "a mile wide and an inch deep" to cover the broad range of areas of coordination between the land and air component. Working in the BCD demands knowledge of operational and joint warfare not learned in the normal course of a soldier's career and, as a result, the learning curve for new BCD personnel is unusually steep. It is not enough for the BCD to simply have all its authorized personnel--the BCD needs the right people with the right backgrounds and the right training.

Leading up to OIF, the BCD manning fell to 65 percent, and while eventually filled, the BCD only was able to integrate the new people successfully because it had adequate time before OIF began and relevant training exercises already scheduled.

The Army should consider establishing an additional skill identifier (ASI) for former BCD personnel to rapidly reinforce a deployed BCD with additional trained personnel, as required.

Habitual Relationships. One key to BCD success in OIF was the good working relationships and shared experiences built between the 1st BCD and the CAOC personnel before OIF as a result of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). A lesson for the Army is that time may not be available in future conflicts to build this trust before the fight.

The number and alignment of BCDs should allow for better opportunities to establish habitual relationships between the BCDs and the Army and Air Force organizations they support. Similarly, the length and intensity of operational-level joint exercises need to be realistic and stressful to develop skills and joint relationships.

Joint Standardization. Despite the benefits of the OEF experiences and train-up exercises, the 1st BCD still faced some tough readiness challenges. The CFACC decision to split Air Force [C.sup.2] operations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia stressed the BCD's ability to execute its mission. The personnel and equipment demands to operate from three locations--Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (OIF), Qatar (OEF) and continental United States (CONUS) for exercises--exceeded the 1st BCD's resources. In the end, the theater required both the 1st and elements of the 19th BCDs to meet the many support requirements.

The fact that CENTCOM and European Command (EUCOM) use different equipment and procedures for planning and coordinating operational fires created a number of hurdles to employing forces from one area of responsibility (AOR) into another. Joint air-ground procedures as well as CAOC and BCD operations should be standardized across all the combatant commands to allow for cross-leveling of people or cross-theater employment of limited BCD units.

Overall, OIF was a tremendous joint force success story. We have focused more on the negative aspects than the positive to highlight some of the critical work that still needs to be done. As we prepare the joint force for future conflict, we must focus on those things that will allow us to start the next joint campaign as effectively as we finished OIF.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Kelly was the Plans Officer in the 1st Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Currently, he is the Chief of the Joint Support Element for the Air Force Command and Control Training and Innovation Group (AF[C.sup.2]TIG) at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Among other assignments, he was the Executive Officer (XO) of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Artillery at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, plus Division Assistant Fire Support Coordinator and XO of the 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery (2-320 FA), all in the 101st Division. In other deployments, he was the Division Plans Officer for the Multinational Division North for Task Force Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a Battalion Fire Support Officer (FSO) in 2-187 IN during Operation Desert Storm.

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John P. Andreasen was the Chief of Plans in the 1st BCD during OIF. He retired after 28 years of commissioned service in July 2003. In previous military assignments, he was the Chief of Staff and, earlier, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, for V Corps Artillery. He also was the XO of the 41st Field Artillery Brigade as well as XO of the 4th Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, part of the 41st Brigade in Germany. He commanded the 1st Regional Training Battalion, 1st Regional Training Brigade at New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, and was the US Army Operations Officer for Combat Support Coordination Team 3 in the 3d Republic of Korea Army. Before his retirement, Lieutenant Colonel Andreasen had been deployed to Southwest Asia from September 2001 until May 2003.

By Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Kelly and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John P. Andreasen